Suchergebnisse

Una teoría iusmoralista no puede dejar de basarse en el objetivismo moral, mientras que una teoría iuspositivista puede ser defendida por objetivistas y no objetivistas. Se examinan las consecuencias que el iusmoralismo tiene para la teoría de la validez de las normas jurídicas y para su aplicabilidad en los casos concretos y se revisan las asimetrías y aporías a que conduce cualquier teoría iusmoralista. Finalmente, se subraya que los iusmoralistas discrepan entre sí radicalmente sobre los contenidos de la moral verdadera y del derecho justo y que sólo un enfoque iuspositivista es compatible con el estado constitucional y democrático de derecho. ; A legal moralist theory of law cannot but be based on moral objectivism, while a legal positivist theory can be defended equally by objectivists and non-objectivists. The consequences that legal moralism has for the theory of the validity of legal norms and for their applicability in concrete cases are examined, and the asymmetries and aporias to which a moralist theory of law leads are surveyed. Finally, it is emphasized that legal moralists radically disagree on the contents of true morality and just law and that only a legal positivist approach is compatible with the constitutional and democratic rule of law.

One of the abiding concerns of the philosophy of law has been to establish the relationship between law and morality. Within the criminal law, this concern often takes the form of debates over legal moralism--that is, "the position that immorality is sufficient for criminalization" (Alexander 2003: 131). This paper approaches these debates from the perspective of the recently revived republican tradition in politics and law. Contrary to what is usually taken to be liberalism's hostility to legal moralism, and especially to attempts to promote virtue through the criminal law, the republican approach takes the promotion of virtue to be one of the necessary aims of a polity. The virtue in question, however, is a specifically civic virtue, and calling for its promotion does not entail that the criminal law should be a straightforward reflection of the conventional morality of a society. What republicanism offers, instead, is a form of legal moralism resting on a distinctively civic morality that lays particular stress on such virtues as fair play and tolerance.

This paper is a critical analysis of the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece; I will discuss the way that a consensus reached in the legislative committee among liberal and conservative jurists on the matter of compensation of surrogate mothers was undermined by intra-party populism in the Greek parliament which banned it to avoid commodification; inevitably the law fell into disuse leading to a new law which allowed government-defined compensation, not the one agreed by the parties; the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece is a typical example of the deleterious effects of the combination of legal formalism and legal moralism in contemporary Greece. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

On October 23, 1987, the United States Senate committed what many considered then-and what many still consider today-to be an unforgivable political and constitutional sin. Wielding its power to advise and consent on nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States, the upper house voted 58-42 not to confirm Judge Robert H. Bork. The vote, which was the largest margin of defeat in history for a nominee to the Supreme Court, concluded one of the most tumultuous political battles in the history of the republic, a battle that would transform the process of judicial selection for years to come.

"Paternalism" published on by Oxford University Press.