Suchergebnisse

Although market-based environmental measures like uniform CO2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost, they do not prevail in real world policies. An efficiency oriented environmental policy fails, as it involves a redistribution of pollution rights, resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents. The present paper analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility of several CO2 tax and reimbursement schemes, using a computable general equilibrium model of Switzerland. The simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform CO2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.

ABSTRACTPolitical feasibility analysis examines the actors and events involved in each stage of a political policy‐making process and anticipates the likely resolution of a policy problem as it works its way through the policy process. Despite the prominence of policy analysis in the social sciences over the past decade or so, there has been virtually no scholarly work concerning the analysis of the political feasibility of policy proposals. Political scientists, because of their central concern with the design and effect of the policy‐making process, have a unique responsibility to contribute a way to evaluate systematically political feasibility. While all policy analysts, regardless of their disciplinary backgrounds, need to be concerned with assessing political feasibility, political scientists should be particularly mindful of its importance in improving public policy.While anticipating the likely outcome of a dynamic policy process is necessarily a difficult task, an analysis of the political feasibility of a proposed alternative can provide insight into the nature of the policy process as well as identify the criteria that must be met for an alternative to be successful.This article discusses a variety of factors that need to be considered in assessing political feasibility. After arguing the need to design political feasibility analysis frameworks, this essay reviews political scientists' current treatment of political feasibility analysis and outlines a general way to undertake such efforts.

Though many economists favor a transition to a fully funded pension system, it is not even considered by politicians in Germany. This paper examines the hypothesis that this is in accordance with the preferences of the population. By performing a dynamic CGE analysis referenda on pension policies are simulated. They show that a fully privatizing scheme is not politically feasible in Germany, however long the pre-announcement period, if the alternatives are the current policy or a partially privatizing policy. This explains why a fully privatizing policy is not an issue in the political debate in Germany. In order to examine what are the reasons for this outcome, the German Bismarckian System is compared to a Beveridge-System, which is similar to the British pension system. In the latter case, a transition to a fully funded system is what the majority opts for in a dynamically consistent equilibrium. This is evidence that the future of the pension system depends on its history. 6 Tables, 2 Figures, 52 References. Adapted from the source document.