Suchergebnisse

This article presents the theoretical framework and the results of research conducted in a brewery concerning the concept of gender discrimination. The main objective of the research is to identify gender inequalities and to describe organizational practices that reflect occupational segregation. The study shows that although there are equal opportunities in the labor market between women and men, there are differences in compensation and options for advancement at work because women tend to give greater attention, time, and effort to family and children than men.

Data shows that there is an obvious gender imbalance in legal profession in Pakistan. The study was taken under the objective to find out the main reasons and causes of the gender imbalance in the legal profession in Pakistan. Gender discrimination is mainly considered the major factor behind gender imbalance in the legal profession in Pakistan. For the purpose of exploring the field the researcher framed the research question and collected public opinion through surveys and interviews. The opinion collection through questionnaires was taken from two cities and interview taken from government officers as well as senior lawyers.Due to limited resources, the researcher selected two district bars of Lahore and Faisalabad. The analysis made from the data collected shows that the legal profession is not gender biased. Females do not feel insecure in the legal profession and there is no harassment or eve-teasing in the workplace. The findings and conclusion shows that gender imbalance is not totally due to gender discrimination but it is one of the many factors that cause gender imbalance in the legal profession.

The standard literature on discrimination in labour market discusses discrimination-generated inefficiency at the firm level which cannot be sustained under competition. As competition gets intense, firms would be more disciplined and would be forced to refrain from practising discrimination. This forms the core of the pioneering works by Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). In this article, we argue that when firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, some of the more efficient firms can easily survive practising discrimination and only relatively inefficient firms will quit the market. Thus, incentives to discriminate, if any, would be greater for more efficient firms. Once they survive, measured efficiency of the market would, in fact, increase. Thus ironically, discriminating industries would exhibit higher efficiency. This article shows that, in a model with heterogeneous firms, a competitive market system cannot eliminate the problem of discrimination. Thus, competition and discrimination may coexist.