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AbstractAs International Organization commemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects; and how external threats combine with these internal dynamics to render the LIO more fragile than ever before. This introduction begins by defining and clarifying what is "liberal," "international," and "orderly" about the LIO. It then discusses some central challenges to the LIO, illustrated by the contributors to this issue as well as other sources. Finally, we reflect on the analytical lessons we have learned—or should learn—as the study of the LIO, represented by scholarship in International Organization, has sometimes overlooked or marginalized dynamics that now appear central to the functioning, and dysfunction, of the order itself.

Is the liberal order in decline? Can we see evidence of that decline in the UN Security Council? Brian Frederking challenges the increasingly popular "decline" narrative by examining the practices of the Security Council in the decades since the end of the Cold War. Relying on both qualitative and quantitative data, Frederking shows that the council has consistently enforced liberal rules to resolve conflicts regarding war crimes, human rights, and democracy. What many interpret as a decline, he argues, is instead a process of renegotiation - the outcome of which remains a liberal order, but one that is less influenced than in the past by the US and its allies.

Is the liberal order in decline? Can we see evidence of that decline in the UN Security Council? Brian Frederking challenges the increasingly popular "decline" narrative by examining the practices of the Security Council in the decades since the end of the Cold War. Relying on both qualitative and quantitative data, Frederking shows that the council has consistently enforced liberal rules to resolve conflicts regarding war crimes, human rights, and democracy. What many interpret as a decline, he argues, is instead a process of renegotiation—the outcome of which remains a liberal order, but one that is less influenced than in the past by the US and its allies

We are witnessing the start of a deep and prolonged political convulsion. This convulsion is caused by the impact of technological change on how wealth is generated and distributed in our societies. Since the 1970s advanced economies have seen a strong productivity increase and stagnant labor income. We believe this should be described as a major breach of our social contract. It is leading to the stagnation of income of the Middle Class, growing inequality and, ultimately, a radicalization of our politics. Unless the cause of this is properly diagnosed and the underlying drivers addressed head on we are bound to see a worsening of the convulsion. Here the paper analyzes technological change, its key cause and propose a series of bold experiments that countries should undertake in order to develop a new social contract with its citizens. The risk of doing nothing involves a long period of uncertainty and convulsion as well as the likelihood that little is achieved in tackling the underlying problems.

Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.

The shock of Donald Trump's election caused many observers to ask whether the liberal international order—the system of institutions and norms established after World War II—was coming to an end. The victory of Joe Biden, a committed institutionalist, suggested that the liberal order would endure. Even so, important questions remained: Was Trump an aberration? Is Biden struggling in vain against irreparable changes in international politics? What does the future hold for the international order?The essays in Chaos Reconsidered answer those questions. Leading scholars assess the domestic and global effects of the Trump and Biden presidencies. The historians put the Trump years and Biden's victory in historical context. Regional specialists evaluate U.S. diplomacy in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Others foreground topics such as global right-wing populism, the COVID-19 pandemic, racial inequality, and environmental degradation. International relations theorists reconsider the nature of international politics, pointing to deficiencies in traditional IR methods for explaining world events and Trump's presidency in particular. Together, these experts provide a comprehensive analysis of the state of U.S. alliances and partnerships, the durability of the liberal international order, the standing and reputation of the United States as a global leader, the implications of China's assertiveness and Russia's aggression, and the prospects for the Biden administration and its successors

Recent criticisms by leaders and scholars have raised questions about prospects for survival of the liberal world order as well as the relationship between American hegemony and order. The three books discussed in this essay have similar diagnoses of problems in the liberal order but differ in their prognoses. Yan's Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers offers an alternative model for leadership of the world order – humane authority. Cooley and Nexon's Exit from Hegemony maintains that US hegemony is gone for good and the liberal world order is unraveling due to the rise of great power challengers, changing behavior by smaller states, and anti-liberal transnational movements. Ikenberry's World Safe for Democracy argues that current problems are due to attempted global extension of the liberal order. The liberal order should be restored to its original purpose of providing a protective environment for liberal democracies. All three books emphasize the role of domestic political governance and moral values in contributing to global leadership.