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 Draft Translation: Not for CitationWhat follows is another attempt at a translation of an important text by André Tosel on the Marx/Spinoza relation. It is not a finished, or polished translation, but a rough sketch put forward to help people get a sense of this overlooked articulation of the relation between Marx and Spinoza.For a Systematic Study of the Relation of Marx to Spinoza: Remarks and Hypotheses

André Tosel Published in 2008 in the book Spinoza au XIXe Siècle  The question of relation of the thought of Marx to that of Spinoza has up until now been the subject of more of a hermeneutic investigation than a philology. It is easier to construct a history of the different interpretations of Spinoza at the center of different Marxisms then to have determined the precise function of the reference to Spinoza in the work of Marx and to define the use Marx made of the spinozist problematic and the elaboration of his thought.  More or less the Marxists that were first developed a relation to Spinoza were an important milestone on the way to developing what could be called a historical and materialist dialectic. The relation begins in the midst of the Second International. The singularity of Spinoza's thought has often been reduced to a stepping stone on the way to "monist" immanentism, which is supposed to be its philosophical structure at least in the reception of two thinkers, as Plekhanov has asserted in some preliminary texts working from some notes of Engels in manuscripts published in the USSR under the title of the Dialectic of Nature. In the dogmatic frame of the struggle between idealism and materialism, Spinoza anticipates materialism by his thesis of the unity of nature and by his doctrine of the equal dignity of the attribute of extension in relation to the attribute of thought. The doctrine of mode and substance causality, coupled with the critique of final causality and the illusions of superstition, signifies at the same time an overcoming of mechanistic thinking and the first form of the dialectic. Rare were those who, like Antonio Labriola, were careful not to oppose two conceptions of the world head-on and maintained a certain distance with polemical opposition, preferring instead to indicate that Marx did for mode of production what Spinoza had done for the world of the passions—a geometry of their production. In the Soviet Union before the Stalinist freeze, this interpretive tension is reproduced: Spinoza becomes the terrain through which the clarification of the dialectic takes place opposing mechanists and anti-mechanists, and original articulation of the thesis of liberty as the comprehension of necessity. These problems have been clarified somewhat. (Zapata, 1983; Seidel, 1984; Tosel, 1995)One would have to wait for the deconstructive enterprise of Louis Althusser for this movement to be reversed. Spinoza is no longer a moment in the teleology which is integrated and surpassed on the way to Marxism-Leninism. His work is the means of theoretical production for reformulating the philosophical and scientific revolution of Marx without recourse to only the Hegelian dialectic. Spinoza is the first to have elaborated a model of structural causality that makes it possible to think the efficacy of the structure as an absent cause over its effects. The theory of knowledge is not one that authorizes absolute knowledge, but it announces this infinite exigency of a break with ideology without the hope of arriving at transparent knowledge. It obliges one to renounce any idea of communism as a state of a final reconciliation in social relations which would be deprived of any contradictions. "We have always been spinozists,' Althusser announces in the Elements of Self-Criticism, and then proceed to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect from the Hegelian dialectic. It is then only an epistemological obstacle which prevents Marx from realizing the full power of his critique of political economy and to explore the continent of history that he discovered. Spinoza for clarifying Marx himself. Everything has been clarified. (Cotten 1992; Raymond, Moreau, 1997).  In terms of historical research, the spinozist studies that have been made after the end of the nineteen sixties in France and Italy have often been made by researchers who have rubbed shoulders with Marxism. We find the same oscillation between a tendency to read Spinoza according to a pre-marxist perspective, in the sense of a dialectic of emancipation, or liberation from a theological political complex and disalienation, even constituent power, and another tendency insisting on the infinity of the struggle against all illusions, even those of total liberation, affirming the unsurpassable dimension of the imagination in the constitution of the conatus and in the production of the power of the multitude. This oscillation is manifest often in the same commentators, often itself a function of the change of the historical conjuncture. However, up until now, there has never been an attempt to study from Marx's works themselves the structural function of the spinozist reference in the constitution of Marxist theory, one which would permit us to better understand the understanding that Marx made of Spinozist work. The interpretations have anyway have developed from a certain exteriority to the letter of Marxists texts.  Several years ago, a German researcher, Fred E. Schrader, in a short text dedicated to the thematic of "substance and concept" chez Marx (Substanz und Funktion: zur Marxsrezeption Spinoza's) drew attention to this situation (1984). He rightly noted that it was necessary to distinguish two moments in the research to avoid any merely external confrontation: a) first, obviously, document the explicit and implicit mentions of Spinoza in Marx's text; 1) then, reconstruct the position of the reference to Spinoza in the process of the constitution of the critique of political economy which is the central Marxist work, alongside of the references to "Hegel" which one knows were constitutive in the years of 1857-1858. Only this philological and philosophical work can permit us to renew the state of the question.
Schrader's study must be considered. We propose to develop it and comment on it because up until now it has not received the attention that it merits. Before everything else, it is necessary to be precise. The work envisioned must be considerable, it includes taking into account the texts published by Marx, those published posthumously by Engels and by Kautsky, and all of those—collections of notes and thematic notebooks—which make up the incomplete nature of Capital, including Marx's correspondence. The MEGA 2, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, still incomplete, has not finished being scrutinized. This work could begin from the hypothesis that we can conceptualize two periods in Marx's work from which it is possible to reassemble occurrences that conceptualize the reference to Spinoza in order to determine their structural function. The first period corresponds to the years of his formation and the interlinking of the critique of politics and the early critique of political economy, it begins with the concept of history underlying the German Ideology and culminates in the Poverty of Philosophy and the Communist Manifesto. The second period begins with the research operating under the title of the critique of political economy beginning in 1857, interrupted provisionally in January of 1859 and beginning again in 1861. The reference to Spinoza is more explicit in the first period where it is a matter of an specifically political practice, articulating a materialism of practice. It is less explicit in the second period, it functions nonetheless as a fundamental operator in the essential theory of the substance of value in capital. The Philosophical Intensifier of Spinoza of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Destruction of the Theologico-Political Complex and Democratic Radicalism.  Marx encounters Spinoza in the beginning of his theoretical and political journey. In 1841 we know from the preface by Alexandre Matheron (Cahiers Spinoza), Marx, after his doctorate, reproduced the extracts he copied from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (MEGA 2 VI/I Berlin, 1977). He is curiously presented as the author of these texts and moreover they are reorganized in their own order which is not that of the Tractatus itself. The chapters containing the critique of the supernatural, of the miracle, and all of all forms of superstition are brought forward as essential and open on the properly political chapters dedicated to the freedom of thought (XX) and the foundation of the republic (XVI). The Ethics is not ignored but it is not reproduced, Letter XII takes the place of a speculative text and is accompanied with Letter LXXVI to Burgh. Everything takes place as if Marx considered as the most important question to be that of theological politics and is concentrated on the question of human freedom in its radical ethico-political dimension. What is important is that the revolutionary democratic state is realized according to this concept.  One could also consider that Spinoza is utilized here as one of the figures that a Doctorate of Philosophy considers along with Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as provocations, of that which puts knowledge in the service of a life liberated from the fear of authorities, which reappropriates humanity's power of thinking and acting confiscated in the service of gods and fetishes. In a certain manner Epicurus is the paradoxically the first of the thinkers who claims that "it is a misfortune to live in necessity, but it is not necessary to live under necessity." This truth finds a new application, after the French Revolution, in the age of a new ethics, where free individuals recognize themselves in a free state.  2. The explicit reference to Spinoza is displaced in the texts of the years 1841-1843—the Kreuznach manuscript dedicated to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, followed by the introduction and the Jewish Question. These constitute the Feuerbachian moment of Marx, at the heart of his theory of the alienation of the human essence. One must not make this critique of politics a simple transition towards the discovery of the alienation of social powers, nor understand it as an end of a politics understood as primarily statist. It is the ethico-political liberation which requires a transformation of social relations and which is a transvaluation or emancipation of social powers. Spinoza is not named, but certain passages from the TTP are repeated almost to the letter: Spinoza figures as the index of a new task , that is lacking in Hegel which is that of thinking beyond the dualism of civil society and the state. The name of this passage is democracy or true democracy. Marx returns to the letter of the Spinozist thesis according to which democracy is not only the name of a constituted political regime, but the essence of politics, the most natural regime, constituting the power of the people. The intensive force of Spinoza is that of democracy not as a mystical act or utopian ecstasy, but as a process of constitution that replaces actual void of the Hegelian state where the people lack themselves, in which the state becomes something separate, still theologico-political. Democracy is the active process by which the people is refigured as the negative instance of any separate political form and gives a political form to its social power. "Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy. Monarchy is necessarily democracy in contradiction with itself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction within democracy. Monarchy cannot, while democracy can be understood in terms of itself In democracy none of the moments obtains a significance other than what befits it. Each is really only a moment of the whole Demos. In monarchy one part determines the character of the whole; the entire constitution must be modified according to the immutable head. Democracy is the generic constitution; monarchy is a species, and indeed a poor one. Democracy is content and form; monarchy should be only form, but it adulterates the content.
In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its modes of existence,. the political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determination, and indeed as the self-determination of the people. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not only in itself, according to essence, but according to existence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work. The constitution appears as what it is, the free product of men." It is possible to remark that this constituent power of the demos tends to be presented as a sort of causa sui in the order of world of social relations. The naturalist dimension thematized in the Ethics is not posited here with the insistence of humanity as part of nature, with the thematization of the relations between internal and external causality. Necessity seems to have disappeared for an instant. It is notable that this in the same moment that Feuerbach defends Spinoza's naturalism against Hegelian idealism and makes the author of the Ethics the Moses of modern thought who has destroyed theology by his pantheism, while reproaching him, for not having arrived at a radical humanist affirmation, since he maintained an equivocal equivalence between the naturalization of god and the divinization of nature. The Marxist reference is primarily to the ethico-political Spinoza, one of the "intellectual heroes of morality" as he says in a text contemporary with it, "Comments on the Latest Russian Censorship—" along with Kant and Fichte he is one of the heroes that found and defend the principal of moral autonomy. Spinoza makes it possible to undertake a philosophical political of Hegel, the people would be the only ontological instance that constitutes the political constitution, which is to say democracy, of civil society. Spinoza makes it possible to introduce a new dialectic within the incomplete dialectic of The Principles of the Philosophy of Right. This dialectic is simultaneously a critique. The object of this critical dialectic is the self-constitution of political activity in the struggle to overcome the domination of abstract entities erected into speculative abstractions defining the latest avatars of the theological-political complex.  Schrader does not say more in the exposition of the reference to Spinoza in this first period. We could take a step beyond his analysis. A unpublished path seems to be presented. We could in fact explore it as Yovel has done (Spinoza and Other Heretics); also the first book of Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (1968) examines the double relation of the human conatus to other conatuses and objects that suit them or do not suit them the rudiments of a theory of objectification of the human essence that Marx elaborates in the texts of 1844 where he analyzes the people under the figure of the proletariat subject and object of alienated labor. The reading can shed light on Spinoza, but Marx has for his interlocuters Hegel, Adam Smith, and Feuerbach. Spinoza does not intervene here explicitly. It is preferable to follow the letter of his texts.  3. The text which follows, The Holy Family of 1845, indicates an unexamined reversal of perspective. Far from finding in Spinoza a radical thinker of liberty through the radicalization of the democratic process and developing Feuerbach's theses of the virtues of Spinoza's naturalization, far from continuing the anti-idealist elements of Spinoza, Marx for the first time distances himself from Spinoza placing him on the side of Descartes, of Malebranche, of Leibniz, of abstract rationalist metaphysics, in a paragraph before celebrating the materialists in which he inscribes himself. These are the materialists of the French Enlightenment, La Mettrie, Holbach, Helvétius, which are lauded for having operated outside of metaphysics. These are the authors that Plekhanov reinscribes as a defenders of monistic materialism in the thought of nature and in the theory of history. Certainly as Olivier Bloch in an important contribution has demonstrated ("Materialism, genesis of Marxism, 1981, reprinted in Matières à penser, Vrin, 1997), this chapter of the history of philosophy is a plagiarism by Marx who literally takes it from the Manuel d'histoire de la philosophie moderne by Charles Renouvier (1844). The soviet Diamat has been founded by a French critic… But the fact remains that Marx endorses this reconstruction which prefers Bacon, Hobbes and Locke to Spinoza, lauding them for the empiricism and nominalism: the English thinkers critique metaphysic speculation and open directly the way to materialism. Pierre Bayler in France can be considered the only fellow traveler of British empiricism by his scepticism he dissolves the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz (The Holy Family, 171).  The Spinoza criticized here is that of the Ethics understood as a dogmatic treatise of metaphysics which has a "profane content" but it has lost its historical condition. This is no longer the antitheological political Spinoza but the speculative philosopher. Is it necessary to conclude that this is a contradiction on the part of Marx and to forget his previous theses? It is a surprising oversight because that which Marx and Renouvier give credit to Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke can be imputed to Spinoza as well. Everything takes place as if Marx, put off by the metaphysics of the Ethics forgets what he had found in the TTP—and this seems to be a permanent transformation. In fact the contradiction is not only apparent, or, more to the point, it concerns Spinoza himself. Marx does not have as his object an analysis of Spinozism. He uses the latter by breaking it down according to the needs of his task which is at this moment is to study the activity of real man and the possibility of his transformation by bringing together the theoretical humanism of Feuerbach, the French communism and socialism, and the English thinkers who represent this humanism in the domain of practice. "[Metaphysics] will be defeated for forever by materialism which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself and coincides with humanism. As Feuerbach represented materialism in the theoretical domain, French and English socialism and communism represent materialism in the practical field which now coincides with humanism." (The Holy Family, pg. 168) One can detect in this passage the presence of a schematic of the history of modern philosophy which has echoes of Moses Hess and Ludwig Feuerbach, the two have confronted the problem of the critical comprehension of Hegel and have begun to present a reinterpretation of the grand moments of the history of philosophy after their master.  Marx deviates from the interpretation of Hess given in a text which had a particular impact: The Sacred History of Mankind by a Young Disciple of Spinoza (1838). Hess appropriates Spinoza's theory of knowledge and exploits his theory of the imagination to develop a positive sense of social utopia, and overall makes Spinoza the true alternative to Hegel's Christian philosophy. Far from being an acosmism, the theory of substance is the perfect incarnation of the Hebraic idea of the unconditional unity of all. It is paradoxical, the other part, of the interpretation by Renouvier followed by Marx recovers and conceals that of Feuerbach that one can find in the same period in Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy (1842) and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843). Marx brushes up against these theses of Feuerbach on Spinoza without reproducing them in their entirety. They make Spinoza an important moment in modern philosophy: at the heart of this movement they make this philosophy an important realization of the humanization of God, Spinoza remains still a speculative philosopher who is at once produces the realization and negation of God. Speculative metaphysics realizes with him its ultimate phase which is determined contradictorily as theism and atheism in the form of pantheism. "Spinoza is the originator of speculative philosophy, Schelling its restorer, Hegel its perfecter."(Thesis 102) Pantheism becomes the only consequential theology in that it anticipates the end of theology in atheism. The Spinozist substance transforms all independent beings into predicates, into attributes of a unique and independent being. God is no longer only a thing thought, it is equally an extended thing (Thesis 3). Spinoza does not make the self-activity of self-consciousness the attribute that unifies and transforms substance into subject. This was Hegel's tour de force but he paid for it with an absolute idealism of spirit since once again spirit prevails over extension and concrete man is subject to abstraction separated from reality of self-consciousness.
This inscription of Spinoza in metaphysics is all the more paradoxical because Marx finds in empiricism and British materialism the theses that Feuerbach attributes to Spinoza, and Marx accepts a definition in which materialism coincides with communism. As can be seen in this passage from Principles of the Philosophy of the Future  Pantheism is theological atheism or theological materialism; it is the negation of theology while itself confined to the standpoint of theology, for it turns matter, the negation of God, into a predicate or an attribute of the Divine Being. But he who turns matter into an attribute of God, declares matter to be a divine being. The realisation of God must in principle presuppose godliness, that is, the truth and essentiality of the real. The deification of the real, of that which exists materially – materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism – or the negation of theology, is the essence of the modern era. Pantheism is therefore nothing more than the essence of the modern era elevated into the divine essence, into a religio-philosophical principle. Empiricism or realism – meaning thereby the so-called sciences of the real, but in particular the natural science – negates theology, albeit not theoretically but only practically, namely, through the actual deed in so far as the realist makes the negation of God, or at least that which is not God, into the essential business of his life and the essential object of his activity. However, he who devotes his mind and heart exclusively to that which is material and sensuous actually denies the trans-sensuous its reality; for only that which constitutes an object of the real and concrete activity is real, at least for man. "What I don't know doesn't affect me." To say that it is not possible to know anything of the supersensuous is only an excuse. One ceases to know anything about God and divine things only when one does not want to know anything about them. How much did one know about God, about the devils or angels as long as these supersensuous beings were still objects of a real faith? To be interested in something is to have the talent for it. The medieval mystics and scholastics had no talent and aptitude for natural science only because they had no interest in nature. Where the sense for something is not lacking, there also the senses and organs do not lack. If the heart is open to something, the mind will not be closed to it. Thus, the reason why mankind in the modern era lost the organs for the supersensuous world and its secrets is because it also lost the sense for them together with the belief in them; because its essential tendency was anti-Christian and anti-theological; that is, anthropological, cosmic, realistic, and materialistic. [In the context of the present work, the differences between materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism are, of course, irrelevant.] Spinoza hit the nail on the head with his paradoxical proposition: God is an extended, that is, material being. He found, at least for his time, the true philosophical expression for the materialistic tendency of the modern era; he legitimated and sanctioned it: God himself is a materialist. Spinoza's philosophy was religion; he himself was an amazing man. Unlike so many others, Spinoza's materialism did not stand in contradiction to the notion of a non-material and anti-materialistic God who also quite consistently imposes on man the duty to give himself up only to anti-materialistic, heavenly tendencies and concerns, for God is nothing other than the archetypal and ideal image of man; what God is and how he is, is what man ought to be or wants to be, or at least hopes to be in the future. But only where theory does not belie practice, and practice theory, is there character, truth, and religion. Spinoza is the Moses of modern free-thinkers and materialists. 4. The anti-metaphysical fury of Marx, the blind submission to Renouvier, limits him in developing an interpretation of the Ethics more nuanced and sensitive to the historical contradictions. This situation is even more strange because it is in The Holy Family that Marx interprets materialist philosophers such that they are a Feuerbachian Spinoza. On can find then three theses that Marx distributes to different representatives of materialism and that can also be imputed to Spinoza. --Thesis 1. Nature is a primary reality, it can be explained by itself without recourse to the principle of a creator. Nothing comes from nothing. One can then have recourse to Bacon for who "the primitive forms of matter are essentially living forms, individuals, and it is they that produce specific differences." He follows, as does Hobbes, in adding that "one cannot separate thought from the matter which thinks." Thought cannot be separated from matter capable of thought.  --Thesis 2. The human order is inscribed in a specific manner in nature. This specificity does not specify anything extra-worldly of human activity. Hobbes has demonstrated the sensible nature of activity. "Man is subordinate to the same laws that nature. Power and liberty are identical." The Holy Family) This order is known to promote the art of forming ideas, the human species is fundamentally educatable. ---Thesis 3. What is important is to think the constitution of this human order according to radical possibilities of the ways of transforming these necessary conditions of experience of liberty-power. "If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality,
crime must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social source of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be made human. If man is social by
nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of separate individuals but by the power of society." (The Holy Family 176).  It is not necessary to give the history of philosophy presented in The Holy Family a structural importance. It acts as a provisionally constructed polemical text where Marx has given the means for his own philosophical conception in broad strokes in order to better understand the intersection of humanism, materialism, and communism. The incongruence of the treatment of Spinoza, reinterpreted to be behind Feuerbach's position, was not overlooked by Marx's comrades in combat since H. Krieg (himself denounces by Marx in a virulent circular as a confused partisan of religious socialism), he wrote in a letter of June 6, 1845 in order to restore Spinoza's battle against metaphysics overlooked by Marx, "you're probably right about what it says in the English Hobbes and Locke [i.e. that they vacillate contradictorily between materialism and theism], the same for Voltaire and his direct partisans; but Holbach is practically Spinozist, and it is with and Diderot that the Enlightenment reaches its summit and becomes revolutionary." (cited by Maximilien Rubel and his edition of the philosophical texts of Marx titled Philosophie) 5. The instrumental and fluctuating character of the reference to Spinoza as a metaphysician is confirmed precisely by The German Ideology. Marx returns in passing to the place of Spinoza in modern philosophy. Spinoza has developed the principle of substantial immanence but he has not integrated the principle with self-consciousness. Hegel would be the unity of Spinoza and Fichte (The German Ideology, 107). But for Marx this representation consigns him to a partial aspect of the Hegelian synthesis. Self-consciousness is at once a hypostasis of the real activity of human beings in the process of their self-production and the "the real consciousness of the social relations in which they appear to exists and to which they appear to be autonomous." In a similar manner substance is "an ideal hypostatized expression of the world as it exists" that is take as the foundation of the world "existing for itself." Marx returns to Feuerbach for clarification of substance and it anthropological resolution. We do not know much more, but the text seems to distinguish the Hegelian critique of substance and its possible materialist significance as "the existing world." We would have expected considerations on the immanence of modes in natura naturans and of their dynamic interdetermination.
In any case, Marx refuses the young Hegelain opposition between self-consciousness and substance, and proposes to maintain the category of substance as an inseparable unity of the existing mode and the beings which constitute the world in the play of their relations. Marx's criticism has as its target the mystification of self-consciousness and its anti-substantial phobia. Everything takes place as if the ontological categories of Spinoza up until now rejected as conservative metaphysics have an intensive force irreducible to the critique of the young Hegelians. However, it remains that in this complex itinerary the use value of the reference to Spinoza is concentrated in the theological political constellation and the political constitution of the political force of social force. This reference becomes the presupposition of the materialist conception of history, but it does not intervene in the texture of these concepts.  The Spinoza Reference in the Critique of Political Economy, Substance and Concept Returning to Schrader and his propositions for the study of the second moment of the reference to Spinoza, that of the Marxist use of Spinozist concepts from the Ethics in the development of the critique of political economy in the development of Capital. Schrader pays particular attention to the reappearance in the margins of the reference to Spinoza in the period of the creation and exposition of the critique of political economy which is developed from 1851 to 1863. An important letter from Marx to Lassale from May 31, 1858 which was published in an obscure book on Heraclitus, gives to Spinoza's metaphysics the same status that he gave to Hegel in a famous letter to Engels a few months before.  Even among philosophers who give a systematic form to the works, as for example Spinoza, the true inner structure of the system is quite unlike the form in which it was consciously presented. The true system is only present in itself. (Marx MEW, 29, Berlin, 1963, 561).

