The author argues against the widespread Western stereotype of Ukraine as a nation divided into two parts: the pro-Western, nationalistic west and the pro-Russian east. He emphasizes the importance of studying Ukraine's individual regions because their reaction during the 2014 war was determined as much by their diverse historical traditions and cultural identities as by the decisions of the local elites and grassroots political activism on both sides. Even before the conflict, the notion of a united Ukrainian "Southeast" served as a tool of Russian propaganda rather than objective analysis; once the conflict started, it was no longer possible to ignore the profound differences among the provinces usually included in it.
This article discusses the possible ways of conceptualizing the revolutionary and nation-building struggles in the Ukrainian lands between 1917 and 1921. The author argues that these processes, which stemmed from the collapse of two European empires, display features not easily accommodated within the traditional interpretive model of the "Russian Revolution." In comparison, the Ukrainian concept of "national-liberation struggle" is too reductionist and teleological. The term "Ukrainian Revolution," which was widely used by the participants of these events, is better suited for an inclusive analysis of this period that emphasizes the significance of the national factor without ignoring the others. Rather than "nationalizing" the story of the Revolution, such an approach highlights the transnational dimensions of the Ukrainian question.
This article discusses the development of a Canadian historiography of modern Ukraine. It argues that the early focus on Ukrainian nation building determined the range of topics that interested Canadian historians, but over the following years their methodology changed significantly. The development of social history provided indispensable tools for in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian national movement. The subsequent development of a new cultural history, post-colonial studies, and the "linguistic turn" allowed for a more subtle analysis of the Ukrainian patriotic discourse and practice. New scholarship focusing on the ambiguities of imperial projects and the everyday life allowed for a re-evaluation of the traditional emphasis on the national intelligentsia's organic work. Because of its focus on the making of a modern Ukrainian nation, beginning in the 1990s Canadian historiography was well positioned to assist in the transformation of Ukrainian historical scholarship from Soviet models to new theoretical and methodological foundations. This often meant helping Ukrainian colleagues to revise the very "national paradigm" of history writing that early Canadian historians had helped develop. In the decades after an independent Ukraine emerged in 1991, the study of Ukrainian nation building became an increasingly global and collaborative enterprise, with historians from Ukraine studying and working in Canada, and with conferences on topics related to modern Ukrainian history involving scholars from around the world.
This article analyzes the memoir of a Russian-speaking Jewish lawyer, Aleksei Goldenveiser (1890–1979), as a source on the history of Kyiv during the revolutionary period (1917–1921). His work stands out among other reminiscences about the Revolution in Ukraine because of the author's unprecedented attention to details of everyday life, along with his self-identification as simply an apolitical resident of Kyiv. Especially striking is the author's satirical, even acerbic, tone in the description of all the political regimes that came to power in Kyiv during the Revolution: Ukrainian, White, and Bolshevik. This article proposes to conceptualize Goldenveizer's position as metahistorical skepticism or as a strategy of conscious resistance to grand narratives, which is grounded in identification with the local and a focus on everydayness. It argues the Goldenveizer developed this narrative strategy following the failure, in the summer of 1917, of the political project of a civic, multinational, and urban identity. Although Goldenveizer served on the Executive Committee of United Civic Organizations in Kyiv and, briefly, on the Small Rada of the Ukrainian Central Rada, he felt like an outsider in politics of the day and described it as an astute bystander rather than participant. Because of this position, he was the first to note the reversal of imperial hierarchies and the creation of a new category: "national minorities." At the same time, Goldenveizer consistently attempted in his memoir to check his own political and cultural biases, as one can see in his ambiguous treatment of the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian national movement. ; Статья посвящена анализу воспоминаний русскоязычного еврейского адвоката Алексея Гольденвейзера (1890–1979) как источника по истории Киева революционного периода (1917–1921). Его труд выделяется среди других воспоминаний о революции на Украине благодаря беспрецедентному вниманию к деталям повседневной жизни, а также самоидентификации автора просто как аполитичного жителя Киева. Сатирический, даже желчный тон автора особенно заметен в описаниях всех политических режимов, которые приходили к власти в Киеве во время революции: украинского, белого и большевистского. Автор предлагает концептуализировать позицию Гольденвейзера как «метаисторический скептицизм», или стратегию сознательного сопротивления большим нарративам, которая базируется на идентификации с локальным и фокусе на повседневности. Показано, что Гольденвейзер выработал эту нарративную стратегию после поражения летом 1917 г. политического проекта гражданской многонациональной городской идентичности. Хотя Гольденвейзер был членом Исполнительного комитета Объединенных общественных организаций Киева, а также Малой рады Украинской центральной рады, в политике того времени он чувствовал себя аутсайдером и описывал ее как наблюдательный посторонний, а не участник. Благодаря такой позиции он первым обратил внимание на полную перестановку имперских иерархий и создание новой категории «национальных меньшинств». В то же время Гольденвейзер постоянно старался не допустить, чтобы его культурные и политические предпочтения сделали текст односторонним, что привело к неоднозначной оценке украинского языка и украинского национального движения.
