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The rapid expansion of sharing economy platforms has generated enormous controversy. Law and the "Sharing Economy" closely examines the challenges that arise from this phenomenon with regard to labour, market, technology and regulation through a legal and interdisciplinary lens. The controversy stems partially from the economic impact - most acutely in certain sectors such as Uber vs taxi drivers and Airbnb vs hotels - and partially from other related consequences such as a trend toward precarious work or an impact on real estate speculation. While governments in some jurisdictions have attempted to rein in the platforms, technology has enabled such companies to bypass conventional regulatory categories, generating accusations of "unfair competition" as well as debates about the merits of existing regulatory regimes.

"Controversy shrouds sharing economy platforms. It stems partially from the platforms' economic impact, which is felt most acutely in certain sectors: Uber drivers compete with taxi drivers; Airbnb hosts compete with hotels. Other consequences lie elsewhere: Uber is associated with a trend toward low-paying, precarious work, whereas Airbnb is accused of exacerbating real estate speculation and raising the cost of long-term rental housing. While governments in some jurisdictions have attempted to rein in the platforms, technology has enabled such companies to bypass conventional regulatory categories, generating accusations of "unfair competition" as well as debates about the merits of existing regulatory regimes. Indeed, the platforms blur a number of familiar distinctions, including personal versus commercial activity; infrastructure versus content; contractual autonomy versus hierarchical control. These ambiguities can stymie legal regimes that rely on these distinctions as organizing principles, including those relating to labour, competition, tax, insurance, information, the prohibition of discrimination, as well as specialized sectoral regulation. This book is organized around five themes: technologies of regulation; regulating technology; the sites of regulation (local to global); regulating markets; and regulating labour. Together, the chapters offer a rich variety of insights on the regulation of the sharing economy, both in terms of the traditional areas of law they bring to bear, and the theoretical perspectives that inform their analysis."--

PurposeExplore the effects of competition policy on an important competitive dimension of digital platforms, namely quality.Design/methodology/approachThe deterrence effect of competition policy should induce firms to compete on merits, with lower prices and higher quality for consumers. Deterrence, or the inducement not to infringe competition law, may depend on the harshness of penalties and/or the likelihood of conviction. We use competition policy indicators that are associated with these deterrence dimensions, allowing for non-linearities and interactions of the indicators. We use a unique data survey of digital gig platform users, that covers at least two dozen platforms and more than 50 countries. Quality is measured using multidimensional indicators of the level of satisfaction of platform users with different platform services. We control for platform user and country characteristics, including other regulatory indicators such as labor laws, to recover different effects.FindingsResults suggest that competition policy is relevant for differences in product quality across platforms and countries. Important non-linearities are uncovered, where substantive rules of competition policy interact with competition authority power. The effects depend on either level of the indicators, suggesting that deterrence effects depend upon a combination of both law in the books and competition policy practice.Practical implicationsThe estimates suggest a need to balance both dimension of deterrence, namely, strictness and effectiveness to expand the effects of competition policy on competition.Originality/valueThis is the first paper that explores the effect of competition policy on non-price or non-margin competition dimension. It is the first to study the effect on a sample of digital platforms. It contributes to the literature of deterrence effects of competition policy.

Platform work is a new umbrella concept which covers a heterogeneous group of economic activities performed through digital platforms. Effective collective rights and bargaining would be essential for platform workers due to their vulnerable employment status. Yet collective organization of platform workers is troublesome, so trade unions face difficulties. The protection of the labour law directives is limited by their personal scope, which may be gradually expanded by the broad ECJ interpretation of the 'worker' concept. The effective right to collective bargaining would be particularly important, but it is restricted by EU antitrust rules with an exemption only for employees. In the last decade, the European Court has moved towards a wider personal scope of collective bargaining by interpreting the concept of 'worker'. The recent FNV Kunsten decision used the notion of 'false self-employed' to go beyond the national concept of 'employee', but the wide interpretation of 'worker' shall be based on the need and necessity of employment protection deriving from economic dependency. As an alternative, the Gebhard formula may be invoked to grant the right to collective bargaining for platform workers.