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Deep precision strike is a generic military operation that depends importantly on C4/ISR system contributions. Information from the latter is realistically subject to chance influences: targets are found and correctly identified generally at rates proportional to their numbers, locations, and activities, and to the coverage of shooter-serving sensors; the events of detection are realistically random, as are the delays, results, outcomes, and follow-up of the targeting shooters. In this paper a simplified version of the above complicated process is analyzed mathematically, here as a multi-stage queuing process with imperfect service. The probabilistic outcomes can be used to anticipate the results of higher-resolution simulations; these often are far more time consuming both to set up and run. Aspects of the above queuing situations can also be deduced via a deterministic 'fluid' queuing approximation that gives an adequate and convenient representation of aspects of the state variables and various Measures of Effectiveness in the stochastic queuing model. Relying on that agreement, we have elsewhere generalized the stochastic queuing model setup to fluid models that incorporate omitted realities, such as losses from target-list tracking, and the inevitable time dependencies, non- stationarities, and adaptive behaviors that typically occur in actual military operations or vignettes. Both the stochastic and deterministic model results are informative and produce reasonable insights. Further validation steps using mathematical probability techniques as well as simulation are planned; some are in progress. ; Prepared for: Space C2 Information Warfare, Strategic Planning Office N6C3, Washington, DC ; Grant No. CNS-0430566 and CNS-0430598.

Why should legislative proceedings in the grand duchy of Luxemburg be given consideration? It is a country with an area less than that of Rhode Island and with a population (260,000) which would barely fill a second class city—a mere atom in the world's history. Nor has it played an heroic part in the great crisis. Here is the excuse. The discussions in the chamber of deputies have reflected, not in their depths but in their shallows, nearly all the phases of the seething unrest which agitates larger nations, and therein lies the reason for offering a few pictures drawn from the official records of the grand ducal chamber— the German reports as they are sent out daily, translated from the proceedings in French, and the final French comptes-rendus. They are miniatures of the processes of readjustment in progress across the Atlantic.The Luxemburg chamber of deputies is a legislative body that has been evolved by a series of still visible leaps and jumps from the simplest feudal conditions to the assembly recently elected by universal adult suffrage on a basis of proportional party representation according to the system of the scrutin de liste. Its modernity is so complete that a Socialist woman has obtained a seat, yet the conservative character of the forbears of the body is not entirely lost to view in the mists of the past.The old duchy of Luxemburg—a countship until raised to higher dignity by an imperial brother of its count (1354)—lost its early independence in the fifteenth century (1441), and thenceforth shared the political lot of the Belgic provinces under Burgundian, Spanish and Austrian rule.

Over the last thirty years, the Italians have tried almost everything, nothing has resulted as expected, the country is stagnated, and this is the only dish on the menu that had not been tasted yet. Economic growth was flat since 2000, and after the Great Recession and the pandemic, the per capita GDP is 5% lower than fifteen years ago. Public debt amounts to about 150% of GDP (the second in Europe, only after Greece, which is a much smaller economy).This permanent turmoil is in sharp contrast with the more than forty years of political stability and economic growth since the establishment of the Italian Republic at the end of World War II. In the first edition of my textbook Political Institutions in Europe, the author of the chapter on Italy, Gianfranco Pasquino, summarized that period as one with unstable governments (one-year average duration), lasting coalitions (always around the Christian-democrats), repeated presidents of the Council (up to De Gasperi eight times, Andreotti seven, Fanfani six…), and stagnated policies. After the Cold War and the dissolution of both the Christian-democracy and the Communist Party, there have been sustained attempts to force alternations in government via political polarization. Five electoral reforms replaced the previous proportional representation system with mixed systems including