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The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Wisconsin through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry is a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates, state constitutional office candidates, and political party committees. In the 1987-88 election cycle, the tobacco industry directly contributed $9,079 to legislators and candidates. In the 1995-96 election cycle the tobacco industry directly contributed $41,125. A majority of tobacco industry campaign contributions to legislative candidates and political parties have shifted from the Democratic party to the Republican party. In the 1987-1988, 1989-1990, and 1991-1992 elections cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 47%, 30% and 44%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1993-1994 and 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 51% and 62%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. A relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she will support tobacco control efforts. Several health related groups, such as the Health and Hospital Association, the Wisconsin Association of HMOs, and the Employer Health Care Cooperative Alliance, are represented by many of the same lobbyists as the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Madison was the first city in Wisconsin to pass a smokefree restaurant ordinance. Middleton and Shorewood Heights, suburbs of Madison, have also passed smoke free restaurant ordinances. Attempts at other smokefree ordinances have failed. Fond du Lac passed a ban on self service displays in 1991. However, a state circuit court and a state appellate court ruled that a 1985 state law preempts localities from passing more stringent local ordinances regarding minors' access to tobacco. Tobacco control efforts in Wisconsin have been characterized by a series of isolated initiatives with little structure or institutional support. This failure of the public health community to develop an institutional base capable of following through on victories or retooling from defeats may explain the lack of progress in tobacco control in Wisconsin.

The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Pennsylvania through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates, state constitutional office candidates, and political party committees. In the 1979-1980 election cycle, the tobacco industry contributed $3,600 to candidates and parties. In 1995-1996, the tobacco industry contributed $65,850 to candidates and parties. A majority of tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates and political parties have shifted from the Democratic party to the Republican party. During the 1991-92 and 1993-1994 electoral cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 40% and 38%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 53% of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. A relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. Legislative behavior significantly influenced the level of tobacco industry contributions in 1993-1994, but did not in 1995-1996. Several health related groups, such as Abington Memorial Hospital, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Lehigh Valley Hospital and the Family Health Council are represented by lobbyists who also represent the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Pennsylvania was one of the first states to pass statewide legislation (the 1988 Clean Indoor Air Act) that preempts localities from enacting stronger clean indoor air ordinances than that of statewide law. Lower Merion township was the first locality in Pennsylvania to ban all cigarette vending machines in 1991. However, an injunction sought by local cigarette vending machine companies prevented Lower Merion from enforcing its ordinance. Although the constitutional merits of the case were never decided, the failure of health organizations and public officials to defend the ordinance and the threat of lawsuits by cigarette vending machine companies stopped the spread of ordinances that completely ban cigarette vending machines. The creation of the Uptown Coalition represented a significant broadening of the tobacco control community to explicitly include the African-American community, and represented the first time a specific tobacco brand was derailed in 1990. The Uptown Coalition remains active in Philadelphia local tobacco control efforts. Pennsylvania tobacco control organizations have unsuccessfully attempted to pass statewide youth access legislation. The inclusion of preemption in statewide youth access legislation has divided the Pennsylvania tobacco control community.

