Modern societies are associated with the constant flow and acceptance of information and communication technologies at home, in the workplace, in the process of education, even in recreational activities. The development of new technologies has not only challenged human rights, but also politics and society in general. Even more importantly, this new technological level has also empowered transnational corporations operating in the digital environment as hosting providers to perform quasi-public functions in the transnational context. New technologies have the potential to make significant positive contributions to the prevention, promotion, and protection of human rights and democratization, decentralization, and digitalization of politics and the advancement of society as a whole.
This comparative study looks into the proposed "vaccine passport" initiative from various human rights aspects. The findings are based on responses to questions put to the network members by the authors of this study in February 2021 (questions attached in Annex I). The study concentrated on the availability of a legal framework for the proposed "vaccine passport", whether such a "!passport" would create binding obligations in the public and private sectors or, alternatively, what would be the scope of discretion allowed to public and private entities to make their decisions affecting rights holders' access to various services.
This article defines the term "cloud computing". The operation of this technology is close to the scope of government regulation, but to date no specific rules and regulations have been created to address the problems associated with the use of cloud technologies. The use of cloud technology requires collaboration between government, industry and private users. The issues of interaction between the service provider and the user are outlined. Keywords: cloud technology, cloud computing, legal system, legislation, privacy. References1. Юдін О.К. Хмарні технології організації інтегрованих корпоративних мереж / О.К. Юдін, Р.В. Зюбіна // Інформаційна безпека.- 2013 - Т.11. - №.3. - С.112-127.2. 2013 BSA Global Cloud Computing Scorecard [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу: http://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2013/assets/PDFs/BSA_GlobalCloudScorecard2013.pdf (2.02.20).3. Про схвалення Стратегії розвитку інформаційного суспільства в Україні: Розпорядження Кабінет Міністрів України No 386-р від 15.05.2013 р. [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу : http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua//laws/show/386-2013-р. (2.02.2020).4. Юдін О.К. Захист інформації в мережах передачі даних/ О.К. Юдін, О.Г. Корченко, Г.Ф. Конахович.- К.: Вид-во ТОВ НВП «Інтерсервіс». - 2009. – 716 c. ; В данной статье определен термин «облачные вычисления». Функционирование данной технологии близкий к сфере государственного регулирования, но на сегодняшний день не созданы специальные нормы и законодательные акты урегулирования проблем, связанных с использованием облачных технологий. Использование облачных технологий требует сотрудничества между правительством, промышленностью и частными пользователями. Определены проблематику взаимодействия поставщика услуг и пользователя. Ключевые слова: облачные технологии, облачные вычисления, правовая система, законодательство, конфиденциальность. Список использованной литературы1. Юдін О.К. Хмарні технології організації інтегрованих корпоративних мереж / О.К. Юдін, Р.В. Зюбіна // Інформаційна безпека.- 2013 - Т.11. - №.3. - С.112-127.2. 2013 BSA Global Cloud Computing Scorecard [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу: http://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2013/assets/PDFs/BSA_GlobalCloudScorecard2013.pdf (2.02.20).3. Про схвалення Стратегії розвитку інформаційного суспільства в Україні: Розпорядження Кабінет Міністрів України No 386-р від 15.05.2013 р. [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу : http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua//laws/show/386-2013-р. (2.02.2020).4. Юдін О.К. Захист інформації в мережах передачі даних/ О.К. Юдін, О.Г. Корченко, Г.Ф. Конахович.- К.: Вид-во ТОВ НВП «Інтерсервіс». - 2009. – 716 c. ; У даній статті визначено термін «хмарні обчислення». Функціонування даної технології близьке до сфери державного регулювання, але на сьогоднішній день не створені спеціальні норми й законодавчі акти врегулювання проблем, пов'язаних з використанням хмарних технологій. Використання хмарних технологій потребує співпраці між урядом, промисловістю і приватними користувачами. Окреслено проблематику взаємодії постачальника послуг і користувача. Ключові слова: хмарні технології, хмарні обчислення, правова система, законодавство, конфіденційність. Список використаної літератури1. Юдін О.К. Хмарні технології організації інтегрованих корпоративних мереж / О.К. Юдін, Р.В. Зюбіна // Інформаційна безпека.- 2013 - Т.11. - №.3. - С.112-127.2. 2013 BSA Global Cloud Computing Scorecard [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу: http://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2013/assets/PDFs/BSA_GlobalCloudScorecard2013.pdf (2.02.20).3. Про схвалення Стратегії розвитку інформаційного суспільства в Україні: Розпорядження Кабінет Міністрів України No 386-р від 15.05.2013 р. [Електронний ресурс]. — Режим доступу : http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua//laws/show/386-2013-р. (2.02.2020).4. Юдін О.К. Захист інформації в мережах передачі даних/ О.К. Юдін, О.Г. Корченко, Г.Ф. Конахович.- К.: Вид-во ТОВ НВП «Інтерсервіс». - 2009. – 716 c.
