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Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) two major tactical aircraft fighter programs, the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, represent an investment of about $280 billion. Problems in the F/A-22 development program have led to a 10-year delay in delivering the initial capability and development cost increases of $16 billion. The Joint Strike Fighter, which experienced problems early in the program, is now at a critical crossroad in development. Any discussion of DOD's sizeable investment that remains in these programs must also be viewed within the context of the fiscal imbalance facing the nation within the next 10 years. GAO was asked to testify on the status of the F/A-22 and draw comparisons between both F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter programs' acquisition approaches."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force started developing the F-22 aircraft in 1991, and plans to complete development in September 2003. The Air Force plans to procure 333 production aircraft at a cost now capped at $37.6 billion. The law does not specify the total number of aircraft to be procured. This testimony discusses (1) potential cost reduction plans, (2) production cost estimates by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and (3) the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement GAO's earlier recommendations (see GAO/NSIAD-00-178, August 2000). GAO found that the F-22 contractors' estimated amount of cost reduction plans total about $26.5 billion. Both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense cost estimators projected in late 2000 that F-22 production costs would still exceed the $37.6 billion congressional cost limitation if the Air Force were to procure 333 F-22s. DOD plans to reconcile the number of F-22s needed with the amount of the congressional cost limitation on F-22 production as part of the next Quadrennial Defense Review."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force F-22 Raptor, an air superiority aircraft with an air-to-ground attack capability is set for completion in September 2003. However, contracts to begin 10 low-rate initial production aircraft for fiscal year 2001 have been delayed until after completion of the President's review of Department of Defense (DOD) programs. The Air Force plans to procure 333 production aircraft through 2013. The cost of F-22 production is limited by law, but the total number of aircraft to be procured is unspecified. This report (1) identifies the cost reduction plans by F-22 contractors, (2) compares the military's latest F-22 production cost estimates with the congressional cost limitation and determines the extent to which cost reduction plans were considered in establishing these estimates, and (3) provides the status of DOD's actions to implement GAO's earlier recommendations on production cost estimates and cost reduction plans for the F-22 program. GAO found that enhancing production technology, improving manufacturing techniques, and improving acquisition practices have contributed to cost reductions. Both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators projected that F-22 production costs would exceed the congressional cost limitation if the Air Force were to procure 333 F-22s. DOD and the Air Force have partially responded to the recommendations in GAO's August 2000 report on the F-22."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs aim to replace many of the Department's aging tactical fighter aircraft--many of which have been in DOD's inventory for more than 20 years. Together, the F-22A and JSF programs represent a significant investment for DOD--currently estimated at almost $320 billion. GAO has reported on the poor outcomes in DOD's acquisitions of tactical aircraft and other major weapon systems. Cost and schedule overruns have diminished DOD's buying power and delayed the delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Last year, GAO testified that weaknesses in the F-22A and JSF programs raised questions as to whether DOD's overarching tactical aircraft recapitalization goals were achievable. GAO is providing updated testimony on (1) the extent to which the current F-22A and JSF business cases are executable, (2) the current status of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts, and (3) potential options for recapitalizing the air forces as DOD moves forward with its tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs aim to replace many of the Department's aging tactical fighter aircraft--many of which have been in DOD's inventory for more than 20 years. Together, the F-22A and JSF programs represent a significant investment for DOD--currently estimated at almost $320 billion. GAO has reported on the poor outcomes in DOD's acquisitions of tactical aircraft and other major weapon systems. Cost and schedule overruns have diminished DOD's buying power and delayed the delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Last year, GAO testified that weaknesses in the F-22A and JSF programs raised questions as to whether DOD's overarching tactical aircraft recapitalization goals were achievable. At the request of this Subcommittee, GAO is providing updated testimony on (1) the extent to which the current F-22A and JSF business cases are executable, (2) the current status of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts, and (3) potential options for recapitalizing the air forces as DOD moves forward with its tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The F-22 aircraft is designed to be less detectable, capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation than the F-15 it will replace. The Air Force began the F-22 development program in 1991 and plans to complete it by March 2004. In 1998, following repeated increases in the program's estimated development cost, Congress capped developmental costs at $20.443 billion. The F-22 program did not meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to complete planned development is likely to exceed the $21 billion reported to Congress, and the program is not far enough along in flight-testing to confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's performance. Despite progress in testing the aircraft's capabilities, problems and delays continue to plague the assembly and delivery of development test aircraft, and the flight-test program is less efficient than planned. Furthermore, flight-test delays make it unlikely that the planned development program can be completed within the current cost goal. On the basis of initial testing, the Air Force projects that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals by the end of development. However, testing to demonstrate performance is not far enough along to allow the Air Force to confirm its projections. The Air Force has implemented process and manufacturing changes to the horizontal tail section and for cracking in the cockpit canopy that GAO reported on last year. Although the results to date appear adequate, the Air Force continues to monitor the results to ensure the corrective actions will be sufficient. In September 2001, the Air Force submitted to Congress a revised acquisition plan to increase the number of aircraft committed to low-rate production before the completion of operational testing. Buying production articles before they are adequately tested can be costly if further testing identifies problems that then require costly modifications. Moreover, an increase in production commitments could occur without the F-22 program office knowing if the contractor's key manufacturing processes are adequate."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force has made progress in developing the F-22, particularly with respect to fulfilling the criteria for awarding a fully funded contract for low-rate initial production. Nevertheless, it lags significantly in flight-testing because of continuing assembly and manufacturing delays, and it is behind schedule in completing nonflying tests that assess the aircraft's structural integrity These delays increase the risk that the Air Force will likely have to extend the test program past the planned completion date or proceed to the next stages of the program without completing all flight-tests. Moreover, the scheduling delays increase the likelihood that costs will not fall within the congressional cap. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has indicated that, on the basis of the test program's current status, operational testing cannot be started as scheduled without clearly unacceptable risks and will probably be delayed almost a year. The Director also concluded there was no reason to authorize low-rate production in January 2001 and some justification to delay it. Cost growth in the development program because of manufacturing and design problems and underestimated amounts of labor required to complete scheduled tasks points to a lack of stability in both design and fabrication."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to fly at higher speeds for longer distances, be less detectable, and improve the pilot's awareness of the surrounding situation. The F/A-22 will replace the Air Force's existing fleet of F-15 aircraft. Over the past several years the program has experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays. Congress mandated that GAO assess the development program and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. GAO also assessed the implications of the progress of the development program on production."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In 1991, the Air Force began developing the F/A-22 aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for long distances. After a history of program cost increases, Congress limited the cost of F/A-22 production to $37.5 billion in 1997. Congress has remained interested in the potential cost of production. As requested, we (1) identified the latest production cost estimate and assessed the planned offsets from cost reduction plans, (2) identified areas where additional cost growth is likely to occur, and (3) determined the extent that DOD has informed Congress about production costs."