<p class="EW-abstract"><strong>Abstract:</strong> Using as a case study Vladimir Beliaev's popular young-adult novel <em>The Old Fortress</em> and its two film adaptations, this article examines evolving Soviet representations of the Ukrainian Revolution. Its main focus is on the cultural construction of "Petliurites" as the "other" of Soviet Ukrainian identity. The article demonstrates that the Stalinist model of historical memory required a strong Ukrainian nationalist enemy in order to highlight the heroic deeds of the positive protagonists, who are encoded as pro-Russian or culturally Russian. By the 1970s, Soviet cinema turned to satirical depiction of the weak nationalist enemies, but the portrayal of Soviet Ukrainians also became more ambiguous, with few markers of ethnicity. Like Soviet Ukrainian culture in general, the book and the films presented Taras Shevchenko's legacy as the central field of contestation between the nationalist and Soviet versions of Ukrainian identity.</p><p class="EW-Keyword"><strong>Keywords:</strong> Vladimir Beliaev, Cinema, Propaganda, Symon Petliura, Identity, "Other"</p>
This article analyzes the early stage of the Ukrainian "sixtiers" movement as a semi-autonomous space of cultural expression that was tolerated by the authorities and defined, developed, and inhabited by young Ukrainian intellectuals. In contrast to present-day Ukrainian representations of the sixtiers as a force acting in opposition to the Soviet regime, the spatial angle employed here reveals an ambiguous relationship with official institutions. The Ukrainian Komsomol organization in particular appears to be both a controlling and an enabling agent that, together with the Writers' Union, provided meeting venues for the sixtiers until the mid-1960s. This complex symbiotic relationship continued even after some creative youth pioneered the first attempts to claim public space for cultural events without the authorities' permission. The cultural terrain inhabited by young Ukrainian intellectuals was not fully separate from mainstream Soviet Ukrainian culture or in opposition to it, although their vibrant cultural space also reached into a world of non-conformist culture unregulated by the state. A series of government crackdowns beginning in the mid-1960s dramatically shrank this open, ambivalent space of semi-free cultural expression, imposing firm boundaries and forcing intellectuals to make political choices.
SUMMARY: Taking as its point of departure the 2015 "decommunization" legislation in Ukraine, this article looks at the transformation of historical memory in that republic from the late 1980s to the present. The author argues that the new canon of national heroes developed through the gradual transformation rather than the radical rejection of Soviet historical narratives, with the Cossacks being the most successful example of a historical symbol supporting a uniting, civic identity for a new Ukraine. Two case studies are used to demonstrate the challenges of merging the nationalist mythologies preserved in the Ukrainian diaspora with the models inherited from Soviet times: that of diaspora-funded films about the Ukrainian insurgents of the 1940s and the cult of the otamans developed by a network of regional historical clubs in central Ukraine. Both projects produced highly divisive historical mythologies that often employed incongruent cultural models reusing the Soviet clichés. Both also constructed an ethnically exclusive vision of Ukraine's past, as opposed to an inclusive, civic one. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent war in the Donbas gave a powerful impetus to the process of memory work in Ukraine, while at the same time furnishing the inclusive, multinational canon of the "Heavenly Hundred," who died for a democratic Ukraine. However, there exists a very real danger that the process of constructing a new Ukrainian historical memory can be hijacked by radical nationalists or discredited by Soviet-style administrative feats. Отталкиваясь от сюжета с принятием весной 2015 г. в Украине "исторических" законов, направленных на десоветизацию общества, статья обращается к проблеме трансформации исторической памяти в республике, начиная с конца 1980-х гг. и до настоящего времени. Согласно автору, новый канон национальных героев сформировался в результате постепенной трансформации, а не радикального оттор-жения советских исторических нарративов. Казаки служат наиболее удачным примером исторического символа, приспособленного для обоснования единой гражданской идентичности новой Украины. Труд-ности совмещения националистических мифов, культивировавшихся в украинской диаспоре, с советским историческим наследием иллю-стрируются двумя историями: о производстве на средства диаспоры художественных фильмов об украинских повстанцах 1940-х гг. и культе "отаманов", продвигаемом сетью региональных исторических клубов в Центральной Украине. Оба проекта предлагают крайне поляризующие исторические мифологии, зачастую использующие несовместимые культурные модели, эксплуатирующие советские клише. Оба формули-руют этнически эксклюзивное видение прошлого Украины в противо-положность инклюзивному, гражданскому. Революция Евромайдана и последующая война на Донбассе дали новый важный толчок процессу работы над исторической памятью в Украине. Они способствовали оформлению нового инклюзивного, многонационального канона Не-бесной сотни, погибшей за демократическую Украину. Тем не менее, сохраняется весьма реальная угроза того, что процесс конструирования новой украинской исторической памяти будет захвачен радикальными националистами или дискредитирован административными усилиями в советском стиле.