Suchergebnisse

AbstractMost EU legislation consists of executive acts of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new type of EU executive legislation – delegated acts, which give the European Parliament formal powers of legislative scrutiny equal to those of the EU Council. Thus, the use of delegated acts could reinforce the institutional balance of power and help reduce the EU's democratic deficit. We studied the situations when the Parliament and the Council agreed to grant the Commission the right to adopt delegated acts, considering the preference constellations of legislative and executive actors and legislative complexity. Using a novel dataset on post‐Lisbon legislation, we found that delegated acts are more likely in cases of high legislative complexity and when the Council sees the Parliament as an ally vis‐à‐vis the Commission. However, the European Parliament gets no say over executive measures when doing so could shift policy outcomes away from the Council's preferences, raising doubts about the effectiveness of parliamentary control.

Research on member states' compliance with European Union legislation often focuses on the timing of self-reported implementation measures. It is generally assumed that the earlier a member state adopts an implementation measure the more compliant it is. This is problematic because early measures may only partially address the goals of a European Union directive. We study whether and when reporting national legislation to signal directive implementation is associated with detected non-compliance by the European Commission. We find that unless facing strong reputational costs, member states often do report pre-existing measures of low fit to a given directive without making timely adjustments. Indicating compliance problems, this generally leads to the European Commission opening infringement cases.

This article analyses the effect of conflict in the Council of the European Union (EU) on delays in the transposition of EU directives. Based on enforcement and management theories, we predict that conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition process. In addition, we control for the instigation of infringement procedures by the Commission and expect a weaker effect of conflict in cases where the Commission disagrees with a directive and if directives grant more discretion to member states. These hypotheses are tested using two indicators of conflict: heterogeneity and polarization. Cox regression analysis is applied with time-dependent effects and with a shared frailty to control for the multilevel structure of the data. The analyses show that, over time, conflict has an increasing negative effect on delays.

The importance of civil society in policy-making is twofold; civil society organizations (CSOs) monitor government performance and mediate between citizens and the state to ensure proper implementation. In this study, we analyse the effects of two aspects of civil society (civic participation and CSO consultation) on member states' implementation of European Union (EU) policy. The analysis is based on a novel dataset of practical implementation in 24 member states. Our findings reveal that the combination of high levels of civic participation and routine CSO consultations improves policy implementation. Furthermore, the effect is conditional on states' bureaucratic capacity to accommodate societal interests regarding the EU directives. The results indicate a paradox; civil society is not effective in countries with low bureaucratic capacity, where civil society is needed most to improve government performance.

This study analyses how preference heterogeneity across EU member states affects the adoption of soft-law acts over time. On the one hand, high diversity in policy preferences is expected to increase the proportion of soft-law instruments because governments are less likely to agree to binding measures. Conversely, preference heterogeneity could also decrease soft law due to the perceived threat of compliance problems. We test these competing arguments using a dataset on all EU soft-law and hard-law instruments adopted between 1967 and 2019. The results show that preference heterogeneity increases the share of soft EU instruments. However, more past heterogeneity prompts EU legislators to decrease the proportion of softer measures in areas that experience high levels of past non-compliance.

AbstractWhereas most research focuses on non‐compliant implementation, we lack understanding of implementers' incentives and abilities to outperform national legislation. This study investigates a largely under‐researched question: to what extent practical implementation exceeds levels of legislative compliance with EU requirements? To explain this phenomenon, we focus on the responsiveness of implementing actors to external (participation in transnational networks) and domestic pressures (national societal attitudes) for compliance with EU requirements and the availability of additional expertise at the implementation stage (bottom‐up). Moreover, implementing actors are unlikely to respond in the same way to different types of national legislative problems (top‐down). The findings suggest that implementers often outperform the transposition of EU laws. Practical outperformance depends on the level of societal support for external policies and is a response to incomplete or ambiguous domestic formal rules.