single-member districts by plurality rule and a "majority bonus" to the largest party. The results have been, paraphrasing Pasquino: slightly less unstable governments (lasting on average 18 months, but remember that Germany had only three chancellors in forty years); changing coalitions with many alternations (about eight, plus two national unity cabinets); repeated presidents of the Council (Berlusconi four times, Prodi two…); and extremely stagnated policies, despite government alternations, because they now largely depend on the European Union. Against some expectations, new parties proliferated. The most significant electoral reform has been the most recent one, used for the first time in this election: an unprecedented cut of the number of seats in both chambers of Parliament (by 37 percent), which has reduced the number of parties and attenuated fragmentation.In this context, the emphasis on the fascist precedents of the current largest party, Brothers of Italy, is largely biased. In the early 1990s, in parallel to the dissolution of the Communist party, the Social Movement with fascist roots also experienced a "perestroika." It first formed the National Alliance, which won the popular vote in the South, merged with Berlusconi's party, and after being in government for a while with Giorgia Meloni as a minister, a group split to form the minor Brothers of Italy, which became the only opposition to Mario Draghi's government. Accusing Meloni of fascist origins is as distracting as it would be accusing the former president of the Council Massimo D'Alema, at the time leader of the Party of the Italian Communists, of being the heir of Stalinism. While D'Alema furtherly evolved and became Vice-president of the Socialist International, the Brothers of Italy became a member of the European Conservative Group (which was founded by the British Tories), a more pro-EU alignment than the Identity Group that includes the Italian League, the French Le Pen, and the Alternative for Germany.Meanwhile, the European Union is reinforcing its fiscal and financial resources. Italy is prepared to receive the largest amount of loans and donations from the EU's programs for recovery and investments. The intended amount is a programs' percentage double the size of the Italian population and economy's share in the EU (as similarly happens with Spain, but the latter is a smaller economy). At some moment, Meloni hinted at renegotiating the conditional reforms on the judiciary, the tax code, or the anti-trust and competition rules. The size and interdependence of the Italian economy in Europe may give her some leverage, as the country is too big for the EU to let it fail. On this basis, the new Italian government could threaten the EU. But the EU is right now also menacing by being stern on that kind of attitude with its firmness on Hungary.This unbalanced game of mutual threats reflects the general political situation in Europe: the Union is already sufficiently strong to nullify many sovereign powers of the states, but not yet enough to establish the EU as the prevailing institutional level in all respects. Perhaps things must go still worse to go better. Worse with the useless politicking in the states to go better with a European more effective union.President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella was aware of this risk when he prevented the League's Matteo Salvini from becoming president of the Council after the last election and appointed the European leader Draghi. He could still try something of the sort.

Yksi keskeisiä kysymyksiä muuttoliikkeen sävyttämässä maailmassa on, miten valtiot ja kansakunnat kykenevät integroimaan uudet tulijat ja heidän jälkeläisensä osaksi yhteiskuntaa. Maahanmuuttajien kotoutuminen tapahtuu lukuisilla yhteiskunnan eri osa-alueilla, kuten työmarkkinoilla, mutta myös politiikassa. Maahanmuuttajien poliittinen kiinnittyminen uudessa kotimaassa – mukaan lukien kyky ymmärtää ja vaikuttaa poliittisiin prosesseihin sekä kiinnostus seurata yhteiskunnallisia asioita – edistää heidän kotoutumistaan sekä yksilö- että ryhmätasolla. Yksi merkittävä maahanmuuttajien poliittiseen kiinnittymiseen vaikuttava tekijä on heidän poliittinen edustuksensa demokraattisissa päätöksentekoelimissä. Etnisten ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten vähemmistöjen mukanaolo poliittisessa päätöksenteossa viestii tasa-arvoisesta ja moniäänisestä yhteiskunnasta, jossa jokaisella on yhtäläinen mahdollisuus vaikuttaa yhteisiin asioihin syntyperästään riippumatta. Tarkastelemalla maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden rekrytoitumista Suomen kuntavaaleissa tämä tutkimus syventää keskustelua tekijöistä, jotka yhtäältä edistävät ja toisaalta vaikeuttavat maahanmuuttajien poliittisen edustuksen toteutumista. Tutkimuksen empiirisessä osiossa keskitytään kevään 2017 kuntavaaleihin ja vastataan kolmeen päätutkimuskysymykseen: (1) Mitkä olivat keskeisimmät erot eri etnisten ryhmien poliittisessa kiinnittymisessä? (2) Mikä vaikutti poliittisten puolueiden kysyntään eli halukkuuteen rekrytoida maahanmuuttotaustaisia henkilöitä ehdokaslistoilleen? (3) Miten maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden tarjonta eli heidän yhteiskunnallinen taustansa, resurssinsa ja motivaationsa vaikuttivat paitsi päätökseen ehdolle asettumisesta myös heidän valikoitumiseensa ehdokaslistalle? Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään sekä määrällistä että laadullista aineistoa. Rekisteri- ja kyselypohjaiset aineistot muodostavat pohjan laajemmalle Suomen maahanmuuttotaustaisen väestön poliittisen kiinnittymisen ja poliittisen edustuksen analyysille kuntatasolla. Määrällisten aineistojen avulla on mahdollista vertailla valtaväestöön lukeutuvien ehdokkaiden ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden henkilökohtaisia ja sosiaalisia voimavaroja, motivaatiota, poliittisia arvoja ja asenteita, sekä ehdokaskampanjoita. Laadullinen haastatteluaineisto puolestaan valottaa etnisten ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten vähemmistöjen poliittista rekrytoitumista niin maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden kuin puolueiden näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, ensinnäkin, että poliittinen kiinnittyminen vaihtelee suuresti eri etnisten vähemmistöryhmien välillä ja että tätä selittävät moninaiset taustamaahan, Suomeen muuton syihin ja ryhmien kotoutumiseen liittyvät seikat. Suomalainen avointen listojen vaalijärjestelmä sekä ehdokkaiden korkea kysyntä kuntavaaleissa kuitenkin luovat verrattain suotuisan ympäristön Suomeen muuttaneiden ehdokkaaksi pääsylle. Toisaalta, vaikka kynnys ehdokkaaksi pääsylle ei ole korkea, useimmat ehdokkaat tarvitsevat ulkopuolista kannustusta ehdokkuudelleen. Suomeen muualta muuttaneet tarvitsevat kannustusta puolueilta ja omalta lähipiiriltään valtaväestöä useammin, sillä monet heistä kokevat oman suomen (tai ruotsin) kielen taitonsa ja/tai suomalaista poliittista järjestelmää ja kulttuuria koskevan tietotasonsa riittämättömiksi. Puolueiden kykyä ja motivaatiota luoda ehdokastarjontaa eli aktiivisesti kannustaa Suomeen muuttaneita asettumaan ehdolle vaaleissa hankaloittavat puolueiden vähäiset sosiaaliset siteet eri etnisiin vähemmistöryhmiin. Verkostojen niukkuus tai suoranainen puute estää puolueita hankkimasta tietoa potentiaalisista maahanmuuttotaustaisista ehdokkaista eli henkilöistä, jotka voisivat olla kiinnostuneita asettumaan ehdolle ja joilla olisi siihen myös riittävät resurssit. Suomen henkilökeskeisessä vaalijärjestelmässä puolueiden vaalitulos riippuu voimakkaasti niiden asettamien ehdokkaiden kyvyistä hankkia henkilökohtaisia ääniä, jotka kaikki menevät puolueen yhteiselle listalle ja määrittävät puolueen saamien edustajanpaikkojen lukumäärän. Näin ollen ehdokkaita rekrytoidessaan puolueet haluavat varmistua siitä, että niiden ehdokkailla on riittävästi voimavaroja ja motivaatiota aktiivisen ehdokaskampanjan järjestämiseen ja äänestäjien mobilisointiin. Tiedon ja sitä myöden luottamuksen puutteen vuoksi puolueet kokevat maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden rekrytoimisen haastavaksi, mikä puolestaan vähentää puolueiden halukkuutta käyttää resurssejaan vähemmistöehdokkaiden löytämiseksi. Puolueet aloittavat ehdokasrekrytoinnin omasta organisaatiostaan edeten organisaation sisäkehältä sen ulkokehälle eli tarkastelemalla ensin aktiivisia jäseniään, sitten vähemmän aktiivisia ja tämän jälkeen jäsenten henkilökohtaisia verkostoja. Koska Suomeen muuttaneet ovat valtaväestöä harvemmin jäseniä puolueorganisaatioissa ja koska heidän verkostonsa eivät aina riittävästi risteä valtaväestön verkostojen ja elämänpiirin kanssa, he jäävät usein puolueiden rekrytointiverkostojen ulkopuolelle. Näin ollen monet Suomeen muuttaneet jäävät vaille sitä kannustusta ja tukea, jota he tarvitsisivat ehdolle asettumisekseen. Sosiaalisilla verkostoilla ja niiden eriytyneisyydellä on siten keskeinen rooli Suomeen muuttaneiden ehdokkaaksi rekrytoitumisen esteiden ja poliittisen aliedustuksen taustalla. Aiemmassa maahanmuuttajien poliittista rekrytoitumista käsittelevässä tutkimuksessa ei ole tarkasteltu riittävästi sosiaalisten verkostojen ja sosiaalisen pääoman merkitystä ja roolia. Sosiaalisiin verkostoihin nivoutuvien tekijöiden järjestelmällinen erittely on tästä syystä yksi tämän tutkimuksen keskeisimmistä kontribuutioista. Tutkimuksen tulokset auttavat tunnistamaan maahanmuuttajien poliittiseen kiinnittymiseen liittyviä tekijöitä ja poistamaan esteitä, jotka vaikeuttavat heidän pääsyään