• After making substantial progress on tobacco control in the mid-1990s, the tobacco industry has stifled tobacco control activities in Washington through a mixture of campaign contributions and legal challenges. • Political campaign contributions have remained steadily high throughout the 1990s. Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, the Tobacco Institute, Lorillard, Brown & Williamson, and the Smokeless Tobacco Council contributed $362,298 to campaigns in 1996 through 2000 election cycles: $114,123 in the 1996 election cycle, $109,975 in 1998, and $138,200 in 2000. • From 1996-2000, 92% of these campaign contributions by the tobacco industry were to Republican candidates, party contributions, and soft money. • The largest lifetime recipients of campaign contributions were Clyde Ballard ($16,830, R-East Wenatchee), William Grant ($7,400, D-Franklin), Dan McDonald ($7,246, R-King), and Pat Scott ($5,490, D-Snohomish). Ballard and Grant are both powerful in the House leadership; Ballard is the Co-Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Grant is the House Democratic Caucus Chair. McDonald was the Majority Leader of the Senate from 1996-1999, and prior to that, he chaired the powerful Ways and Means Committee. • The tobacco industry has also spent heavily on lobbying; from 1996-2000, the industry spent $1,864,086 to lobby members of the legislature and the state administrative offices. This includes lobbyists' salaries and perks given to legislators such as holiday gifts, entertainment and meals. • Washington and its Attorney General, Christine Gregoire, played an active role in the state tobacco trials and subsequent 46 state settlement (known as the Master Settlement Agreement) in 1998. The legislature reserved $100 million of the settlement money for a new Department of Health tobacco control program. • Department of Health officials and health advocates had requested $26 million to begin the tobacco control program, but, because of pressure from the Republican members, the legislature only allocated $15 million for the first year, about half of what the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends for Washington State. • Attempts to pass local smoking regulations, with provisions stricter than the 1985 Clean Indoor Air Act, have been hampered by an ambiguous legal question about whether the Clean Indoor Air Act preempts local legislation. Puyallup, the only city attempting to pass a smokefree restaurant ordinance, rescinded it after being challenged with an industry-funded lawsuit without seeking a court ruling on the issue of preemption. The fact that the Attorney General's office has not issued a formal decision on this issue has contributed to the reluctance from local governments. This circumstance has allowed the tobacco industry to stop local clean indoor air regulations. • Spokane has adopted a voluntary approach to controlling secondhand smoke in restaurants with their Big Air Program. Many restaurants in the City and County of Spokane have become voluntarily smokefree since the program was initiated in 1996. Although city officials initiated their program independently, it is very similar to the tobacco industry's voluntary smoking regulations through their "accommodation" and "red light/green light" programs. • The industry has also orchestrated legal pressure to attack the federally-funded ASSIST tobacco control project with allegations of "illegal lobbying" and filed a complaint to the Public Disclosure Commission. While the ASSIST project has ended, the tobacco industry successfully used this experience to discourage health departments and advocates from using the policy process to promote tobacco control. • Several counties, including King, Snohomish, Pierce and Spokane passed outdoor and color advertising restrictions between 1996 and 1999. These measures abolished all outdoor billboards and restricted advertising in stores to small, black and white posters. The industry supported challenges that overturned these restrictions on the grounds that they were preempted by federal law and a violation of the First Amendment. The industry prevailed in the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the defendants agreed not to appeal in exchange for the industry not demanding that its legal fees be paid. This situation has stopped similar legislation in Washington. Similar laws were upheld elsewhere in the United States and as of early 2001 the issue was under review at the US Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court upholds such laws, Washington authorities may seek to reinstate them. • Health advocates, who could play a decisive role in anti-tobacco campaigns, have been hindered by the lack of a continuously functioning statewide coalition in Washington. The former group, Tobacco Free Washington Coalition, was funded in large part by a grant from ASSIST. Without ASSIST funding, the statewide coalition could not procure the resources to continue operations. Many advocates limited their efforts to smaller, local coalitions which dilutes their strength as a statewide lobbying force. A new group, Washington Alliance for Tobacco Control and Children's Health (WATCH), was created in 1998 to replace Tobacco Free Washington. They are a broad-based coalition funded by their member organizations. They lobbied in 1999 to ensure that money from the tobacco settlement went to fund health services and that the Department of Health's tobacco programs received adequate funding. • WATCH, together with the Washington Restaurant Association, sponsored Senate Bill 5993 which passed the Senate in March 2001. The bill would ensure more smokefree restaurants, but it has several flaws including exceptions for restaurants where minors are prohibited and the creation of a task force to study ventilation systems. The tobacco industry often advocates ventilation systems to dilute smokefree restaurant legislation and perpetuate controversy around the fact that no ventilation system can completely remove secondhand smoke from an enclosed environment. • In general, the tobacco industry has succeeded in stalling tobacco control efforts in Washington State. Although advocates, local public health officials, the Department of Health, the Attorney General, and some influential members of the legislature are all in favor of broad-based, fully funded, tobacco control education programs and increased Clean Indoor Air legislation, these advocates have not mobilized the resources necessary to overcome the legal and political impediments the industry has created.

