Suchergebnisse

San José — (Costa Rica, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, the Lesser Antilles)Haiti — The National Society received technical and financial assistance from the ICRC which enabled it to continue its programme of dissemination to members of its individual branches within the country, as well as to other sectors of the population, especially law students.

Arabian Peninsula: (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates).The ICRC regional delegate for the Arabian Peninsula was based in Geneva. Nevertheless, since 2 August 1990 the delegate in charge was present in the region. (For further details see Iraq/Kuwait above).

New Delhi: (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, India, the Maldives, Nepal)Bangladesh—Negotiations with the country's authorities concerning a possible joint ICRC/League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies/National Society survey in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were at a standstill.

We discuss a government's incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm's technology depends on how that uncertainty changes. ; This research has received funding from the ESOP Centre at the University of Oslo, with which both authors are associated. ESOP has received support from the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number 179552. ; publishedVersion

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts a fraction of the transfer. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government, so-called bureaucratic drift. We study how the bureaucratic drift and the bureaucratic cost interact to a affect the incentives to delegate. Furthermore, we discuss how partial delegation, i.e., delegation followed by laws and regulations that restrict bureaucratic discretion, increases the scope of delegation. We characterize the optimal delegation rule and show that, in equilibrium, three different regimes can arise that differ in the extent of bureaucratic discretion. Our analysis has implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift but that, because of the nature of the regulation problem, the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm's technology on the bureaucratic discretion depends on how that uncertainty is reduced.

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts a fraction of the transfer. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government, so-called bureaucratic drift. We study how the bureaucratic drift and the bureaucratic cost interact to affect the incentives to delegate. Furthermore, we discuss how partial delegation, i.e., delegation followed by laws and regulations that restrict bureaucratic discretion, increases the scope of delegation. We characterize the optimal delegation rule and show that, in equilibrium, three different regimes can arise that differ in the extent of bureaucratic discretion. Our analysis has implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift but that, because of the nature of the regulation problem, the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm's technology on the bureaucratic discretion depends on how that uncertainty is reduced.

Originally published in 1956, this book outlines the history of delegation in local government since the establishment of county councils in 1888. It describes the use made of delegation over a wide range of council services. The technique of delegation has become more important in recent years and represents the compromise of the competing claims of county and district councils to control local government. This book is an important contribution both to the detailed study of local administration and to the debate on the future pattern of local government.