Suchergebnisse

Im Beitrag wird untersucht, wo eine konkrete republikanische Analyse postnationalen Regierens ansetzen kann. Der republikanische Theorieapparat erscheint als durchaus geeignet, auch für die jüngsten Veränderungen politischer Systeme einen Rahmen zur normativen Erörterung zu stellen. Er lässt sich hinreichend differenziert ausarbeiten und verspricht einen analytischen Mehrwert gegenüber im Diskurs etablierten demokratietheoretischen Positionen. Wichtig ist diesbezüglich, dass republikanische Theorien sich nicht auf die nostalgische Reproduktion der legitimatorischen Maßstäbe und Verständnisse überkommener Gemeinschaften versteifen, sondern vielmehr, dass in ihnen das institutionelle Potential reflektiert wird, welches im langen Nachdenken über freiheitliche Ordnungen herausgebildet wurde. Der Fokus auf öffentlicher Freiheit und dem Austragen von Differenz ergibt eine von den liberalen und deliberativen Demokratietheorien absetzbare Perspektive, in der ein positiv besetztes Konfliktverständnis an die Stelle der Suche nach gerechten oder konsensfähigen Lösungen tritt. Ein weiteres Ausarbeiten des republikanischen Instrumentariums kann insofern helfen, die gegenwärtig herrschende konzeptionelle Erschöpfung des überstaatlichen Demokratie- und Legitimationsdiskurses aufzubrechen.

Buzan, Barry ; Diez, Thomas: The European Union and Turkey. - In: Survival (Oxford). - 41 (Spring 1999) 1. - S. 41-57

Part I: Approaches to analysis -- Part II: Country studies -- Part III: Policy studies -- Part IV: Conclusion

This study explores the formation of the European Union's tax policy and asks why member states did not raise objections to it. The author's analysis is enriched by two further levels of inquiry. Firstly, he examines the 'Europeanization' of domestic tax policy in Italy and the UK, asking how domestic policy has changed and what is meant by 'Europeanization'. Secondly, he puts the European Union tax policy in the wider context of tax globalization. Will the liberalization of capital movement, tax havens and the flexibility of multinationals in managing their taxable incomes wreck the European

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 -- Re-Colonization by Means of Economic Globalization -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Economic Globalization -- 1.3. Colonialism and Neocolonialism -- 1.4. Is Law the Means for the Re-Colonization in Globalization? -- 1.5. Colonization via Globalization -- 1.6. Money and Competition in Re-Colonization -- 1.7. Electronic Technology in Re-Colonization -- 1.8. MNEs in Re-Colonization -- Conclusion -- Chapter 2 -- The Global Economic Background -- 2.1. Law in Globalization -- 2.2. Legal Systems and Justice -- 2.3. The Rule of Law in Globalization -- 2.4. The Role of Legal Factors -- 2.5. Networks and Logistics -- 2.6. Financial Globalization and Crisis Management -- 2.7. Financial Crisis Developments -- 2.8. Reorganizing Financial Globalization -- 2.9. Markets Globalization and Global Financial Markets -- 2.10. Competition and Stability -- 2.11. Corporate Governance of Banks and the Financial Crisis -- 2.12. Banking Globalization and International Flows -- 2.13. Bank Regulation and Securitization -- 2.14. Basel I, II, III Regulations -- 2.15. Bank Resolution and European Banking Union -- 2.16. Banks and Competition -- 2.17. Finance and Dollarization -- 2.18. Finance and EU -- 2.19. Competition Law in EU -- 2.20. Corporate Governance in EU -- 2.21. MNEs and Taxation -- 2.22. Electronic Commerce -- Chapter 3 -- Federations' Background and the United States of Europe -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Characteristics of Federations -- 3.3. Federalism and Democracy -- 3.4. U.S. Model Federalism -- 3.5. Creation of Indian Federation -- 3.6. Chinese Federation -- 3.7. Australian Federal System -- 3.8. The EU Course towards Federation or Not -- 3.9. Politics Overruled the Rule of Law in the Continent of Europe -- 3.9.1. Introduction -- 3.9.2. Legal Globalization -- 3.9.3. The Advancement of Law

In 2003, in Salonica, Balkan countries were told that "their future lies in the EU". The Berlin process in 2014 provided a framework for a period of four years. In 2017, President Juncker, speaking of all non-EU Balkan countries except Turkey, estimated the first accessions would potentially take place in 2025! The Berlin process seeks to restore stability in the Balkans by leading to reconciliation. It includes new fact-finding commissions to establish the real facts in order to restore friendly relations, efforts to build economic links in transport and communication and new roads, establishment of a Western Balkan Common Market as a new partner for the EU, EFTA, and the EEA, and a new partnership among its member countries. The European Council will meet the Balkan heads of state in Sofia, Bulgaria, in April 2018. Without stability in the Balkans, there cannot be a stable Europe. In this paper we look at how to keep the Berlin process open and successful, possibly to accelerate it, and how to overcome current challenges. Notably, we look at the "deterioration of democratic standards" in some countries, which will have to be stopped and reversed. The conclusions support positive decision-making outcomes at all levels.

In 2003, in Salonica, Balkan countries were told that "their future lies in the EU". The Berlin process in 2014 provided a framework for a period of four years. In 2017, President Juncker, speaking of all non-EU Balkan countries except Turkey, estimated the first accessions would potentially take place in 2025! The Berlin process seeks to restore stability in the Balkans by leading to reconciliation. It includes new fact-finding commissions to establish the real facts in order to restore friendly relations, efforts to build economic links in transport and communication and new roads, establishment of a Western Balkan Common Market as a new partner for the EU, EFTA, and the EEA, and a new partnership among its member countries. The European Council will meet the Balkan heads of state in Sofia, Bulgaria, in April 2018. Without stability in the Balkans, there cannot be a stable Europe. In this paper we look at how to keep the Berlin process open and successful, possibly to accelerate it, and how to overcome current challenges. Notably, we look at the "deterioration of democratic standards" in some countries, which will have to be stopped and reversed. The conclusions support positive decision-making outcomes at all levels