Discusses the history of cognitive science. Looks at the computational theory of the mind as a framework, the emergence of cognitive psychology, the evolution of artificial intelligence and biological aspects. (SJO)
In the historiography of the 20–30s of the XX century, the problem of the development of scientific centers, as well as the formation of scientific intelligentsia in the regions, began to take shape as an independent direction. In the North Caucasus, this problem was organically connected with the study of the natural productive forces of national regions and with the tasks of their economic development, which was determined by the course of the Soviet power. During these years, the first publications on the history of the organization of scientific re-search in the region began to be published. The scientific centers established in the North Caucasus planned their work on the basis of maximum connection with the economic, commercial and cultural needs of the na-tional regions. The prospective plans of research institutes included topics that were most relevant to the prac-tice of socialist construction in the national regions during the period under study.
Nearly thirty years after the first stirrings of the Kuhnian revolution, history and philosophy of science continues to galvanize methodological discussions in all corners of the academy except its own. Evidence for this domestic stagnation appears in Warren Schmaus's thoughtful review of Social Epistemology in which Schmaus takes for granted that history of science is the ultimate court of appeal for disputes between philosophers and sociologists. As against this, this essay argues that such disputes may be better treated by experimental psychology. Humanistic methods typically (though not always) blind the historian to cognitive biases and limitations that make it difficult for philosophers and sociologists to mobilize historical research for settling their differences. It is also observed that the failure of philosophers to incorporate the methods and findings of experiemental psychology is symptomatic of an artificially restrictive understanding of the normative dimension of their enterprise.