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This article approaches Russia's strategy of countering the United States indirectly by way of intermediate states. It is concerned with the reasons why Russia decided to engage in the Syrian conflict in 2015 and, from this perspective, the real goals of Russia's policy in the region. These questions cannot be considered without taking account of how they are linked with the all-out confrontation between Russia and the West in Ukraine. The Syrian conflict merely represents an external platform for Russia in countering the United States. Russia is testing her own power to force the United States out of Syria and seeks any opportunity to demonstrate American vulnerability. There is a triangle of interests for the key regional actors—Turkey, Iran, and Russia—that oppose US interests. The rising confrontation with Washington in Syria triggered Moscow to seek ways of using other potential rivals of the United States, given that there are numerous areas of tension and conflict with Washington beyond the Middle East. The author's analysis of the actors' behavior is based on the "security dilemma" and the "balance of power" approaches. There are well-known disputes between "defensive" and "offensive" realism in the theory of international politics concerning which of these approaches is more reliable and reasonable when considering costs and results, as well as the risk of tensions spiraling out of control ("security spiral"). The aim of this research is to make a comparison between America's offensive strategy with Russia's defensive approach and evaluate the efficiency of both policies. Following a particular scholarly approach, this article presumes that Moscow acquires power via the indirect, "low-cost strategies," using any opportunity available to counterbalance US power via other countries. It is concluded that offensive or defensive behavior depends on the situation and available resources. The United States has sufficient resources to implement an offensive strategy, and Washington may raise the stakes in confrontation. Russia's defense approach of a "buck-passing" strategy is more efficient, but Moscow suffers from a lack of resources and chooses indirect countering, using any means necessary to counterbalance US power in Syria and beyond.

"Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractTransformations in state violence are intimately associated with technological capacity. Like previous era-defining technologies, global digital networks have changed state violence. Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) appear to constitute a major technological development that offers the potential for reducing state violence. This article asks: are OCCs really the better angels of our digital nature? Current scholarship in strategic studies, adopting a narrow definition of violence, conceives of OCCs as largely non-violent. This ignores how technology has given rise to new forms of harm to individuals and communities, particularly in the context of violent state repression. We propose using an expanded definition of violence, including affective and community harms, and argue that OCCs relocate, rather than reduce, state violence towards non-bodily harms. Even though their lethal effects are limited, OCCs are not, as is supposed, a non-violent addition to state arsenals. This conclusion has important implications for international affairs, including re-orienting defensive cybersecurity efforts and altering calculations around the perception of OCCs by adversaries.

Generally, various risky tasks or certain difficult operations cannot be done completely by humans and thus there is need for change in present era. As robots play vital roles in different fields of industries, medical, colleges, home appliances, military and defence, thus robots can be good and effective option for such difficult purposes. The proposed work is to develop an all terrain robot prototype. The robots which are presently in the market works on simple terrains while this project claims to make a prototype which can work on plain surfaces as well as rough surfaces such as forests, hilly and rocky areas. This project presents a offensive and defensive robot which uses different technologies like Arduino, Android Application, Bluetooth module and Laser Module. It develops a low voltage power supply, low cost and wireless robot prototype which is controlled using microcontroller and android application. Dr. M. Sampath Kumar | Anchal Mohanty | Meghana Beesu | E. Sai Kiran "All Terrain Offensive and Defensive Robot" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-3 | Issue-3 , April 2019, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd23370.pdf

The article argues that the most important cut in the range of possible reactions to an attack is not between weapons of mass destruction and conventional defense, nor between military and non-military defense, but between offensive and defensive means of defense. Defensive weapons systems are defined as those that have a limited range and destruction area and for that reason can (essentially) only be used on one's own territory; offensive weapons systems are all the others. The distinction is based on their objective properties, not on subjective declarations or perceptions. Three types of defensive defense are then described: conventional military defense, para-military defense and nonmilitary defense — a good non-provocative or inoffensive defense should then be based on all three. The concept is explored further and some objections are discussed, the most important being that a minimum interdiction capability is indispensable, and that it would be offensive by the criterion used. The conclusion is that the defensive character will have to rest on the overall posture. The concept developed is then related to similar concepts in the rapidly emerging literature in this field in Eastern Europe.

Jefferson Davis is credited with authoring an offensive-defensive Confederate strategy. This pillar of Civil War historiography is incorrect, having been derived from a misunderstanding of the levels of policy and war, and the misreading of scant primary source documentation.

China's rise has been the greatest development of the 21st century. It has emerged as the second largest economy in the world, a country with a modern army and nuclear weapons. China's rise has come to be seen as a major threat by the West and especially the US. Most scholarly debates predict that it will lead to a conflict between China and the US. Set in this context, this paper takes John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which predicts intense competition and conflict between China and the US and examines China's behaviour as a rising power against it. The paper finds that far from being an aggressive, hegemonic and a revisionist state, China is a status quo power that aims to preserve its position in the international system rather than upset it. The paper argues that China's behaviour displays elements of defensive rather than offensive realism.

Conventional wisdom holds that the quantitative balance between the defender and the attacker should be 3:1 in favor of the attacker. Israel's experiences in her wars against the Arab nations proves her ability to defend successfully on the tactical level despite an even greater quantitative imbalance than 3:1 in favor of the attacker. Major-General Tal, Assistant Minister of Defense, argues that this is true only at the tactical level. (DÜI-Hns)