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This paper has been delivered within the context of the research project "Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes: Constitutional foundations and governance design". ; This paper considers the topic of private regulation and enforcement for internationally active financial services firms. The paper documents the following types of regulation and enforcement that involve significant private input: house rules, contracts, internal compliance, management-based regulation, private standard-setting bodies, cartels, and private litigation. The paper assesses these systems or modalities along the dimensions of effectiveness, legitimacy, quality, and enforcement. The paper suggests that the following factors (among others) will contribute to determining the pattern of private/public interaction in a given regulatory context: (1) minimization of transactions costs; (2) access to information; (3) expertise; (4) political power of the regulated industry; (5) contests over regulatory turf; (6) regulatory budget constraints, and (7) history or path-dependence. The topic of financial private regulation and enforcement concerns the activities of private firms in the financial sector which are involved in cross-border activities – Citigroup, Bank of America, HSBC, UBS, JPMorgan Chase, RBS, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, HBOS, Société Générale, Banco Santander, American Express, Nomura, and so on. For convenience of reference, I will refer to this type of organization as an "internationally active financial services firm" (IAFSF). This paper will categorize different types of private regulation and enforcement applicable to IAFSFs and then will offer some tentative thoughts about the underlying forces that may determine the phenomena under observation, with special reference to the HiiL Concept Paper, "The Added Value of Private Regulation in an Internationalised World? Towards a Model of the Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Enforcement and Quality of Private Regulation." The principal subject of investigation will be the activities of IAFSFs under U.S. law, but attention will be given to international standards and regulations as well. ; The project "Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes: Constitutional foundations and governance design" is co-financed by HiiL (Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law), www.hiil.org

The article examines the technique of private enforcement as a juridical instrument to protect the market in combination with the punitive sanction mechanisms of public law. After a first definition of private enforcement, we investigate the position taken by the European Commission on the use of private enforcement, verifying its function with respect to the objectives of market protection. The main instruments of private enforcement are therefore considered: civil liability, termination of the contract, nullity of the contract, injunction. We will focus on the main constraints to the application of the abovementioned instruments of private enforcement proposing solutions in the light of an overcoming of the boundaries between public law and private law. As highlighted in Directive 2014/104/EU, "the practical effect of the prohibitions laid down requires that anyone – be they an individual, including consumers and undertakings, or a public authority – can claim compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them by an infringement of those provisions." For this reason it is important to consider all the different private enforcement tools and try to remove the obstacles to their effective functioning. Private law is activated on the action of individuals who exercise the rights recognised by the law. Individuals being closer to the emergence of the problem are able to represent the violation of the interests at stake according to the logic proper to the principle of subsidiarity. The Principle of subsidiarity states that a wider and greater body, such as a government, should not exercise functions that can be carried out efficiently by a smaller one, such as an individual or a private group, acting independently.

Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in large part due to insufficiently competitive markets. Waves of consolidation have fortified providers and insurers with market power, resulting in higher prices and lower quality for consumers. As antidotes, advocates have proposed various legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions. Yet, unlike public antitrust enforcement, private antitrust enforcement is either not mentioned or criticized as sour grapes from competitors or a money grab by consumers. Instead of ignoring or bashing private litigation, those looking to address the health care pricing crisis in the United States should be looking to optimize it. Effective private enforcement can restore competition, deter antitrust violations, and compensate victims in the markets for health care services and insurance. For plaintiffs, the key to optimizing private antitrust enforcement is overcoming the unavoidable challenges in litigating these cases—from satisfying pleading standards and establishing standing, to defining relevant markets. This article explains the key obstacles involved in these cases and tracks recent and current plaintiffs whose experiences provide insight.

A decision-aid system. for determining and achieving optimal distributions of wildlife law enforcement manpower was developed. Manpower distributions were computed by means of a workload formula for a case study application in the J.E.B. Stuart Enforcement District, Virginia Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries. A linear programming model was used to determine least cost methods of achieving prescribed manpower distributions. Simulations of permanent relocations and hiring of personnel were performed to evaluate the impact of management decisions on costs of achieving prescribed distributions. In the case study, total transfer cost resulting from simulated permanent relocation of personnel was 73% that of the present distribution, total transfer cost of simulated hiring of new personnel was 94% that of the present distribution. A simulation of inappropriate location of new personnel resulted in an increase in total transfer cost of 22% over that of the present distribution. These findings were relevant only to the case study; however, the use of the system as a general purpose simulator was demonstrated. Studies were performed of the relationships of patrol area environmental attributes, agent personal background characteristics, enforcement methods, enforcement effort, and season with enforcement efficiency (quality arrest score per enforcement hour). A wildlife law violation seriousness scale was developed in order to compute the measure of enforcement efficiency. Observations were obtained from Virginia wildlife law enforcement agents during November 1977, February, May, and August 1978. Patrol area intensity of 20 environmental variables, 25 personal background variables, 5 enforcement methods variables, total enforcement hours, and 4 study periods were independent variables. Two and 3-way interactions were detected by automatic interaction detection (AID) among total quality arrest score (QAS) by patrol, total QAS by response to citizen notification, and total enforcement hours. Analysis of covariance by multiple regression procedures indicated that methods of enforcement, effort, and their interactions we.re more closely associated with enforcement efficiency than other major categories of independent variables. Total QAS by patrol, total QAS by investigation, an interaction of total QAS by patrol and total enforcement hours, total QAS by response to citizen notification, total QAS by stakeout, and effort showed the greatest association with the dependent variable. To a lesser degree, agent rank, months of service, and whether the agent had been fired from previous employment were also shown to be associated with enforcement efficiency. Only one environmental attribute, the intensity of water recreation in the patrol area, was associated with enforcement efficiency. These results generally supported assumptions employed in the decision-aid system. ; Ph. D.