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Frontier poetry is the specific literature of the Tang Dynasty era. It tells about military campaigns against the enemies of China. It depicts the whole life world of the defenders of the country, for instance their exploits and everyday life, everyday features, feelings and emotions. A characteristic feature of this poetry is the borrowing of facts and plots from historical writings about the past of the empire to describe the events of the Tang time proper. All these characteristic features of frontier poetry are analyzed on the example of the poem of Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty.

The article discusses the creation of a local department in Moscow of the Society of Zealots of Russian Historical Enlightenment in memory of Emperor Alexander III. For the first time, the materials of personal correspondence of the chairman of the Society, Count S.D. Sheremetev and I.F. Tyutchev, who was to form a local department, were involved. The Moscow department was given paramount importance. The initiative was supported at the level of the Moscow administration. However, to implement this initiative promptly it didn't work out.

The emergence of the Great Silk Road was associated with China's westward expansion under the Han and Tang dynasties. Under the Tang dynasty western frontiers of Celestial Empire were settled, and Chinese order and culture were established in the new lands included into the empire. At the same time and in the same place, a specific literature of this era, frontier poetry, appeared. From these poems one can obtain indirect information about the Great Silk Road and the lands around it.

This article explores the linkages between domestic affairs and foreign policies in China in fulfilling its grand ambition of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It examines the complexities in decision-making process of "BRI" inside Beijing's administration. It departs from the most existing literature on BRI in Europe, which focus upon the geo-economic and geo-political impacts of the BRI. Instead, it adopts an "inside-out" approach by examining the actual policy process with a primary focus to individual actors such as the Party, the government department and the state-owned enterprises as well as individual academics. It also disentangles the intricate relations amongst the Party, the key decision-making institutions and the policy execution entities in determining the final outcome of the BRI. It will finally reflect the extent to which Beijing's bureaucratic complexities have impacted upon the EU and its member states' willingness in collaborating or in formally endorsing China's BRI.

AbstractAs a result of Brexit, China faces both enormous economic challenges and political uncertainties in future relations with its largest trading partner, the EU. But while the UK's vote to leave creates an unexpected dilemma for the Chinese leadership, whose EU policy focuses largely on gaining vast market access, it also presents a rare opportunity for China to harness its policy instruments and diversify its initiatives to pursue its economic goals with European partners. As a pre‐condition to achieving the desired outcome, however, Beijing will need to untangle its foreign policy decision‐making processes. Against this backdrop, the author will illuminate post‐Brexit Sino–British relations and reflect on the possible impacts of Brexit upon future relations between Beijing and Brussels. A second section will analyse the very complex foreign policy making mechanism in Beijing in terms of its economic policy goals with the EU.

Taiwan's experience with transitional justice over the past three decades suggests that dealing with historical injustice is a dynamic and fluid process that is fundamentally shaped and constrained by the balance of power and socio-political reality in a particular transitional society. This Article provides a contextualized legal-political analysis of the evolution of Taiwan's transitional justice regime, with special attention to its limits and challenges. Since Taiwan's democratization began, the transitional justice project developed by the former authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) has been rather disproportionately focused on restorative over retributive mechanisms, with the main emphasis placed on reparations and apology and little consideration of truth recovery and individual accountability. But since the Democratic Progressive Party began to control the government and legislature in 2016, its new transitional justice initiatives have introduced significant changes, including, among others, investigating the KMT's "illicit party assets" and removing authoritarian symbols such as Chiang Kai-shek's statues, eliciting various contentions and contestations along the way. In our view, Taiwan is now confronted with profound challenges in developing a holistic, thoughtful transitional justice regime: fierce partisan politics that could interrupt progress at any time, conflation of transitional justice and identity politics, pending legal complications and a general distrust of the judiciary, and limited public engagement in transitional justice issues. Whether Taiwan can continue to thrive depends on how it grapples with these challenges in pursuit of justice and reconciliation that will strengthen and sustain tomorrow's democratic Taiwan.

Social-psychological research on phishing has implicated ineffective cognitive processing as the key reason for individual victimization. Interventions have consequently focused on training individuals to better detect deceptive emails. Evidence, however, points to individuals sinking into patterns of email usage that within a short period of time results in an attenuation of the training effects. Thus, individual email habits appear to be another predictor of their phishing susceptibility. To comprehensively account for all these influences, we built a model that accounts for the cognitive, preconscious, and automatic processes that potentially leads to phishing-based deception. The resultant suspicion, cognition, and automaticity model (SCAM) was tested using two experimental studies in which participants were subjected to different types of email-based phishing attacks.