Suchergebnisse

In a recent publication in this journal, Mozaffar and Scarritt claim to have found a puzzling combination of low fragmentation and high volatility in African party systems. However, if we look at national party systems rather than Africa-wide averages, include regime type as a variable and specify dominance, we find three different constellations: dominant party systems with relatively low volatility, non-dominant and pulverized party systems with high volatility and dominant authoritarian party systems with high volatility. The real surprise is that dominant parties in authoritarian regimes have higher electoral instability than dominant parties in democracies. The analyis is based on data from 78 elections in 20 African countries with at least three consecutive multiparty elections.

This article investigates accountability in South Africa's dominant party system by studying how the African National Congress (ANC) reacts to electoral incentives at the local level. It compares the ANC's degree of responsiveness to voters across municipalities with different levels of political competition. The analysis focuses on whether and under which conditions the ANC is more likely to renominate better quality municipal councillors. It examines the relationship between renomination as ANC municipal councillor and local government performance – as measured by voter signals, service delivery and audit outcomes. The results show that the ANC does indeed adapt its behaviour to electoral incentives. In municipalities where the ANC has larger margins of victory, performance matters little for renomination. In contrast, in municipalities with higher electoral competition, local government performance is strongly correlated with renomination. These results suggest the need to expand dominant party research to topics of voter responsiveness and sub-national behaviour.

Although Thaksin Shinawatra's three political parties, together called "the TSP" in this article, overwhelmingly won all four elections between 2001 and 2011, explaining their dominance is a challenge. Nevertheless, this article attempts to shed some light on how the TSP politicized already latent cleavages, namely the basic split between the lower-middle class and the rural poor versus mostly Sino-Thai Bangkokians and the urban middle class, and made them even more significant. After the TSP was dissolved by court order following the 2006 military coup, these deep divides transformed into two major cleavages, namely the dominating center-local dimension which pits Bangkokian and the urban pole against the provincial pole and the royalist and traditional establishment pole against pro-populist politicians. The TSP's ability to incorporate certain demands into its agendas pointed to its power to manipulate these cleavages. At the same time, its capacity to organize and mobilize certain groups deepened those divisions and allowed the party to win elections without having to institutionalize the party. The TSP's failure to develop a strong organizational structure was partly a result of frequent coups d'etat as well as its centralized style of leadership. The TSP's reach across groups spanning these two cleavages would allow the TSP to win the upcoming election without having to embrace the dynamics of change in voters' preferences. However, the precariously balanced relationship between the TSP and its supporters has to be carefully maintained, or the existing social cleavages may be increasingly difficult to sustain if new political parties emerge.

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the bases of support for Mexico'sPartido Revolucionário Institucional. A model is developed which identifies the major and minor variables affecting changes inPRIsupport in the six elections between 1952 and 1967. Throughout the paper the unit of analysis is the state; the dependent variables are voter turnout and the percentage of the total vote in each state received by thePRI.