The tobacco industry has been active in Texas politics for over 25 years. It spends money on lobbying, campaign contributions, legislative events and gifts in order to gain favor with the legislature and attempt to control the agenda set for tobacco control efforts. Political campaign contributions–reported only by Philip Morris–have remained high throughout the 1990s. Philip Morris reported contributing $556,250 to legislative, judicial and statewide candidates between 1988 and 2001. In recent years, their contributions to statewide officeholders and judicial candidates have decreased as their legislative contributions have increased. In each election cycle, 1998-1999 and 2000- 2001, Philip Morris contributed $51,000 to legislative candidates. The 3 largest lifetime recipients of campaign contributions in the legislature were all Senators: David Cain ($8,250, D-Mesquite), Ken Armbrister ($5,500, D-Victoria), and Chris Harris ($5,500, R-Arlington). The largest recipient of tobacco money from the statewide offices was former Lt. Governor Bob Bullock who received $36,500 from the tobacco industry from 1988-1996. The tobacco industry has also spent heavily on lobbying, although it is impossible to calculate the exact amounts. When lobbyists' report their fees to the Texas Ethics Commission, they are only required to report a fee range for each of their clients, not the exact amount that they were paid by each client. For example, a lobbyist would select between the ranges of $0-$10,000, $10-$25,000, $25-$50,000, etc. However, given these estimates, we can determine that from 1993-2001, the tobacco industry spent between $4,660,000-$9,640,000 on lobbyists' fees to influence the legislature. Texas' only statewide tobacco control laws are Senate Bill 55 (by Senator Zaffarini, DLaredo) and House Bill 119 (by Rep. Hirschi, D-Wichita Falls), both passed during the 1997 legislative session. SB 55 is the "Texas Tobacco Law" which establishes strict penalties for retailers who sell tobacco to minors and for minors in possession of tobacco products. The tobacco industry fought heavily against the legislation. The provisions in SB 55 which impose penalties upon minors are controversial among public health advocates because they distract attention from retailers and clerks who sell tobacco to minors. HB 119 is an ingredient disclosure bill, requiring manufacturers who sell tobacco products in Texas to report their ingredients to the Texas Department of Health. The tobacco industry uses allies like the Texas Restaurant Association, the Texas Retailers Association and the Texas Association of Business and Chambers of Commerce (TABCC) in order to shield its involvement in tobacco control issues. Restaurant owners are mobilized to oppose smoking restrictions and retailers testify against youth access and advertising restrictions. The TABCC opposed the state's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, with coaching on the issue from tobacco industry lobbyists. The tobacco industry has partnered with and heavily sponsored the activities of the Texas Civil Justice League (TCJL) in order to enact tort reform legislation which protects the industry from prosecution. In the tort reform and products liability legislation during the 1993 and 1995 sessions, the tobacco industry and TCJL limited punitive damage awards and the rights of plaintiffs to sue the tobacco industry for smoking-related illnesses. In 1996, then- Attorney General Dan Morales was the third Attorney General to sue the tobacco industry. He settled the case in 1998, prior to the 46 state settlement known as the Master Settlement Agreement. Texas' suit against the industry resulted in a $17.3 billion dollar settlement. From the money that the state has received as of 2001 ($1.8 billion), only $30 million has been spent on tobacco control programs from 1999-2001. In 1999, the state legislature deposited $200 million into a tobacco trust fund to be used for statewide tobacco control programs. However, the legislature only allowed for the interest on that money to be spent for tobacco control (about $9 million annually). The Texas Department of Health, charged with developing a tobacco control program with that small amount of money, was required to focus their efforts in East Texas. The Texas Department of Health comprehensive tobacco control program has been very successful, however, their attempts to secure more funding and expand the program statewide have failed. In 2001, the Legislature only increased funding for the program to $12 million annually. The Centers for Disease Control's Best Practices recommends that a state with the size and population of Texas should spend between $103 million - $180 million annually for an effective tobacco control program. Texas' only statewide smoking regulations, the 1975 Clean Indoor Air Act, sets up minimum standards for smoke-free public places. All of the state's effective smoking regulations have been passed by local governments. Most of the regulations simply establish smoking and nonsmoking sections in workplaces and restaurants. In recent years, several communities, including some