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In the dialogue entitled "Parmenides" Plato introduces an objection to his own theory of ideas, one that he never managed to answer, dubbed by Aristotle as the "Third Man" argument. According to that objection, the theory of ideas is threatened with infinite regress when examining why a specific Platonic form (say, justice) is predicated of a particular set of facts. This article seeks to show how any defence of fact-insensitive principles like the one offered by G.A. Cohen in his recent book "Rescuing Justice and Equality" is vulnerable to a similar objection. Cohen wants to insist that, when showing why facts support principles, the process of reason-giving is finite and terminates in fact-independent comprehensive principles. But something like the Third Man argument undermines Cohen's conclusion just as it does Plato's. The search for ultimate fact-independent principles is indeed threatened by infinite regress. Dans le dialogue intitulé 'Parmenides' Platon introduit une objection à sa propre théorie des idées, à laquelle il n'a jamais réussi à répondre, appelée par Aristote l'argument du « troisième homme ». D'après cette objection, la théorie des idées est menacée par une régression à l'infini lorsque l'on examine comment une forme platonique spécifique (par exemple, la justice) s'établit à partir d'un ensemble particulier de faits. Cet article cherche à montrer que toute défense de principes insensibles aux faits, comme celle offerte par G.A. Cohen dans son livre récent, Rescuing Justice and Equality est vulnérable à une objection semblable. Cohen voudrait montrer que lorsque l'on montre pourquoi certains faits soutiennent des principes, le processus explicatif est fini et se termine dans des principes complets qui sont indépendants des faits. Mais, quelque chose de semblable à l'argument du troisième homme est susceptible de saper les conclusions de Cohen comme celles de Platon. La recherche pour des principes ultimes indépendants des faits est bien menacé par une régression à l'infini.

The purpose of this article is to explore the tension between the celebration and critique of the nation in Albanian political thought through an analysis of key texts produced during the critical years 1920–1928. The discussion is placed in the context of a distinctive nation-building project, one which sought to consolidate the Rilindje kombëtare (National Renaissance) whilst also having to critically interrogate it. These intellectual efforts can be understood as an attempt to shift from an ethnic form of nationalism to a political one, seeking to replace or integrate the kin-based categories on which the previous nation-building discourse had relied with an emphasis on civic allegiances based on shared social and political interests. This involved a revised analysis of issues that had been central to the Rilindje narrative, including new arguments on the status of a shared ethos within modern state structures and integrating the question of religious diversity through an analysis of faith in the public sphere. It progressively developed into a collective effort to reinvent more abstract moral categories under which to conceptualize emerging political allegiances, with important repercussions for the way the newly shaped, allegedly liberal, political institutions figured in the nation-building discourse.