Parina Hassanaly,1 Jean Charles Dufour2 1Aix Marseille Université, Inserm, IRD, SESSTIM, Sciences Economiques & Sociales de la Santé & Traitement de l'Information Médicale, ISSPAM, Marseille, France; 2Aix Marseille Université, APHM, Inserm, IRD, SESSTIM, Sciences Economiques & Sociales de la Santé & Traitement de l'Information Médicale, ISSPAM, Hop Timone, BioSTIC, Biostatistique et Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication, Marseille, FranceCorrespondence: Parina HassanalyAix Marseille Université, Faculté de Médecine, 27 Boulevard Jean Moulin, Marseille, 13005, FranceTel +33 491 324772Email parina.hassanaly@univ-amu.frIntroduction: Mobile health (mHealth) is now considered an important approach to extend traditional health services and to meet the growing medical needs. The prescribability of mHealth applications is a complex problem because it depends on a large number of factors and concerns a wide range of disciplines and actors in the industrial, health, normative, and regulatory domains.Objective: Our study correlated data from the scientific literature with data on regulatory developments in the United States, the European Union, and France with the aim of identifying the conditions for the prescription of mHealth applications.Methods: The search method adopted was the systematic literature review process by Brereton et al. All empirical evidence from the relevant fields of study was gathered and then evaluated to answer our predefined research questions. The WoS and PubMed databases were queried for the period between 1 January 1975 and 30 November 2020. A total of 165 articles (15 with a direct focus and 150 with an indirect focus on mHealth prescribing) were analyzed/cross-referenced. The ScienceDirect database was consulted to complement the collected data when needed. Data published by international and national regulatory bodies were analyzed in light of the scientific data obtained from the WoS, PubMed, and ScienceDirect databases.Results: The International Medical Device Regulators Forum has ensured the international structuring of the regulatory field in collaboration with participating countries. The creation and updating of databases have allowed the tracking of medical device versions/upgrades and incidents. The regulatory organizations of the United States, the European Union, and France are currently consulting healthcare personnel, manufacturers, and patients to establish evaluation criteria for usability and quality of instructions for use that take into consideration patients' level of literacy. These organizations are also providing support to manufacturers who wish to file marketing applications. Marketing, privacy, and cybersecurity measures are evolving with developments in technology and state cooperation policies. The prescription of mHealth applications will gain social acceptance only if consistency and coordination are ensured at all stages of the process: from pre-design, through verification of medical effectiveness, to ethical consideration during data collection and use, and on to marketing.Conclusion: The conditions for mHealth prescribability include the adaptation of international regulation by the different states, the state provision of marketing support, and the evaluation of mHealth applications. For mHealth to gain social acceptance, increased collaboration among physicians, manufacturers, and "information technology stakeholders†is needed. Once this is achieved, MHealth can become the cornerstone of successful health care reform.Keywords: national and international laws and regulations, medical device, evaluation of technologies, mHealth, prescription feasibility
En un contexto social donde los dispositivos electrónicos y la conectividad están a la orden del dia, la UE se decide en 2016 a regular el uso de los datos personales con tal de ofrecer una eficaz protección al ciudadano, al mismo tiempo que ofrecer a las entidades la posibilidad de tratarlos y fomentar un mercado único digital europeo. Ante el nuevo marco legislativo, las entidades que tratan los datos personales deben afrontar nuevos cambios. Este trabajo focaliza la atención en la comunicación de los datos personales entre entidades para realizar un ejercicio de análisis de los mismos para obtener un valor añadido. Así, se abordarán las exigencias que el Reglamento 2016/679 juntamente con la normativa estatal plantean a tales entidades, modificando por ejemplo, las condiciones del consentimiento, exigiendo una actitud proactiva en materia de garantizar la protección de datos etc. En un enfoque más práctico, se abordan cuestiones como las bases legitimadoras del tratamiento, el tratamiento que se realiza, y las finalidades que persiguen, para analizar las políticas de privacidad tomadas por diferentes empresas líderes. ; In a social enviroment where electronic devices and connectivity are on our dayly basis, the EU decides in 2016 to regulate the use of personal data in order to offer effective protection to citizens, while at the same time giving entities the possibility of processing them and promoting an European digital single market. In view of the new legislative framework, entities that process personal data must face new changes. This study focuses on the communication of personal data between entities in order to carry out an exercise of analysis to obtain an added value. In that whay, the requirements that Regulation 2016/679 together with the state regulations impose to such entities will be aproched, modifying, for example, the conditions of consent, requiring a proactive attitude in terms of guaranteeing data protection, etc. In a more practical approach, issues such as the legitimacy of the processing, the processing carried out, and the objective pursued, will be addressed in order to analyse the privacy policies adopted by different leading companies. ; En un context social on els dispositius electrònics i la connectivitat formen part de la nostre vida, la UE decideix el 2016 regular l'ús de les dades personals amb l'objectiu de oferir una protecció eficaç al ciutadà, i a l'hora oferir a les entitats la possibilitat de tractar-los i fomentar un mercat digital europeu únic. Front el nou marc legislatiu, les entitats que tracten les dades personals han d'afrontar nous canvis. Aquest treball focalitza la atenció en la comunicació de dades personals entre entitats per realitzar un exercici de anàlisis d'aquests i obtenir un valor afegit. Així doncs, s'abordaran las exigències que el Reglament 2016/679 juntament amb la normativa estatal plantegen a les entitats modificant, per exemple, les condicions del consentiment, exigint una actitud proactiva en matèria de garantir la protecció de dades etc. Amb una perspectiva més pràctica, s'examinaran qüestions com les bases legitimadores del tractament, el tractament que es realitza, i les finalitats que es persegueixen, per analitzar les polítiques de privacitat adoptades per diferents empreses líders.
