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AbstractPolicy-makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation, especially a good reputation for resolve. Recent work, however, has argued that reputations for resolve do not form, and hence that past actions do not influence observers' behavior in subsequent interactions. This conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics. In particular, juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests, while the common approach of looking at crisis decision making misses the impact of reputation on general deterrence. We thus derive hypotheses about conflict onset from both the arguments of reputation critics and the logic of more standard reputation arguments, which we put to statistical test. We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict.

It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception.

It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception.

AbstractThis paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible "frontstage" signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, "offstage" signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possible. We argue that this can be explained by considering the domestic environments in which the leaders of major powers and protégés operate. Focusing particularly on the United States as we develop our theory, we argue that the US will prefer to send offstage signals of support for more autocratic protégés for several reasons. First, sending frontstage support signals for autocracies would expose US leaders to charges of hypocrisy. Second, frontstage signals of support for autocracies face an impediment to credibility because of the public backlash in the United States that overt support for dictators could generate. Third, many autocratic protégés would be reluctant to accept a frontstage signal of support from the US because it could undermine their regime stability. We test our theory in a data set that records various support signals sent by the United States for other countries between 1950 and 2008, finding strong support for our expectations. We also find evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by our theory in a case study of relations between the US and the Shah's Iran.

ABSTRACTA wave of recent scholarship has breathed new life into the study of reputation and credibility in international politics. In this review article, the authors welcome this development while offering a framework for evaluating collective progress, a series of related critiques, and a set of suggestions for future research. The article details how the books under review represent an important step toward consensus on the importance of reputation in world politics, elucidating scope conditions for when reputational inferences are likely to be most salient. The authors argue that despite the significant accomplishments of recent studies, the scholarly record remains thin on the psychology of the perceiver and is instead focused on situational factors at the expense of dispositional variables and is rather myopically oriented toward reputation for resolve to the exclusion of other important types. Despite its contributions, the new literature still falls short of a full explanation for how actors draw inferences about reputation. These remaining theoretical challenges demand scholarly attention and suggest a role for psychology in filling some of the gaps.

How do great powers decide whether to provide arms to or form alliances with client states? This "patron's dilemma" revolves around a decision about how to best provide security to clients without becoming entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment. This traditional alliance dilemma can be addressed through the provision of arms and alliances. Great power patrons primarily make such decisions on the basis of two factors: first, the extent to which the patron believes it and its client have common security interests; and second, whether the patron believes that its client has sufficient military capabilities to deter its main adversary without the patron's assistance. Patrons assess the degree of shared threat and the local balances of capabilities in determining whether to support their clients with arms, alliances, or both. As demonstrated in the U.S. provision of security goods to Taiwan and Israel during the Cold War, this strategic logic explains how great powers manage the patron's dilemma.