uuden kotimaansa poliittisen järjestelmän tasavertaisiksi jäseniksi. ; One of the crucial questions facing countries across the world is how immigrants and their descendants can become part of a society and nation. Integration of immigrants takes place in multiple arenas, such as in the labour market, but also in the political arena. Immigrants' engagement in host country politics – including the ability to understand and influence political processes as well as having an interest in what is happening in society – facilitates their societal inclusion at both individual and group levels. One of the important factors that supports the political engagement of immigrants is their presence in decision-making bodies. It sends a message of an equal and multivoiced society in which everyone has a chance to participate and to 'have a say'. The general aim of this study is to further the discussion of factors that facilitate and hinder immigrants' political representation by investigating the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates in Finnish municipal elections. The study draws on empirical evidence from the 2017 municipal elections and answers three main questions. First, what were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups? Second, what influenced political parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates, i.e. motivated parties to recruit immigrants to their candidate lists? Third, what role did immigrant-origin candidates' supply factors, i.e. their socioeconomic backgrounds, resources, and motivations, play in their decision to stand as candidates and in their selection to candidate lists? The empirical material consists of both quantitative and qualitative data. The register and survey-based datasets form the basis for understanding the wider picture of electoral engagement and political representation of the foreign-origin population in Finnish municipal politics. They enable comparisons between native and immigrant-origin candidates regarding their personal and social resources, motivations, political attitudes, and campaigns. The qualitative interview data, in turn, sheds light on the process of political recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates from the perspective of parties and individual immigrant-origin candidates. The findings show, first, that the level of electoral engagement varies significantly between ethnic minority groups due to factors related to their countries of origin, reasons for migrating, and the level of integration in Finland. Second, the Finnish open-list proportional representation electoral system and a high demand for candidates in local elections result in a relatively favourable context for immigrants' access to candidacy. However, although the barrier of access to the ballot list is not high, most candidates need external encouragement before they decide to stand as candidates. Due to factors such as the language barrier and unfamiliarity with the Finnish political system and political culture, immigrant-origin candidates need even more encouragement from parties and their own personal networks. Yet, active recruitment by the parties is hindered by their lack of social ties to immigrant groups. Limited ties prevent parties from acquiring information about immigrant-origin individuals with interest and resources to stand as candidates. When recruiting candidates under a heavily personalised electoral system, in which parties' ability to win seats depends on their individual candidates' ability to attract personal votes, parties want to know that their candidates engage in active campaigning and have vote-earning attributes. Due to a lack of information, as well as the familiarity and trust related to it, parties often feel unable and unwilling to recruit candidates from immigrant communities. Furthermore, immigrants have significantly less experience with political organisations, and hence are less often in the party's inner network, from which parties begin their search for candidates. Those who are not members of parties' networks are not very likely to be personally targeted and encouraged to stand. Therefore, social networks play a fundamental role in the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates and, thus, in the political representation of immigrants in Finnish municipal councils. The role of social networks and social capital in political recruitment has not been sufficiently acknowledged in previous studies on immigrants' political representation. Therefore, the systematic documentation of these factors is one of the main contributions of this study. The findings of this study can be used to recognise and overcome the barriers that immigrants face on their pathways to political integration.