The regulation of film exhibition in Iceland has closely shadowed the history of cinema exhibition itself. Although regulation practices have undergone various shifts and realignments throughout the twentieth century, they retained certain core concerns and a basic ideological imperative having to do with child protection and child welfare. Movies were thought to have a disproportionate impact on children, with "impressionable minds" often being invoked. Their interior lives and successful journey towards maturity were put at risk each and every time they encountered unsuitable filmic materials. Thus, while assuming that adults could fend for them-selves among the limited number of theaters in Reykjavík, children were a whole another matter and required protection. Civic bodies were consequently formed and empowered to evaluate and regulate films. But even in the context of fairly rigorous surveillance and codification, the turn taken by regulatory authorities in the 1980s strikes one as exceptional and unprecedented. The Film Certification Board (TFCB) was, for the first time, authorized to prohibit and suppress from distribution films deemed especially malignant and harmful. Motivating this vast expansion of the powers of the regulatory body were concerns about a variety of exploitation and horror films that were being distributed on video, films that were thought to transgress so erroneously in terms of on-screen violence that their mere existence posed a grave threat to children. Two years after finding its role so radical-ly enlarged, TFCB put together a list of 67 "video-nasties", to borrow a term from the very similar but later moral panic that occurred in Britain. Police raids were conducted and every video store in the country was visited in a nation-wide effort to remove the now illegal films from rental stores. This article posits that the icelandic nasties list can be viewed as something of a unique testament to the extent to which the meaning, aesthetic coherence and the affect of cultural objects is constructed in the process of reception, while also main-taining that the process of reception is thoroughly shaped by historical discourses, social class, embedded moral codes and a social system of values, as well as techno-logical progress. in what amounts to a perfect storm of moralizing, political games-manship and the sheer panic of a certain segment of the population, the governing institutions in iceland managed in the span of months to overturn constitutionally protected rights to free speech and privacy, as well as undermine central principles of the republic. Two decades would pass before these setbacks were recuperated, and then only on a legal and institutional level. While analyzing the history of the icelandic video nasties, the article also attempts to grapple with and articulate the symbolic register of the ban, how it speaks to the status of cinema in Iceland at the close of the twentieth century, and what ideological strains, morals and/or values were being put into play and funneled into this particular debate. Then, to close, the role of the most notorious of the nasties, Cannibal Holocaust (Ruggero Deodato, 1980), is examined in the context of media coverage and parliamentary debates at the time.
