DR CONGO: 'War' on Militias
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 55, Heft 1
ISSN: 1467-825X
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In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 55, Heft 1
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Strategic comments: in depth analysis of strategic issues from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Band 19, Heft 8, S. v-vii
ISSN: 1356-7888
In: Jane's terrorism & insurgency monitor: the magazine of IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, Heft 4, S. 4
ISSN: 2048-352X
In: Armed Groups and the Balance of Power; LSE International Studies
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Pro-Government Militias and Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Z magazine: a political monthly, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 33-37
ISSN: 1056-5507
In: The world today, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 24-25
ISSN: 0043-9134
World Affairs Online
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 345-362
ISSN: 1743-9558
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 5, S. 770-793
ISSN: 1552-8766
Research on militias portrays them as subservient proxies of governments used to achieve tactical goals. The conventional wisdom, however, ignores the diversity of state–militia relations. This article outlines four distinct strategies that states can pursue toward militias, ranging from incorporation to suppression. It then argues that regime ideology shapes how governments perceive and deal with militias. A new theory of armed group political roles brings politics back into the study of militias. Comparative evidence from India and Pakistan shows that varying regime ideological projects contribute to different patterns of militia–state relations. These findings suggest that political ideas ought to be central to the study of political violence, militias should be studied in direct dialog with other armed groups, and a traditional focus on civil war should be replaced by the broader study of "armed politics."
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 215-266
ISSN: 1547-7444
To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theoretic model, we argue that states take this risk in order to prevent rebels from co-opting local populations, which in turn may shift power away from the government and toward the rebels. Governments strategically use civilian militias to raise the price rebels must pay for civilian cooperation, prevent rebels from harnessing a territory's resources, and/or to deter rebels from challenging government control in key areas. Empirically, the model suggests states are likely to support the formation of self-defense militias in territory that may moderately improve the power of rebel groups, but not in areas that are either less valuable or areas that are critical to the government's survival. These hypotheses are tested using data from the Colombian civil war from 1996 to 2008.
World Affairs Online
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 50, Heft 2
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 19611A
ISSN: 0001-9844
In: Latin American weekly report, Heft 15, S. 176
ISSN: 0143-5280
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 5, S. 770-793
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086