What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident... If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified. (Correspondence Marx-Engels)  Marx makes it clear that the elaboration of the critique passes through the utilization of elements of philosophical works which others appear to have completely bypassed. The presence of Hegel is the center of the interpretation of Capital. It would appear certain to this period that Marx no longer takes inspiration from the Feuerbachian critique of abstract speculation. In this case, the Idea separated from its contents generates the latter in a mystified way by legitimizing the crudest aspects, losing the benefit of seizing the real as a contradictory process, as is explained in The Holy Family or The Poverty of Philosophy. Hegel is from now on solicited for his dialectical discoveries: he elaborates the dialectic as an immanent process of thought and his discoveries serve Marx in developing his proper critique. The presence of Hegel in the period up to the publication of the first volume of Capital in 1867, in passing through diverse manuscripts of 1857-1858 (The Grundrisse) and the manuscripts from 1861-1863, has been attested to and demonstrated by works, either to reaffirm the heretical Hegelianism of Marx, (Rosdolsky, Reichelt, Zelenyi, all dedicated to research the logic of Capital, all following one of the most famous injunctions of all times, Lenin in the Notes on Dialectics) or to combat it in order to argue that Marx was Hegelian or anti-Hegelian (Althusser, and Bidet in his famous study, The Making of Marx's Capital).
This usage of Hegel consists essentially in using the categories of logic to expose the theoretical structure of the passages which operate from the commodity to value, from money as the measure of value to money as the means of exchange and as the universal means of payment, from money to capital. Schrader proposes the following recovery of the Marxist exposition of Hegelian categories: --Exchange value and the form of value correspond to the pure quantity of Hegel: this value and its measure is realized as money. The Marxist measure of value adopts the Hegelian determinations of the quantitative relations and their measure. --The circulation of commodities and money is described by the concepts of an infinite qualitative and quantitative process.  --Finally the passage from money to capital transposes the passage from being to essence. Marx has thus read and reused these conceptual determinations for the diverse functions of commodity, value, money and circulation.  And what about Spinoza? According to Schrader, he intervenes to resolve a logical problem that is at this point unresolved, that of the determination of the concept of capital supposed to integrate the logically preceding determinations. In good Hegelianism, Marx has made the movement of capital that of the essence of the concept. When Marx maintains that exchange value is realized in the circulation of other substances, in an indefinite totality, without losing the determination of its form, always remaining money and commodities, he makes capital the totality of substances. However, it thus impossible to maintain the internal connection between capital and labor, and more precisely abstract labor. Spinoza intervenes to make possible another use of the category of substance: that would not have its function to subsume the plurality of all substances, but to determine the quality of the fluent quantity that defines abstract labor.  One can see this in the text of Volume One of Capital, revised by Marx in 1873 for the French translation of J. Roy. The category of substance is introduce in the passage from the commodity to its determination as the contradictory unity of use value and exchange value. The exchange of commodities is only possible if the their values are "expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they represent a greater or less quantities." This something is a substance specific to all commodities. "This common "something" cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural property of commodities…[] it is evident that one makes an abstraction from use value when one exchanges, and that the relation of exchange is characterized by this abstraction (Capital). Exchange and the production process which supports it operate this real abstraction from the useful qualities of the objects to be exchanged. This utility, although necessary, does not render possible the exchange of objects of value insofar as they products of labor. Exchange concerns the objects considered as products of labor.  If then we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract.  Capitalism cannot be grasped as a subject enveloping the totality of the process of the development. It is no longer a simple quantity in indefinite expansion. It is thought as the "social substance of as exchange values." This substance can be determined as capital, but it goes beyond this process of determination by constituting a remainder, a "residue" that constantly reappears. "Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is, that human labour power has been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are – Values." The concept of Capital is not that of the concept of substance becoming subject., it returns to the concept of social substance defined as abstract labor creator of value, substance of value, and substance which increases value: purely progressive quantity reduced to its infinity which is a true infinity irreducible to the logic of bad infinity, that of capital which nonetheless subsumes it.  However it is said that this reconstruction does not rest on an explicit reference to Spinoza. The objection is well founded. Schrader responds that it is Marx who reread Hegel and saw that the formal system of Spinoza could be used against Hegel critique of the concept of substance in the Logic. It is a matter of the problem of determination. Omnis determination negatio, Marx keeps reminding everyone of this. If it is Hegel who validates Spinoza's judgement by demonstrating its insufficiency which for Marx transforms into a sufficient truth to permit him to avoid identifying capital with the Hegelian concept. Capital can increase its reality only by determining this social substance of abstract labor, by negating it. The tendency of capital, its ideal, is the absolute negation of this substance. Marx makes the insufficiency of Spinoza's substance according to Hegel into a virtue.  In the Logic the principle according to which determination is negation is recognized as essential. But Spinoza, according to Hegel, remains with determination as limit which is founded on an other being. The mode is in another from which it derives its being but this other is in itself. It is the integral concept of all realities. But its immanence is only apparent. Each mode negates each other, determination of each is the result of the determined negation of all of the others. Far from determining itself in these negations, substance is negated in its absolute indifference. It does not reflect itself in these negations no more than they reflect it. The Spinozist principle does not arrive at absolute negation that it anticipates contradictorily. The substance is posed by an external reflection which compromises the otherwise affirmed subsistence of the determinations which become an effervescent moment (attributes and modes). This can be read in the texts from The Science of Logic dedicated to Spinoza.  "Of this proposition that determinateness is negation, the unity of Spinoza's substance — or that there is only one substance — is the necessary consequence. Thought and being or extension, the two attributes, namely, which Spinoza had before him, he had of necessity to posit as one in this unity; for as determinate realities they are negations whose infinity is their unity. According to Spinoza's definition, of which we say more more subsequently, the infinity of anything is its affirmation. He grasped them therefore as attributes, that is, as not having a separate existence, a self-subsistent being of their own, but only as sublated, as moments; or rather, since substance in its own self lacks any determination whatever, they are for him not even moments, and the attributes like the modes are distinctions made by an external intellect. Similarly, the substantiality of individuals cannot persist in the face of that proposition."Hegel, Science of Logic  "Since absolute indifference may seem to be the fundamental determination of Spinoza's substance, we may add that this is indeed the case in so far as in both every determination of being, like every further concrete differentiation of thought and extension and so forth, is posited as vanished. If we stop short at the abstraction [of substance] then it is a matter of complete indifference what something looked like in reality before it was swallowed up in this abyss. But when substance is conceived as indifference, it is tied up with the need for determining it and for taking this determination into consideration; it is not to remain Spinoza's substance, the sole determination of which is the negative one that everything is absorbed in it. With Spinoza, the moment of difference — attributes, thought and extension, then the modes too, the affections, and every other determination — is introduced empirically; it is intellect, itself a mode, which is the source of the differentiation." Hegel, Science of Logic  3. It is capital which fails to realize its ideal determinations of essence and which falls back into the residue of the social substance, of the abstract labor which it masks. Capital as a mode of production is ruled by the real abstractions of exchange value which are not comprehended by social agents. Value is a social abstraction that is produced from the base of multiple dispersed evaluations, that the understanding of the economist produces only after the fact, but can be known as a real abstraction operated by society and which is determined as a social substance of abstract time. The determination of the common substance as abstract labor makes it possible to dissipate the mystification produced by the appearance of capital as the self moving essence of value. All of the people, who are modes of this substance, cannot immediately represent to themselves the internal determinations of this substance in which they appear other than as representation of theological-political complex, the same as the agents of capital who cannot represent to themselves the determinations of capital (commodity-value-money-forms of capital) without fetishizing them as autonomous movements of the value form. Theoretical knowledge, the Wissenschaft, does not dissolve this fetishism because the mechanisms of its social reproduction are founded on the constitution of these forms of representation and their real efficacy. Capital cannot arrive at self-identity in terms of an absolute reflection. The determination that Hegel imputes to Spinoza negatively of substance as exterior reflection can better convey the determinations of moments of its critique. This places within the development of initial economic forms this sort of equivalent of the attribute of extension that is human labor, this common social substance comprising the forms of modal representations which capture it, that is to say that the forms of consciousness and their functional relations in the material process of reproduction. It is therefore the relationship between the substances of abstract human labor and mystified or adequate forms of social representations of this substance that Marx finds in in the hidden Spinozian system and that he utilizes in order to escape the limits of Hegel's categories, which tend to sublimate substance into the concept and therefore annul the contradictions of capital in the passage from substance to the essence and the concept. From this point of view, Hegel and Spinoza would both be utilized without reservations by Marx as the complimentary and constitutive means of production of the critique of political economy. Spinoza would thus be primarily critical to the extent that the process of the development of the determination of capital cannot be ruled by the teleological order of being-essence-concept. The theory of the substance of abstract labor interrupts the movement of the idealization of capital from the mimesis of the Hegelian order that has been opposed. Spinoza is a moment of the emendation of the intellect internal to the Marxist critique, not an external instance that would be opposed in the confrontation with exteriority.  On an Incomplete Analysis  1. Schrader goes no further. The outline of his work remains open. In particular this analysis
Postulates as evidence a substantial theory of abstract labor, one that has come under criticism from multiple non-marxist thinkers (Croce, Pareto, Menger) and also, more recently, by Marxists (Althusser and Bidet). In this case the relation to Spinoza would lose its fecundity. But if one leaves to the side the labor theory of value and its supposed foundational role, on the internal level the analysis still remains allusive, because it would have been necessary to exceed the level of Volume One of Capital in order to demonstrate the decisive character of Spinoza's conceptuality in the Marxist conception.  Despite these uncertainties, the perspective opened by Schrader is stimulating in that can necessitate a more rigorous study, tempering the contradictory interpretations by the rigors of philology.  2. Schrader's final remarks seem to us be more provocative. Starting from the idea that
Spinoza and Marx begin from two different historical moments—that of manufacturing capital limited by the desire of hoarding and that of capitalism fully developed—the logical and ethico-political thesis of the submission of needs to absolute monetary enrichment, and that therefore the refusal of money as an end in itself, he begins to construct a shocking analogy between the third type of knowledge in Spinoza and the knowledge of the capitalist which exposes its money to circulation in order to multiply it. The determination of particular things sub specie aeternitas, as deepening the knowledge of their essence would symbolize with the effort of capitalists to insert money to measure things in their circulation sub specie capitalis. The reference to Marx attests to the irony of Marx: if the movement of true knowledge is infinite, this infinity cannot be confused with that of monetary accumulation which becomes a bad infinity because the means of accumulation are reversed and perverted to be posited as an end in itself.  3. It is more correct, as Schrader makes apparent, to find a space more effective for the
forma mentis common to Marx and Spinoza: the two both diagnosis the pathology of the understanding and that of a form of life proper to a given historical world. Both understand the irreversible character of modern passions and set to understand and eventually cure these pathologies.
Spinoza, son of a merchant enriched by international trade and a merchant himself in his youth, does not have contempt for money and the new wealth of nations promoted by capitalist economy. He does not dream of a return to oikos of finite needs in a household setting, he is not an aristoltean who condemns bad infinity of the circulation of merchandise which has as its object money and not the use value of merchandise. He registers the emergence of exchange value, he sees, as Aristotle did, that it is the subordination of true value.
Remember the famous text from Ethics IV Appendix, consecrated to the function of money.  XXVIII. Now to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be sufficient if men did not help one another. But money has provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids. That is why its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude more than anything else. For they can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.  XXlX. But this is a vice only in those who seek money neither from need nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the art of making money and pride themselves on it very much. As for the body, they feed it according to custom, but sparingly, because they believe they lose as much of their goods as they devote to the preservation
of their body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set
bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little. The realization of money as a concept, the accumulation of money for accumulation, is unrealized. Marx adds that this goal is inaccessible because the character of use value of commodities contradicts the universal sociality of value. The common social substance in so far as it is measured in abstract labor time is measured according to quantitatively determined portions. Money is supposed to represent value in its infinite becoming of an end in itself, but it can only effectively represent a determined part. This contradiction is resolved in the deplacement that money makes in becoming capital, exchange value multiplied in profit. Spinoza's therapeutic of desire also concern the intellect of calculation: the latter is not condemned, it is superior to the intellect of avarice which theorizes by avarita and does not develop the capacity to act and think. This understanding, however, is called upon to better understand the monetary economy by subordinating it to immanent true utility, that which is inscribed in the republic of free citizens. It is only in this sense that the accumulation of wealth under the monetary form can enter into the correct perspective of knowledge of the third kind. Marx in his own way wants to understand the action of human beings without deploring or flattering them. Capital cannot be understood going from substance to the essence of the concept, but it has its basis in substance, the social substance of abstract labor, and can be rethought and regrouped in the forms of economic understanding. Capital also has as its goal a particular therapeutic manner, the health and well-being of a social body that cannot be subsumed under capital but must encompass the increase of the capacities of acting and thinking that capital subordinates to itself.  4. This anti-teleological function of the concept of substance/abstract labor is not
maintained by Marx for long in his dialectic. Certainly the function of the subject cannot be attributed to capital, but it is displaced and given a different support, not that of abstract labor with its internal multiplicity and impersonality, but its bearer, that of the working class, the proletariat, the people of the people. The substance of abstract labor becomes subject in the determination that Marx always uses with the English term general intellect. One could thus see a final return of Hegel which interrupts Marx's return to Spinoza. The communism developed by the general intellect is the practical substitute of the Hegelian concept and imposes an anthropological version and anthropocentric teleology that Spinoza would not accept. What does the general intellect represent? It represents the capacity of the proletariat to organize the ensemble of forces defining the collective worker and the cooperation associated with it, under the direction of formation of the factory in the constitution of the unqualified worker, all representing the advance front of the progressive socialization of the social productive forces. Communism is not something that is imposed as a simple moral ideal, it is a product of the real historical process.  However, Marx does not escape here the teleologism that he shares with majority of
German idealism. The socialization of productive forces—that for Marx leads the process of the self-production of humanity realizing its immanent end and to which he attributes the function of the concept—is not realized at the level of society. It cannot in any way constitute itself as a causa sui. The human world remains a world of world of modal relations and interactions: if the effects of liberation can realize themselves at the level of the individual (by the knowledge of singular things) or at the level of collectivity ( by the democratic constitution of the multitude), these effects would not be made from a mode as a complete cause of itself under all points of view. The capacity of a mode to act and think, human individual or society, can be more or less adequate, but this adequation does not annul the difference that separates the mode which is produced by and in another which it requires to subsist and which is produced in and by itself and becomes a cause of itself. The identity of natura naturata and natura naturans cannot grant a mode the capacity to be cause of itself under all points of view: it permits it to do so under certain points of view and certain conditions which are sufficient for an ethical realization. Communism to the extent that Marx thinks in terms of the becoming concept of the collective worker exceeds the conditions and possibilities of action predicated on modes.  To this structural impossibility we can add the consideration of an analytical one: modern society is not immense and singular enterprise under the order of the collective worker, it is, to say the least, a network of antagonistic enterprises in which on the contrary the process of work is fragmented to the point where it loses all material and ideal unity, a fragmentation that has been imposed by the imperative of capitalist society. Exploitation is not only maintained but it is generalized, it is only in compensation that the recomposition of labor process itself as something collective, cooperative, and associated that Marx believes leads the dialectic of the process of capitalist production. Spinozist realism is here irreducible. It does not limited us in taking the measure of the problem posed generally by Marx, it excludes, however, the solution envisioned from speculative teleology and it compels us to attempt to comprehend the modal form in which exploitation is reproduced. How can we form a new theory of the capacity for insurrection of the multitude subordinated to capital while they also resist it. What effects of liberation can still be manifested by producing new subjectivities which are embedded in real productive activities, not prisoners of unproductive ghettos ravaged by self-destructive violence, nor recluse themselves in the powerless rumination of a moral salvation? How can we escape forms of historical impotence? How can we avoid being reduced to the status of spectators of this impotence? Such are the questions posed by Marx and which are posed again today along with Spinoza and his critique of the teleological illusions of the general intellect, questions which have not arrived at the end of their road. But it is historically vain to ask Marx these questions: they are ours and it is up to us to answer them.

Cass Sunstein has a lovely New York Times essay that tries to give us back the word "Liberal." I hope it works. "Liberal" from "Libertas" means, at bottom, freedom. In the 19th century, "liberals" were devoted to personal, economic, and increasing social freedom from government restraint.  "Conservatives" wanted to maintain aristocratic privileges, and government interventions in the traditional way of doing things. The debate was not so obvious. Conservatives defended their view of aristocratic power in a noblesse-oblige concern for little people that the unfettered free market might leave behind, in a way quite  reminiscent of today's elites who think they should run the government in the name of the downtrodden (or "nudge" them, if I can poke a little fun at Sunstein's earlier work). But by the 1970s, the labels had flipped. "Liberals" were advocates of big-state interventionism, in a big tent that included communists and marxists. It became a synonym of "left." "Conservatives" became a strange  alliance of free market economics and social conservatism. The word "classical liberal" or "libertarian" started to be used to refer to heirs of the enlightenment "liberal" tradition, broadly emphasizing individual liberty and limited rule of law government in both economic and social spheres. But broadly, "liberal" came to mean more government intervention and Democrat, while "conservative" came to mean less state intervention and Republican, at least in rhetoric.  But a new force has come to the fore. The heirs of the far-left marxists and communists are now, .. what shall we call them.. perhaps "censorious totalitarian progressives." Sunstein calls them "post liberals." The old alliance between center-left and far left is tearing apart, and Oct 7 was a wake up call for many who had skated over the division. Largely, then, I read Sunstein's article as a declaration of divorce. They are not us, they are not "liberals." And many of you who call yourselves "conservatives," "free marketers" or even "libertarians" should join us to fight the forces of illiberalism left and right, even if by now you probably completely gave up on the New York Times and read the Free Press instead. Rhetoric: Sunstein is brilliantly misleading. He writes what liberalism "is" or what liberals "believe," as if the word were already defined his way. It is not, and the second part of this post quotes another NYT essay with a quite different conception of "liberal." This is an essay about what liberal should mean. I salute that. It's interesting that Sunstein wants to rescue the traditional meaning of "liberal," rather than shade words in current use. "Classical liberal," is mostly the same thing, but currently shades a bit more free market than he'd like. "Neoliberal" is an insult but really describes most of his views. People have turned insults around to proud self-identifiers before.   "Libertarian," probably has less room for the state and conservativism than Sunstein, and most people confuse "libertarian" with "anarchist." It's interesting he never mentions the word. Well, let's rescue "liberal." Here are some excerpts of Sunstein's 37 theses. I reorganized  into topics. What is "liberalism"? 1. Liberals believe in six things: freedom, human rights, pluralism, security, the rule of law and democracy....6. The rule of law is central to liberalism. ...It calls for law that is prospective, allowing people to plan, rather than retroactive, defeating people's expectations. It requires conformity between law on the books and law in the world. It calls for rights to a hearing (due process of law)....Liberalism requires law evenly applied, not "show me the man, and I'll find the crime." It requires a legal system in which each of us is not guilty of "Three Felonies a Day," unprotected unless we are trouble to those in power. 10. Liberals believe that freedom of speech is essential to self-government....11. Liberals connect their opposition to censorship to their commitment to free and fair elections, which cannot exist if people are unable to speak as they wish. ...They agree with ... "the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."   It's freedom, individual dignity, equality before the law and the state. Economics On economic matters, "liberalism" starts with the basic values of the laissez-faire tradition, because the right to transact freely is one of the most basic freedoms there is:15. Liberals prize free markets, insisting that they provide an important means by which people exercise their agency. Liberals abhor monopolies, public or private, on the ground that they are highly likely to compromise freedom and reduce economic growth. At the same time, liberals know that unregulated markets can fail, such as when workers or consumers lack information or when consumption of energy produces environmental harm.On the latter point, Sunstein later acknowledges room for a variety of opinion on just how effective government remedies are for such "failures" of "unregulated markets." I'm a free marketer not because markets are perfect but because governments are usually worse. A point we can respectfully debate with fact and logic.16. Liberals believe in the right to private property. But nothing in liberalism forbids a progressive income tax or is inconsistent with large-scale redistribution from rich to poor. Liberals can and do disagree about the progressive income tax and on whether and when redistribution is a good idea. Many liberals admire Lyndon Johnson's Great Society; many liberals do not.I endorse this as well, which you may find surprising. Economics really has nothing to say about non-distorting transfers. Economists can only point out incentives, and disincentives. Redistribution tends to come with bad incentives. "Liberals" can and do argue about how bad the disincentives are, and if the purported benefits of redistribution are worth it. Cass allows liberals (formerly "conservatives") who "do not" admire extensive federal government social programs, because of their disincentives. Me.17. Many liberals are enthusiastic about the contemporary administrative state; many liberals reject itI also agree. I'm one of those who largely rejects it, but it's a matter of degree on disincentives, government competence, and the severity of the problems being addressed. "Liberals" can productively debate this matter of degree.  Liberalism is a framework for debate, not an answer to these economic questions. Integrating ConservativismIntegrating "conservative" into "liberal" is one of Sunstein's charms, and I agree. He is also trying to find a common ground in the "center," that tussles gently on the size of government while respecting America's founding enlightenment values, and unites many across the current partisan divide. 2...Those who consider themselves to be leftists may or may not qualify as liberals. You can be, at once, a liberal, as understood here, and a conservative; you can be a leftist and illiberal. 22. A liberal might think that Ronald Reagan was a great president and that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was an abomination; a liberal might think that Roosevelt was a great president and that Reagan was an abomination.   "Conserativism" properly means conserving many of the traditions of our society, rather than burning it down once a generation striving for utopia, and having it dissolve into tyranny. Sunstein's "liberalism" is conservative 24. Liberals favor and recognize the need for a robust civil society, including a wide range of private associations that may include people who do not embrace liberalism. They believe in the importance of social norms, including norms of civility, considerateness, charity and self-restraint. They do not want to censor any antiliberals or postliberals, even though some antiliberals or postliberals would not return the favor. On this count, they turn the other cheek. Liberals have antiliberal and postliberal friends.26. .. if people want the government to act in illiberal ways — by, for example, censoring speech, violating the rights of religious believers, preventing certain people from voting, entrenching racial inequality, taking private property without just compensation, mandating a particular kind of prayer in schools or endorsing a particular set of religious convictions — liberals will stand in opposition.The latter includes, finally, a bit of trends on the right that "liberals" do not approve of, and they don't. 28. Some people (mostly on the right) think that liberals oppose traditions or treat traditions cavalierly and that liberalism should be rejected for that reason. In their view, liberals are disrespectful of traditions and want to destroy them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Consider just a few inherited ideals, norms and concepts that liberals have defended, often successfully, in the face of focused attack for decades: republican self-government; checks and balances; freedom of speech; freedom of religion; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; due process of law; equal protection; private property.29. Liberals do not think it adequate to say that an ideal has been in place for a long time. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Still, liberals agree that if an ideal has been with us for a long time, there might be a lot to say in its favor.A lover of freedom can also admire rule of law, tradition, and custom. Why do we have private property? A illiberal, like many college students fresh to the world, might start from basic philosophical principles, and state that all of the earth's bounty should be shared equally, and head out to the ramparts to seize power. As a philosophical principle, it can sound reasonable. But our society and its laws, traditions, and customs, has thousands of years of experience built up. A village had common fields. People over-grazed them. Putting up fences and allocating rights led to a more prosperous village. The tradition of property rights, and their quite detailed specification and limitation that evolved in our common law, responding to this experience,  along with well-educated citizens' conception of right and virtue, the moral sense of property right that they learn from their forebears, can summarize thousands of years of history, without us needing to remember each case. This thought is what led me in the past to characterize myself as an empirical, conservative, rule-of-law, constitutional and pax-Americana (save that one for later) libertarian, back when the word "liberal" meant something else. But, as Holmes points out, a vibrant society must see that some of this laws and traditions are wrong, or ineffective, and thoughtfully reform them. Property rights once extended to people, after all. Most of all, the 1970s "liberal" but now  "illiberal" view has been that government defines the purpose and meaning of life and society, be it religious purity, socialist utopia, or now the vanguard of the elite ruling on behalf of the pyramid of intersectional victimization. The role of the government is to mold society to that quest. "Conservatives" have thought that the purpose of life and society is defined by individuals, families, churches, communities, scholars, arts, culture,  private institutions of civil society, via lively reasoned debate; society can accommodate great variety in these views,  and the government's purpose is just to enforce simple rules, and keep the debate peaceful, not to define and lead us to the promised land. I read Sunstein, correctly, to restore the word "liberal" to this later view, though it had largely drifted to the former.  Who isn't liberal? The progressive leftWho isn't a "liberal," to Sunstein? If you've been around university campuses lately, you know how much today's "progressives" ("post-liberals") have turned politics into a tribal, warlike affair. This is who Sunstein is really unhappy with, and to whom this essay is a declaration of divorce: 5. ...liberals ... do not like tribalism. ... They are uncomfortable with discussions that start, "I am an X, and you are a Y,"... Skeptical of identity politics, liberals insist that each of us has many different identities and that it is usually best to focus on the merits of issues, not on one or another identity.I would add, liberals evaluate arguments by logic and evidence, not who makes the argument. Liberals accept an enlightenment idea that anything true can be discovered and understood by anyone. Truth is not just listening to "lived experience." 18. Liberals abhor the idea that life or politics is a conflict between friends and enemies.23. Liberals think that those on the left are illiberal if they are not (for example) committed to freedom of speech and viewpoint diversity. They do not like the idea of orthodoxy, including on university campuses or social media platforms. Ad of course, 30. Liberals like laughter. They are anti-anti-laughter.Old joke from my graduate school days: "How many Berkeley marxist progressives does it take to screw in a light bulb?" Answer: "I don't think that kind of humor is appropriate." ****In case you think everyone agrees on this new definition of "liberal," the essay has a link below it to another one by Pamela Paul, "Progressives aren't liberal." Paul's essay also covers some of the history of how the word was used, but in the end uses it in a quite different way from Sunstein.  In the 1960s and 70s, the left proudly used the word in self-description. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan, who often prefaced [liberal] with a damning "tax and spend," may have been the most effective of bashers. ...Newt Gingrich's political organization GOPAC sent out a memo, "Language: A Key Mechanism of Control," urging fellow Republicans to use the word as a slur.It worked. Even Democrats began avoiding the dread label. In a presidential primary debate in 2007, Hillary Clinton called herself instead a "modern progressive." She avoided the term "liberal" again in 2016.I think Clinton was trying to position herself to the right of what "liberal" had become by 2016.  "Progressive" has come to mean something else. But I may be wrong. Never Trump conservatives tout their bona fides as liberals in the classical, 19th century sense of the word, in part to distinguish themselves from hard-right Trumpists. Others use "liberal" and "progressive" interchangeably, even as what progressivism means in practice today is often anything but liberal — or even progressive, for that matter.In the last sentence she is right. Sunstein is not, as he appears, describing a word as it is widely used today,  but a word as it is slowly becoming used, and as he would like it to be used. liberal values, many of them products of the Enlightenment, include individual liberty, freedom of speech, scientific inquiry, separation of church and state, due process, racial equality, women's rights, human rights and democracy.Here you start to think she's got the same basic big tent as Sunstein.  But not so -- this essay is testament to the enduring sense of the "liberal" word as describing the big-government left, just please not quite so insane as the campus progressives: Unlike "classical liberals" (i.e., usually conservatives), liberals do not see government as the problem, but rather as a means to help the people it serves. Liberals fiercely defend Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, the Voting Rights Act and the National Labor Relations Act. They believe government has a duty to regulate commerce for the benefit of its citizens. They tend to be suspicious of large corporations and their tendency to thwart the interests of workers and consumers.Sunstein had room for disagreement on these "fierce" defenses, or at least room for reasoned argument rather than profession of essential belief before you can enter the debate. "Tout their bona fides" above also does not have quite the reach-across-the aisle non partisan flair of Sunstein's essay. I don't think Paul welcomes never-Trump classical liberals in her tent. For Paul, the divorce between "liberal" and "progressive" is real, as for many other "liberals" since the October 7 wake up: Whereas liberals hold to a vision of racial integration, progressives have increasingly supported forms of racial distinction and separation, and demanded equity in outcome rather than equality of opportunity. Whereas most liberals want to advance equality between the sexes, many progressives seem fixated on reframing gender stereotypes as "gender identity" and denying sex differences wherever they confer rights or protections expressly for women. And whereas liberals tend to aspire toward a universalist ideal, in which diverse people come together across shared interests, progressives seem increasingly wedded to an identitarian approach that emphasizes tribalism over the attainment of common ground.It is progressives — not liberals — who argue that "speech is violence" and that words cause harm. These values are the driving force behind progressive efforts to shut down public discourse, disrupt speeches, tear down posters, censor students and deplatform those with whom they disagree.Divisions became sharper after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, when many progressives did not just express support for the Palestinian cause but, in some cases, even defended the attacks as a response to colonialism, and opposed retaliation as a form of genocide. This brings us to the most troubling characteristic of contemporary progressivism. Whereas liberals tend to pride themselves on acceptance, many progressives have applied various purity tests to others on the left, and according to one recent study on the schism between progressives and liberals, are more likely than liberals to apply public censure to divergent views. This intolerance manifests as a professed preference for avoiding others with different values, a stance entirely antithetical to liberal values.Yes. But no Republicans, please. Unlike Sunstein, Paul's "Liberalism" remains unabashedly partisan. I hope Sunstein's version of the word prevails. In any case, it is nice to see the division between the Woodstock Liberals, previously fellow travelers, from the extreme progressive left, and it is nice to see this word drift back to where it belongs. This is an optimistic post for the future of our country. Happy Thanksgiving. Update: I just ran across Tyler Cowen's Classical Liberals vs. The New Right. Excellent. And I forgot to plug my own "Understanding the Left," which I still think is a great essay though nobody seems to have read it.  

Es un hecho que los derechos humanos se han erigido como el principal regulador del accionar político – y también moral – a nivel internacional desde mediados del siglo pasado, monopolizando los debates y convirtiéndose en un verdadero contrapeso de las decisiones tomadas por los Estados, llegando incluso a transformarse, cada vez con mayor frecuencia, en una fuerza relativizadora de la soberanía estatal. En este sentido, es posible afirmar que en la actualidad, los derechos humanos intentan cumplir la función de un código moral universal.Sin embargo, desde la creación de las Naciones Unidas, y con la posterior Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (en adelante DUDH), estos han ocupado un lugar preponderante en la política internacional sin hacerse eco del profundo debate académico a su respecto, y se han nutrido de una imponente burocracia internacional que ejecuta las políticas delineadas para su defensa de forma automática.Esta falta de relación entre el debate académico y la evolución de los derechos humanos, sumado a la carencia de debate público acerca de los fundamentos que los sustentas, ha generado un estancamiento que se evidencia a través de una aparente aceptación universal de los derechos humanos tal cual los definen y defienden las Naciones Unidas. La avasallante lógica expansiva que caracteriza a los organismos que trabajan en la materia – cuya única preocupación parecería ser, en muchos casos, la de aumentar las áreas de la vida humana reguladas por estos derechos – impide, en gran medida, que el foco de debate se centre en cómo concebimos dichos derechos, una cuestión central que se encuentra en el origen del inmenso aparato burocrático en el que se han convertido las Naciones Unidad.Para comenzar a echar luz sobre este tema, sería bueno introducir un conocido debate entre de dos diferentes concepciones de los derechos humanos que se enfrentan en sus postulados más básicos. El análisis de dicho debate nos permitirá esclarecer los sustentos filosóficos de un concepto que ha devenido en un factor de vital relevancia en la política internacional, y que a su vez justifica el accionar de una organización internacional en la que muchos ven el "germen" de un futuro gobierno mundial.¿Derechos naturales o políticos? La idea de que los derechos humanos son universales, inalienables e incluso inherentes en toda su dimensión a la naturaleza humana, se ha convertido ya en un lugar común a la hora de tratar el tema, amenazando incluso con convertirse en una verdad incuestionable. Sin embargo, esta simple definición tiene serias implicancias filosóficas que no pueden ser dejadas de lado al momento de realizar una abordaje serio de dicha cuestión.En concreto, la aparente obviedad de que los derechos humanos radican de forma natural sobre todos los seres humanos, en todo lugar y momento histórico, implica la aceptación, a priori, de una concepción iusnaturalista de estos derechos, que los presenta como naturales y los identifica en una instancia previa a la sociedad y su posterior ordenamiento. Esta concepción, que podríamos identificar como universalismo naturalista, colisiona de manera frontal con la concepción política de los derechos humanos, que los entiende como una construcción esencialmente política y por ende también humana.Surge aquí una contradicción notoria. Estas concepciones son absolutamente incompatibles, pues si los derechos humanos son una construcción política, es imprescindible renunciar a la idea de que radican sobre todos los seres humanos simplemente en base a nuestra "humanidad" compartida, al tiempo que la idea de que son innatos caería por su propio peso.La argumentación esgrimida por los partidarios del universalismo naturalista es quizá la más conocida, no solo por estar presente en la DUDH, sino además por el atractivo inicial de sus principales postulados. La idea de que los derechos humanos son universales, pues son poseídos de igual forma por todos los seres humanos, e independientes a todo reconocimiento social, político o jurídico, resulta sumamente atractiva desde un punto de vista moral, más aun si lo miramos desde una sociedad cuya organización política corresponde a una democracia liberal. Pero la solidez de este argumento puede ser fácilmente puesta en cuestión, tan solo con analizar cuáles son los derechos humanos reconocidos en las principales convenciones internacionales.En este caso podemos seguir la sugerencia realizada por Kenneth Baynes (2009,373) para testear en qué medida un derecho humano es o no genuino. El autor, gran defensor de la concepción política, sostiene que para ser concebidos como naturales, los derechos humanos deben ser derechos negativos y no positivos, pues de lo contrario confirmarían la sospecha de que son una construcción meramente humana. El ejemplo favorito en este caso es el derecho a tener vacaciones periódicas pagas, consagrado en el artículo 24 de la DUD1, punto que no merece mayor discusión, dado que es muy claro su carácter positivo. Sin embargo, el aspecto fundamental de este simple "test" sugerido por Baynes, es que pone en entredicho el carácter natural de los derechos humanos, pues estos suponen, en varios casos, la existencia de instituciones políticas y sociales sin las cueles no serían jamás comprendidos. El carácter "pre-social" que se les atribuye sería entonces imposible, pues su existencia se adscribiría a un lugar y momento dado, lo que tiraría por tierra toda pretensión de universalidad.Quienes se oponen al universalismo naturalista desde el foco del relativismo cultural esgrimen este argumento como una de sus más potentes objeciones. ¿Cómo es posible que para respetar debidamente los derechos humanos una sociedad deba contar con determinado tipo de instituciones? El artículo 25 de la DUDH es quizá más revelador aun, introduciendo conceptos como el de "nivel de vida" o "bienestar"2.Pero esto último no significa que todos los derechos comprendidos en la DUDH adolezcan de los mismos vicios que los artículos 24 y 25. Por el contrario, los derechos primordiales, como el derecho a la vida, son claramente derechos negativos, y en tanto tales podrían ser entendidos como derechos naturales con una validez suprapositiva. Esta suprapositividad a la que hacemos referencia implicaría su elevación por encima de todo ordenamiento jurídico ya sea nacional o internacional, por lo que los legisladores de turno no podrán hacer más que garantizarlos, pues nunca serán capaces denegarlos ni mucho menos derogarlos (Ferrara, 2003).Sin embargo, siguiendo la crítica que Habermas (1997, 81) realiza a los defensores del universalismo naturalista, por más que en los principales documentos se refiera a los derechos humanos como "innatos", nada los protegerá "del destino de todo derecho positivo", pues estos podrán ser "cambiados" o "derogados" en cualquier momento, dado que solo hace falta para ello el cambio del régimen político que los aprueba y ampara. Como bien nota el mismo Habermas, concebidos "como normas constitucionales – los derechos humanos – gozan de validez positiva, pero como derechos que les corresponden a cada persona como ser humano se les adscribe al mismo tiempo una validez suprapositiva".Esta validez suprapositiva es, en cierta medida, la que intenta combatir la concepción política a la que hacemos referencia. La explicación que ofrece Habermas (1997, 81) es la siguiente:"El concepto de derechos humanos no tiene un origen moral, sino una acuñación específica del concepto moderno de derechos subjetivos, esto es, de una terminología jurídica. Los derechos humanos tienen originariamente una naturaleza jurídica. Lo que le presta la apariencia de derechos morales no es su contenido, y con mayor motivo tampoco su estructura, sino su sentido de validez, que trasciende los ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados nacionales".El pensamiento de Habarmas con respecto a los derechos humanos podría ubicarse en un extremo de la concepción política, pues para el autor alemán estos derechos no son más que puras herramientas jurídicas que, a pesar de regular aspectos morales, deben su validez y legitimidad al ordenamiento jurídico que los comprende. Sin embargo, dentro de esta misma concepción podemos encontrar posturas menos radicales que la de Habermas y que, a pesar de negar y combatir la asociación de los derechos humanos con algún tipo de derechos naturales, sí le otorgan una validez suprapositiva en el sentido que no requieren ningún tipo de reconocimiento legal o político para ser validos, dado que han sido creados para funcionar como una unidad de medida para juzgar el éxito de una determinada sociedad (Baynes, 2009, 327).Jack Donelly, reconocido teórico defensor de la universalidad de los derechos humanos, ha introducido un concepto intermedio entre la concepción política y la universalista. En un texto titulado The Relative Universality of Human Rights, el autor bosqueja lo que ha denominado como Universalismo Relativo, evitando relacionar a los derechos humanos con cualquier versión de universalismo antropológico u ontológico, dejando así espacio para particularidades nacionales, regionales y culturales. Este matiz reconoce su origen político pero nada implica que por ello deban dejar de ser universales.En cambio, lo que sí trasciende a todos los defensores de la concepción política es la idea de que los derechos humanos, por su condición de creación política, han sido diseñados para cumplir con determinados objetivos en el seno de la sociedad que los comprende. El hecho de que "dejen" de ser derechos naturales implica, de manera esperable, una cierta instrumentalidad que varía según el autor al que nos refiramos. El caso paradigmático en este aspecto es quizá John Rawls, quien en El Derecho de Gentes (1999) propone una doctrina de los derechos humanos en la que estos no cumplirían la función de proteger a los seres humanos en el ejercicio de sus derechos más básicos, sino que tendrían como único fin regular las relaciones entre Estados. Por el contrario, como ya ha sido expuesto anteriormente, muchos autores ven en los derechos humanos un marco de referencia para juzgar el funcionamiento de una sociedad y su éxito en el respeto de los derechos y libertades de sus integrantes.ConclusiónEl breve análisis de estas dos concepciones nos permite ingresar en un amplio debate acerca de sustentos filosóficos de los derechos humanos. Su origen, fundamentación y alcance son algunos de los temas que mayor polémica generan en el debate académico. Hemos realizado aquí la aproximación tan solo a uno de estos temas, dejando de lado apasionantes discusiones, como por ejemplo si todos los derechos humanos deberían ser considerados como tales o si existen diferentes niveles de importancia dentro de los reconocidos en la actualidad. Sin embargo, es importante reconocer que toda discusión acerca de los derechos humanos comienza con el problema de establecer cuál es su origen, pues dependiendo a la conclusión que lleguemos, las implicancias sobre el derecho y la política internacional serán realmente importantes. Es indudable que el universalismo naturalista ha prevalecido en el sistema de derechos humanos desarrollado por Naciones Unidas, pero ello no implica desconocer la validez de otras concepciones que tienen mucho que decir al respecto, incluso en cuanto a la mejora de la concepción dominante. BibliografíaBAYNES, Kenneth. 2009. Toward a political conception of human rights. Philosophy & social criticism, (35, 4): pp. 371-90.DONNELLY, Jack. 2007. The relative universality of human rights. Human Rights Quarterly (29, 2): pp. 281-306.FERRARA, Alessandro. 2003. To notions of humanity and the judgment argument for human rights. Political theory, (31, 3): pp.392-420.HABERMAS, Jürgen. 2010. El concepto de dignidad humana y la utopía realista de los derechos humanos. Diánoia, (55, 64): pp. 3-25.RAWLS, John. 1999. The Law of peoples: with "The idea of public reason revisited". Cambridge: Harvard University Press.UNESCO. 2008. Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos. Santiago de Chile: ORELAC/UNESCO.1- "Toda persona tiene derecho al descanso, al disfrute del tiempo libre, a una limitación razonable de la duración del trabajo y a vacaciones periódicas pagadas" (Unesco, 2008).2- El artículo 25 de la DUDH consagra lo siguiente "1. Toda persona tiene derecho a un nivel de vida adecuado que le asegure, así como a su familia, la salud y el bienestar, y en especial la alimentación, el vestido, la vivienda, la asistencia médica y los servicios sociales necesarios; tiene asimismo derecho a los seguros en caso de desempleo, enfermedad, invalidez, viudez, vejez y otros casos de pérdida de sus medios de subsistencia por circunstancias independientes de su voluntad. 2. La maternidad y la infancia tienen derecho a cuidados y asistencia especiales. Todos los niños, nacidos de matrimonio o fuera de matrimonio, tienen derecho a igual protección social". Sobre el autorEstudiante de Estudios Internacionales (Universidad ORT-Uruguay)