The right to the protection of personal data, which is part of the right to privacy, is a fundamental human right. Thus, its guarantees were included in the high-level regulations of the European Union as well as the legal norms of the EU Member States. The first Polish law regulating the protection of personal data was adopted in 1997 as the implementation of EU Directive 95/46. The law imposed a number of obligations on public and private entities which process personal data in order to protect the rights of data subjects and, in particular, to guarantee them the ability to control the correctness of processing of their personal data. Therefore, the law obliged data controllers to process data only on the basis of the premises indicated in the legislation, to adequately secure data, and to comply with the disclosure obligation concerning data subjects, including their right to correct false or outdated data or to request removal of data processed in violation of the law. However, as complaints directed by citizens to the supervisory body—the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection—showed, personal data controllers, especially those operating in the private sector, did not comply with the law, acting in a manner that violated their customers' rights. In the hitherto existing unfair business practices of entrepreneurs, the violations of the data protection provisions that were the most burdensome for customers were related to preventing them from exercising their rights, including the right to control the processing of data, as well as the failure to provide the controller's business address, which made it impossible for subjects whose data were used in violation of the law or for the inspecting authorities to contact the company, a lack of data security and a failure to follow the procedures required by law, the failure to secure documents containing personal data or their abandonment, a lack of updating customer data, the use of unverified data sets and sending marketing offers to deceased people or incorrect target recipients, and excessive amounts of data requested by controllers. The violations of the rights of data subjects recorded in Poland and other EU Member States—among other arguments—provided inspiration for the preparation of a new legal act in the form of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (which entered into force on 25 May 2018). The extension of the rights of people whose data are processed was combined in the GDPR with the introduction of new legal instruments disciplining data controllers. Instruments in the form of administrative fines and the strongly emphasised possibility to demand compensation for a violation of the right to data protection were directed in particular against economic entities violating the law. ; Publication of English-language versions of the volumes of the "Annales. Ethics in Economic Life" financed through contract no. 501/1/P-DUN/2017 from the funds of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education devoted to the promotion of scholarship.
Nowadays society tends to be more and more technologically evolved, with that a lot of personal information is shared with computational systems through online records; microphones that perform voice recognition in which it is processed remotely; application of filters on person portraits or recognition of the age at which the image is saved on a server to improve the standard of an Artificial Intelligence (AI). The devices we currently interact with end up compiling information about our consumption habits, routines, collected photographs, videos or personal content. Sometimes exposing our privacy to third parties, it is not noticeable where that data is been saved, or that is being stored. And if we could have a simpler device to perform some tasks, in which there was no camera, microphone or storage. No personal data will be processed locally or remotely, so the regulation European Union (EU) law on data protection and privacy, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), will not affect this kind of device. Furthermore, if a device of this nature was located in a public place, there would be no need for any requirement, consent or authorization to the intervening users or only those who approach the device, because would not differentiate the user or even recognize him, since the collection of gesture commands is performed through non-evasive sensors. Recently the world was surprised by the cases of a new coronavirus which caused a pandemic on a planetary scale. New rules had to be applied, to the way we interact with objects in order not to spread the disease. It was created a prototype discriminated in this study, using a grid of ultrasonic sensors, capable of recognize trained gestures. This interaction can be made from a distance of the prototype, and do not require contact, in which it solves a human interaction with the computer avoiding that the user has to use the touch on a component, thus avoiding the contagion of Corona virus disease of 2019 (COVID-19). The early stage results evidence that the proposed system is suitable to create a new input type of Human Interface Device (HID), and may replace devices as a remote control of television, to a new way to interact with information panels in public places, like a shopping mall, airports, train and bus stations. ; Hoje em dia a sociedade tende a estar cada vez mais evoluída tecnologicamente, consequentemente muitas informações pessoais são compartilhadas com sistemas computacionais através de registros online; microfones que realizam reconhecimento de voz, em que é processado remotamente; aplicação de filtros em retratos de pessoas ou reconhecimento da idade, em que a foto é guardada em um servidor para melhorar o padrão de uma Inteligência Artificial (AI). Atualmente os dispositivos com os quais interagimos acabam compilando informações sobre os nossos hábitos de consumo, rotinas, fotos e vídeos armazenados ou conteúdos pessoais. Por vezes, expondo nossa privacidade a terceiros, não é perceptível onde os dados foram guardados ou onde estão a ser armazenados. E se pudéssemos ter um dispositivo mais simples para realizar algumas tarefas, em que não possuísse câmera, microfone ou armazenamento. Nenhum dado pessoal será processado local ou remotamente, portanto, a legislação da União Europeia (EU) sobre proteção e privacidade de dados, Regulamento Geral de Proteção de Dados (GDPR), não afetará este tipo de dispositivo. Além disso, se um dispositivo desta natureza estivesse localizado em local público, não haveria necessidade de qualquer exigência, consentimento ou autorização aos utilizadores intervenientes ou até mesmo aos que apenas se aproximam do dispositivo, pois não distinguiria o utilizador e também não o reconheceria, já que a recolha de comandos por gestos é realizada por via de sensores não evasivos. Recentemente, o mundo foi surpreendido por vários casos de um novo coronavírus que causou uma pandemia em escala mundial. Novas regras tiveram que ser aplicadas, à forma como interagimos com os objetos para não espalhar a doença. Foi criado um protótipo discriminado neste estudo, utilizando uma grelha de sensores ultrassônicos, capaz de reconhecer gestos treinados. Esta interação pode ser feita à distância do protótipo, e não requer contato, no qual se resolve uma interação humana com o computador evitando que o utilizador use o tato no dispositivo, evitando assim o contágio de (COVID-19). Os resultados da fase inicial evidenciam que o sistema proposto é adequado para criar um novo tipo de Dispositivo de Interface Humana (HID), podendo substituir dispositivos como um controle remoto de televisão, ou uma nova forma de interagir com painéis de informação em locais públicos, como um shopping center, aeroportos, estações de comboios e de autocarros.
