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Introduction générale. --1re partie.Contexte historique et facteurs favorables aux coups d'État au Dahomey. --ch. 1.Du contexte historique aux racines du phénomène --ch. 2.Les facteurs économiques favorables --ch. 3.Les facteurs militaires favorables. --2me partie.Les coups d'État. --ch. 4.Les coups d'État de Christophe Soglo --ch. 5.Les coups d'État de Maurice Kouandété (1967, 1969, 1972) --ch. 6.Le coup d'État de Mathieu Kérékou. --3me partie.Les répercussions des coups d'État au Dahomey. --ch. 7.La mise en place des régimes militaires --ch. 8.Le recul de la démocratie et des droits de l'Homme --ch. 9.L'affaiblissement du pouvoir d'État et de l'armée. --Conclusion générale.

Current explanations of African coups d'état concentrate on national political factors and generate predictive models for both successful and unsuccessful coups. The explanation offered here challenges these approaches through the application of a probabilistic theory and the model deduced from it which have already demonstrated their value for coups in general. This theory holds the underlying causes of successful coups to be economic rather than political, and views coups as the consequence of the lack of political control which results from the domestic uncertainties produced by world market trade. Specifically, it is argued that the underlying causes of coups are specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by poverty. Such preconditions render even the most responsible governments open to accusations of incompetence and corruption, so inviting coups d'état. The chance of a successful coup actually occurring has, though, also to take into account the existence of factors which hinder coups. Two general obstacles are suggested: the absence of a previous coup and the continuing or historic presence of foreign troops since independence. A testable hypothesis is deduced from this theory which is examined through the application of discriminant analysis to data for three sets of African countries. The models produced are shown to support the theory and predictions for future coups and policy implications are considered. In sum, by no means all African countries are predicted to have coups d'état and in a substantial proportion of cases escape from future coups can be avoided only through international trade policies.

Abstract: Mali, once argued to be a democratic model for Africa, is in a state of perennial crisis, the result of poor governance, unmet democratic expectations, and competition for domestic political legitimacy among the political class, the military, and religious leaders. After the 1991 revolution, international donors poured money into Mali to promote democratization. Meanwhile, most Malian citizens were becoming increasingly disconnected from a growing political class dependent on these funds. This article shows how popular protests led to both the reversal of family-law reform and the instigation of military coups d'état. The lack of accountability of the political class and the influx of donor money have contributed to increased popular perceptions of state corruption and impunity. Peace and security are impossible amid governance failures and serial coups d'état. This article explains the political consequences of the breakdown of popular trust and political legitimacy of the ruling elite and argues that restoring trust and legitimacy is a critical element to rebuilding Mali.

We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d'état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government's capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010.