Women's low political participation remains a problem in many parts of the globe. Previous research within the African context has examined the gender gap, focusing on individual-level factors. Still, the gender gap persists after controlling for the usual barriers (resource, attitudinal, social, and cultural). We complement prior studies by exploring the impact of an overlooked factor—institutions. We theorize that the gender gap in political participation in Africa depends on the specific institutional context and nature of the institutions themselves. Focusing on electoral systems, gender quotas, and their inclusive outcomes (increase in women's numbers in national assemblies), we hypothesize that in countries with proportional (PR) electoral systems, gender quotas should encourage higher participation among women and yield small to no gender gap. Using five waves of Afrobarometer data covering 32 African countries, the multilevel regression results reveal nuanced effects of institutions on the gender gap in both electoral and non-electoral participation. First, compared with majoritarian systems, we find that PR electoral systems help erase the gender gap only for electoral participation (voting). In contrast, for non-electoral participation, PR electoral systems show no significant impact on reducing the gender gap. Second, we find no evidence to support the hypothesis that gender quotas reduce the gender gap in electoral and non-electoral participation. Third, where women's representation in legislatures exceeds 20 percent, there is a reversal of the gender gap for voting. However, for non-electoral activity, improving women's presence in national legislatures proves more effective in reversing the gender gap only for those belonging to a political party. For other activities, such as joining others to raise issues, protest actions, and attend community meetings, the gender gap persists but diminishes, with women holding 20–45 percent of seats.

The aim of the article is to study the activities of political parties and public associations of the western provinces of the Russian Empire on one of the most important issues of public and political life – the election of legislative chambers. The beginning of struggle over the changes in the electoral law to the State Duma was made at the congress of the "Union of October 17" on February 8–12, 1906 in Moscow. Activities of the Octobrists of the western outskirts were aimed at limiting the in uence of the Polish landlords and the Catholic church, against granting autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland. In this, they essentially separated from the leadership of the Octobrist party. Around the idea of introducing the principle of proportional election of electors and deputies of the State Duma by nationalities, ensuring the election of at least one Russian member of the State Council from each outlying province, local Octobrists went to an agreement with the extreme right and regional monarchist organizations, forming the Russian Suburban Union. By sending petitions and deputies to Nicholas II, negotiations with P.A. Stolypin, the Octobrists of the western provinces and their allies managed to achieve a change in the electoral law to the State Duma on June 3, 1907, which allowed them to increase the number of monarchist deputies in the lower chamber. In 1908 – 1911 together with other monarchist organizations, the "Union of October 17" managed to solve in its favor the question of "Russian" representation in the State Council from the Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Kiev, Podolsky and Volyn provinces, as well as to defend Stolypin's idea of the introduction of elective zemstvos in Belarus and Ukraine.

World governments have committed to increase the global protected areas coverage by 2020, but the effectiveness of this commitment for protecting biodiversity depends on where new protected areas are located. Threshold- and complementarity-based approaches have been independently used to identify important sites for biodiversity. We brought together these approaches by performing a complementarity-based analysis of irreplaceability in important bird and biodiversity areas (IBAs), which are sites identified using a threshold-based approach. We determined whether irreplaceability values are higher inside than outside IBAs and whether any observed difference depends on known characteristics of the IBAs. We focused on 3 regions with comprehensive IBA inventories and bird distribution atlases: Australia, southern Africa, and Europe. Irreplaceability values were significantly higher inside than outside IBAs, although differences were much smaller in Europe than elsewhere. Higher irreplaceability values in IBAs were associated with the presence and number of restricted-range species; number of criteria under which the site was identified; and mean geographic range size of the species for which the site was identified (trigger species). In addition, IBAs were characterized by higher irreplaceability values when using proportional species representation targets, rather than fixed targets. There were broadly comparable results when measuring irreplaceability for trigger species and when considering all bird species, which indicates a good surrogacy effect of the former. Recently, the International Union for Conservation of Nature has convened a consultation to consolidate global standards for the identification of key biodiversity areas (KBAs), building from existing approaches such as IBAs. Our results informed this consultation, and in particular a proposed irreplaceability criterion that will allow the new KBA standard to draw on the strengths of both threshold- and complementarity-based approaches.

