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Local government is the second or third tier of government deliberately created to bring government to the grassroots population, as well as give its members a sense of involvement in the political process that controls their daily lives. Decentralization is a natural indispensable counterpart to pluralistic democracy, i.e. it extends the work of democracy and fulfils democratic aspirations. Consequently, any political reform aimed at democratizing institutions, will only be effective if it is accompanied by far‐reaching administrative reforms which effectively redistribute power. In South Africa's political circumstances as a country of almost 40 million, constituted of heterogeneous cultural and political groups, the need for effective decentralized democratic local government as a vehicle for development and national integration is imperative. The current interim constitution reflects a certain degree of decentralization. It exhibits a highly visible effort and a bold move towards full autonomy. The country currently has nine provinces and approximately 700 transitional non‐racial local authorities. The November 1995 and May/June 1996 local government elections was a watershed in political history and was the last chapter in the democratization of the South African State. The relationship between central, provisional and local authorities has been debated and the view is that elected officials must wield real power and the State wishes to protect local government. Details powers, functions and structures of local government will be defined in terms of provincial legislation. However, although local governments are creatures of provincial legislation and provisional government will exercise control over them, they will still have a reasonable amount of autonomy. The process has therefore been underway to determine the constitutional and legal position of local government in relation to central and provincial government. An important issue was the possible devolution of powers and functions to local government. The State is nurturing a co‐operative system where measures to harmonize relations between central, provincial and local governments are encouraged and promoted. The new South African State as defined by the new Constitution will be highly centralized as provincial power over local government is limited. Central government's legislative competence over local government is strengthened as the former must determine the appropriate fiscal powers and functions of each category of local government. However, the final analysis, the purpose of the Constitution should not be forgotten. It is intended to define the basic rules in terms of which the country should be governed. The Constitution proposes the idea of recognizing distinct "spheres" of government as opposed to "levels" of government. The implication of this is that one tier of government is not inferior to the other. Each sphere of government is given definite responsibilities on which the other spheres are not allowed to encroach.

The Norwegian system of government comprises three levels: highest is the central government, or Storting (Parliament); in the middle are the counties, and at the lowest level are the municipalities. The municipal and county levels are considered local government. In this paper the degree of central control of the lower two levels of Norwegian government are compared and the implications of national regulations for local democracy, particularly for county governments, are discussed. The counties are more heavily controlled by the central government than are the municipalities, measured both by reliance on central grants and by regulation of the service supply. Whereas the representatives of the municipal councils are ambiguous when it comes to expressing the extent of central government control, the county-level politicians are clearly dissatisfied with central governmental constraints. Central regulations appear not to weaken the attractiveness of positions on the local councils, and the desire for reelection appears higher at the county level than at the municipal level. Voters see the parliamentary elections as most important, the municipal elections as of secondary importance, and the county elections as least important. At the county elections, national policymakers are to some extent responsible for the performance of the county government. It is argued that the lack of voter interest and voter control increases the ability of lobbying organizations to influence county decisions, which is likely to strengthen the dominance of producer interests relative to that of citizens and consumers. Such developments may induce demand for further state legislation to protect consumer interests, which will challenge the overall legitimacy of intermediate democracy.

Rights and responsibilities of local governments are defined by the central legislature, in accordance with the given country's rules, traditions, institutions of constitutional and administrative law. To perform public duties they need financial resources, incomes and wealth. Above these, the right of disposition, financial and economic autonomy have to be provided, moreover, the possibility to receive suitable subsidies from central budget. The proportion and guarantees of the income are important too, as the autonomy of local governments depending from central subsidies may be injured. The question of primary importance is that where are the limits of the mentioned autonomy, protected by various constitutional provisions and international legal documents, how the legislature is able to control the law of taxation, to enter transactions that give rise to debts, or how to withdraw different resources from local governments. The central withdrawal and reallocation of resources may raise the issue of local government solidarity. As well as the extent to which the property and income of local governments can be limited. According to the practice of the various constitutional courts and the supreme courts (American, French, German and Hungarian judicature), the rights and authorities of local governments are not unlimited. Although, local governments have to get effective protection, but after all it is the state who determines the content and the framework of relevant legal regulations for local governments. Therefore, within the constitutional framework, the central legislature has a serious opportunity to intervene in protected autonomy by withdrawing or reallocating revenues, assets or subsidies. The research method of the study is primarily financial and administrative legal analysis and legal comparison: in addition to international, constitutional and legal (American, German, French, Hungarian) rules, the basic characteristics of local government financial autonomy are presented based on the principles worked out in various Supreme Court and Constitutional Court decisions elements, as well as the limitations that said autonomy must face as a result of the decisions of the central legislature. The subject of the research is the financial autonomy of local governments and its legal limitations, which point out that autonomy - unfortunately, cannot be unlimited. Local taxation, own revenues and subsidies can indeed provide adequate foundations for independent local government management, however, since local governments must adapt in the state's central system of public administration and public finances, therefore, within the constitutional framework, the central legislation can make decisions that adversely affect their incomes, budgets and assets.

AbstractIt is widely acknowledged that poor government policy performance undermines public trust in government. However, there has been insufficient study of how citizens attribute responsibility to different levels of government within an authoritarian unitary context. Inquiry is needed to assess the ways government performance in various policy domains affects central–local political trust. This study uses the case of China to addresses these questions. Results show that, in particular, local governments risk losing public trust for corruption. Nevertheless, the central government loses public trust due to unsatisfying economies. Both local and central governments lose public trust for poor performance regarding environmental protection, food safety problems, public health, and primary/middle school education. The central government cannot always avoid blame, depending on different policy issues. The results indicate that the perceived administrative responsibility of different levels of government affects citizens' evaluations of the performance of the central and local governments as well as their political trust.

Despite vast efforts to build the state, profound political order in rural Afghanistan is maintained by self-governing, customary organizations. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan explores the rules governing these organizations to explain why they can provide public goods. Instead of withering during decades of conflict, customary authority adapted to become more responsive and deliberative. Drawing on hundreds of interviews and observations from dozens of villages across Afghanistan, and statistical analysis of nationally representative surveys, Jennifer Murtazashvili demonstrates that such authority enhances citizen support for democracy, enabling the rule of law by providing citizens with a bulwark of defence against predatory state officials. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it shows that 'traditional' order does not impede the development of the state because even the most independent minded communities see a need for a central government - but question its effectiveness when it attempts to rule them directly and without substantive consultation.

DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL STATE STUDIES WAS MAINLY ROOTED IN ECONOMIC THEORY, WITH SOME INSIGHTS INTO SOCIAL PROBLEMS. THE AUTHOR ADVOCATES A MORE SYNTHETIC APPROACH IN WHICH IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF OPINION BUILDERS AND LEADERS ARE STRESSED. THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM IS USED AS AN EXAMPLE.