Problem setting. In a market economy and increased competition between enterprises become increasingly important concepts such as business information, trade secrets, know-how, confidential information, the information with restricted access. Given the fact that only one patent protection is unable to meet the needs of researchers, in addition to formal public protection and secured legal means we would like to pay attention at private legal measures, particular, the mode of trade secrets.Recent research and publications analysis. Different aspects of the protection of trade secrets were investigated by specialists such as G. Androschuk, J. Berzhye, I. Davydov, O. Davydyuk, D. Zadyhaylo, P. Kraynov, G. Nikiforov, S. Nikiforov, V. Rubanov, E. Solovyov, L. Hoffman, V. Chaplygin, A. Cherniavsky and others. However, at present there is a lack of comprehensive research of this legal phenomenon, equally useful for innovators and businesses that actively protect corporate security.Paper objective. This article is planned to determine the legal characteristics, structural elements and mechanisms by which the use of trade secrets in business have a positive impact on innovation development and corporate security entities.Paper main body. On the basis of requirements of Art. 505 Civil Code of Ukraine and art. 39 of the TRIPS Agreement we formulated commercial information signs under which it receives legal protection as an object of intellectual property: (1) privacy (real or potential) in the sense that it is as a whole or in a precise combination of aggregate and its components are not generally known or available to persons in the circles that normally deal with such information; (2) commercial value (not purely industrial or industrial), due to its secrecy; this information is unknown to others, which is a commercial interest; (3) the lawful holder of the information provides active special measures (technical, organizational, legal) to preserve secrecy. The objects of trade secrets, depending on the fields may be the following types of information: (1) scientific and technical; (2) management; (3) commercial; (4) financial.At this stage, there is a growing role of know-how, compared with patents, because as their special advantages and drop interest in patenting innovations as an independent factor, as well as economic and legal efficiency mode of trade secrets. Under the know-how necessary to understand the technical, manufacturing, engineering knowledge, experience and skills related to the design, development, manufacture, sale, operation, maintenance, repair, improve technology and other innovative objects which have the status of trade secrets, and a factor of competitiveness entity.Given the fact that the administrative and jurisdictional mechanisms for the protection of trade secrets are more or less clear, we focused on internal corporate events. First, this is consolidation in the basic documents of the entity (statute, founding and collective agreements, work rules on trade secret law) such provision as law on ownership and protection of trade secrets. Second, the order of the head of the entity to approve the list of information to be protected as a trade secret. Third, develop and adopt regulations on trade secrets. Fourth, to approve the regulations on the organization of the documents containing trade secrets. Fifth, to include in a labor agreement (contract) the condition of non-disclosure of trade secrets or employee expected signing of enhancing privacy protection.Conclusions of the research. In order to stimulate innovation growth and protection of corporate security entities we should propose changes to the legislation: (1) secure the definition of the concept of «know-how (secret production)» indicating that the exclusive right to the secret of acting as long as the relation of production secrets operating mode of trade secrets; (2) add Tax Code of Ukraine following types of tax benefits: (a) exemption of small businesses from paying value added goods produced using in-house production know-how (secrets), sold small businesses within the term of exclusive rights to these intellectual activities, but not more than 5 years; (B) exemption of small businesses from paying income tax amounts in the form of sales of products derived from the use of know-how (secrets) in-house production from the beginning of their use, within the term of the exclusive rights to these intellectual activities, but not more than 5 years; (3) adopt by the Cabinet of Ministers exemplary (typical) provision of trade secrets in business organizations, which determine the general procedure for the use of legal, organizational and technical means to ensure the confidentiality of trade secrets. ; В статье дана хозяйственно-правовая характеристика коммерческой тайны и ноу-хау, определено их соотношение с патентной защитой и место в системе охраны интеллектуальной собственности. Предложены подходы к совершенствованию правового обеспечения этих отношений и защиты корпоративной безопасности субъектов хозяйствования. ; У статті дано господарсько-правову характеристику комерційної таємниці та ноу-хау, визначене їх співвідношення з патентним захистом і місце в системі охорони інтелектуальної власності. Запропоновано підходи до вдосконалення правового забезпечення цих відносин і захисту корпоративної безпеки суб'єктів господарювання.
