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We examine the role that an exogenous increase in household income due to a government transfer unrelated to household characteristics plays in children's long run outcomes. Children in affected households have higher levels of education in their young adulthood and a lower incidence of criminality for minor offenses. Effects differ by initial household poverty status. An additional $4000 per year for the poorest households increases educational attainment by one year at age 21 and reduces having ever committed a minor crime by 22% at ages 16−17. Our evidence suggests that improved parental quality is a likely mechanism for the change.

All over the world, a very large number of elections take place concurrently with other elections for representatives in different government tiers. A crucial question for understanding electoral outcomes in those elections is the existence of electoral spillovers or coattail effects. Causal identification of coattail effects is challenging because popularity shocks typically affect parties in both concurrent elections. This paper exploits a quasi-experiment—the ban of a party in only one of the concurrent elections—to estimate coattail effects. The results show that a 1 pp decline in electoral support for a party in a given election reduces its support in the concurrent election by 0.25 pp. This comes along with a decline in turnout of the same size in both elections.

Abstract
The global energy mix and cost structure of the power industry are experiencing a redefinition. Many countries are revamping electricity-pricing systems to guarantee fixed-cost recovery, often by raising the fixed charge of two-part tariff schemes. However, a key assumption of two-part tariff schemes and associated fixed-cost recoveries is that consumers discriminate fixed from marginal costs. We conduct a quasi-experiment with data from a major electricity price reform recently implemented in Spain and find robust evidence indicating that consumers fail to distinguish between fixed and marginal costs. As a result, policymakers are not achieving the goal of cost recovery.

This study used a quasi-experimental design to assess the effectiveness of self-managing teams in a telecommunications company. These teams performed customer service, technical support, administrative support, and managerial functions in a variety of locations. The balance of evidence indicates that self-managing teams were more effective than comparable traditionally-managed groups that performed the same type of work. The study illustrates the value of a collaborative research project in which researchers and clients jointly define the research questions, study design, and methods.

I test how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, affected district court decision making from 1999 to 2003. Policymakers effectively used legal regulation to constrain judicial discretion by specifying (a) the sentencing ranges applicable to certain factual patterns, (b) the departures from these ranges allowed for prosecutors, or (c) the departures allowed for judges. My results establish significant differences in how judges make decisions depending on whether or not they were constrained by guideline ranges. When the guidelines curtailed judges' discretion, judges followed these guidelines but overwhelmingly sentenced defendants to the minimum sentence possible under the guidelines. Conversely, when guidelines allowed judges to depart from the sentencing ranges and instead to exercise broad discretion, they used this authority, and case sentences, although widely varying, were right censored at a point at or below the guideline minimum. Finally, the lowest sentences arose from prosecutors' motions rather than judges' own initiatives.

Cybersecurity is a national priority in this big data era. Because of negative externalities and the resulting lack of economic incentives, companies often underinvest in security controls, despite government and industry recommendations. Although many existing studies on security have explored technical solutions, only a few have looked at the economic motivations. To fill the gap, we propose an approach to increase the incentives of organizations to address security problems. Specifically, we utilize and process existing security vulnerability data, derive explicit security performance information, and disclose the information as feedback to organizations and the public. We regularly release information on the organizations with the worst security behaviors, imposing reputation loss on them. The information is also used by organizations for self-evaluation in comparison to others. Therefore, additional incentives are solicited out of reputation concern and social comparison. To test the effectiveness of our approach, we conducted a field quasi-experiment for outgoing spam for 1,718 autonomous systems in eight countries and published SpamRankings.net, the website we created to release information. We found that the treatment group subject to information disclosure reduced outgoing spam approximately by 16%. We also found that the more observed outgoing spam from the top spammer, the less likely an organization would be to reduce its own outgoing spam, consistent with the prediction by social comparison theory. Our results suggest that social information and social comparison can be effectively leveraged to encourage desirable behavior. Our study contributes to both information architecture design and public policy by suggesting how information can be used as intervention to impose economic incentives. The usual disclaimers apply for NSF grants 1228990 and 0831338.