The position of victims on international criminal scene has considerably progressed since the first international militaries tribunals were created in 1945. Even if the victims don't properly have the status of « parties » in international criminal trial, their participation in trial is henceforth a guarantee, with substantial rights. The scale of these rights, at different steps of the procedure, clarifies the way the international criminal judge interpreted the proportional dispositions of international positive laws. The role of victims is more, at the first time, to « confirm » international « public action » than exercise themselves this action to establish accused guilty or not. Their role is finally reinforced during the presentation of civil claims, by supplementary way of intervention, and more widely in search of full satisfaction. At that moment, victims become real « civil parties » with full international juridical capacity to claim their right. So, because of their actions, the victims appear in a "double" posture, vindicatory (repression) and repairing (compensation). The targeted and achieved aim was to show today what was the place of the victims in front of the international penal jurisdictions. ; La position des victimes sur la scène pénale internationale a considérablement évolué depuis la mise en place des tous premiers tribunaux militaires internationaux en 1945. Même si les victimes n'ont pas, à proprement parler, le statut de « partie » au procès pénal international, leur participation au procès est désormais une garantie, avec des droits substantiels. L'étendue de ces droits, aux différentes phases de la procédure, clarifie la manière dont les dispositions correspondantes du droit positif international sont interprétées par le juge pénal international. La fonction des victimes tient, dans un premier temps, davantage à « corroborer l'action publique » internationale qu'à pouvoir déclencher par elles-mêmes cette action destinée à établir la culpabilité ou non des personnes, objets du ...

The position of victims on international criminal scene has considerably progressed since the first international militaries tribunals were created in 1945. Even if the victims don't properly have the status of « parties » in international criminal trial, their participation in trial is henceforth a guarantee, with substantial rights. The scale of these rights, at different steps of the procedure, clarifies the way the international criminal judge interpreted the proportional dispositions of international positive laws. The role of victims is more, at the first time, to « confirm » international « public action » than exercise themselves this action to establish accused guilty or not. Their role is finally reinforced during the presentation of civil claims, by supplementary way of intervention, and more widely in search of full satisfaction. At that moment, victims become real « civil parties » with full international juridical capacity to claim their right. So, because of their actions, the victims appear in a "double" posture, vindicatory (repression) and repairing (compensation). The targeted and achieved aim was to show today what was the place of the victims in front of the international penal jurisdictions. ; La position des victimes sur la scène pénale internationale a considérablement évolué depuis la mise en place des tous premiers tribunaux militaires internationaux en 1945. Même si les victimes n'ont pas, à proprement parler, le statut de « partie » au procès pénal international, leur participation au procès est désormais une garantie, avec des droits substantiels. L'étendue de ces droits, aux différentes phases de la procédure, clarifie la manière dont les dispositions correspondantes du droit positif international sont interprétées par le juge pénal international. La fonction des victimes tient, dans un premier temps, davantage à « corroborer l'action publique » internationale qu'à pouvoir déclencher par elles-mêmes cette action destinée à établir la culpabilité ou non des personnes, objets du ...

The position of victims on international criminal scene has considerably progressed since the first international militaries tribunals were created in 1945. Even if the victims don't properly have the status of « parties » in international criminal trial, their participation in trial is henceforth a guarantee, with substantial rights. The scale of these rights, at different steps of the procedure, clarifies the way the international criminal judge interpreted the proportional dispositions of international positive laws. The role of victims is more, at the first time, to « confirm » international « public action » than exercise themselves this action to establish accused guilty or not. Their role is finally reinforced during the presentation of civil claims, by supplementary way of intervention, and more widely in search of full satisfaction. At that moment, victims become real « civil parties » with full international juridical capacity to claim their right. So, because of their actions, the victims appear in a "double" posture, vindicatory (repression) and repairing (compensation). The targeted and achieved aim was to show today what was the place of the victims in front of the international penal jurisdictions. ; La position des victimes sur la scène pénale internationale a considérablement évolué depuis la mise en place des tous premiers tribunaux militaires internationaux en 1945. Même si les victimes n'ont pas, à proprement parler, le statut de « partie » au procès pénal international, leur participation au procès est désormais une garantie, avec des droits substantiels. L'étendue de ces droits, aux différentes phases de la procédure, clarifie la manière dont les dispositions correspondantes du droit positif international sont interprétées par le juge pénal international. La fonction des victimes tient, dans un premier temps, davantage à « corroborer l'action publique » internationale qu'à pouvoir déclencher par elles-mêmes cette action destinée à établir la culpabilité ou non des personnes, objets du ...

Kemacetan yang terjadi di Kota Surabaya dipicu oleh pertumbuhan kendaraan yang tidak sebanding dengan kapasitas jalan. Untuk mengurangi kemacetan tersebut, pemerintah kota telah membangun banyak ruas jalan baru, diantaranya pembanguna The congestion that occurs in the city of Surabaya is triggered by the growth of vehicles that are not proportional to road capacity. To reduce congestion, the city government has built many new roads, including the construction of the Ahmad Yani road frontage road, which is divided into east and west sides, each 4 km long. The purpose of this article is to obtain a traffic flow system simulation at one of the roundabouts on Jalan Ahmad Yani Surabaya and to build a coverability tree. This article uses the petri net application to simulate a traffic flow system and represent it in a matrix form on the traffic flow system, and build a coverability tree. The use of petri nets can help form a traffic flow system simulation at one of the roundabouts on Jalan Ahmad Yani Surabaya so that the simulation can be obtained, and the results of the matrix representation and coverability tree can be built. n jalur lambat (frontage road) jalan Ahmad Yani yang terbagi atas sisi timur dan barat masing – masing sepanjang 4 km. Tujuan dalam artikel ini memperoleh simulasi arus lalu lintas salah satu bundaran di jalan Ahmad Yani Surabaya dan menganalisisnya serta membangun coverability tree. Artikel ini menggunakan aplikasi petri net dalam membentuk simulasi sistem arus lalu lintas, merepresentasikan ke dalam bentuk matriks pada sistem arus lalu lintas, serta membangun coverability tree. Petri net dapat diaplikasikan ke dalam sistem arus lalu lintas salah satu bundaran di jalan Ahmad Yani Surabaya sehingga dapat diperoleh simulasinya, hasil representasi matriks serta dapat dibangun coverability tree. Sehingga tidak terjadi kekacauan arus lalu lintas saat para pengendara melintasi jalan tersebut dan sekitarnya.

Context Over 20 years of conflict in the DRC, North and South Kivu have experienced cycles of stability and conflict, resulting in a compromised health system and poor sexual and reproductive health outcomes. Modern contraceptive use is low (7.5%) and maternal mortality is high (846 deaths per 100,000 live births). Program partners have supported the Ministry of Health (MOH) in North and South Kivu to provide good quality contraceptive services in public health facilities since 2011. Methods Cross-sectional population-based surveys were conducted in the program areas using a two-stage cluster sampling design to ensure representation in each of six rural health zones. Using MOH population estimates for villages in the catchment areas of supported health facilities, 25 clusters in each zone were selected using probability proportional to size. Within each cluster, 22 households were systematically selected, and one woman of reproductive age (15–49 years) was randomly selected from all eligible women in each household. Results Modern contraceptive prevalence among women in union ranged from 8.4% to 26.7% in the six health zones; current use of long-acting or permanent method (LAPM) ranged from 2.5% to 19.8%. The majority of women (58.9% to 90.2%) reported receiving their current method for the first time at a health facility supported by the program partners. Over half of women in four health zones reported wanting to continue their method for five years or longer. Conclusion Current modern contraceptive use and LAPM use were high in these six health zones compared to DRC Demographic and Health Survey data nationally and provincially. These results were accomplished across all six health zones despite their varied socio-demographic characteristics and different experiences of conflict and displacement. These findings demonstrate that women in these conflict-affected areas want contraception and will choose to use it when good quality services are available to them.

