Essays in Economic Theory, first published in 1983, combines two essays on game theory and its applications in economics. The first, ""Learning Behavior and the Noncooperative Equilibrium"", considers whether an adaptive justification, like those commonly available for the optimization models frequently employed elsewhere in economics, can be found for the Nash noncooperative equilibrium. The second essay, ""A Game of Fair Division"", was motivated by the desire to find attractive methods for solving allocation problems and bargaining disputes that are simple enough to provide useful alternatives
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieses Buch ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar:
This book brings together in a single coherent framework a research programme begun by the author in the forties. The main model around which the analysis is built is Hicksian in character, having been drawn in large part from John Hicks's Value and Capital. The model is extended so as to include money and securities. In respect of the theory of the firm the model focuses on demand and supply plans, on inputs and outputs, on inventories, and on dependencies between them. The stability of temporary equilibrium is discussed for linear and non-linear cases. Because the concept of structural stability is important for understanding non-linear cases, it is defined and applied to the case of economic motion generated from the temporary equilibrium analysis. The addenda focus on developments in economic theory following the publication of the main model
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
In: Panoeconomicus: naučno-stručni časopis Saveza Ekonomista Vojvodine ; scientific-professional journal of Economists' Association of Vojvodina, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 103-118
In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way ? which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non ? economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That?s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I?ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.
This book attempts to explain what exactly "Economics" is and whether or not the theories it espouses actually work in the real world. It addresses how it is taught in colleges across the United States and the world, how it is deeply flawed and what the future holds for economies around the world, especially in the context of mega-banks that impact Main Street more now than they did in the past. This book will explore how derivatives have swarmed the balance sheets of banks and how governments throughout the "free world" have guaranteed private profits for banks, but have socialized losses for these same banks, impacting the taxpayer, and putting the economy at increased risk as volatility and leverage increase over time.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext: