Suchergebnisse

An icon of administrative law is under attack. Prominent figures in the legal world are attacking Chevron. The critics could hardly have gone after a bigger target. Chevron is the most-cited administrative law case of all time. Every law student who has taken a basic course in administrative law is familiar with the principle of "Chevron deference," under which courts must defer to an executive agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a statute the agency administers. The current attack on Chevron does not merely suggest that courts should limit the case's application. It is true that the Supreme Court has recently limited Chevron in various ways-it has, for example, limited the kinds of agency pronouncements that are entitled to deference, and it has declared that some matters are so momentous that Chevron does not apply to them. But the latest attack goes far beyond that. The latest claim is that the very concept of Chevron deference is unconstitutional. Judges, legislators, and scholars have suggested that the Constitution imposes a duty on courts to exercise "independent judgment" when interpreting a statute. This duty, Chevron's critics say, derives from Article III's vesting of the "judicial Power" in the courts, and it forbids courts from deferring to an agency's interpretation.

Rawls's constitution-centered "liberal principle of legitimacy" : a first look -- The constitution as procedural recourse : rawlss liberal principle of legitimacy -- Constitution as directive code -- Constitutional essentials. A singularity of reason, or a space of reasonability? -- Constitutional law and human rights : the call to civility -- Constitutional fidelity : of courts, citizens, and time -- A realistic utopia? -- Legitimacy : procedural compliance or ethical attitude? -- Offsets to proceduralism -- Constitutional application : between will and reason -- Justification-by-constitution, economic guarantees, and the rise of weak-form review -- Judicial restraint (and judicial supremacy) -- Legal formalism and the rule of law -- Constitutional rights and private legal relations -- Liberal tolerance to liberal collapse?

Rhetoric on the topic of Australian citizenship has widely emphasised its significance, particularly as a source of important rights and corresponding obligations. Despite this, as many commentators have noted, the constitutional limits of Parliament's power over citizenship remain unsettled, and the rights and obligations that legally distinguish citizens from non-citizens are not easy to identify. This thesis is motivated by a desire to determine the extent to which claims about the significance of Australian citizenship are reflected in its reality, as a legal concept.There are three dimensions in which the legal concept of Australian citizenship is shaped: constitutional law, statute law and the common law. The thesis conducts a doctrinal study driven by two questions: First, what are the parameters of citizenship, and what rights and obligations are generated for citizens, within each of the three dimensions identified? Secondly, to what extent do the three dimensions intersect in a manner that helps to inform the legal meaning of Australian citizenship?The study finds that, within each individual dimension, silences and ambiguities limit the potential for a cohesive notion of citizenship that gives rise to clear rights and obligations to emerge. However, it demonstrates that, by paying close attention to the intersections between the three dimensions, it is possible to arrive at a conceptualisation of Australian legal citizenship that is more cohesive than the law within any individual domain would suggest. The thesis illustrates one way in which the intersections between the different citizenship dimensions might be coherently resolved. This is by no means the only interpretation available, nor does it provide an answer to every question that has plagued citizenship law in Australia. However, it serves as an indication of the potential for a clearer notion of Australian legal citizenship than that which exists at present to be developed through focus on the connections between existing conceptualisations of citizenship.Note: There have been a number of very recent changes and proposals for change in the area of citizenship law, both in Australia and in foreign countries. I have endeavoured to incorporate these developments into this thesis, as far as possible. The state of the law reflected in the thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, correct as at March 10 2015.

Abstract
This is a response to the contributions of Professors Lech Garlicki and Zofia A Garlicka-Sowers, Vicki C Jackson, Sabrina Ragone and Adrienne Stone, in a book symposium on Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (OUP 2017).

Human dignity is now a central feature of many modern constitutions and international documents. As a constitutional value, human dignity involves a person's free will, autonomy, and ability to write a life story within the framework of society. As a constitutional right, it gives full expression to the value of human dignity, subject to the specific demands of constitutional architecture. This analytical study of human dignity as both a constitutional value and a constitutional right adopts a legal-interpretive perspective. It explores the sources of human dignity as a legal concept, its role in constitutional documents, its content, and its scope. The analysis is augmented by examples from comparative legal experience, including chapters devoted to the role of human dignity in American, Canadian, German, South African, and Israeli constitutional law