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The December 2018 Global Compact on Refugees reaffirmed the inter­national community's commitment to refugee protection - yet willing­ness to accept refugees is in decline globally.
No progress has been seen in the search for viable modes of responsibility-sharing. With the exception of Germany, all the main host countries are middle-income or developing countries.
In a situation where more people are forced to leave their homes than are able to return every year, the more affluent countries must shoulder more responsibility. That would mean pledging more resettlement places and increasing public and private funding to relieve the poorer host countries. Aid organisations regularly find themselves faced with funding shortfalls. As the second-largest donor of humanitarian and development funding, Germany should campaign internationally to expand the available finan­cial resources and improve the efficiency of their use. None of the new funding ideas will master the multitude of demands on their own. New and pre-existing financing instruments should therefore be combined.
The German government should collect experiences with the different funding approaches in its new Expert Commission on the Root Causes of Forced Displacement (Fachkommission Fluchtursachen). The Global Refugee Forum, which meets for the first time in December 2019, pro­vides an opportunity to start a discussion on new ways of mobilising the required funds for international refugee protection. (author's abstract)

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have exerted a profound influence on the scope and dictates of international law. NGOs have fostered treaties, promoted the creation of new international organizations (IOs), and lobbied in national capitals to gain consent to stronger international rules. A decade ago, Antonio Donini, writing about the United Nations, declared that "the Temple of States would be a rather dull place without nongovernmental organisations." His observation was apt and is suggestive of a more general thesis: had NGOs never existed, international law would have a less vital role in human progress.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Vorwort -- Inhaltsverzeichnis -- Literaturverzeichnis -- 1. Teil: Einleitung -- 1. Abschnitt: Die Bedeutung internationaler Sportveranstaltungen -- 2. Abschnitt: Diskussionen um die Vergabe internationaler Sportveranstaltungen -- 3. Abschnitt: Gegenstand der Untersuchung -- 4. Abschnitt: Gang der Untersuchung -- 2. Teil: Anwendbarkeit des Unionsrechts -- 1. Abschnitt: Geltungsbereich der Grundfreiheiten -- A. Auslegung der Grundfreiheiten im Hinblick auf ihre extraterritoriale Wirkung -- B. Völkerrechtliche Vorgaben

Great art is often assumed to symbolize a state's cultural level, & is often used for diplomatic reasons as evidence of cultural accords among states, especially when they have been previously antagonistic. Here, several politically motivated museum exchange exhibitions are analyzed, in terms of the varying political agendas of the US vis-a-vis Japan, Egypt, China, the USSR, & the Vatican. Any propagandistic effects are found to depend on the aesthetic -- ie, the apolitical -- qualities of the artworks themselves. If art is to be politically useful, it must transcend politics. 38 References. AA

METHODOLOGICAL FALSIFICATIONISM HAS BEEN OFFERED AS THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES ON THREE ASPECTS OF THIS "PROGRAM": THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERDEPENDENT DEDUCTION, THE FALSIFIABILITY CRITERION AND THE CRITICAL TESTING POLICY. THE AUTHOR FINDS THE SCIENTIFIC THEORY LACKING IN METAPHYSICS.

AbstractThe proponents of international courts (ICs) expect that creating formal legal institutions will help to increase respect for international law. International relations scholars question such claims, since ICs have no tools to compel state compliance. Such views are premised on the notion that states have unique preferences that ICs must satisfy in order to be effective. The tipping point argument is premised on the notion that within each state are actors with numerous conflicting preferences. ICs can act as tipping point actors, building and giving resources to compliance constituencies—coalitions of actors within and outside of states—that favour policies that happen to also be congruent with international law.