surrounding the state capitol in Austin and the West Texas town of El Paso, establish 100% smoke-free public places, including workplaces and restaurants. El Paso's smoking ordinance, passed in 2001, also establishes smoke-free bars, the first ordinance of its kind in Texas. Beginning with the initiative of a sixth grade student, Lubbock enacted a strong clean indoor air ordinance. The tobacco industry, working with the Restaurant Association and Libertarians, opposed the ordinance. After the city council enacted the ordinance, the Libertarians forced a referendum. Tobacco control advocates mounted a vigorous defense and the ordinance was ratified by voters in May, 2002, with 64% voting for it. While tobacco control advocates, generally working through the voluntary health agencies, are showing increasing aggressiveness and effectiveness in working at the local level, they are still unwilling to confront the tobacco industry's allies in the state legislature, which explains their failure to force Texas to mount a strong state tobacco control program despite the millions of dollars made available by the state's tobacco settlement.

Розкривається зміст концепту «виборча фреквенція». Визначено, що виборча фреквенція – базовий і наймасовіший рівень непрофесійної політичної діяльності, визначає ступінь реального впливу виборців на діяльність інституційних і персоніфікованих суб'єктів політичної влади. Як індикатор політичної активності виборча фреквенція фіксує участь громадян у голосуванні на виборах як осіб, що володіють активним виборчим правом. Виборча фреквенція передбачає не тільки голосування за певного кандидата (кандидатів) чи партію (блок партій); вона може також передбачати і протестне голосування («проти всіх»), якщо це дозволяє існуюча виборча система, і неголосування (навмисне чи ненавмисне псування виборчого бюлетеня, ухилення від опускання бюлетеня в скриню тощо).Встановлено, що обсяг виборчої фреквенції залежить від політичного режиму, форми правління та рівня виборів. Визначено, що для демократичних країн притаманна автономна форма виборчої фреквенції, а для недемократичних – мобілізаційна. Прослідковано, що найвищий показник участі у голосуванні спостерігається в країнах з парламентською формою правління та пропорційною виборчою системою, більше 2/3 виборчої фреквенції спостерігається в країнах з парламентською формою правління та мажоритарними виборчими системами, найнижчий рівень виборчої фреквенції спостерігається в країнах з президентською формою правління. Також зазначається, що підвищена виборча фреквенція спостерігається в країнах, де встановлено обов'язкове голосування. Зафіксована тенденція щодо залежності виборчої фреквенції та рівня виборів: електоральна активність на виборах у місцеві, регіональні і наднаціональні представницькі органи влади значно нижча, ніж на президентських та парламентських виборах.Звертається увага на доцільність при поясненні виборчої фреквенції враховувати як раціональні, так і нераціональні чинники, оскільки голосування являє собою дворівневий процес: активна, політично визначена частина виборців голосує партійно-ідеологічно, а політично незаангажована – раціонально. ; Reveal the specifics of the concept of «voting frequentia». Determined that the voting frequentia is basic and the most massive non-professional level of political activity, determines the degree of real influence voters in the activities of institutional actors and personalized political power. As an indicator of the political activity of voting frequentia captures citizens' participation in voting in elections as individuals with active suffrage. Voting frequentia involves not only vote for a particular candidate (candidates) or party (Bloc), it may also provide and protest vote («against all»), if it allows the existing electoral system, and non-voting (intentionally or unintentionally damaged ballot, avoiding dropping the ballot into the ballot box, etc.).Found that the amount of voting frequentia depends on the political regime, the form of government and the level elections. Determined that democracies characterized by an autonomous form of voting frequentia and for undemocratic – mobilizational form of voting frequentia. Followed that the highest rate of participation in voting observed in countries with a parliamentary form of government and proportional electoral system, more than 2/3 of the voting frequentia observed in countries with a parliamentary form of government and majoritarian electoral systems, lowest level of voting frequentia observed in countries with a presidential form of government. It also notes that increased voting frequentia observed in countries where compulsory voting is set. Observed trend of dependency and level elections: electoral activity of elections on the local, regional and supra-national representative authority is much lower than in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Attention is drawn to in explaining the voting frequentia considered rational and irrational factors, since voting is a two-tiered process: active, politically defined part of the voters voted party ideologically and politically unbiased – rationally.