Throughout the past two decades there has been a resurgence of the concern with the rise of new great powers and its thematic cousin, American hegemony's challenges and challengers (a resurgence that must be seen, of course, as relative to the static preoccupations of Cold War/bipolar International Relations theory). However, scholarly production has not been particularly enlightening. Not because the subject there considered is unimportant. On the contrary, rises and declines –be it of states, empires, civilizations, inter alia- and the potential to restructure world politics inherent to preeminent or hegemonic political units are powerful engines in international relations. This is why a critique of the epistemological, methodological and empirical aspects of this literature and a quest for more productive avenues of research is necessary.Neither a comprehensive critique of the literature nor a complete proposal for an alternative research project can be the goal of the present short essay. For the time being it will suffice to open some paths of discussion by way of putting forward certain challenges to this literature and sketching some notes (in a not un-Gramscian way) on alternative paths of research.By now the reader might reasonably be wondering what does Gramsci has to do with all this. Gramsci's concept of hegemony, but also his ideas on war of position vs. war of movement and passive revolution could eventually be employed, I will argue, as one of the building-blocks of, as Gramsci would have expressed it himself, a counter-hegemonic narrative on the phenomenon of the rise and fall of great powers and international hegemony. (1) A note on the use of Gramsci: As with most of the work of the Italian Marxist, coming up with a circumscribed definition for these critical concepts and ideas is an arduous, and probably unfruitful exercise. The Prison Notebooks, (2) Gramsci's magnum opus, is in itself just notes; ideas dispersed in short chapters that do not claim to be a coherent project (at least in the way we tend to think the argumentative organization of books). Thus Gramsci's own work allows for a not rigidly structured use of his ideas (e.g. there is no need to follow him all the way down in his unorthodox Marxism). Even more, one of the central points of Gramscian thought centers around the notion of a pragmatic understanding of theory. In other words, the search for a "real theoretical truth" is not nearly as relevant as the search for a "useful truth". With this spirit is that I approach the issues of hegemony and rise and fall with the Prison Notebooks behind the arm.* * * * * * The most diffused argument on the rise and decline of the great powers (3) can be summarized, grosso modo –and avoiding existing differences between schools and theorists- as following: the international system, against what balance of power theorists would argue, tends to have a hegemonic power (Spain in the 16th centuries, Portugal in the 17th century, the Netherlands in the second half of the 18th century, Great Britain in the 19th and beginnings of the 20th century, and, from then on, the United States) that establishes a certain international order. But the system is not immutable, the difference in the rates of growth between states will generate competitors to the hegemon, which, if dissatisfied with the present order, will try to bring it down (4) -even if this entails the use of force (i.e. a hegemonic war, in the words of Raymond Aron). (5) Not surprisingly, and in some ways understandably, the literature has an obsession with transition periods and war. In social scientific terms then, the whole phenomenon of rising and declining ends up as the explanandum to explicate the explanans (i.e. transition and war). By doing this it obscures an array of phenomena that cannot be studied in a dichotomy of hegemon and challenger. Methodological and empirical issues (e.g. How do we measure power? Is economic rise a sufficient cause for a change in the system? How many cases are historically relevant? etc.) are part of the problem (more on these difficulties below). Moreover, this approach seems to be propelled by an anxiety generated by the prospect that there will be no huge transformations in the world. In the words of John Gray: "paranoia is a protest against unimportance." (6) In Gramscian vocabulary: people need to think they are living in changing "epochal" times (especially academics that make a living out of "explaining and predicting" these "epochal changes"). The result has been an anxious expectation for the arrival of a challenger to the hegemon and the plausibility of a hegemonic conflict in the process of transition. First came the USSR from the 1950s to the 1970s. When the Soviets proved to be a pathetic challenger, the time came for Japan, the "rising sun." Japan's challenge was dismissed before the end of the 20th century. However, this was not a cause of distress for students of power transitions, now they had China.As I have showed elsewhere, (7) serious contemplation cannot but conclude that there is little use for the kind of futurology contest that this literature has turned into. Of course, the central question then is: acknowledging that this is a topic that should be seriously studied, how can the discipline go forward?Diversifying the questions we have been asking is one way. For example, the problématique should be not so much what will happen when a state rises, or even which are the states currently rising, but why have so many states failed to rise -a necessary(!) counterpart to understand the deep reasons for "successful" rises. Working on the "rise of the West" in a comparative-civilizational line, Jack Goldstone comments on the tendency to uncritically accept a "winner" bias: "Because all too often, we view world history in terms of 'winners' and 'losers,' elevate to prominence much in the 'winners'' history, and obscure or lose sight of similar items in the history of retrospective 'losers'." (8) Until we have a good grasp of why the great-powers-that-could-have-been -or as I call it elsewhere, "failed rises"- (9) follow different trajectories from those considered "successful" rises (while sharing similar departure points) our understanding of rises, declines and hegemony will stay worryingly incomplete.On the other hand, increasing the complexity in the concept of hegemony (and thus, of power) promises to be a profitable enterprise. And here is where Gramsci enters the scene.The most convincing Gramscian in International Relations theory has defined the Italian's concept of hegemony in the following way:"Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure- in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups…. A hegemonial structure of world order is one in which power takes a primarily consensual form…"(10) One of Gramsci's biggest challenges was how to devise the creation of a new hegemony in Western Europe –that is, an alternative to western capitalism/democracy. The classical methods of frontal and violent attack, essence of the Russian Revolution, or what Gramsci calls "war of movement," were of no use in the West. While it was just a government that the Bolsheviks had to overthrow in order to install a new regime, the proto-Modern Princes (i.e. Communist Parties) in Western Europe would have to confront a much more robust complex represented in the formula "civil society plus state." In this context a "war of position" would be the best option. The core of this notion is that, confronted to such a resilient organization, one must win the battle from within; create a new hegemony before taking power. According to Gramsci: "A social group can and indeed must, already 'lead' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power)"(p. 47, Prison Notebooks). A simple power battle -a new October 1917- was not enough. This is why Cox talks about a "consensual form" and the primacy of ideology.Going from mainstream IR "thin" to a "thicker" version of hegemony (using Geertzian concepts in a slightly unorthodox way) would problematize the issue of rises and declines in interesting ways.To begin with, the preeminent place currently occupied in the literature by rates of growth would seem laughable to Gramsci. (11) Both in the analysis/futurology of possible challengers to US hegemony and for the more general dynamics of rises and declines -see especially the libraries of (naïve?) scholarly and journalistic production on the so-called "BRICS". Even if these trajectories of growth could be accurately predicted (a dubious assumption), inferring a new international historic bloc or a new great powers configuration would depend on a leap of faith. Extrapolating Gramsci's historicism, it could be argued that an essentially material account of power might have been plausible during, let's say, Habsburg preeminence in the 16th and part of the 17th centuries. This has not been the case for a long time. Just as Gramsci devised a qualitative change in European politics, in which civil-society/state and ideas/material-forces were inevitably intertwined, there is case to make that the present international order is too complex to be seen just through ratios of economic growth and other material variables. (12) A counter-hegemon would need to do much more than surpass the US materially (however this is defined). But the point is also that the general phenomenon of the rise of great powers is likewise much more complex than devising future scenarios under the bewilderment generated by the BRIC's growth rates. Several paths follow the critique of "thin" hegemony. One is to give a more relevant place to discourse, recognition and legitimacy. Achieving great power status or building a hegemonic order is in many ways a discursive affair. In the 19th century recognition as a great power might have been identified by, inter alia, studying who participated in the diplomatic arena as a legitimate great power –e.g. who was sitting as a peer at the table during the Congress of Vienna. This discursive dynamic is probably more complex nowadays –e.g. who is identified in the cover of the Economist as "rising"- but is still an essential element and it should be studied carefully.(13) In a word, achieving a certain status in world politics is not the automatic effect of material variations but the recognition by an Other(s) that a political unit has become part of a particular club or class because, among other things, such a variation in material capabilities has occurred. This mutual empowerment aspect could also be useful in explaining the aforementioned phenomenon of "failed rises" (the development of this idea, however, must be saved for another occasion).It should be clear that this is also a call to historicize the sources of power. Since, as Gramsci assumed, hegemony –but any order in general- changes its basic attributes and dynamics with time, likewise the variables that explain how agents interact with those structures should also change. Social scientists tend to be weak against the temptation to over-generalize; a Gramscian outlook could work as an antidote to the follies inherent in the excesses committed in the name of social scientific "laws."Another interesting possibility lies in the elucidation of the resilience American hegemony seems to be presenting. Neorealism has been left in an uncomfortable place under the unwillingness of American preeminence to give place to a multipolar or bipolar world (since unipolarity is an anomaly for neorealist theory). A "thick" notion of hegemony would help explain this. Even if material change is continuously going on, "thick" hegemony, as explained before, does not depend exclusively on it. There is an ideological aspect that reinforces path dependence trajectories that might turn hegemony more resilient even when the US might be losing ground in terms of its material preeminence (this could be paired with neoliberalism's focus on institutions as central to an hegemon and its order). Hegemonic path dependence does not mean that we have arrived to the "end of History and the last Hegemony", to paraphrase an excessively well-known title. It is, however, an acknowledgment that change in international politics is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon.* * * * * * It is certainly possible that one day –probably a long time from now- China will replace the US as the most powerful state, eventually –but not necessarily- building a new international order. It is also possible that the "BRICS" (or any other creation from the armies of acronym-chasers) will rise to great power status conforming a multipolar world. The problem is that it is also very possible that 30 years from now no one will remember the "rise of China" or the "rise of the BRICS." These are unknowns we cannot escape. As with "Japan's rise" in the 1980s, the infinite paper, ink, and time wasted could end up in the most embarrassing dustbin in the history of the discipline. This should not be interpreted as a call to stop studying these dynamics, but as an emphatic request to critically think about the best way(s) to do this. Though engaging in futurology is definitely the correct approach if the goal is selling books and being published in well-known journals, I argue that the best way to do this if the purpose is building knowledge is: a) increasing the complexity in the use of variables and concepts such as power, hegemony, rise and decline, etc. b) avoiding a "winner bias" and understanding the cases of "failed rises", c) historicizing structural dynamics and properties and the sources that explain how agents interact with those structures, d) engaging with history in the search for clues on how to think about the present and not in an attempt to come up with historical "laws", e) finally, and probably the most important, accepting the complex nature of profound change in international politics instead of escaping to the triteness of futurology that rather than educating fosters misunderstanding. (1) This is not an unprecedented line of work. There is a substantive body of scholarly work on Gramscian IPE. It must be said, however, that I will not attempt to engage in a rigorous Gramscian analysis of international relations, but just use some of his ideas as building blocks.(2) Gramsci, Antonio, Selections From the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, New York, 2010.(3) See: Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, Chicago University Press, 1980; and Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Vintage, 1989.(4) Though some argue that it is the fear of the hegemon to lose its current position that brings about hegemonic war.(5) Nota bene: Aron worked on the concept of hegemonic war as part of his studies on "total war", and not in the transition framework. This point is pertinent since he should not be included in the group of scholars conforming this literature –being his oeuvre of a sophistication and scope not matched by them.(6) Interview at The Browser, available online: http://thebrowser.com/interviews/john-gray-on-critiques-utopia-and-apocalypse(7) Castro, Guzmán, "Measuring the Future: Rises, Failed Power Transitions and the Problem of Systemic Change," unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 2011.(8) Goldstone, Jack, "The Rise of the West – or Not? A Revision to Socio-economic History", Sociological Theory, 18:2, July 2000.(9) Castro, Guzmán, "The (Intellectual) Costs of Hegemony: Hegemonic Bias and the Poverty of the Theories of Systemic Change," unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 2012.(10) Robert Cox cited in Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 44.(11) See here to laugh with Gramsci.(12) Gramsci is clear on this: "The analysis of these propositions tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of historic bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this disctintion between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces" (p. 377).(13) There is some encouraging new work on the subject. See: Zarakol, Ayse, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West, Cambridge UP, 2011, and Suzuki Shogo, "Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO," International Relations, 2008 22: 45.Sobre el autorProfessor, Ph.D. student.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.

Forming in the first months after the February Revolution, sections of the extremely leftist branch of the Polish Socialist Party, the Polish Socialist Party – Left and the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania almost immediately made contact with Polish soldiers dispersed in the Russian Army, as well as serving in the Polish Rifle Division being part of the Army. Promoted in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution the idea of creating "Polish workers and peasants formations" initially received moderate attention from Polish military circles. This attitude was observed both among those who were still in active service, as well as among their demobilized companions. The widespread pacifist attitude among Polish military was a serious obstacle in attracting people ready to serve in revolutionary formations. It was previously infused by the very same emigrant radicals who, after November 7, 1917, for a change, had encouraged armed support for the revolution. In such a situation without the support of the Soviet civil and military authorities, any organizational initiatives from the Polish communist circles in Russia had no chance to be implemented. ; Translation and edition co-financed by Faculty of History and Sociology & Institute of History and Political Sciences of University of Bialystok ; adam.miodowski@uwb.edu.pl ; Adam Miodowski - historian since 1994 associated with the Institute of History and Political Sciences of the University of Bialystok. His research interests focus primarily on the political and military history of the 19th and 20th centuries. A parallel field of interest is women's history and press studies. In the territorial dimension, he directs his research towards Central and Eastern Europe, primarily Poland, as well as the space of his small homeland defined by the borders of the contemporary Podlasie Voivodeship. Apart from dozens of articles and publications of source materials, he also published five book monographs: -Wychodźcze ugrupowania demokratyczne wobec idei polskiego wojska w Rosji w latach 1917-1918, Białystok 2002; - Przewłaszczenia dóbr dojlidzkich na tle kampanii politycznej przełomu lat 1921/1922, Białystok 2003; - Związki Wojskowych Polaków w Rosji (1917-1918), Białystok 2004; - Polityka wojskowa radykalnej lewicy polskiej (1917-1921), Białystok 2011; - Wspólnota doświadczeń i odrębność historii ziem województwa podlaskiego. Wybrane zagadnienia z XIX i XX- wiecznych dziejów Białostocczyzny, Suwalszczyzny i Łomżyńskiego, Białystok 2016. ; Wydział Historyczno-Socjologiczny Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku ; Alexandrowicz Stanisław, Karpus Zbigniew, Rezmer Waldemar (eds), Zwycięzcy za drutami: jeńcy polscy w niewoli (1919–1922). Dokumenty i materiały, Toruń 1995. ; Bagiński Henryk, Dokumenty z okresu organizacji i walk wojska polskiego na wschodzie 1917–1918. 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(eds), Marksizm-leninizm o wojnie i wojsku, Warszawa 1969. ; Lafargue Paul, Pisma wybrane, Warszawa 1961, Vol. 1. ; Lenin Włodzimierz, Dzieła wszystkie. Dokumenty marzec – lipiec 1918, Warszawa 1988, t. 36. ; Marcińczyk Jan, Chwila osobliwa, Lublin 1919. ; Podsiadło Józef, W szeregach rewolucyjnego Pułku Czerwonej Warszawy, "Z Pola Walki" 1958, Issue 1. ; Wasilewski Zygmunt (ed.), Proces Lednickiego. Fragment z dziejów odbudowy Polski 1915–1924, Warszawa 1924. ; Wojciechowski Stanisław, Moje wspomnienia, Lwów 1938, Vol. 1. ; Wojciechowski Stanisław, Wspomnienia, orędzia, artykuły, Warszawa 1995. ; Żbikowski Stefan, Zarys historii Zachodniej Dywizji Strzelców, "Z Pola Walki" 1960, Issue 2. (excerpts from the author's manuscript of this work elaborated by: L. Dubacki). ; "Izviestia Wsierossijskogo Ispolnitielnogo Komitieta Sovietov" No. 263 z 12.01.1918. ; Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z posiedzenia Sejmu Ustawodawczego w dniu 22.02.1919 r. 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THE « GETTYSBURG JBERGUHY The Literary Journal of Gettysburg College Vol. XII. GETTYSBURG, PA., NOVEMBER, 1903 No. 6 CONTENTS THE EVOLUTION OF OUR NATION'S PRINCIPLES . 174 JOSEPH E. ROWK, '04. ROOSEVELT AND MALTHUS 180 W. W. BARKLEY, '04. "THE RAVIN' " SCHOOLMASTER 1S4 B. A. STROHMEIER, '06. POLITICAL INDIFFERENCE 185 THE ANALYSIS OF A NURSERY RHYME . 188 JAMES G. DILLER, '04. A VISIT TO McKINLEY'S TOMB 191 BRUCE COBAUGH, '05. THE HOUSE WE BUILD i93 EDITORIALS . 196 EXCHANGES 199 174 'J'HE GETTYSBURG MEKCURV. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR NATION'S PRINCI-PLES. JOSEPH E. ROWE, '04. TIME continues to roll on in its eternal course. Nations are only born under the doom of decay. Men rise to heights of greatness, are cut off in the twinkling of an eye, and pass forever from this earthly habitation. But there is one principle whose evolution the vicissitudes of fortune have failed to arrest. It is the development and growth of government. From time immemorial men have lived under some sort o f government; its genesis antedates all history. As far back as the great Aryan migrations there existed established laws, but even these were not the first in the history of the world. Many centuries had passed away since the mighty Nimrod or the queenly Semiramis held sway in Babylon; the Israelites had al-ready grown into a great nation, and the valley of the Nile had become both the "cradle and the tomb" of kings. Even the most primitive and most degraded peoples recog-nize some sort of leadership or control. From the Bushman of Australia, and the Hottentot, down to the American Indian, there is the same idea, though vastly different in degree, of rul-ing and of being ruled. Slowly has the evolution of government progressed, but, as surely as there is a God from whom it flows, no obstacle has impeded its steady advance. It has grown under the law of "the survival of the fittest," and its triumphs are but the re-sults of natural law. The civil ideas which have been evolved from a less complete to a more perfect and more practical sys-tem were as irresistible in their course as decrees of fate. There seems to have been that same great but awful force at work for the development of the ideal nation which, to a great extent, "shapes our ends, rough hew them as we will." When con-ditions favored the established principles, epochs of peace and prosperity ensued; when circumstances were adverse, wars and revolutions necessarily arose to restore the equilibrium. THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 175 The path of their triumphal march down through the ages reeks with blood; where they have been opposed desolation reigns. The once glorious empires of the East are only dis-covered in their buried ruins; the pyramids are monuments of the dynasties which built them ; the crumbled statuary and art of Greece are but symbolic of her decay; and the ruins of Pompeii are the only vestiges of glorious Rome. Every at-tempt and apparent success to crush out the idea of further de-velopment in the governmental realm has virtually been a throwing of oil upon the fire glowing in the hearts of patriotic people. The pious Aeneas, exiled by fate, founded a nation greater than the victor of his fatherland. Carthage tried to crush aspiring Rome and only brought about her development. Pilgrims, deprived of liberty and exiled from the Old World, founded a mightier and freer commonwealth in the New. In this governmental evolution there have been two distinctly opposite principles warring against each other—Liberty and Unity. The spirit which has animated the heroes of liberty is active in its plans, uncontrollable in its measures and irresistible in reaching its goal; its doctrine is Radicalism. On the other hand, unity has been developed under the stern but careful plan of deliberation and statesmanship; its doctrine is Conservatism. Liberty is the harder to repress and was first evolved ; unity is the more difficult to maintain and its completion was last. The Goddess of Justice, determining the destiny of nations, holds in her hands a huge balance; on the one side is liberty, on the other unity. An uneven amount of either disturbs the equilibrium in the affairs of a nation; only a complete balanc-ing and blending of both can assure stability. The struggle which has shaken the world for so many centuries arose, first, from an excess of one and, then, of the other; the great beam rose and fell, and in turn the glory of nations grew resplendent or faded away. Every nation has been founded upon the plan of remedying one defect or the other. The people, furious at the remembrance of former injustice, drove Tarquin from the streets of Rome simply because he had been called king, but their freedom soon led to anarchy. Rulers of the Middle 1' 176 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. Ages, fearing such outbreaks, kept the people in virtual servi-tude, and the French Revolution was the inevitable reaction. The momentum of hatred for tyranny had so accumulated that no earthly force could withstand it. The equilibrium of the French nation was disturbed and it did not regain itself until Napoleon arose, who tried to force the great beam to the oppo-site extreme of one-man power. But France was not the only country in the world to groan beneath the horrors of revolution. In England there had been an almost continual contest between the King and Commons. The Magna Charta and the Declaration of Rights were both proclamations of liberty. James I brought about the "blood-less revolution of 1688," and later, George III forced the American Colonies into rebellion. But our forefathers felt the great importance of freedom. They fought with an invincible determination for liberty. For-mer examples of oppressed liberties made them desperate, and they sallied forth to meet the foe with the battle cry, "Give me liberty or give me death !" Thus, the seed, implanted in the heart of man from the be-ginning of the world, blossomed forth into newness of life. It had at last fallen upon good ground, taken deep root, and brought forth the blessings of liberty to all succeeding genera-tions. The United Colonies of America became free and inde-pendent states—the goal of liberty's evolution was reached. But unity was lacking. So long as there was a common foe, the States were as impenetrable as a Macedonian phalanx. But now there was no longer a common cause, and it looked as if there would be many little nations, each trying to main-tain its own place in the great struggle for existence. The States were jealous of one another, and bitter quarrels soon arose. Under the Articles of Confederation, the nation had no head. Congress could indeed pass laws, but could in no way enforce them. Conventions were called, but the States even refused to send representatives. Conditions grew worse and worse; so much so that the historian declares, "Instead of be-ing a united and friendly people, the States were fast growing THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 177 to be thirteen hostile nations, each ready to draw the sword upon its neighbor." Finally, in 1787 a convention was held in Philadelphia, the object of which was to form "a more perfect union." But the difficulties to be surmounted were indeed perplexing. The populous States insisted that representation in Congress should be apportioned according to population; the smaller States were equally emphatic in maintaining that each State, large or small, should have equal power. They finally compromised. There were to be two houses embodied in Congress: the one, whose representatives were to be apportioned according to pop-ulation ; the other, whose delegates were to be two from each State, vested with equal power. Thus, it is a blending of prin-ciples which lies at the foundation of our government. Accordingly, under the new Constitution, our nation entered upon a career of great success and national development. Dur-ing this period the Louisiana Purchase more than doubled our area. The pirates of Tripoli were disposed of with impunity. The war of 1812 proved beyond doubt the great power of American arms, whilst not one battle was lost by us in the war with Mexico. There had come into the heart of every true American a common national pride and devotion to country. So long as the foe was external the States fought together like brothers. But, in the near future, there were times to come when the foe would not be common. From the very foundation of our republic an awful tempest had been gathering its threatening clouds. Eminent men no longer .feared destruction or dismem-berment by any European power, but looked forward with great anxiety at the inevitable causes of internal disorder. Even in Jefferson's time the storm was already so menacing that he said: "In contemplating the future welfare of my country, there are troubles which startle me as a fire-bell in the night." It broke forth in its fury in the year 1861. The South claimed the right to secede. She looked upon the election of Abraham Lincoln as-a great step toward the abolition of slav-ery which, as she thought, meant her ruination. Eleven States f 178 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. seceded and set up a government of their own under the title of "The Confederate States of America." But the integrity of the country had to be maintained. War was declared; not to abolish slavery, but to prevent the disasters of permanent sepa-ration. The first gun was fired from Fort Sumter on April 12th. It is said to have been heard around the world, for it heralded a conflict which concerned not only our nation but the world. Men on both sides were inspired, not only by the prestige of the principles which they upheld, but by the love of home, country and family. The one represented freedom in the ex-treme, the other unity or common welfare. Both realized the vast importance of victory; each knew that defeat meant utter failure. They fought with the desperate valor of a wounded wild hart, which turns once more to make a final and supreme effort against its foe. Four long years of war left the country in desolation and ruin, which before had been the peaceful habitation of ttscbild-ren. For a long time the destiny of our beloved republic hung in the balance. Bull Run raised the fervor of the combatants to a white heat. Antietam favored the non Unionists. But, led on under the heat of passion and by the glory of victory, their "vaulting ambition o'erleaped itself." The Mason and Dixon line was crossed and the cause of secession was fighting against fate. But the valor of her constituents was mighty, and their spirit invincible. The crisis came. Something had to be immediately done or all would be lost. Fifteen thousand men rushed forth on open ground to dislodge the Unionists. Cannon after cannon ploughed through their gallant ranks, but on they came unfaltering. Even the cannon's mouth—the High Water Mark was reached, but their ranks had been mowed down and the cause of secession forever lost. The evolution of the ideal governmental principles was com-pleted, and the stability of our nation proven by test. She had long since shown her shores impregnable to a foreign foe, but now it was proven to the world that America, unlike the na-tions of the past, was not to be rent or overthrown by internal THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 179 disorder. The civil world was at last given a breathing spell, for the combating forces seemed glad to discontinue the con-flict and forget their quarrels. And now there is no longer a North, South, East or West, but all are blended into one in-separable compact—the United States of America. Her principles have spread throughout the world. They have leaped across the Atlantic and modified, if not completely changed, the spirit of the mother country; they have given new life to the sturdy mountaineer of 'Switzerland ; they have brought peace into Italy's sunny climes, and have made Greece long for a second "Golden Age." And it is only a matter of time, of progress, and of civilization until the world will recog-nize the efficiency of America's governmental principles, which are, in the words of her greatest statesman: "Liberty and Union now and forever, one and inseparable!" • Ever judge of men by their professions. For though the bright moment of promising is but a moment, and cannot be prolonged, yet if sincere in its moment's extravagant good-ness, why, trust it, and know the man by it, I say,—-not by his performance; which is half the world's work, interfere as • the world needs must with its accidents and circumstances: the profession was purely the man's own. 1 judge people by what they might be,-—not are, nor will be.—BROWNING. "Sow a thought and you reap an act, Sow an act and you reap a habit, Sow a habit and you reap a character, Sow a character and you reap a destiny." 180 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. ROOSEVELT AND MALTHUS. \V. W. BARKLEY, '04. The attitude which President Roosevelt has recently taken toward 'the increase of population in the United States, apparently challenging the theories of certain political econo-mists, particularly Mr. T. R. Malthus and his followers in Eng-land and America, puts before us a question worthy of our earnest consideration. Is it wise or unwise to advocate a con-tinuous increase in the population of our country ? In order to determine the wisdom of Mr. Roosevelt's position regarding this matter, we must go to our authorities, viz: Mr. Malthus and certain other political economists—to obtain a basis for our decision. The object of Mr. Malthus' investigations (1798-1803) were to find means for the improvement of society and to deliver it from its wretchedness and .poverty. He inquired into "the causes that had impeded the progress of mankind toward hap-piness," and offered a corrective for the same. Mr. Malthus advanced a theory (which is popularly known as the Malthusian Doctrine) in which he tried to prove that society could not hope to provide enough food to sustain all its members and that poverty, therefore, must be the inevitable outcome of a persistenee in increasing population, and that no blame could reasonably be attributed to society for its poverty. The Malthusians hold that population has a tendency to in-crease faster than subsistence, and that under such conditions some people, in the course of time, will not have sufficient food to maintain themselves, and poverty must be the inevitable re-sult, irremediable, unless the race in question adopts some means to prevent the possible increase of population. If the race fails to provide the necessary restriction, nature will step in and provide it for the race. Vice, disease, war, pestilence and famine—all these and more means may be adopted by na-ture to do her work of reducing numbers. In such a sifting process as this nature will make her selection and the fittest must ultimately survive. The above is a brief statement of the Malthusian Doctrine ^ THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. l8l It has been substantially adopted and supported by many mod-ern political economists whose opinions we have consulted. The Malthusians show that the birth-rate among any people, when procreation is allowed to run free and unrestricted, will always be in advance of the death-rate, hence, there will be a continual rise in population. The possibilities of this increase are very large, according to the law of geometrical progression. The probabilities are considerable. The facts of history indi-cate that the birth-rate is almost always in the advance, in a higher or lower degree, in an undisturbed state of society. Population then increases steadily. We said that it increases or has a tendency to increase faster than subsistence. This conclusion is based upon the great law of Diminishing Returns in Agriculture. This law needs no proof or explanation. Walker proves it conclusively in his Economy. Briefly it is this: "There is a limit to the amount of labor and capital which can be advantageously employed or expended upon a given area of land." Subsistence increases according to the law of arithmetical progression in contradistinction to the law of geo-metrical progression, according to which population increases. It is easily seen, therefore, that, as population increases, subsist-ence pet capita decreases. If population be carried beyond the limit of sufficient production lor the maintenance of the whole bod)' of society, poverty will ensue among a people. In a crowded community, such as the above continued in-crease in population will lead to, the pressure will come first upon the man with the large family and will force him to struggle hard against the scarcity of food and comforts; dis-ease and starvation must finally come. We have illustrations of this among barbarians and some modern Oriental nations, such as India and China, where they experience frequent fam-ines. Improvements in the arts of agriculture, domestic man-agement and government may withstand this pressure for a time, but, no matter in what direction, or how great the im-provement may be, population will ultimately, under the above circumstances, reach the point where the products of the soil will not support it adequately. So, the only sure and reason-able remedy for such a condition of scarcity, according to Mai- 182 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. thus, is prevention of reproduction to an extent sufficient to insureamplesubsistence/ifrcapita forall. Malthus wouldemploy rnan's reason and prudence and make it a moral restraint in-stead of reducing numbers by means of vice and misery, which, as we have seen, become inevitable results unless the former method is adopted. Evidently, France has adopted this Mal-thusian theory and practices it. The population of France is decreasing, and there is a growing sufficiency of subsistence and comfort for the whole nation. However, it is a question among many whether France is not doing this at the expense of her moral and physical well-being. It seems to be leading her into gradual degeneration. After all, France is hardly a good illustration of the practicability and good common sense of what Malthus taught regarding prudence and moral restraint as a means of checking the too rapid increase of population. Now returning to the question asked at the start, we may inquire again whether President Roosevelt is right in encour-aging the enlargement of families and the consequent growth of the total population of our country. What reasons can he produce? Has America yet reached the point in her econ-omic development where the Malthusian precaution is needed to check population ? If she has, how can we account for President Roosevelt's attitude ? There are reasons, perhaps, outside of the field of political economy that prompt Mr. Roosevelt to take the position he holds, but, assuming that he accepts the doctrine of the Malthusians, there is, nevertheless, sufficient ground to justify his attitude. He certainly would not advocate recklessness and imprudence in a matter of so great importance to the welfare of his country. In the first place, I do not believe that the United States has yet reached the point of Diminishing Returns in Agricul-ture, taking the country as a whole. That it is rapidly ap-proaching that point is not to be doubted. As it is, however, the prevention under consideration is uncalled for. With our present population, we have hardly reached the limit of our highest economic usefulness and the greatest returns per capita, with our vast areas of farm land under cultivation and still capable of much greater returns by the addition of more la- THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 183 borers. I refer particularly to the broad expanse of arable land in our Great West. Undoubtedly, we have not yet reached the limit where we cannot advantageously add more laborers in agriculture. Surely there is no room for apprehension and fear. What poverty there is now in our country is largely due to shiftlessness, ignorance, laziness and vice. There is still a splendid chance for all who will take advantage of our educa-tional system and then go to work. Mr. Roosevelt is right from a moral standpoint also. The increase of population ought to be encouraged in our country. There are those among the wealthy and educated classes in the United States, holding erroneous ideas about "Social Standing," who deprecate large families and who consciously avoid them. This ought not to be true. It would be a blessing for our country if more children were born to the wealthy and cul-tured and fewer to the poorer classes, the ignorant and vicious. We need more citizens reared in the upper strata of society among our best people and fewer in the lower strata. Mr. Roosevelt is right and has given his country a splendid ex-ample in the honest pride he takes in his own large family. France is wrong. Without doubt she is carrying the Malthu-sian Doctrine to wicked extremes. We need to rid ourselves of the sinful tendencies abroad in France which are wasting her morals and reducing her national strength. We need to exercise prudence and reasonable restraint at all times and shun conscious and wicked checks to the increase of our population. The honor, hope and pride of a mother are her children. This is Mr. Roosevelt's opinion and he would have no father and mother consider them a disgrace, a dishonor or a burden. f» 184 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. "THE RAVIN'" SCHOOLMASTER. B. A. STROHMKIKR, '06. ONCE upon a school-day dreary, As I waited weak and "skeary," 'Waited nervously the verdict from the teacher's judgment seat; While my eyes were nearly sapping, Suddenly there came a tapping As of something loudly rapping, Rapping on my breeches' seat. 'Twas the music of the raw-hide as it mercilessly beat Tunes upon my breeches' seat. How the dust flew out those patches, As I felt the raw-hide's scratches ! Yet I didn't necessarily have to skirmish or to dance. Strange the sound those whacks were making As the Prof, great paiiis was taking To appear to have me aching ; But he didn't have a chance, For the force of all the muscle he could use could not advance Past my armor-plated pants. Suddenly there came a silence, And I stood in grim defiance, While the goggle-eyed Professor squinted at me long and hard. He was tired out and panting. And I thought I heard him chanting Words that told that he was granting I his record sad had marred. Then he started, paused, and said these words which cut me like a sword, "Hand me out that weather-board !" Robbed of all my former po.wer, Like a nation's final hour— Like a Sampson with his hair off—I grew weak and weaker still. Then a bright thought struck me : "Mister, I know that you court my sister, And I'll tell Pa that you kissed her, Hit me even with a quill!" Fire flashed his eyes ; but that was all—he dared not do his will. Glory hallelujah Bill! W THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. I85 POLITICAL INDIFFERENCE. SECOND only to the claims of religion are the claims of country. This does not mean that the Christian should desecrate holy places with political harangue, or that he should become the willing servant of a political boss, but that he should discharge his political duties to free government in a manner befitting a noble, religious life and consistent with the patriotic ideals of our forefathers. The government that maintains liberty of thought, word and deed as a fundamental principle, and recognizes education and Christianity as the only safeguards of public liberty, has a just claim upon every citizen for patriotic vigilance of all political rights. If it is true, as has been said, that "the standard of personal morality in America is higher than in England, that of com-mercial morality probably a little lower, and that of political morality quite distinctly lower," let it not be said that it is a defect in our system of government, or that it is wholly a fault of those who are faithless and incompetent in office, for, here, every citizen, no difference what his race or creed, has equal power with his voice and vote, and can claim no exemption from the just responsibilities for the evils of the body politic. Ours is, in fact as well as in theory, a government of the peo-ple, and its administration is neither better nor worse than the people themselves. It was devised by patriotic men who faith-fully gave it their wisest thought, and so perfectly is its frame-work fashioned that an accidental mistake of the people, or the perfidy of an official, or the enactment of profligate laws are all held in such wholesome check by coordinate powers as to enable the chief executive to restrain or suppress almost every conceivable evil for the welfare of the nation. To achieve the highest results in our system of government, it is necessary that the citizens throw aside the theories and idealities of the philosophers for the practical guidance of the ship of state. But alas! he who is best fitted for governing f» 186 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. men too often loves it least, and he who is least fitted for teach-ing men moral and political truths too often turns his back upon his duty for the sake of more pleasurable occupations of litera-ture, art or science. If the reputable citizen refrains from bearing a just responsi-bility in our political conflicts, and thereby voluntarily surren-ders the safety of his person and things, as well as the good order and well-being-of society, into the hands of those who are least fitted for governing men, turn and place the responsi-bility where it belongs and do not blame the thief and adven-turer, for they are but plying their trade, and rob public rather than private treasure because men guard the one and do not guard the other. How often have we not seen good men swiftly invoking the avenging arm of Justice for an injury done to private property, but who are criminally indifferent to the public wrongs done by those who, in the enactment and exe-cution of the laws, directly affect their happiness and pros-perity? Do not excuse the indifference of the good citizen by saying that politics have become polluted. Such a declaration would be a confession of guilt, and he who utters it becomes his own accuser. If it be true that the politics of a state or municipality bave become degraded, who is to blame for it ? Surely not the country or ward politician, for they are a small minority in every community and in every party. If they have gained control of the political organizations, and thereby have secured their election to offices of high trust, it must have been with either the passive or the active assent of the good citizens who hold the actual control of the government in their own hands. Does not the official, who shames his constituents with disgraceful acts, owe his election to the silent assent or positive support of those who claim to be patriotic and intelli-gent citizens, but who lay aside their political duties because of some private interest ? If incompetent appointments have been made through the influence of some political boss, it is due to the fact that honest and good citizens have not protested with a manliness that would point to a sure and swift retribution for such wrongs and, at the same time, have not demanded a per- THE GETTVSBURG MERCURY. 187 manent and practical civil service whereby all dishonor, dis-honesty and incompetency in office would end. Can our presi-dents and governors be wholly responsible for the low standard of our officials? No; for if good men concede primary polit-ical control to those who wield it for sdftsh ends, and thereby make the appointing powers depend tit i-ir both counsel and support upon the worst political eU iiient, u ho is to blame when public sentiment is outraged by the selection of unworthy men to important offices ? The fruits are but the natural, logical results of good citizens refusing to accept their political re-sponsibilities. There is not a blot in our body politic to-day that the better element of the people cannot remove whenever they resolve to do so. There is not a defect nor a deformity in our political administration that they cannot correct in the legitimate way pointed out by our free institutions. If our country is to reach the ideal pictured for it by the framers of the Constitution, it must have the active support of those upon whom the burden of government should rest. It must have behind it more men like Nathan Hale, who was sorry that he had only one life to give his country. It must have the influence and best thought of every American scholar and not the scheme of the demagogue or the trickery of the partisan politician. Three millions of men lie buried beneath American battle-fields to give us that which we seem to prize so lightly : Politi-cal Freedom. But "that these dead shall not have died in vain," that the Utopia of Thomas More's imagination may become a realization, and "that this Republic, under the guidance of A1T mighty God, will live and prosper through the ages," we must bear our burdens patiently, accept our responsibilities courage-ously, and discharge our duties intelligently and with fidelity. "NASHY." 188 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. H THE ANALYSIS OF A NURSERY RHYME. JAMES G. DIJ.LER, '04. OVV often, in the care-free hours of childhood, have we repeated that alliterative verse of linen-book poetry,. with its halting meter and quaint simplicity of language: "Hickory, dickerv, dock. The mouse ran up the clock. The clock struck one, The mouse ran clown. Hickory, rlickery. dock.'' And yet, how many of us have ever discovered in this bit of seemingly senseless doggerel the hidden story of an appar-ently triffling incident, with all its philosophical suggestiveness and condensed moralizing upon the great truths of life? Lest the casual reader should condemn this writing as non-sensical at the very outset, let us begin at once to interpret the jingling and apparently meaningless and disconnected lines. Have you not always considered the first line, "hickory, dick-ery, dock," as merely a mechanical contrivance of words to-rhyme with the word "clock" in the line immediately follow-ing? Doubtless you have, and have regarded it as a useless corruption of our language made to subserve a trivial end. Hut stop to think, and to your surprise you realize that that very mechanical meter, with its abrupt ending, is a most accurate adaptation of words to imitate the ticking of a clock. This ticking of the tireless time-piece attracted the attention of a diminutive rodent, and gives us material for a bit of mor-alizing upon the next line, "the mouse ran up the clock."' Frightened, no doubt, at first, he overcomes his trepidation and hesitatingly approaches in the direction of the monotonous sound. Alas ! how many of us yield, as did the little mouse, to misdirected curiosity and flee, as he did, affrighted from that which was not meant for us to know! Incidentally, we call at-tention here to another concealed bit of information. The clock must have been one of the old-fashioned variety, with long, pendant weights exposed to the open air, else our little THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 189 friend could not have reached it in the course of his investiga-tions. The next line is of special value in our analysis, inasmuch as it gives us the time of this historic occurrence, the narration of which has doubtless entertained the younger generation since the days of the horn-book A, B, C. It may have been either broad-daylight in the early afternoon when, we are told, "the clock struck one;" or it may have been the hour immediately succeeding that— "—very witching time of night. When churchyards yawn." Hut our insight has already become sufficiently keen by our experience of the first two lines, so that we readily conclude it must have been one o'clock at night when his mouseship pur-sued his nocturnal meanderings. Had it been one o'clock in the afternoon, the bustle of the kitchen in clearing away the remnants of the mid-day meal, together with the presence and wide-awake activity of the dog or cat, would have entirely pre-cluded the possibility of the mouse performing his perpendicu-lar tight-rope-walk on the rope or chain of the hanging clock weights. And, now, the last line of pure English in this classic bit of nursery lore gives, perhaps,a larger scope of meaning than any of those preceding. Having accomplished his perilous ascent, and explored the intricate labyrinth of wheels, pinions and oscillating pendulum, he hesitates whether to retrace his steps or to delve still far-ther into the unexplored mysteries of this queer contrivance. But suddenly, close to his velvety ear, there breaks upon the silence of the night a loud, jarring sound, half stunning him by its proximity, and throwing him into a state, of quivering terror as he crouches behind the farthest clock wheel and lis-tens to the ebbing, throbbing waves of sound vibrating with the detonation of the stroke through the metallic fabric of the works. Then, the innate instinct of self-preservation asserting itself, he makes a dash for safety, half sliding, half tumbling down 190 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. the clock-weights' chain and scurries away to his dark abode. Does he not typify all too well that over-ambitious spirit which strives to attain impossible ends, and to climb to heights where the atmosphere is too rare when the summit is finally reached, and the baffled, disappointed and heart-sick seeker is glad to return to his allotted place in the universe, just as the frightened mouse besought his subterranean retreat ? The last line, a repetition of the first, is intended to show how the clock went on ticking, in its accustomed manner, after the mouse had fled. Even so the great world goes on. Man is born—a diminutive mouse in the vast mansion of creation— he explores for a brief time, as the mouse did, mysteries too great for his feeble comprehension, and then returns to that place whence he came. And now, dear reader, have you not formed a better opinion of this doggerel rhyme which haunted your childish memory; and have you not conceived for it that appreciation which it so richly deserves ? 1 "A soul to fear its maker and to feel The finer things of life in their full measure ; A soul to hear God in the twilight calm And see him in the varied hues of dawn. A heart to hold some loves that closer lie Than aught of earth comparable ; a heart That spells its charity in words of deeds, A mind to commonsense, and those high acts That, welded, shape great Labor in its glory ; An arm to wield and mould all that these three Design, contrive—this constitutes a man.-' - ** # THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 191 ■*• A VISIT TO McKINLEYS TOMB. BRUCE COBAUGH, '05. AT the end of a short avenue which leads from the main wes-tern street of Canton, Ohio, lies the beautiful West-lawn Cemetery. To the many visitors it is of special interest as being the burial place of our late President McKinley, and it is for the purpose of visiting his tomb that we pass through the large gate at the entrance on a Sunday afternoon in July. On entering we are greeted by a pleasant surprise as we note the natural beauty of the place, for it is a veritable park. We cannot help but contrast it with other burial grounds we have known, many of whose chief characteristics are the long rows of cold marble and granite with their intermittent spaces laid out with mathematical precision, as if old Mother Earth were jealous of giving one man more than an alotted resting place in her spacious bosom. Nor do we experience that cold un-comfortable feeling that often passes over one on entering a cemetery. On the contrary, as we stroll along the winding avenue which leads through the cemetery, we pause as our attention is attracted to some new beauty of the place. To our left rises a ridge covered with trees. Here the stately oaks are sighing softly in the summer breeze. From their branches comes the songs of their feathered tenants in joyful melody as if inviting all to rejoice. We pause in the shade of a large oak and listen while nature speaks with an eloquence that can never be surpassed. Descending below, to the right, is a slope whose gently un-dulating surface is covered with green. It is bounded below by a brook whose clear waters sparkle in the sunlight The bank is covered with willows which dip their overshadowing branches into the stream. Here and there along its course are ponds in which swim the little sunfish among the floating lilies. We follow a short path from the main avenue and this brings us to the object of our visit. On the eastern slope of the wooded ridge is the exterior of the ** 192 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. large vault. In the .stone front with its solid arch and massive pillars, hangs the heavy iron gate that guards the entrance. It gives one an impression of stability and its general appearance is plain. We can approach no nearer than a distance of about fifty feet for it is guarded day and night by armed sentries who are pacing to and fro about the tomb. As we gaze on the walls which enclose his mortal remains, our thoughts turn back on McKinley's life. Thoughts of his public career come to our mind. We think of how he rose step by step from one position to a higher by proving himself worthy of promotion. His ability as a statesman, his election to the office of chief ruler of our nation and the integrity with which he served his country are among our thoughts. He seems to us a true American in the highest sense of the word. No less than these, however, is his great example of charac-ter. Again, we think of his death, his patience in suffering and the spirit of forgiveness which he showed for the man who gave him a mortal wound. And his calm resignation in the dying hour along with his trust in God make him a worthy example of a true Christian spirit. The sun is sinking behind the treetops and we have time to stay no longer. We return with thoughts of our visit that will ever be pleasant in our memory. THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 193 THE HOUSE WE BUILD. IN the land of the East there once lived a king who gave to twelve of his subjects a sum of money with the command that each should build him a house. Each man took the allot-ted sum and set out to obey the command. Eleven bought the cheapest materials in the market and constructed their buildings on the simplest plan, so that they might save some money for their own use and complete their tasks; but the twelfth secured the most durable materials he could find and with painstaking care built his house as nearly perfect as pos-sible. When the buildings were finished, the king issued a de-cree that each subject, for the rest of his life, should live in the house which he himself had constructed. Imagine the chagrin of the eleven when they found that they must dwell in such unstable structures. Repairs soon became necessary as part after part gave way, and in a short time the buildings, too weak to stand the wear of time, collapsed. But the twelfth subject dwelt in his substantial home until the end of his days. Although this is only a legend, there is hidden vVithin it a truth which is applicable to mankind. Each individual must rear a building for himself—that unseen and uncomprehensible being or spirit—to dwell in. Perhaps we are carrying this on unconsciously, nevertheless, each day has its effect upon these structures. Either we are fashioning pillars and supports which will make our house a strong and beautiful one—fit to contain the noblest aims and purposes—or we are, by living lives of in-difference and ease, rearing such a structure as one finds on a neglected farm, which can contain nothing securely and which every adverse wind threatens to destroy. And there is no ex-change of property, no rental, sale or giving away. Each man must keep his own building and live in it as he himself has built it. Our acts, our thoughts, our feelings, our resolves, our aims and the influences which we receive from associates, books and surroundings are as really the material for our buildings as the t 194 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. lumber and nails for the carpenter. And just as essential for us is a plan. Each one should have a definite ideal as he takes up his work of art. For such an ideal, observe nature in her perfection as she manifests herself in the snowflake with its per-fect arrangement and whiteness, the globe of dew in its round-edness and purity, the new blown rose in its fresh beauty, the magnificent forests in their strength and grandeur,and the lofty mountains in their towering might. And the human body in itself, in its harmonious structure and workings, is a model for perfect symmetry and order. One of our writers speaks of it thus:— Not in the world of light alone, Where God hath built his blazing throne, Nor yet alone in earth below, With belted seas that come and go And endless isles of sunlit green, Is all thy maker's glory seen. Look in upon thy wondrous frame, Eternal wisdom still the same. One should carefully consider both the exterior and interior of the building which he erects. The exterior, while not most important, should receive some care. Have a good strong frame secured by temperate living and proper exercise, an erect form. A clear interior structure, with its furnishings, is import-ant, not only because it is the character, or at least what makes the character of the individual, but because it affects the exterior and makes it what it is to a very great extent. Our houses are more or less transparent, and one without can tell the nature of the man who lives within. On the outside we post the signs which describe the resident. Ruskin says on this subject: "There is no virtue, the exercise of which, even momentarily, will not impress a new fairness upon the features, neither on them only, but on the whole body." In the furnishings let a good strong individuality form the centre piece and let it secure for itself an appropriate setting; let it secure those qualities which make us noble and images of the divine. Let earnestness, enthusiasm, tenderness, a love for THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 195 beauty and harmony, observation, unselfishness and determina-tion be essentials in the equipments. If a man wished to build a perfect house, he would give his attention to every detail and try to make it complete. So in rearing our house, let us not polish and adorn one part to the neglect of another. The young girl who strives only for grace in a ball room and popularity in the social world, and the young man who develops only his muscles in athletics, are building very deficient houses. Symmetry and proportion are two qualities necessary to a beautiful building. In this work of building, we may often improve our own structures by helping our companions as they toil. While we are supporting a pillar or repairing a broken part for them, what is our surprise to find a new beauty in our own, while rough edges have become beautifully rounded curves. How delightful it is to live in a country that is adorned with beautiful and well constructed buildings ! In us lies the ability to adorn or mar the world by the structures which we rear in it. In addition to their improving our surroundings, they serve as incentives to others in perfecting their own buildings. The poet Holmes gives us an inspiration in the words: "Build ye more stately mansions, O my Soul, While the swift seasons roll. Leave thy low vaulted past, Let each new temple nobler than the last Shut thee from Heaven with a dome more vast, Till thou at length art free, Leaving thine outgrown shell, By life's unresting sea." "ORLANDO." THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY Entered at the Postoffi.ee at Gettysburg as second-class matter VOL. XII GETTYSBURG, PA., OCTOBER, 1903 No. 5 Editor-in-chief LYMAN A. GUSS, '04 Exchange Editor M. ROY HAMSHER, '04 Business Manager F. GARMAN MASTERS, '04 Asst. Business Manager A. TY. DTT.LENBECK, '05 Associate Editors M. ADA MCLINN, '04 BRUCE P. COBADGH, '05 C. EDWIN BUTLER, '05 Advisory Board PROF. J. A. HIMES, L-ITT. D. PROF. G. D. STAHI.EY, M.D. PROF. J. W. RICHARD, D.D. Published each month, from October to June inclusive, by the joint literary societies of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. Subscription price, one dollar a year in advance; single copies 15 cents. Notice to discontinue sending the MERCURY to any address must be accompanied by all arrearages. Students, Professors and Alumni are cordially invited to contribute. All subscriptions and business matter should be addressed to the Busi-ness Manager. Articles for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY, GETTYSBURG, PA. EDITORIALS. What a great thing it is ! What a commendable TRUTH trait of character! What a power in everything! And yet how often debased, how often contaminated, how often distorted! It is our purpose to briefly set forth herein a few facts bear-ing directly on the welfare of this college; to reconstruct cer-tain distortions of the truth, which have been circulated by yel-low journalism to our detriment; and to assure our friends and supporters that Gettysburg is a college of gentlemen and not of "hoodlooms," as certain press manipulators, with clouded vision, would make us. During the past two months, there have been evil and ma-licious reports scattered broadcast, within no small radius of THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. I97 our college community, in which the boys of Gettysburg have been deprecated as a gang of rowdies, rogues and general roustabouts ; have been designated in all sorts of terms, border-ing on the villiainous; have had epithets, becoming anything but gentlemen heaped upon them in profusion; and have been characterized as an aggregation of degenerates. If these things were true, ours it would be to "grin and bear," but no individual, without a word of protest, much less a body of loyal college students, can see such maledictions afloat and such slander indulged in with impunity. We labor with righteous indignation under the knowledge that the good name of our college, undefiled for decades, is being vitiated without provocation. Therefore, we refute with vigor these monstrous prevarications. To the friends of Gettysburg we would say that the reports referred to above are not true, are utter falsehoods, and are not warranted. Instead of all kinds of devilment, which these vile, disgraceful recitals portray, such a state of affairs is non-exist-ent almost in totality. Class spirit, college spirit—all kinds of spirit, we are loath to confess, is at a lower ebb than it has been for a number of years, and, consequently, the real and only ex-cess, conducted by the student body, is thereby removed; for, be it known, that there by no means exists an organized quota of students in the college whose aim and object is the destruc-tion of property, and the debasement of their fellow-students. Such personalities Gettysburg does not support. To be sure, occasionally, a sudden outburst of college en-thusiasm does impel prudence a little beyond the limit, but never, within the time during which we have been flailed with the confounded misstatements of a debauched press, has it been carried to an end approaching that which these enlarged, in-flated, falsified and perverse specimens of a journal of the "yellow" type would have you believe. To the source of this polluted literature we consider it be-neath our dignity to directly refer. It suffices to state the facts connected with its origin and promulgation. These we offer to you as explanatory of these disseminated articles so liberally 198 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. savored with prevarication. We trust they may serve to right your estimate of our college; to reinstate you in your former attitude of good will toward us, if you have fallen therefrom by the great injustice done, and being done, us without cause, real or sham; to lead you "to believe that we are not "hood-looms," but men, such as Gettysburg has merited and owned in the past, and yet finds perpetuated in our persons. We ask you to discount these reports, which appear at our expense, with a reduction of one-half or three-fourths, which they will readily bear, and then the residue may, perhaps, be taken at par. These remarks may seem somewhat eulogistic, but we are given to self-laudation only in case of stringent necessity. This is one such case. What we want you to believe, alumni and friends, is that Gettysburg is a college, not composed of men of ideal character,but equally on a level basis with our contemporary institutions. We are not tainted and debased in character, in a class of our own, but whole and sound as any. The Pennypacker press muzzle was met with derision and denunciation when it became law. It was fairly paralyzed with a storm of opposition. And yet there is quality in that piece of legislation. While its operation, for the most part, is out of harmony with American principle, it could be made to operate with admirable results in specific cases. It is not our intention to justify the "muzzier," but would it not justify itself in our instance ? It would purge e\^il from the local press, perchance. Shall we try it? DIALECT 1'ne fed °f writing stories in various dialects, STORIES. particularly that of the Negro, the Irishman, the Westerner or Backwoodsman, is becoming very contagious. These stories, while they are comical and interesting and serve the purpose intended perhaps well enough, may become very detrimental to our language and especially so if they continue to multiply. The colloquial form of the English language is now ungram- THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 199 matical enough, as every one will acknowledge, but what it might become if these corruptions are acquired, I should fear to state. For example the colloquy of the Westerner put into the speech of our fairly educated men of today would be unbecom-ing and distasteful, to say nothing of its effect. While this illustration may be an absurd one, yet it is not far in advance of the result of dialect writing. If we are given this species of literature we are going to acquire more and more of this kind of language. Another example only too realistic is that of the college student whose corrupt terms and phrases are understood only by himself and those associated with him. How often when speaking to an outside man does he find himself uttering these corruptions, which are, it may be, Hebrew to his hearer. This is an example of how easily we may acquire the lore of the different dialects if they are thrust upon us for our constant amusement or edification. Our tongues would be confused far more than the tongues of historic Babel. To the student of English, dialect stories, when they exceed the limit in number and quality, should be especially repulsive and, by heeding them with little or no regard, the student will be justified, the'offender punished, and the dignity of our English preserved. EXCHANGES. The most delightful bit of optimism, for it does seem to savor of the optimist, that we have noticed in our last month's reading, has been penned with regard to the college publica-tions. Hear some of the soul-cheering words of the Georgetown College Journal's ex-man, who has been so highly esteemed as to be re-elected to office: "They bring to us a message of the thousands of college men and women of this country who are giving their time to the study of letters and are becoming writ-ers of good English. We do most emphatically believe in col-lege journalism; and it is our firm conviction that out of the 200 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. humble efforts that the college editor is to-day making will come the great American novel, and the great American epic, and the great American essay; in short, will come the great American literature, a golden age, that will outshine all that have gone before it." May college journalism result in a de-velopment of our literature equal to the expectations of our sanguine friend. There is much in the college magazine that does not warrant such expectations. But there are some col-lege men who, although their literary efforts are now making but a feeble light, are, nevertheless, blazing a pathway for grander and nobler things in literature. The Carthage Collegia?i has this interesting preface to its last number, which is intended, no doubt, for critics who become cynical in their observations:— "Kind reader, ere you turn away From viewing this small booklet's pages, And judge, perchance, correctly too, That they who wrote it are not sages, Think well, before you place it on the shelf, You might have written it yourself. Forget the weak, the poor, and of the rest, Though it be poor, remember thou the best." If there were made a classification of the college magazines into those seemingly making a special effort to present college news, with one or more literary articles to fill up the space, and those devoted principally to literary work, we would, no doubt, place such magazines as Tlie Monthly Maroon and University of Virginia Magazine in the second class. They belong to the part of college journalism that will result in the "Great Ameri-can Literature." The Ursinus Weekly has just come out with its first Literary Supplement of the year. The essay on "Seventeenth Century Lyric Poetry" shows a knowledge of the spirit of that time. The writer compares the songs of the "light-hearted" Robert Herrick with the "deep, sonorous" notes of Tennyson in an in-teresting manner. The exchange editor seems to have a good word for every one.