Problem setting. In a market economy and increased competition between enterprises become increasingly important concepts such as business information, trade secrets, know-how, confidential information, the information with restricted access. Given the fact that only one patent protection is unable to meet the needs of researchers, in addition to formal public protection and secured legal means we would like to pay attention at private legal measures, particular, the mode of trade secrets.Recent research and publications analysis. Different aspects of the protection of trade secrets were investigated by specialists such as G. Androschuk, J. Berzhye, I. Davydov, O. Davydyuk, D. Zadyhaylo, P. Kraynov, G. Nikiforov, S. Nikiforov, V. Rubanov, E. Solovyov, L. Hoffman, V. Chaplygin, A. Cherniavsky and others. However, at present there is a lack of comprehensive research of this legal phenomenon, equally useful for innovators and businesses that actively protect corporate security.Paper objective. This article is planned to determine the legal characteristics, structural elements and mechanisms by which the use of trade secrets in business have a positive impact on innovation development and corporate security entities.Paper main body. On the basis of requirements of Art. 505 Civil Code of Ukraine and art. 39 of the TRIPS Agreement we formulated commercial information signs under which it receives legal protection as an object of intellectual property: (1) privacy (real or potential) in the sense that it is as a whole or in a precise combination of aggregate and its components are not generally known or available to persons in the circles that normally deal with such information; (2) commercial value (not purely industrial or industrial), due to its secrecy; this information is unknown to others, which is a commercial interest; (3) the lawful holder of the information provides active special measures (technical, organizational, legal) to preserve secrecy. The objects of trade secrets, depending on the fields may be the following types of information: (1) scientific and technical; (2) management; (3) commercial; (4) financial.At this stage, there is a growing role of know-how, compared with patents, because as their special advantages and drop interest in patenting innovations as an independent factor, as well as economic and legal efficiency mode of trade secrets. Under the know-how necessary to understand the technical, manufacturing, engineering knowledge, experience and skills related to the design, development, manufacture, sale, operation, maintenance, repair, improve technology and other innovative objects which have the status of trade secrets, and a factor of competitiveness entity.Given the fact that the administrative and jurisdictional mechanisms for the protection of trade secrets are more or less clear, we focused on internal corporate events. First, this is consolidation in the basic documents of the entity (statute, founding and collective agreements, work rules on trade secret law) such provision as law on ownership and protection of trade secrets. Second, the order of the head of the entity to approve the list of information to be protected as a trade secret. Third, develop and adopt regulations on trade secrets. Fourth, to approve the regulations on the organization of the documents containing trade secrets. Fifth, to include in a labor agreement (contract) the condition of non-disclosure of trade secrets or employee expected signing of enhancing privacy protection.Conclusions of the research. In order to stimulate innovation growth and protection of corporate security entities we should propose changes to the legislation: (1) secure the definition of the concept of «know-how (secret production)» indicating that the exclusive right to the secret of acting as long as the relation of production secrets operating mode of trade secrets; (2) add Tax Code of Ukraine following types of tax benefits: (a) exemption of small businesses from paying value added goods produced using in-house production know-how (secrets), sold small businesses within the term of exclusive rights to these intellectual activities, but not more than 5 years; (B) exemption of small businesses from paying income tax amounts in the form of sales of products derived from the use of know-how (secrets) in-house production from the beginning of their use, within the term of the exclusive rights to these intellectual activities, but not more than 5 years; (3) adopt by the Cabinet of Ministers exemplary (typical) provision of trade secrets in business organizations, which determine the general procedure for the use of legal, organizational and technical means to ensure the confidentiality of trade secrets. ; В статье дана хозяйственно-правовая характеристика коммерческой тайны и ноу-хау, определено их соотношение с патентной защитой и место в системе охраны интеллектуальной собственности. Предложены подходы к совершенствованию правового обеспечения этих отношений и защиты корпоративной безопасности субъектов хозяйствования. ; У статті дано господарсько-правову характеристику комерційної таємниці та ноу-хау, визначене їх співвідношення з патентним захистом і місце в системі охорони інтелектуальної власності. Запропоновано підходи до вдосконалення правового забезпечення цих відносин і захисту корпоративної безпеки суб'єктів господарювання.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in three blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation, second, it identifies the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and finally, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by public administrations, businesses, and citizens because they bear the promise of enormous opportunities, the potential to help solve global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. In fact, these technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. Indeed, AI is increasingly considered a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery, and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, this swift progress is filled with risks which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological areas. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report to establish a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas where the international community should collaborate and cooperate regarding the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22). The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the intention to avoid the fragmentation of the Internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of Artificial Intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – although uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of 'courage', which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adoption. Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own frameworks – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to human rights – and implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability. However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiplicity of global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the speed of technological change and development, it is challenging to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted frameworks do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer actors to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This absence of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding by different actors of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies. As such, there is a mismatch of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and the protection of the fundamental freedoms of every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity of substantive participation between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual-focused perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicisation and securitisation of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the EU and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and to dominate the standard setting of these technologies to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary of the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach a consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.In conclusion, the lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. Paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent digital advances show the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach – for example, in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact – and a top-down multilateral approach which gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow, implying the subordination of multi-stakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialised conversation with a limited number of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing regulatory processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be suitable for non-Western realities.Besides more a representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must have their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In conclusion, the governance of technology must incorporate democratic and participatory elements on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. Beyond ensuring policy coordination, two further concerns and challenges that arise from current efforts are the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community. As such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts.Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. While regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract.Moreover, the unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be essential to guarantee that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. Regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Additionally, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. These spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Furthermore, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technology advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity and ensure it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multi-stakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/
Crowd monitoring was an essential measure to deal with over-tourism problems in urban destinations in the pre-COVID era. It will play a crucial role in the pandemic scenario when restarting tourism and making destinations safer. Notably, a Destination Management Organisation (DMO) of a smart destination needs to deploy a technological layer for crowd monitoring that allows data gathering in order to count visitors and distinguish them from residents. The correct identification of visitors versus residents by a DMO, while privacy rights (e.g., Regulation EU 2016/679, also known as GDPR) are ensured, is an ongoing problem that has not been fully solved. In this paper, we describe a novel approach to gathering crowd data by processing (i) massive scanning of WiFi access points of the smart destination to find SSIDs (Service Set Identifier), as well as (ii) the exposed Preferred Network List (PNL) containing the SSIDs of WiFi access points to which WiFi-enabled mobile devices are likely to connect. These data enable us to provide the number of visitors and residents of a crowd at a given point of interest of a tourism destination. A pilot study has been conducted in the city of Alcoi (Spain), comparing data from our approach with data provided by manually filled surveys from the Alcoi Tourist Info office, with an average accuracy of 83%, thus showing the feasibility of our policy to enrich the information system of a smart destination. ; This research was carried out within the research Project Alcoi Tourist Lab framework, co-funded by the Alcoi City Council & the Valencian Innovation Agency. The research was also partially funded by project UAPOSTCOVID19-10 from the University of Alicante. Finally, this research was partly supported by the EU CEF project GreenMov, CARM HORECOV-21 project (https://horecovid.com/ (accessed on 12 January 2022)). is financed through the Call for Public Aid destined to finance the Strategic projects contemplated in the Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialization - RIS3MUR Strategy by the Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia, through the Ministry of Economic Development, Tourism and Employment within the framework of the FEDER Region of Murcia Operational Program 2014–2020 within the framework Thematic Objective 1. Strengthen research, technological development and innovation by 80% and with CARM's own funds in 20%, and finally the EU project H2020 NIoVE (833742).
In: Bak , M A R , Veeken , R , Blom , M T , Tan , H L & Willems , D L 2021 , ' Health data research on sudden cardiac arrest : perspectives of survivors and their next-of-kin ' , BMC Medical Ethics , vol. 22 , no. 1 , 7 . https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-021-00576-9
Background: Consent for data research in acute and critical care is complex as patients become at least temporarily incapacitated or die. Existing guidelines and regulations in the European Union are of limited help and there is a lack of literature about the use of data from this vulnerable group. To aid the creation of a patient-centred framework for responsible data research in the acute setting, we explored views of patients and next-of-kin about the collection, storage, sharing and use of genetic and health-related data for observational research. Methods: We conducted qualitative interviews (n = 19) with Dutch sudden cardiac arrest survivors who donated clinical and socio-economic data and genetic samples to research. We also interviewed their next-of-kin. Topics were informed by ethics literature and we used scenario-sketches to aid discussion of complex issues. Results: Sudden cardiac arrest survivors displayed limited awareness of their involvement in health data research and of the content of their given consent. We found that preferences regarding disclosure of clinically actionable genetic findings could change over time. When data collection and use were limited to the medical realm, patients trusted researchers to handle data responsibly without concern for privacy or other risks. There was no consensus as to whether deferred consent should be explicitly asked from survivors. If consent is asked, this would ideally be done a few months after the event when cognitive capacities have been regained. Views were divided about the need to obtain proxy consent for research with deceased patients' data. However, there was general support for the disclosure of potentially relevant post-mortem genetic findings to relatives. Conclusions: Sudden cardiac arrest patients' donation of data for research was grounded in trust in medicine overall, blurring the boundary between research and care. Our findings also highlight questions about the acceptability of a one-time consent and about responsibilities of patients, researchers and ethics committees. Finally, further normative investigation is needed regarding the (continued) use of participants' data after death, which is of particular importance in this setting. Our findings are thought to be of relevance for other acute and life-threatening illnesses as well.