In this review, we provide a framework for understanding both the predictors and approaches of CPA that firms undertake to achieve their objectives. We identify the predictors of CPA and classify them into two distinct categories: internal and external. In addition, we suggest that CPA approaches will vary depending on the firm's goal to either manage or mitigate regulation and legislation as compared to attempting to pass new bills into law. We conclude by suggesting several future CPA research directions for management scholars.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the cultural dimensions of corporate political activity (CPA).Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a qualitative research design. Data collected from interviews conducted with the Brussels‐based Government Affairs Managers of French and British firms are analysed to examine the impact of national culture on their objectives and preferred political strategies.FindingsThe findings suggest possible relationships between the cultural dimensions elaborated by Hofstede and the different components of corporate political action: uncertainty avoidance can help explain managers' objectives when becoming politically active; the long‐term vs short‐term dimension can account for their general approaches to political activity; their level of participation in the political process can be explained by the individualism vs collectivism dimension; and their choices of specific lobbying tactics and techniques can be explained in terms of power distance.Practical implicationsAs firms increasingly interact with foreign rivals when seeking to influence policy outcomes, knowing that corporate political strategies are in part culturally grounded can help Government Affairs Managers to anticipate, respond to and act on the strategies pursued by firms socialised in other national cultures.Originality/valueWhile previous mainstream research into CPA is based largely on universal theories, the primary contribution of the paper is to introduce national culture as a variable to explain cross‐country differences in the types and processes of firms' political activities.

In their pursuit of competitive advantage, firms will sometimes engage in politics. In this dissertation, I build on a resource-dependence understanding of business-government relations to answer the following questions: (1) what are the antecedents of corporate political activity (CPA)?

POLITICAL TERRORISM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS VIOLENT POLITICAL BEHAVIOR PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO GENERATE FEAR IN THE COMMUNITY, OR A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF IT, FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.1 POLITICAL TERRORISM IS DISTINGUISHED FROM REVOLUTION IN THAT THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF TERRORIST ACTS IS INTIMIDATION RATHER THAN THE OVERTHROW OF THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT. TERRORISM IS A FORM OF POLITICAL EXTORTION. POSITIVE THEORIES OF CRIME2 AND EXTORTION3 ASSUME THAT INDIVIDUALS WILL ACT TO MAXIMIZE SOME OBJECTIVE FUNCTION SUBJECT TO EXISTING SOCIAL OR LEGAL CONSTRAINTS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO PARALLEL TO THESE POSITIVE APPROACHES AIMED DIRECTLY AT THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL TERRORISM.

This article examines the emergence of broad-based organizing in the UK and the importance given to political activity within community development. Popularly associated with Saul Alinsky and the work of the Industrial Areas Foundation, the translation from the USA has been problematic. With the emergence and sustained growth of 'London Citizens', now one of the largest citizen-based organizations in the country, a firmer foothold has been established. The article examines the central concepts underpinning the political and philosophical basis of broad-based organizing and explores some of the challenges involved in developing and sustaining an approach that is overtly political and utilizes conflict and direct action to engage and negotiate with established power. At a time when the neo-liberal agenda has had a depoliticizing effect upon community development, this provides a model that challenges current orthodoxy associated with 'partnership' and 'empowerment' and reasserts the centrality of power and politics in promoting change and social reform.