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We study the channels of interstate risk sharing in Germany for the time period 1970 to 2006 following the methodology of Asdrubali et al. (1996). Their framework allows us to estimate the degree of smoothing of a shock to a state's gross domestic product by factor markets, the government sector, and credit markets, respectively. For the time period from 1970 to 1994 pre-unification Germany we find that about 19 percent of shocks to a state's gross domestic product (GDP) are smoothed by private factor markets, 50 percent are smoothed by the German government sector, and a further 17 percent are smoothed through credit markets. For the post-reunification period, 1995 to 2006, the relative importance of the smoothing channels changes. In the complete sample, factor markets contribute around 50.5 percent to consumption smoothing, and credit markets contribute another 17.5 percent. The government sector's role is diminished: it smoothes around 10 percent of a shock. For this period, we also split our sample between West and East German states. In West Germany, 63 percent of idiosyncratic income shocks are smoothed out by factor markets; and another 15 percent by the government sector. In East Germany, factor markets smooth about 34.5 percent of the volatility in state GDP, the government sector about 19 percent, and another 18 percent are smoothed by credit markets.

We provide empirical estimates of the risk-sharing and redistributive properties of the German federal fiscal system based on data from 1970 until 2006, with special attention to the effects of German unification. We find that tax revenue sharing between the states and the federal government and the fiscal equalization mechanism (Länderfinanzausgleich) together reduce differences in per-capita state incomes by 37 percent during period 1970 to 1994. After the full integration of East German states into the mechanism in 1995, the redistributive effects increase slightly to about 39 percent. With respect to the insurance effect of the German fiscal system, our results indicate that the federal fiscal system offsets 47 percent of an asymmetric shock to state per-capita incomes. This effect has significantly decreased after the inclusion of the East German states in 1995. Furthermore, we find that the German fiscal system provides almost perfect insurance for state government budgets against asymmetric revenue shocks; also, its redistributive effect with regard to the tax resources available to state governments is very strong.

We provide empirical estimates of the risk-sharing and redistributive properties of the German federal from 1970 until 2006, with special attention to the effects of German fiscal system base unification. We find that tax revenue sharing between the states and the federal government and the fiscal equalization mechanism (Länderfinanzausgleich) together reduce differences in per-capita state incomes by 36.9 percent during period 1970 to 1994. After the full integration of East German states into the mechanism in 1995, the redistributive effects increase slightly to about 38.6 percent. With respect to the insurance effect of the German fiscal system, our results indicate that the federal fiscal system offsets 47 percent of an asymmetric shock to state per-capita incomes. This effect has significantly decreased after the inclusion of the East German states in 1995. Furthermore, we find that the German fiscal system provides almost perfect insurance for state government budgets against asymmetric revenue shocks; also, its redistributive effect with regard to the tax resources available to state governments is very strong.

We develop a model of a small open economy with credit market frictions of the Holmstrom-Tirole type to analyze the consequences of capital account liberalization. We show that financial opening facilitates the inflows of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency. Reforms increasing labor market flexibility can further improve such efficiency gains. However, capital account liberalization also has important distributional consequences. Specifically, it may be impossible to use public transfers to fully compensate the loss of those negatively affected by capital account liberalization. This explains why financial opening often meets fierce opposition even though it leads to efficiency gains for the economy as a whole. From a practical perspective, capital controls should be lifted gradually for a smooth transition.

We analyze the long-run and short-run implications of financial liberalization in a small open economy. Our main results are as follows. First, whether financial deregulation in one sector can improve production efficiency may depend on financial regulation in other sectors. Second, financial liberalization may have opposite welfare implications to domestic agents with different productivity in the long run. Third, although some domestic agents lose in the long run, they benefit from financial liberalization during the transitional process of deregulation. Finally, a gradual implementation helps achieve a smooth transition.

By introducing a new measure of the banking systems' size, the paper challenges the existing consensus on severe underdevelopment of the CEE banking sectors. We argue that the existing studies on the size of CEE banking systems exaggerate the real degree of underdevelopment because common measures of the size of the banking system produce downward biased results when applied to transition economies. We compare various measures of the size of the CEE banking sectors with those of several 'old' European Union (EU) member countries which are used as benchmarks. The comparison indicates that indeed the banking sectors in the CEE countries lag behind the most developed financial systems in the EU, but are very close to the levels in the financially less developed EU countries.

This paper analyses the choices of exchange rate regimes in developing countries since 1980. Static and dynamic random-effects multinominal panel models are estimated using simulation-based techniques. Explanatory variables include OCA fundamentals, stabilization considerations, currency crises factors, and political and institutional features. The results reveal strong state dependence in regime choices.

This paper uses a panel probit model with simultaneous equations to explain the joint determination of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes in developing countries since 1980. We also derive an ordered-choice panel probit model to explain the causes of discrepancies between the two regime choices. Both models are estimated using simulation-based maximum likelihood methodsl. The results of the simultaneous equations model suggest that the two regime choices are dependent of each other and exhibit considerable state dependence. The ordered probit model provides evidence that regime discrepancies reflect an error-correction mechanism, and the discrepancies are persistent over time.

This paper provides an empirical investigation on the discrepancies between official exchange rate regimes and de facto exchange rate policies in transition economies. Since official and de facto regime choices are not independent of each other, we adopt a bivariate probit model to describe the joint determination of the two regime choices. After finding the important determinants of both regime choices, we use a univariate probit model to describe the determination of regime discrepancies. We find that errors in the selection of official regimes as well as the macroeconomic developments calling for conflicting adjustments in exchange rate regimes are important determinants of regime discrepancies.