NOTICIAS / NEWS ("Transfer", 2016) 1) CONGRESOS / CONFERENCES: 1. Languages & the Media – Agile Mediascapes: Personalising the Future, Hotel Radisson Blu, Berlín, 2-4 Nov. 2016 www.languages-media.com 2. Third Chinese Drama Translation Colloquium Newcastle University, UK, 28-19 Junio 2016. www.ncl.ac.uk/sml/about/events/item/drama-translation-colloquium 3. 16th Annual Portsmouth Translation Conference – Translation & Interpreting: Learning beyond the Comfort Zone, University of Portsmouth, UK, 5 Nov. 2016. www.port.ac.uk/translation/events/conference 4. 3rd International Conference on Non-Professional Interpreting & Translation (NPIT3) Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Suiza
5-7 Mayo 2016. www.zhaw.ch/linguistics/npit3 5. 3rd Postgraduate Symposium – Cultural Translation: In Theory and as Practice. University of Nottingham, UK, 18 Mayo 2016. Contact: uontranslation2016@gmail.com 6. 3rd Taboo Conference – Taboo Humo(u)r: Language, Culture, Society, and the Media, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) 20-21 Sep. 2016.
https://portal.upf.edu/web/taco 7. Postgraduate Conference on Translation and Multilingualism Lancaster University, UK, 22 Abril 2016. Contacto: c.baker@lancaster.ac.uk 8. Translation and Minority University of Ottawa (Canadá), 11-12 Nov. 2016. Contacto: rtana014@uottawa.ca 9. Translation as Communication, (Re-)narration and (Trans-)creation Università di Palermo (Italia), 10 Mayo 2016 www.unipa.it/dipartimenti/dipartimentoscienzeumanistiche/convegni/translation 10. From Legal Translation to Jurilinguistics: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study of Language and Law, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla,
27-28 Oct. 2016. www.tinyurl.com/jurilinguistics 11. Third International Conference on Research into the Didactics of Translation. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 7-8 Julio 2016 http://grupsderecerca.uab.cat/pacte/en/content/second-circular-1 12. EST Congress – Expanding the Boundaries or Strengthening the Bases: Should Translation Studies Explore Visual Representation? Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/18-expanding-the-boundaries-or-strengthening-the-bases-should-translation-studies-explore-visual-representation/ 13. Tourism across Cultures: Accessibility in Tourist Communication Università di Salento, Lecce (Italia). 25-27 Feb. 2016 http://unisalento.wix.com/tourism 14. Translation and Interpreting Studies at the Crossroad: A Dialogue between Process-oriented and Sociological Approaches – The Fourth Durham Postgraduate Colloquium on Translation Studies Durham University, UK. 30 Abril – 1 Mayo 2016. www.dur.ac.uk/cim 15. Translation and Interpreting: Convergence, Contact, Interaction Università di Trieste (Italia), 26-28 Mayo 2016 http://transint2016.weebly.com 16. 7th International Symposium for Young Researchers in Translation, Interpreting, Intercultural Studies and East Asian Studies. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1 Julio 2016. http://pagines.uab.cat/simposi/en 17. Translation Education in a New Age The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China 15-16 Abril 2016. Contact: Claire Zhou (clairezhou@cuhk.edu.cn) 18. Audiovisual Translation: Dubbing and Subtitling in the Central European Context, Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra (Eslovaquia). 15-17 Junio 2016. https://avtnitraconference.wordpress.com 19. Cervantes, Shakespeare, and the Golden Age of Drama Madrid, 17-21 Oct. 2016 http://aedean.org/wp-content/uploads/Call-for-papers.pdf 20. 3rd International Conference Languaging Diversity – Language/s and Power. Università di Macerata (Italia), 3-5 Marzo 2016 http://studiumanistici.unimc.it/en/research/conferences/languaging-diversity 21. Congreso Internacional de Traducción Especializada (EnTRetextos) Universidad de Valencia, 27-29 Abril 2016 http://congresos.adeituv.es/entretextos 22. Translation & Quality 2016: Corpora & Quality Université Charles de Gaulle Lille 3 (Francia), 5 Feb. 2016 http://traduction2016.sciencesconf.org/?lang=en 23. New forms of feedback and assessment in translation and interpreting training and industry. 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries, Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016. www.bcom.au.dk/est2016 24. Intermedia 2016 – Conference on Audiovisual Translation University of Lodz (Polonia), 14-16 Abril 2016 http://intermedia.uni.lodz.pl 25. New Technologies and Translation Université d'Algiers (Argelia). 23-24 Feb. 2016 Contacto: newtech.trans.algiers@gmail.com 26. Circulation of Academic Thought - Rethinking Methods in the Study of Scientific Translation. 11 - 12 Dec. 2015, University of Graz (Austria).https://translationswissenschaft.uni-graz.at/de/itat/veranstaltungen/circulation-of-academic-thought 27. The 7th Asian Translation Traditions Conference Monash University, Malaysia Campus, 26-30 Sep. 2016. http://future.arts.monash.edu/asiantranslation7 28. "Translation policy: connecting concepts and writing history" 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/13-translation-policy-connecting-concepts-and-writing-history 29. International Conference – Sound / Writing: On Homophonic Translation. Université de Paris (Francia), 17-19 Nov. 2016 www.fabula.org/actualites/sound-writing-on-homophonic-translationinternational-conference-paris-november-17-19-2016_71295.php 30. Third Hermeneutics and Translation Studies Symposium – Translational Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm Technische Hochschule, Colonia (Alemania), 30 Junio-1 Julio 2016 www.phenhermcommresearch.de/index.php/conferences 31. II International Conference on Economic Financial and Institutional Translation. Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (Canadá), 17-18 Agosto 2016. www.uqtr.ca/ICEBFIT 32. International Congress - liLETRAd 2016-Cátedra LILETRAD. Literature Languages Translation, Universidad de Sevilla, 6-8 Julio 2016. https://congresoliletrad.wordpress.com 33. Transmediations! Communication across Media Borders Linnæus University, Växjö (Suecia), 13–15 Oct. 2016 http://lnu.se/lnuc/linnaeus-university-centre-for-intermedial-and-multimodal-studies-/events/conferences/transmediations?l=en 34. Translation Education in a New Age, 15-16 Abril 2016. School of Humanities and Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. Contacto: chansinwai@cuhk.edu.cn 35. Translation and Time: Exploring the Temporal Dimension of Cross-cultural Transfer, 8-10 Diciembre 2016. Departamento de Traducción, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Contacto: translation-and-time@cuhk.edu.hk. 36. Du jeu dans la langue. Traduire les jeux de mots / Loose in Translation. Translating Wordplay, 23-24 Marzo 2017, Université de Lille (France) https://www.univ-lille3.fr/recherche/actualites/agenda-de-la-recherche/?type=1&id=1271. Contacto: traduirejdm@univ-lille3.fr, julie.charles@univ-lille3.fr 37. Translation and Translanguaging across Disciplines. EST Congress 2016 "Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries", European Society for Translation Studies, Aarhus (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/12-translation-and-translanguaging-across-disciplines/ Contacto: nune.ayvazyan@urv.cat; mariagd@blanquerna.url.edu; sara.laviosa@uniba.it http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/submission/ 38. Beyond linguistic plurality: The trajectories of multilingualism in Translation. An international conference organized jointly by Bogaziçi University, Department of Translation and Interpreting Studies, and Research Group on Translation and Transcultural Contact, York University, Bogaziçi University, 1-12 Mayo 2016. Contacto: sehnaz.tahir@boun.edu.tr, MGuzman@glendon.yorku.ca 39. "Professional and Academic Discourse: an interdisciplinary perspective". XXXIV IConferencia Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Lingüística Aplicada (AESLA), 14-16 Abril 2016. Interuniversity Institute for Applied Modern Languages (IULMA) / Universidad de Alicante. http://web.ua.es/aesla2016. Contacto: antonia.montes@ua.es. 2) CURSOS, SEMINARIOS, POSGRADOS / COURSES, SEMINARS, MASTERS: 1. Seminario: Breaking News for French>English and English>French Translators King's College Cambridge, UK, 8-10 Agosto 2016 Contacto: translateincambridge@iti.org.uk 2. Curso on-line: Setting Up as a Freelance Translator Enero – Marzo 2016. Institute of Translation & Interpreting, UK https://gallery.mailchimp.com/58e5d23248ce9f10c161ba86d/files/Application_Form_SUFT_2016.pdf?utm_source=SUFT+December+Emailer&utm_campaign=11fdfe0453-Setting_Up_as_a_Freelance_Translator12_7_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6ef4829e50-11fdfe0453-25128325 3. Curso: Using Interpreters for Intercultural Communication and Other Purposes (COM397CE) http://darkallyredesign.com/what-we-do/using-interpreters-for-intercultural-communication 4. Workshop: How to Write and Publish Your Scholarly Paper In cooperation with the European Association of Science Editors (EASE) New Bulgarian University, Sofia (Bulgaria), 21-23 Marzo 2016 www.facebook.com/events/1511610889167645 http://esnbu.org/data/files/resources/ease-nbu-seminar-march-2016-fees.pdf 5. Posgrado: II Postgraduate Course on Spanish Law Taught in English "Global study". Universidad Internacional de Andalucía / Colegio de Abogados de Málaga. www.unia.es/cursos/guias/4431_english.pdf 3) CURSOS DE VERANO / SUMMER COURSES: 1. STRIDON – Translation Studies Doctoral and Teacher Training Summer School, Piran (Eslovenia), 27 Junio – 8 Julio 2016 www.prevajalstvo.net/doctoral-summer-school 2. Training in Translation Pedagogy Program School of Translation and Interpretation, University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. https://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs 3. 2016 Nida School of Translation Studies. Translation, Ecology and Entanglement, San Pellegrino University Foundation, Misano Adriatico, Rimini (Italia), 30 Mayo – 10 Junio 2016. http://nsts.fusp.it/Nida-Schools/NSTS-2016 4. TTPP - Intensive Summer Program in Translation Pedagogy University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. http://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs-2016/ttpp 5. CETRA Summer School 2016. 28th Research Summer School University of Leuven, campus Antwerp (Bélgica), 22 Agosto – 2 Sep. 2016. Contacto: cetra@kuleuven.be. http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/cetra 4) LIBROS / BOOKS: 1. Varela Salinas, María-José & Bernd Meyer (eds.) 2016. Translating and Interpreting Healthcare Discourses / Traducir e interpretar en el ámbito sanitario. Berlín : Frank & Timme. www.frank-timme.de/verlag/verlagsprogramm/buch/verlagsprogramm/bd-79-maria-jose-varela-salinasbernd-meyer-eds-translating-and-interpreting-healthcare-disc/backPID/transued-arbeiten-zur-theorie-und-praxis-des-uebersetzens-und-dolmetschens-1.html 2. Ordóñez López, Pilar and José Antonio Sabio Pinilla (ed.) 2015. Historiografía de la traducción en el espacio ibérico. Textos contemporáneos. Madrid: Ediciones de Castilla-La Mancha. www.unebook.es/libro/historiografia-de-latraduccion-en-el-espacio-iberico_50162 3. Bartoll, Eduard. 2015. Introducción a la traducción audiovisual. Barcelona: Editorial UOC. www.editorialuoc.cat/introduccion-a-la-traduccion-audiovisual 4. Rica Peromingo, Juan Pedro & Jorge Braga Riera. 2015. Herramientas y técnicas para la traducción inglés-español. Madrid: Babélica. www.escolarymayo.com/libro.php?libro=7004107&menu=7001002&submenu=7002029 5. Le Disez, Jean-Yves. 2015. F.A.C.T. Une méthode pour traduire de l'anglais au français. París: Ellipses. www.editions-ellipses.fr/product_info.php?cPath=386&products_id=10601 6. Baker, Mona (ed.) 2015. Translating Dissent: Voices from and with the Egyptian Revolution. Londres: Routledge. www.tandf.net/books/details/9781138929876 7. Gallego Hernández, Daniel (ed.) 2015. Current Approaches to Business and Institutional Translation / Enfoques actuales en traducción económica e institucional. Berna: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/download/datasheet/86140/datasheet_431656.pdf 8. Vasilakakos, Mary. 2015. A Training Handbook for Health and Medical Interpreters in Australia. www.interpreterrevalidationtraining.com/books-and-resources.html 9. Jankowska, Anna & Agnieszka Szarkowska (eds) 2015. New Points of View on Audiovisual Translation and Media Accessibility. Oxford: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?event=cmp.ccc.seitenstruktur.detailseiten&seitentyp=produkt&pk=83114 10. Baer, Brian James (2015). Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature, Londres: Bloomsbury. Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature is the inaugural book in a new Translation Studies series: Bloomsbury's "Literatures, Cultures, Translation." 11. Camps, Assumpta. 2016. La traducción en la creación del canon poético (Recepción de la poesía italiana en el ámbito hispánico en la primera mitad del siglo XX). Berna: Peter Lang. 5) REVISTAS / JOURNALS: 1. JoSTrans, The Journal of Specialised Translation, nº especial sobre Translation & the Profession, Vol. 25, Enero 2016. www.jostrans.org 2. Translation and Interpreting – Nº especial sobre Community Interpreting: Mapping the Present for the Future www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint. 3. inTRAlinea – Nº especial sobre New Insights into Specialised Translation. www.intralinea.org/specials/new_insights 4. Linguistica Antverpiensia NS-Themes in Translation Studies, 2015 issue, Towards a Genetics of Translation. https://lans-tts.uantwerpen.be/index.php/LANS-TTS/issue/view/16 5. Quaderns de Filologia, Nº especial sobre Traducción y Censura: Nuevas Perspectivas, Vol. 20, 2015. https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qdfed/issue/view/577 6. The Translator – Nº especial sobre Food and Translation, Translation and Food, 2015, 21(3). www.tandfonline.com/eprint/ryqJewJUDKZ6m2YM4IaR/full 7. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E, 2015, 2 www.cttl.org/cttl-e-2015.html 8. Dragoman Journal of Translation Studies. www.dragoman-journal.org 9. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E. Edición especial sobre Translation Studies Curricula Across Countries and Cultures. www.cttl.org 10. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Nº especial sobre Translation Policies and Minority Languages: Theory, Methods and Case Studies http://fouces.webs.uvigo.es/CallForPapersIJSLTranslationPolicies.pdf 11. Nº especial de The Interpreter and Translator Trainer 11(2) – Employability and the Translation Curriculum www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1750399X.2015.1103092 12. InTRAlinea. Nº especial sobre Building Bridges between Film Studies and Translation Studies www.intralinea.org/news/item/cfp_building_bridges_between_film_studies_and_translation_studies 13. Nº especial de TranscUlturAl: Comics, BD & Manga in translation/en traduction https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/TC/announcement/view/290 14. The Journal of Translation Studies 2015, 16(4) Nº especial sobre Translator and Interpreter Training in East Asia Contacto: Won Jun Nam: wjnam@hufs.ac.kr, wonjun_nam@daum.net 15. TRANS Revista de Traductología, 19(2), 2015. www.trans.uma.es/trans_19.2.html 16. Between, 9, 2015 – Censura e auto-censura http://ojs.unica.it/index.php/between/index 17. Translation Studies, Nº especial sobre Translingualism & Transculturality in Russian Contexts of Translation http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ah/rtrs-cfp3 18. Translation & Interpreting, 7:3, 2016 www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint/issue/view/38 19. "The translation profession: Centres and peripheries" The Journal of Specialised Translation (Jostrans), Nº. 25, Enero 2016. The Journal of Translation Studies is a joint publication of the Department of Translation of The Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University Press. Contact: jts.tra@cuhk.edu.hk, james@arts.cuhk.edu.hk 19. Nuevo artículo: "The Invisibility of the African Interpreter" por Jeanne Garane, Translation: a transdisciplinary journal http://translation.fusp.it/. Contact: siri.nergaard@gmail.com.