В статье на основании сравнительно-правового и исторического методов исследования проводится анализ избирательного законодательства Веймарской Германии и других государств Европы первой половины XX века. Исторический опыт доказывает, что закрепляя мажоритарную избирательную систему, законодатель тем самым создаёт существенные предпосылки для установления в государстве стабильности и управляемости. При этом несколько ограничивается демократический принцип представительства, предусматривающий участие всех слоёв общества в управлении государством. В ряде государств, где была введена избирательная система, основанная на пропорциональном представительстве, в условиях экономической и политической нестабильности выборы сыграли роковую роль в развитии демократии. Общественно-политический характер избирательного права и проводимых на его основе выборов нельзя определить только процедурой избрания и наличием нормативно установленных избирательных прав, основополагающим является вид государственного политического режима государства. Исследование выполнено в рамках проведения поисковой научно-исследовательской работы по реализации ФЦП «Научные и научно-педагогические кадры инновационной России» на 2009–2013 годы, государственный контракт от 09.06.2010 № П1291. ; In the article an attempt is made to analyse the the suffrage legislation of Weimar Germany and other European states in the first half of the XX century. This analysis is made on the basis of the comparative and historical methods. The historical experience shows that imposing the majority electoral system is an important prerequisite for stability and controllability in the state. In this case the democratic principle of representation is somewhat restricted as this principle provides for all the society's strata participation in the government bodies. In some states where the proportional electoral system was adopted elections proved baneful for democracy in conditions of economic and political instability. Social and political character of suffrage and elections based on it cannot be determined only by the procedure of elections and the elective rights stated in the legislation. It is political regime that is crucial. Research is performed within carrying out search research work FCP «Scientific and scientific and pedagogical shots of innovative Russia» 2009–2013, state contract from 09.06.2010 No. P1291.

We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member's influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The policy consists of informed and uninformed voters : only informed voters join parties, and the party campaign chest, the sum of its received contributions, is used to advertise and reach uninformed voters. Parties compete with each other strategically with respect to policy choice and advertising. We propose a definition of political equilibrium, in which party membership, citizen contributions, and parties' policies are simultaneously determined, for each of four financing institutions, running a gamut between a purely private, unconstrained system, to a public system in which all citizens have equal financial input. We compare the representation and welfare properties of these four institutions. ; Nous proposons une théorie de la politique (deux partis, une seule question) dans laquelle les citoyens deviennent membre d'un parti en le financant et dans laquelle l'influence d'un de ses membres sur la politique proposée par le parti est proportionnelle à sa contribution. L'électorat est constitué de votants informés et non-informés: Seuls les votants informés rejoignent les partis, et le budget de campagne d'un parti, la somme des contributions qu'il reçoit, est utilisé pour communiquer en direction des votants non-informés. Les partis sont en compétition stratégique par rapport à leur choix politique et leur communication. On propose une définition de l'équilibre politique dans laquelle l'appartenance partisane, les contributions et les politiques sont déterminées simultanément, pour quatre modes institutionnels de financement, allant d'un système non contraint purement privé à un système public dans lequel tous les citoyens ont le même impact financier. On compare les qualités des quatre systèmes en termes de représentation et de bien-être.

The author analyses electoral systems as a rule of decision-making and representation and points to the problems in classifying different kinds of majority and proportional electoral systems. The author emphasizes the electoral unit, the threshold, the manner of voting and the formula for transposing votes into mandates as the elements of the electoral system which have the greatest political influence on the political consequences of the electoral system, party system, parliament, government, etc. Interpreting Duverger's, Rea's, Lijphart's, Sartori's and Nohlen's electoral determinism, the author points to the theoretical and empirical argumentation of the consequences of different electoral systems, their advantages and shortcomings. Simplicity, participation, aggregation effectiveness and legitimacy - are the criteria in evaluating the expected and real consequences of the electoral system that the author uses to compare different electoral models, emphasizing that electoral reforms are partial, party-motivated, lacking clear aims, all of which results in a combination of contradictory elements that produce effects opposite to those desired. ; Autor analizira izborne sisteme kao pravilo odlučivanja i pravilo predstavljanja, ukazujući na probleme klasifikacije različitih varijanti većinskog i proporcionalnog izbornog sistema. Izbornu jedinicu, izborni prag, način glasanja i formula transponovanja glasova u mandate - autor potencira kao elemente izbornog sistema koji imaju najveći uticaj na političke posledice izbornog sistema, na stranački sistem, parlament, vladu itd. Interpretacijom izbornog determinizma Diveržea, Rea, Lijpharta Sartorija i Nolena ukazuje se na teorijsku i empirijsku argumentaciju konsekvenci različitih izbornih sistema, njihovih prednosti i nedostataka. Jednostavnost, participacija, agregacija i efektivnost reprezentacija i legitimitet - kriterijumi su vrednovanja očekivanih i realnih konsekvenci izbornog sistema kojima autor poredi različite vrste izbornih modela, ukazujući da su izborne reforme parcijalne, stranački motivisane, bez jasnih ciljeva, što često rezultira kombinovanjem protivrečnih elemenata koji proizvode suprotne efekte od željenih.