AbstractThe purpose of this research is to offer novelty related to legal protection that is relevant and can quickly be applied in public boarding houses. Using empirical research methods to describe the legal regulations that live in society. Through this research, the researcher offers the concept of legal protection for victims of sexual harassment who live in an environment that is only limited by one door. Namely that the influence of an environment that is too friendly to teach the individual a touch that should not be done, besides the geographical factor of the environment which is an industrial area with most male workers who only live alone there so they cannot control their passions, besides that the divider between freedoms people per person only one door is considered too thin in protecting each other's privacy so that it is widely used for sexual harassment. In this case, the community around the public boarding house receives two legal protection measures, namely the first, which is preventive, namely building a protection institution for victims of sexual harassment in collaboration with local village officials. The second is to urge the Legislative to immediately pass the Draft law on the Elimination of Sexual Violence because Indonesia is an emergency of sexual harassment.Keywords: legal protection; public boarding houses; sexual harassmentAbstrakTujuan penelitian ini yaitu menawarkan kebaruan terkait perlindungan hukum yang relevan dan cepat dapat diterapkan di dalam kosan umum. Mengunakan metode penelitian empiris dengan menguraikan peraturan hukum yang hidup di masyarakat. Melalui penelitian ini peneliti menawarkan bagaimana konsep perlindungan hukum korban pelecehan seksual yang tinggal di dalam lingkungan yang hanya berbatas oleh satu pintu. Yaitu bahwa pengaruh dari lingkungan yang terlalu ramah sehingga mewajarkan sentuhan yang tidak seharusnya dilakukan kepada individu, selain itu faktor geografis lingkungan yang merupakan kawasan industrial dengan kebanyakan pekerja laki-laki yang hanya tinggal sendirian disana sehingga tidak dapat mengontrol nafsu nya, selain itu sekat diantara kebebasan orang per orang hanya berbatas satu pintu dinilai terlalu tipis dalam melindungi privasi masing-masing sehingga banyak dimanfaatkan untuk melakukan pelecehan seksual. Di dalam hal ini maka masyarakat sekitar kosan umum mendapat dua upaya perlindungan hukum yaitu yang pertama, bersifat mencegah yaitu membangun lembaga perlindungan korban pelecehan seksual yang bekerja sama aparat kampung setempat. Yang kedua yaitu mendesak DPR untuk segera mengesahkan RUU PKS karena Indonesia darurat pelecehan seksual.
This study compares three formal criminal laws on the corruption act to show the importance of due process model for wiretapping/lawful interception in Indonesia. Investigators of Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) assume that the implementation of wiretapping based on the due process model decelerate the performance and independence of corruption eradication. The problem particularly happens on the execution of caught in the act operation. This study covers the design of wiretapping on corruption case linked with the due process model as an effort to guarantee the right of privacy. Firstly, legislators accentuated an effective corruption eradication, which highlights the implementation of the crime control model. Secondly, the latest amendment to the Law on Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia alters wiretapping to become a procedural activity for stronger synergy among the law enforcement institutions. The regulation of wiretapping as a method to reveal corruption case in Indonesia does not adhere to the due process model entirely. The wiretapping still tends to deal with stages of preliminary-investigation, investigation, prosecution, and the execution of internal approval process. From Crime Control Model to Due Process Model: Studi Kritis Pengaturan Penyadapan oleh Komisi Tindak Pidana Korupsi Republik Indonesia AbstrakHasil penelitian atas tiga undang-undang hukum pidana formil terkait tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia menunjukkan pentingnya model due process dalam penyadapan. Penyidik Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Republik Indonesia memandang pelaksanaan penyadapan berdasarkan model due process memperlambat kinerja dan independensi penegakan korupsi terutama dilakukannya Operasi Tangkap Tangan. Artikel ini membahas rancang bangun penyadapan pada tindak pidana korupsi dikaitkan dengan model due process sebagai upaya menjamin hak asasi manusia, secara khusus hak privasi. Pertama, awalnya pembentuk undang-undang lebih menekankan pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi secara efektif sehingga menunjukkan penerapan model pengawasan tindak pidana. Kedua, UU KPK RI mengubah penyadapan lebih prosedural dengan harapan menguatkan sinergitas antar lembaga penegak hukum. Pengaturan penyadapan atas tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia masih belum sepenuhnya memberlakukan model due process. Penyadapan masih bersifat sektoral dengan mencakup tahap penyelidikan, penyidikan dan penuntutan serta menjalankan proses perijinan secara internal. Kata kunci: korupsi, model due process, model pengawasan tindak pidana.DOI: https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v7n3.a7