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The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.

It is well-established that oil wealth in weakly institutionalised states tends to undermine development instead of catalysing it. Cross-country regressions, however, struggle to explain why comparably oil-wealthy countries such as Nigeria and Angola experience different political and economic outcomes over time. This thesis explains these differing outcomes through a theoretical lens derived from the New Institutional Economics and Political Settlements literature. Methodologically, it employs analytic narrative - the application of a game theoretic model to a historical puzzle to produce a thin explanation - and treats economic transactions as the key unit of analysis for understanding why particular outcomes obtain and not others. As a comparable site of analysis, I select the oil-for-infrastructure deals that were negotiated in Angola and Nigeria with Asian National Oil Companies between 2004 and 2007. Contrary to expectation, the deals were struck in Angola but failed in Nigeria. I hypothesise that the differential outcome reflects the varying quality of the institutional arrangements in each country for engaging foreign investors. This differential institutional quality resulted in differing commitment credibility over time, which partly accounts for deal failure in Nigeria. Divergent political economy trajectories and political settlements account for these differences. I use a game theory model that explains heterogeneity within authoritarian regimes to test these hypotheses. Application of the model to Angola and Nigeria respectively shows that Angolan dictator, José Eduardo dos Santos, was able to consolidate power within six years of becoming the head of state by successfully eliminating potential threats to his dictatorial ambitions. Under this closed, stable regime, foreign investors perceived greater levels of commitment credibility and struck deals. Nigeria's uneven institutional evolution towards greater openness was punctuated by multiple successful coups and occasional civilian rule between long periods of military autocracy. The resultant instability undermined the perception of credibility, explaining why the deals failed. The thesis closes with a description of how Nigeria and Angola's political economies have evolved since the oil-price crash of 2014, including how dos Santos unexpectedly lost power, and poses questions for future research.

This article explores relations between popular protests and institutional politics in a petroleum-dependent economy. The 2012-protest against fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria was one of the biggest popular mobilisation in Nigeria's history, and possibly the largest in the wave of protests in Sub-Saharan Africa. This article uses perspectives of contentious politics that bridge structure and agency through a focus on relational dynamics between protests and institutional politics. This article makes four interrelated claims of how the protests are conditioned by and contribute to institutional politics: First, the protests builds on a historical trajectory of labour-led subsidy protests that in itself form part of institutionalised politics. Second, the 2012-protests were historically large due to the particular context of a decade of democracy and oil-led growth, without a popular sense economic justice and real political participation. Third, while new actors came to the scene in 2012, intra-movement fragmentation exposed trade union and civil society weaknesses and failure to build a sustained social movement. Fourth, the 2012-protests inspired civic agency and influenced institutional politics and state-citizen relations, especially reflected in party politics and elections.

Cover -- Preface -- Acknowledgment -- I. Introduction -- The Making of a Petro-state -- What is at stake? -- Structural overview -- II. The Global Oil Debate -- Afro-pessimism in the oil debate -- a. Oil and government institutions -- b. Oil and authoritarianism -- c. Oil, entitlements and struggles for resource control -- The oil debate in Uganda -- Government -- Foucauldian view of government -- The epistemology of government -- III. Context and Question of methods -- Context -- Uganda's post-independence instability -- a. The era of "fundamental change" -- b. The structure of political power -- c. The national economy under Museveni -- The fundamental change, oil and government -- Question of methods -- The Government of Epistemology -- Practice of governing, governing practices -- a. Power relations and the regulation of petro-practices -- b. The art of creating order and orderability -- c. Critical attitudes and bio-political agenda from below -- IV. Making Oil Production Effective -- Oil as an institutional problem of government -- a. Uganda's Oil Policy -- b. Oil Laws and Regulations -- c. Constituting National Petro-sovereign -- The art of governing oil -- a. Rendering oil technical -- b. Caucusing mentality and petro-politics -- c. Securing national interest -- d. Euphoria of development -- Sovereignty and petro-power -- V. Constituting Petro-order -- Statistical rationalisation of petro-order -- a. The Kabaale Census - Hoima -- b. The Tilenga Census in Buliisa -- Technical problems -- Technical solutions -- a. Territorialisation: the production of spatial petro-order -- b. Bio-politicisation: the production of social petro-order -- c. Strategic Education and Capacity-building Programmes -- d. Improvements in Healthcare Facilities -- Power relations and petro-ordering -- VI. Subaltern Expressions of Petro-order.

Dieses Buch veranschaulicht die Art und Weise, wie sich Uganda in ein ölproduzierendes Land verwandelt, das hier als "Petrostaat" bezeichnet wird. Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Verwendung des Begriffs hebt der Begriff "Petrostaat" hier den bewussten Versuch hervor, die politische Wirtschaft Ugandas auf die künftige Ölförderung auszurichten. Die Erwartung von "Petrodollars" hat den Staat gezwungen, seine institutionelle Infrastruktur zu verändern und zu versuchen, die sozioökonomische und räumliche Orientierung der Bevölkerung zu rekonfigurieren. Der Autor stellt die Machtverhältnisse und die dynamischen Kämpfe dar, in die die Schlüsselakteure im Prozess der Erdölförderung in Uganda verstrickt werden. Ausgehend von einem Foucault'schen Ansatz in der Regierungs- und Machtfrage zeigt er auf, wie die ölbezogenen Entwicklungsprojekte in Uganda die Bevölkerung mehrdimensional fördern sollen.

Parting from conventional social science arguments that people speak for the ethnic groups they represent or for social or class-based groups, this study argues that attitudes of Ecuador's Amazon citizens are shaped by environmental vulnerability, & specifically exposure to environmental degradation. Using results of a nationwide survey to show that vulnerability matters in determining environmental attitudes of respondents, the authors argue that groups might have more success mobilizing on behalf of the environment through geographically based 'polycentric rights,' rather than through more traditional & ethnically bound multicultural rights. This text offers among the first methodological bridges between scholarship considering social movements, & predominantly ethnic groups, as primary agents of environmental change in Latin America & those emphasizing the agency of individuals.

First published in 1999, this volume focuses on the impact of democratic bargaining on the process of oil policy-making in Venezuela, stressing the constraints posed by politics on PVDSA's efforts to expand its foreign operations. Venezuela offers a unique case and fertile ground for the study of oil policy-making processes. In the specialised literature, very little attention has been paid to the nature and operations of multinationals from developing countries. By analysing Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PVDSA)'s international policy, this unique book explores the difficulties encountered by a major state oil enterprise in its efforts to grow beyond national borders.

Iraq is a compelling example of a state highly dependent on a singular source of rent, namely oil revenue. Since 2003, Iraq has also been characterized by a fractured, rivalrous elite without central control over organized violence. This formula represents a "rentier political marketplace" in which state funds for salaries and contracts are the essential lubricant of the political system. During 2014–2021, successive shocks to national oil revenues represented a partial and temporary, but traumatic, decarbonization of Iraq's government and political finance. In turn, this triggered a series of governance and political reconfigurations including a nominal decentralization process and fracturing of sectarian power, followed by a nationwide civic movement demanding transformational change. This paper traces these changes and the abrupt return to business as usual when oil prices rebounded. In doing so, the paper further investigates the nexus between oil and democracy in Iraq and addresses the unanswered question of how Iraq can decarbonize and democratize in the future.