A serendipitous field experiment in job design
In: Journal of vocational behavior, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 364-370
ISSN: 1095-9084
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In: Journal of vocational behavior, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 364-370
ISSN: 1095-9084
In: Journal of management education: the official publication of the Organizational Behavior Teaching Society, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 80-90
ISSN: 1552-6658
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10207
SSRN
In: Management revue: socio-economic studies, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 28-46
ISSN: 1861-9908
In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making
ISSN: 2054-9571
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14455
SSRN
In: Organizational dynamics: a quarterly review of organizational behavior for professional managers, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 66-79
ISSN: 0090-2616
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4710
SSRN
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 44-69
ISSN: 1756-2171
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.
In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 2, S. 834-864
ISSN: 1944-7981
High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: "bad" jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and "good" jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination. (JEL D12, D82, J24, J31, J41, M12, M54)
In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making
In: The International journal of humanities & social studies: IJHSS, Band 8, Heft 6
ISSN: 2321-9203
In: Employee relations, Band 11, Heft 6, S. 17-22
ISSN: 1758-7069
In: European journal of work and organizational psychology: the official journal of The European Association of Work and Organizational Psychology, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 59-79
ISSN: 1464-0643