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Ned
Lebow on Drivers of War, Cultural Theory, and IR of Foxes and Hedgehogs









Drawing
on classical political theories, International Relations is dominated by
theories that presuppose interests or fear as dominant drivers for foreign
policy. Richard Ned Lebow looks further back into the history of ideas to conjure up a
more varied set of drives that underpin political action. In this Talk, Lebow, among others, elaborates on
the underpinnings of political action, discusses how war drives innovations in
IR theorizing in the 20th century, and likens himself to a fox,
rather than a hedgehog.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)








What
is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?







Well, the big challenge in international politics is always
how do we keep from destroying one another and that's the negative question.
But it is mirrored by a positive question which is, how do we build community
and tolerance and peace? And that's not exactly the flip side, but that's
always been the big question in IR. And part of that, I think, is how we learn
to manage threatening change. Because in my perspective, that's the driving
force of conflict: ultimately, both World Wars can be attributed to
modernization and its destabilizing consequences. That is also the reason why
it is a falsehood to base theory on that little select slice of history during
the World Wars, extrapolate it, and try to think its universal. Yet that is
what IR theory does: so many theorists, and so many of the people you recently
interviewed, are guilty of doing that. So that's the big question and
certainly, that's what drove me to study IR in the hope that I could make some
small contribution to figuring out some of the answers or partial answers to
these questions.







If we turn to what the central debate should be in
International Theory, well, I would frame this in two parts: the first should
be 'what are the different ways in which we can conceive of international
theory and how, by all of us pursuing it the way we feel comfortable with, we
can enrich the field without throwing bric-a-brac at each other and find ways
of learning from each other?'







A few years ago, I edited a book with Mark Lichbach (Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics
and International Relations) as a rejoinder to King, Keohane and Verba's
book, which we found deeply offensive. It has the narrowest framework and then
they base their understanding on the Vienna school yet they seem to have forgotten
that Hempel and Popper would disavow the positions that King, Keohane and Verba
(KKV) are anchoring themselves in as epistemologically primitive. And the very
examples they give to illustrate 'good science'—Alvarez and his groupaddressing the problem of dinosaur extinction—they fail to see that what
these people did was in fact code on the dependent variable, which is the big
no-no for KKV! And the reason why Alvarez et al were taken seriously, was not because they went through the order
of research that KKV promoted, but rather because they came up with an
explanation for a phenomenon that people have long known about—yet explanations
don't figure at all in KKV's take; they had no interest in mechanisms, it was
all narrow correlations. It's absurd! So we edited the book, and we invited
people who represented different perspectives, but all of whom had evidence and
struggled to make sense of the evidence, to talk to one another and to look at
the problems they themselves find in their positions and how one could learn
broadly from considering this. That's the kind of debate that seems to me is a
useful one. Not who is right or wrong, but how can we learn collectively. And
secondly, I think maybe we need fewer debates, and more good research.











How did you arrive
at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







I suppose it's a combination of people, books, and events, and
being a dog that constantly gnaws on bones and works it through. Very clearly the
Second World War and the Cold War were what brought me to the study of IR. I'm sure
in their absence, considering the counterfactual, I would have gone into Astrophysics,
which was the other field that really interested me.







I think the first concrete influence was as an undergraduate
and then as a graduate, being struck by certain individuals whose minds seemed
to sparkle; and I admired them for that and they became role models. And I
would make myself, intellectually, a little Hans Morgenthau, a little Karl
Deutsch; see the world through their eyes, and play with it. I never really wanted
to make myself into them, but rather to benefit by seeing what the world was
like when seen through their eyes. So in this sense, let me go back and draw on
Boswell, Hughes, and Mill for my answer. They all conceived of identity as
something that's a process of self-fashioning in which we mix and match the
characteristics that we observe in other people. And the purpose of society is
to throw up these role models and provide interaction with them so that we can
constantly be engaging in self-fashioning. And ultimately, we create something
that's novel that other people want to emulate or reject, as the case may be.
And I think that mixing and matching, and ultimately creating a synthesis of my
own, I developed my own approach to things.







