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Scholars of autocracies increasingly debate whether autocratic regimes promote their subordinates based on achievements, such as economic performance, and further a meritocratic system. This article argues that the extent to which autocratic regimes reward economic performance is not
constant over the course of an autocratic regime's lifespan but varies depending on the strategic goals of the regime and the regime's ability to monitor its subordinates' performance. We collect a new dataset on the careers of the regional leaders of the German Nazi Party, the Gauleiters,
from 1936 to 1944, and a wealth of historical data sources from the regime. Using this, we show that better regional economic performance increased the chance of receiving a promotion before the outbreak of World War II but not after.

AbstractDuring recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. Amidst a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite–mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when individuals become exceptionally well known they become threats to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China's 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam's 11th Party Congress in 2011, using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.

Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; however, most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian rule. In this article, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international peacebuilders can act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish this category of behaviour from explicit 'autocracy promotion', which implies intentional support to autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we identify two mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity of incumbent authoritarian leaders and by signalling a permissive environment for authoritarian behaviour for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; however, most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian rule. In this article, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international peacebuilders can act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish this category of behaviour from explicit 'autocracy promotion', which implies intentional support to autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we identify two mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity of incumbent authoritarian leaders and by signalling a permissive environment for authoritarian behaviour for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; however, most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian rule. In this article, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international peacebuilders can act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish this category of behaviour from explicit 'autocracy promotion', which implies intentional support to autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we identify two mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity of incumbent authoritarian leaders and by signalling a permissive environment for authoritarian behaviour for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

How do China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) facilitate or hinder political liberalization in Belarus? In this paper, using the qualitative case study method, I primarily highlight the competition that the EU faces with the Russian active autocracy promotion in Belarus. The EU provides aid only in exchange for promise of democratic and economic reforms, which might be very costly and danger the persistence of ruling elites. Russia, at the same time, offers economic and diplomatic support to Belarus, which is, however, conditioned by privatization of the Belarusian strategic assets in favor of Russian stakeholders. I also claim that China, with growing international ambitions, passively supports autocracy in Belarus, by providing financial aid without interfering with internal political affairs. For Belarus, whose leadership still enjoys legitimation by a large part of the population due to the economic stability, losing major state enterprises might weaken sovereignty. Thus, diversification of economic partners is of crucial importance for Belarus. I argue that Belarusian ruling elites may have found an escape away from democratic and autocratic pushes from the EU and Russia, respectively, by increasing linkages with China. To promote effectively democracy in its neighborhood, the EU ought to reconsider interactions with external non-democratic actors. The paper concludes by providing some policy recommendations for the EU.

"Autocratic Regimes and Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Figures -- 2.1 Modes of External Influence: The Concept Tree -- 2.2 Analytical Model -- 3.1 Autocratization in the GCC - Scores on the Democracy Status (Bertelsmann Transformation Index) -- 3.2 Gradation of Saudi Influence Toward its GCC Fellows -- 4.1 The Development of the Democratic Status According to the BTI (2003-2016) -- 8.1 Meetings of the CCP-ID with Party and Non-Party Representatives in Asia, 2002-2017 -- 8.2 Heatmap of the CCP-ID's Activities in Asia by Country, 2002-2017 -- 8.3 CCP-ID Contact with Government and Opposition Parties for Different Political Regime Types, 2002-2017 -- Tables -- 2.1 Sub-Mechanisms: Methods, Instruments, and Coercion -- 4.1 Steps in the Constitutional Reform Process in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia -- 4.2 Empirical Results of Autocracy Promotion and Diffusion in Latin America -- 6.1 Comparing the Russia Model to Fidesz's Strategy of Democratic Erosion -- 9.1 SCO Evolution of Membership, Observer, and Dialogue Partner Status -- Preface -- Part I: Concept -- 1 Autocratization and Its Pull and Push Factors - A Challenge for Comparative Research -- 2 Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers: Sources and Addressees, Mechanisms and Motives of Authoritarian Pressure and Attraction -- Part II: Empirical Studies on Authoritarian Gravity Centers: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan -- 3 Kingdom of Gravity: Autocratic Promotion and Diffusion in Saudi Arabia -- 4 Democratic Erosion and Autocratization in Latin America: The Role of Venezuela as an Authoritarian Gravity Center -- 5 Kazakhstan: A Possible Future Authoritarian Gravity Center? -- Part III: The International Dimension of Authoritarianism Revisited.