Suchergebnisse

This paper explores whether social preferences influence portfolio choices of retail investors. We use administrative investor trading records which we link to decisions of the same investors in experiments with real money at stake. We show that social preferences rather than return expectations or risk perceptions are the main driver of investments in socially responsible (SRI) mutual funds. Social preferences are only associated with investments in SRI funds without tax benefits, but are unrelated to investments in SRI funds with tax incentives. This illustrates that tax incentives change the clientele of mutual funds and that tax incentives crowd out the intrinsic motivations of investors with strong social preferences. Our results also show that prosocial behavior in one domain (experiment) is correlated with prosocial behavior in another domain (investments), which adds to the discussion on the usefulness of experiments in finance.

We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (JEL C91, D03, Z13)

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest class of tax payers).

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest class of tax payers). ; Cet article renverse la logique classique de la littérature de la fiscalité optimale. On part de la distribution observée des revenus bruts et des revenus disponibles d'une population et des taux d'imposition marginaux observés calculés par un modèle de microsimulation. On montre alors que, sous certaines conditions simplificatrices, il est possible d'identifier la fonction de bien-être social qui rendrait optimal le schéma des taux marginaux observés sous certaines hypothèses sur les préférences consommation-loisir. Dans ce cadre, la question de l'optimalité d'un système tax-benefit concret peut être analysée en vérifiant si la fonction de bien-être social associée satisfait certaines propriétés. Cette méthode est appliquée au système de redistribution français. On observe que, ou l'autorité fiscale assigne des valeurs peu élevées aux élasticités de l'offre de travail, ou bien elle assigne des poids sociaux négatifs aux agents les plus riches.

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest class of tax payers). ; Cet article renverse la logique classique de la littérature de la fiscalité optimale. On part de la distribution observée des revenus bruts et des revenus disponibles d'une population et des taux d'imposition marginaux observés calculés par un modèle de microsimulation. On montre alors que, sous certaines conditions simplificatrices, il est possible d'identifier la fonction de bien-être social qui rendrait optimal le schéma des taux marginaux observés sous certaines hypothèses sur les préférences consommation-loisir. Dans ce cadre, la question de l'optimalité d'un système tax-benefit concret peut être analysée en vérifiant si la fonction de bien-être social associée satisfait certaines propriétés. Cette méthode est appliquée au système de redistribution français. On observe que, ou l'autorité fiscale assigne des valeurs peu élevées aux élasticités de l'offre de travail, ou bien elle assigne des poids sociaux négatifs aux agents les plus riches.

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest class of tax payers). ; Cet article renverse la logique classique de la littérature de la fiscalité optimale. On part de la distribution observée des revenus bruts et des revenus disponibles d'une population et des taux d'imposition marginaux observés calculés par un modèle de microsimulation. On montre alors que, sous certaines conditions simplificatrices, il est possible d'identifier la fonction de bien-être social qui rendrait optimal le schéma des taux marginaux observés sous certaines hypothèses sur les préférences consommation-loisir. Dans ce cadre, la question de l'optimalité d'un système tax-benefit concret peut être analysée en vérifiant si la fonction de bien-être social associée satisfait certaines propriétés. Cette méthode est appliquée au système de redistribution français. On observe que, ou l'autorité fiscale assigne des valeurs peu élevées aux élasticités de l'offre de travail, ou bien elle assigne des poids sociaux négatifs aux agents les plus riches.