Political Institutions in Italy
In: The political quarterly: PQ, Band 79, Heft 4, S. 650-651
ISSN: 0032-3179
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In: The political quarterly: PQ, Band 79, Heft 4, S. 650-651
ISSN: 0032-3179
In: American political science review, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 213-223
ISSN: 1537-5943
Liberia will long be a source of permanent interest to the government and people of the United States, not only because it was founded and fostered by American citizens, but because there is going on there in the interest of the African races one of the unique struggles in modern state-building, in an endeavor to perpetuate in West Africa a government fashioned after the American democracy in which liberty shall be limited and regulated by law.Under the most unfavorable circumstances the Liberian people have entered upon a grave and stupendous undertaking. The high political ideas and principles which they represent, the ardor and fidelity with which they have maintained them for nearly three quarters of a century against European opposition and in the midst and in the presence of the overwhelming numbers and dissimilar civilization of their African kinsmen, entitle them to the sympathetic consideration and good will of all liberty-loving nations.
In: Italian Political Science Review: Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 306-308
ISSN: 0048-8402
A clear, accessible introduction to the institutional regimes of 15 countries in western Europe, by an outstanding team of European political scientists.
In: Why Politics Matters, S. 165-186
In: South European society & politics, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 249-251
ISSN: 1360-8746
In: Pôle sud: revue de science politique, Band 1, Heft 28, S. 177-180
ISSN: 1262-1676
In: International Governance of War-Torn Territories, S. 109-134
In: A New Handbook of Political Science, S. 133-166
In: International affairs, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 382-382
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Social studies: a periodical for teachers and administrators, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 57-58
ISSN: 2152-405X
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 906
ISSN: 0032-3470
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics , 119 (2) pp. 565-611. (2004)
A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
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