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This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz., by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using detailed examples of their many social science applications. There is no obvious fix.

This research assesses the empirical validity of the classic anomie theory articulated by Robert Merton and the important contemporary extension of his work encompassed in Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory. Using a unique aggregate‐level data set, our empirical investigation reveals that, consistent with theoretical expectations, instrumental crime rates are significantly higher in areas where both a strong commitment to monetary success goals and a weak commitment to legitimate means exist. The tendency for this "goals/means" value complex to translate into higher rates of instrumental crime is reduced in the context of higher levels of welfare assistance and more frequent socializing among families. We also find that low levels of educational and economic attainment and high levels of inequality enhance the degree to which commitment to monetary success translates into instrumental crime. Overall, the findings are supportive of some claims by classic and contemporary anomie theories, but also they point to the need for further refinement of these perspectives and additional assessments of their empirical validity.

A fundamental identification problem in program evaluation arises when idiosyncratic gains from participation and the treatment decision depend on each other. Imbens and Angrist (1994) were the first to exploit a monotonicity condition in order to identify an average treatment effect parameter using instrumental variables. More recently, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) suggested estimation of a variety of treatment effect parameters using a local version of their approach. However, identification hinges on the same monotonicity assumption that is fundamentally untestable. We investigate the sensitivity of respective estimates to reasonable departures from monotonicity that are likely to be encountered in practice and relate it to properties of a structural parameter. One of our results is that the bias vanishes under a testable linearity condition. Our findings are illustrated in a Monte Carlo analysis.

This paper examines the properties of instrumental variables (IV) applied to models with essential heterogeneity, that is, models where responses to interventions are heterogeneous and agents adopt treatments (participate in programs) with at least partial knowledge of their idiosyncratic response. We analyze two-outcome and multiple-outcome models including ordered and unordered choice models. We allow for transition-specific and general instruments. We generalize previous analyses by developing weights for treatment effects for general instruments. We develop a simple test for the presence of essential heterogeneity. We note the asymmetry of the model of essential heterogeneity: outcomes of choices are heterogeneous in a general way; choices are not. When both choices and outcomes are permitted to be symmetrically heterogeneous, the method of IV breaks down for estimating treatment parameters

Der instrumentale Positivismus in der amerikanischen Soziologie.
Ausgehend von einer Definition des instrumentellen Positivismus, der die amerikanische Soziologie seit Ende der 30er Jahre dominiert und der hier von der die Bewegung der charities and corrections begründenden Theorie sowie der Chicagoer Schule unterschieden wird, zeichnet der Autor die seiner Meinung nach zentralen Merkmale dieses Positivismus nach : Bestreben nach Verfeinerung der statistischen Techniken und Forschungsinstrumente ; Übernahme einer nominalistischen oder individua- listischen Konzeption der Gesellschaft ; Neigung zum Induktionismus, Verifîkationismus und Inkrementalismus ; Verbindung zwischen einer (falschen) Dichotomie Tatsachen/Werte und einer (falschen) Konzeption der Wertfreiheit ; Vorrang der Forschungsteams und Vermehrung von Zentren und Instituten angewandter Sozialforschung. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird daneben dem Werk Lazarsfelds und der Tradition von Columbia gewidmet. Schließlich sucht der Artikel den gegenwärtigen Einfluß und die kunftigen Perspektiven des instrumentellen Positivismus einzuschätzen. Am Ende steht das Bedauern des Autors, daß viele amerikanischen Forschungen zwar auf der Ebene der Forschungsinstrumente und quantitativen Methoden höchst innovativ sind, aber aus Routine die soziologischen und politischen Theoriedebatten ignorieren.

Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. Sergio Tenenbaum argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action, even to explain the rational governance of relatively simple actions. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. Tenenbaum provides a new theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action

Rational choice theories (RCTs) of crime assume actors behave in an instrumental, outcome‐oriented way. Accordingly, individuals should weight the costs and benefits of criminal acts with subjective probabilities that these outcomes will occur. Previous studies either do not directly test this central hypothesis or else yield inconsistent results. We show that a meaningful test can be conducted only if a broader view is adopted that takes into account the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives. Such a view can be derived from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg, 2005) and the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström, 2004). Based on these theories, we analyze the willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax fraud in a sample of 2,130 adults from Dresden, Germany. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that only respondents who do not feel bound by moral norms show the kind of instrumental rationality assumed in RCTs of crime. Where norms have been strongly internalized, and in the absence of neutralizations, instrumental incentives are irrelevant.

This paper investigates four topics. (1) It examines the different roles played by the propensity score (probability of selection) in matching, instrumental variable and control functions methods. (2) It contrasts the roles of exclusion restrictions in matching and selection models. (3) It characterizes the sensitivity of matching to the choice of conditioning variables and demonstrates the greater robustness of control function methods to misspecification of the conditioning variables. (4) It demonstrates the problem of choosing the conditioning variables in matching and the failure of conventional model selection criteria when candidate conditioning variables are not exogenous.

How do Goya's representations of the body disrupt the Enlightenment's configurations of the corporeal? If for 18th-century aesthetics the body is both the site of ideal beauty & the limit of what can & may be represented, then Goya's panoply of monsters provides a way of understanding other modes of reason(ing), other ways of representing the body & its functions within culture. In his work there is a recuperation of those elements that seem to lie outside the ken of the Enlightenment project: physicality, animality, hybridity, the grotesque, the popular; a recognition of the animal nature of the body & the products of bodily impulses & forces. A rethinking of the body would incorporate an understanding of its role as a physical & social phenomenon in the constitution of the subject. Following on from Paul Ilie's concept of counter-rational Reason, which he defines as the opposite of a uniform centre of rationality in representative thought, the first half of my paper will consider Goya's problematization of representation. My analysis of a selection of drawings from the collection Los Caprichos (1799) will focus not just on the representation of bodies in the painter's work but on his exploration of bodies in their material variety -- configurations of modes of constructing the body. This examination of Goya's prolific pictorial negotiations & adaptations of flesh & world will draw upon contemporary approaches to theorizing the body, namely the theories of Julia Kristeva & Elizabeth Grosz. 3 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Theories demand much of data, often more than a single data collection can provide. For example, many important research questions are set in the past and must rely on data collected at that time and for other purposes. As a result, we often find that the data lack crucial variables. Another common problem arises when we wish to estimate the relationship between variables that are measured in different data sets. A variation of this occurs with a split half sample design in which one or more important variables appear on the "wrong" half. Finally, we may need panel data but have only cross sections available. In each of these cases our ability to estimate the theoretically determined equation is limited by the data that are available.