The second element of this is to pick problems that engage
me, and stick with them. My first book in IR was about international crises and
I worked on this, it must have been 8, possibly even 9 years. I started out initially
convinced that deterrence theory made sense but wouldn't fit the historical evidence. Then one day, while
playing around, I realized the theory was wrong and by reversing it, I could
understand why it didn't work and see there were very different dynamics at
play. So working on a problem constantly and going back and forth between
theory and empirical findings, you gradually develop your own sense of the
field.







It also helps, over the course of an intellectual lifetime, to
work on different kinds of problems: I've just finished a book on the politics
and ethics of identity; I finished a manuscript up for review on the nature of
causation and different takes on cause; and the previous two books were on
counterfactuals and the origins of war. And I learned something theoretically
and methodologically by throwing myself into these problems and also, in some
cases, by going beyond what one would normally consider the domain of IR to look
for answers. I've often done philosophy and literature in the identity book. I
also go to musical texts: I have a reading of the Mozart Da Ponte Operas as a deliberate
thought experiment to test out ancient regime
and enlightenment identities under varying circumstances to expose what's wrong
with them and to work toward a better approach of Così fantutte. And I
read the music, not only the libretti,
to get at an answer. Of course, when you've been doing it a long time, it keeps
you alive and alert when you look at something new. I'm just finishing my 46th
year of University teaching. It's a long time!







Thirdly, there were a few pivotal books. I read George
Orwell's 1984 and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in the early 50s. Both
of those were very powerful books. I also read in about 1950 - Life Magazine
produced a large volume on WWII and it had fabulous photographs and of course
Life was famous, Robert Capa's photographs, and
the text by John Dos Passos. A big big book that I read and re-read and that
was a powerful influence on me. I'd say the Diary of Anne Frank, when it came
out, which was not all that dissimilar but had a different ending from my own
war experience, and then in high school I read, or struggled to read—I don't
think I understood it—Ideology and Utopia
(full text here) by Karl
Mannheim, and then I read Politics among
Nations and the Twenty Year's Crisis.
And both those books made enormous sense to me at the time. But I think the
book that over the course of my lifetime has had the most influence on me of
anything is Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War (read full text here).











What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?







I am tempted to give you a flippant answer that an expert is
somebody from out of town; what used to be with slides would now be with a PowerPoint
presentation. I think frankly you need to do two things: you need to be
analytically sophisticated and original on the one hand, but to do it well, you
have to have an empirical base. There has to be some problem or set of problems
that you've rolled up your sleeves, looked at the data, talk to the people who
are on the ground doing these things, and you need to go back and forth between
that empirical knowledge and conceptual one. That's success as a social scientist. 







And traditionally, there's
always been another key. You must have one foot in society in which you belong
and another foot outside so you can do it as an outsider as well as an insider.
That's terribly important. I think, in this sense, that Americans are more
parochial than other people. They are good insiders but they are not very good
outsiders and they just don't understand the rest of the world and when you
read what they write about the rest of the world, you wonder what planet they
are living on. If you don't see the rest of the world, you can't look at the
America from another perspective. It's like people who take hegemony seriously;
it's like believing in Santa Claus, except Santa Claus is benign. To gain a
deep experience of the world in itself is a pre-requisite. Do a year abroad in
some other culture. Learn a language. Have a relationship with someone from a
different culture—you begin to learn the languages and all the rest will come.
That's the way to start.











You are
most famous to most people for your Cultural
Theory of International Relations (2008). What does it comprise and can you
say something about its classical roots?







I return to classical theory of conflict and cooperation
because I find that in modern theory, all drives of human action have been
reduced to appetite, and reason to mere instrumentality. The Greeks, by
contrast, believed there were several fundamental drives—drives that affected
politics—and while these included appetite, they weren't just appetite. Reason was more than instrumentality; it also had
the goal of understanding what led to a happy life; then, next to reason and
appetite, the third drive was spirit or self-esteem (the Greek thumos), which is very different and
often opposed to appetite. It is about winning the approbation of others to
feel good about ourselves. The difference between honor and standing—two
variants of self-esteem—is that honor is status achieved within a fixed set of
rules, while standing is whenever you achieve status by whatever means.







Now most existing IR theories are either only built on
appetites—as liberalism and Marxism—or fear. And for the Greeks fear is not a
human drive but a powerful emotion which can become a motive. And when reason
loses control over either appetite or spirit, people begin to worry about their
own ability to satisfy their appetites, their spirit, or even protect
themselves physically. That's when fear becomes a powerful motive. Realism is
of course the paradigm developed around fear. I differ in that my theory
recognizes multiple motives, that are active to varying degrees at different
times. They don't blend the way a solution does in chemistry, but they retain
their own characteristics, even if jumbled together. So my theory expects to
see quite diverse and often conflicting behavior, whereas other theories only
pay attention to state behavior that seems to support their theory, and feel
the need to explain away other behavior inconsistent with their theory. I revel
in these variations. Second, I vary in describing what derives from these
motives as (Weberian) ideal types—which means, something you don't encounter in
the real world, but rather, an abstraction, a fictional or analytical
description, that helps to make sense of the real world but never maps onto it
exactly. So, a fear-based world gives you a very nice description of a
foundation of anarchy. But of course this is an ideal-type world. Fear is only
one motive. You have go to a place where civil order has broken down, like
Somalia or the trenches in WWII, to see fear-based models compete.







Starting from these three motives and the emotion of fear, I
argue that each of these generates a very different logic of cooperation,
conflict and risk-taking; and each is associated with a different kind of
hierarchy. And all of them except fear rely on a different principle of
justice. Just to give an example: for actors—whether individuals or
states—driven by self-esteem, they tend to be risk prone (because honor has to
be won by successfully overcoming ordeals and challenges); it leads to a
conflictual logic because you are competing with others for honor; and it can
be rule-based (although the rules can brake down and move into fear); and the
principle is one of fairness, in contrast to interest or appetite which has a
principle of equality. The hierarchy is one of clientelism, where people honor
those at the top, which, in return, provides practical benefits for those on
the bottom. The Greeks called this hegemonia;
the Chinese had a similar system.







But because any actual system is not an ideal type, we have
to figure out what that mixture is and we can begin to understand foreign
policies. And I try to give numerous examples in the book. And the big turning
point, I argue, is modernity, where it becomes more difficult to untangle the
motives and their discourses. Because in modernity both Rousseau and Adam Smith
try to understand why we want material things, so the two become connected. You
could argue that even in Egyptian times they were connected, in the pyramids,
which are nothing if not erections of self-esteem. But it becomes more
difficult and so, rather than saying, using literary texts, artistic works and
political speeches as a way of determining the relationship, I approached the
problem differently with the examples of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the
Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq. I said let's run a test of seeing how
carefully we can explain the origins and the dynamics of these conflicts on the
basis of interest, on the basis of fear, on the basis of self-esteem. And I
think that's methodologically defensible.



Now the interesting point is that the honor or self-esteem
explanation is gone completely from modern IR explanations but does at least
just a good a job—if not better—at explaining these conflicts I mention above. There is an important sense—and this is my latest book—in which going to war was the dominant way to get recognized as a great power, and I feel that the example of the war in Iraq illustrates that that principle is on the retreat.







I obviously use Greek thinking as a source here of—again, I
wouldn't use the word knowledge—but as a source of insight into human nature
and the recurring problems regardless of society. Some of the great writers and
thinkers cannot be surpassed as sources of knowledge that we as social
scientists are shadows on the cave by comparison. And I find the Greeks
particularly interesting for several reasons. One, they had a richer
understanding of the psyche that moderns who have adduced everything to appetite
and reason to a mere instrumentality, this is, to me, an incredibly narrow,
crude way of thinking of the human mind. And, for whatever reason, they were
gifted with tragedians who pierced to the core of things. So I find them as a
source of inspiration but it's by no way limited to the Greeks. You can pick
great authors from any culture, in any century, and read them and learn a lot.











How
should we understand your cultural theory of international relations in
relation to the 'big' paradigms?







My theory is constructivist, at every level. I can go even further and claim that my theory is
the only constructivist theory.
Alexander Wendt is not a constructivist. If anything, he's a structural
liberal. It did have preexisting identities and has a teleology as he believes
a Kantian world is inevitable— that's quite a statement to make! And I hope
he's right. On the other hand, I define constructivists in a broader way. Most
constructivists start with identities and identities are certainly an important
feature of my work, but my theory rests on a different premise, and that is the
notion of there being certain core values which are germane to politics, and
they vary in relative importance from society to society, and they find
expression in different ways. So it is constructivist, I think, in the Weberian
sense: we have to understand from within the culture what makes things
meaningful. And, in that sense, you could bring in the notion of
inter-subjective reality, but I go beyond it, because other values are always
present in this mix and therefore there's behavior that appears contradictory
that is often misunderstood if you apply the wrong lens to it. So there's a
lack of interdisciplinary understanding as well: you have to look at both to
see how the world works. So cultural theory is constructivist and it allows us
to reframe and expand what constructivism means.







If I apply this constructivist thinking to one of the core
principles in our approach to world politics: what is a cause? I start by
asking, what does 'cause' mean, in physics? Why physics? Because physics is
always the field that political scientists look at, we have 'physics envy', so
to speak. And interestingly, in physics, there is no consensus about what cause
means. Some physicists think that very notion of cause is unhelpful to what
they do. Others are happy with regularities and subscribe to causal thinking. Still
others thing that you need to have mechanisms to explain anything. Still others,
and here statistical mechanics can be taken as a case in point, invoke Kantian
understandings of cause. Within physics there's no argument between people
adhering to these different understandings of 'cause', because you should do
what works! They don't criticize one another. So if they have this diversity,
why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we develop understandings of cause that are
most appropriate to what we do? So I develop an understanding I call 'inefficient
causation' (download full paper here),
sort of playing off of Aristotle. And it is a constructivist understanding, but
it also incorporates elements that are distinctively non-constructivist. And
identities are only a small piece of the puzzle.











Is
there any sense to make of the way IR has evolved over the 20th
century?







I think if you look at some of the central figures, it's
quite easy. There are 2 great cohorts of International Relations theorists.
Those born in the early years of the 20th century comprise Hans
Morgenthau, John Hertz, E.H. Carr, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, Frederick Schuman, and Karl Deutsch—who was
on my dissertation committee together with Isaiah Berlin and John Hertz. The
second cohort is born between about 1939 and 1945, and it comprises Robert
Jervis (Theory Talk #12), Joseph Nye
(Theory Talk #7), Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9), Oren Young, Peter
Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15), Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk#21), Janice Steinberg… And I'll tell you what I think the reasons are for
these groups to emerge at these particular moments: the first cohort lived
through World War I. And did so, fortunately, in at an age where they were too
young to be combatants for the most part, but they certainly had to deal
intellectually and personally with its consequences and then watch the horrors
unfold of the 1930s.







And the second, my own, cohort was born at the outset of the
Second World War. I think, in that group, I may be the only one of them born in
Europe (France). The rest of them were born in the US. And we came of age
during the most acute crisis of the cohort. So I was either in university or
graduate school during the Berlin crisis, during the Cuba crisis, and certainly
had an interest first in the consequences of WWII and how something like this
could happen, and then living through the horrors of the Cold War, not knowing
if indeed one would live through
them. And that created a very strong incentive and focus for our group of
people. Now a surprising number of this second group did their graduate studies
at Yale: Janice Stein, I, Oren Young, Bruce Russet, Krasner, later all at Yale
with Karl Deutsch. The rest, Jervis, Keohane and Krasner at Harvard with Samuel
Huntington. I think you have the odd person who's born somewhere in between –
so, Ken Waltz (Theory Talk #40), for
instance, is younger. He must be a 1920 person, almost exactly in between these
two, just as Ernst Haas.







And I wouldn't be surprised now if there is another cohort
emerging, the people of around the age of Stefano Guzinni, Jens Bartelson,
Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44).
What ties this third cohort together is that they all watched the end of the
Cold War and are coping with its aftermath. So I believe that it's probably two
things: the external environment and the extent to which you're in an
intellectually nurturing institution. And of course for our cohort, it
certainly helped that there were jobs. That was not true of the earlier cohort.
Almost all of them, except E.H. Carr, ended up in the US as refugees. Did you
know Morgenthau started as an elevator boy in New York? Then he got a job
teaching part-time at Brooklyn College because someone fell ill. His wife
cleaned other people's apartments to supplement their income. Then he got a job
at the University of Kansas City, which was a hellhole, and finally Harold
Lasswell got called to Washington for some war work and got Chicago to hire
Morgenthau to replace him.











What is
the issue with the discipline today if, as you noted before, we fail to ask the
most interesting questions and instead focus on method?







Well, it of course depends on which side of the pond you
sit. On the American side of the pond, positivist or game-theoretical
behaviorist or rationalist modeling approaches dominate the literature; it's
just silly, from my perspective. It's based on assumptions which bear no
relationship to the real world. People like it because it's intellectually
elegant: they don't have to learn any languages, they don't have to read any
history, and they can pretend they're scientists discussing universals.
Intellectually, it's ridiculous. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Theory Talk #31) is a classic case in point. He's made a huge
reputation for himself with The War Trap (1981).
That book and the corresponding theory are based on a simple assumption,
namely, that there's a war trap compelling states into war, because initiators
win wars. But just look at the empirical record from 1945 to the present—initiators
lose between 80-90% of the wars they start. And that really depends on the
definition of victory. If you use the real definition, the Clausewitzian one,
you have to ask: do they achieve their political goals through violence? Then
the answer is, even fewer "victories". Well, let's cut them some slack, use a
more relaxed definition: did they beat the other side militarily? Initiators
still lose 78 or 82%—I forget exactly which percentage of their wars. And the
profession right now is so ignorant of history that nobody said 'Wait a
minute!' the day the book came out. Instead IR scholars all focus on this model
and fine-tuning it—it's ridiculous! And well, I don't want to go on with a
critique, but this is a serious problem, for it concerns a huge
misunderstanding regarding one of the most important problems out there.







But what happens now is this kind of thinking metastasizes
throughout the discipline because what students in International Relations or
Political Science more generally are taught are calculus, statistics—and I'm
not against this, one should learn them; I use them myself when I wear my
psychologist hat and do quantitative research and statistical analysis—but they
don't learn languages, they don't learn history, they don't learn philosophy.
They are so narrow! Much of this of course has to do with the reward structure
in the United States. It's clear that the statistical scientists are at the top
of the hill. So, economists transform themselves into scientists; but the
social scientists copy them because there are clear institutional rewards. If
you look at our salaries in comparison to the salaries of anthropologists,
historians—then if you sit at the edge of your chair and look over the abyss
you might see the humanists down there in terms of what they get. So very
clearly, there are strong institutional rewards. Once the positivist crowd got
a lock on various foundations and journals, if you want a job, if you want to
rise up through the profession, students tell me you have to do this stuff. IR
graduate students are bricklayers that get turned out of these universities.
That's the tragedy! It's no longer a serious intellectual enterprise. It's not
connected to anything terribly meaningful.







And mind you, I must say, while on the other, European, side
of the pond there is more diversity (one of the reasons I feel more comfortable
here), at the same time there is a strong tendency to go for a certain
heavy-handed brand of post-modernism. If you don't start an article with a
genuflection to Foucault or De Saussure or Derrida, you don't get published.
And by not looking beyond these 20th century thinkers, people in
Europe are often given credit for inventing things which were common knowledge
for hundreds and hundreds of years. Utterly ridiculous. But in between, there
are of course people who are trying to make sense of the world, including many
people in the positivist tradition who are doing good quantitative research and
trying to address serious problems in the world. The difficulty is that these
two extremes are often people who approach IR as a religion and they think that
their way of doing research is the only way
and they have no respect for others. And that's a kind of arrogance to which,
to me, is a violation of what the university is all about.







Ultimately, what is good theory? One approach would be to
say that a good theory is one that appears to order a domain in a way that is
conceptually rigorous - to the extent that that's even possible - that is
original and that raises a series of interesting questions which haven't been
asked before, but which are amenable to empirical research and finally it
should have normative implications. This is what Hans Morgenthau meant when he
said that the purpose of IR theory is not to justify what policymakers did, but
to educate them to act in ways that would lead to a better and more peaceful
world. And that, I think, is the ultimate goal of IR theory that we should not
lose sight of.











You
indicated that Isaiah Berlin was on your dissertation committee. He famously
tries to explain Tolstoy's philosophy of history (in War and Peace) through the parable of the hedgehog and the fox. If
theorists constraining themselves to one drive underpinning policy choices
would be hedgehogs, how would you see yourself? A fox or a hedgehog?







I am clearly a fox! I do different things. Whether I do them
well is debatable. But I certainly think that I'm a man of many tricks. Of
course the distinction also implies not believing in an overarching truth, and
indeed, I try hard not to think about truth because I don't think you can get
very far when you do. Epistemologically and eclectically, I'm a great believer
that we can never really establish a cause, truth, and knowledge. One of the
great problems here goes back to Plato who was shocked that craftsmen equated
technical ability to produce things with knowledge—Sofia, which is wisdom. And
today you have the problem one step up, so another category of knowledge for
the Greeks was episteme. Aristotle
would describe it as 'conceptual knowledge' or that which might even be
represented mathematically. And the people who would be 'expert' in episteme
think they have sofia and their claim
to being a hedgehog is the same kind of conceit, a form of hubris. Berlin's
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is a very useful and nice concept to
play around with.







Yet it's a bit much to reduce Tolstoy to that tension. You
could do it as a game but it doesn't do much justice because there is so much
else in Tolstoy. He's tilting against the French historians of the 19th
century who have erected Napoleon into this strategic genius. And he does a
very convincing job of showing that what goes on on the battlefield has nothing
whatsoever to do with what Napoleon or anyone else who is wearing a general's
ebullience or theorists hat says. And also, and in this sense, one could see
him as the beginning of subaltern history of social science, he's telling the
story—admittedly about aristocrats, not commoners—but he's telling the story of
ordinary people on the battlefield, not the people making the decisions. So the
war is in a way a background to the lives of the people, focusing our attention
a very humanist way, on people. This, too, is revolutionary for his time.















Professor
Richard Ned Lebow Professor of International Political Theory at the Department
of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential
Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is also a Bye-Fellow of
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy and the
National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the
Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He has
authored and edited 28 books and nearly 200 peer reviewed articles.















Related
links








Read the
first chapter of Lebow's The Tragic
Vision of Politics (2003) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow & Kelly's Thucydides and
Hegemony: Athens and the United States (Review of International Studies
2001), here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's Deterrence and Reassurance:
Lessons from the Cold War (Global Dialogue 2001) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Long Peace, the End of the
Cold War, and the Failure of Realism (International Organization, 1994)
here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading
the Lessons Correctly (Political Science Quarterly 1983) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)

1 - Teoría del valor y Justicia DistributivaEl conflicto entre libertad e igualdad posee en el liberalismo igualitario un obvio lugar central. Podemos intentar una síntesis sobre la importancia de ese lugar: busca evitar que las sociedades igualitaristas mantengan la autonomía individual y busca evitar que las sociedades individualistas eliminen o debiliten las igualdades. Otra manera de definirlo sería: el liberalismo igualitario ha buscado generar condiciones para la igualdad en aquellas sociedades donde la libertad se ha consolidado y, por otro lado, busca generar condiciones para la libertad en aquellas sociedades donde la igualdad ha primado.Ronald Dworkin ha profundizado y radicalizado la noción rawlsiana de justicia como equidad introduciendo un mecanismo de subasta y de seguros, buscando no sólo generar condiciones de partida igualitarias sino contribuir a generar condiciones de igualdad en el punto de llegada. La búsqueda de conciliación entre libertad e igualdad ha supuesto para Dworkin la búsqueda de un pensamiento filosófico práctico. Es decir, la filosofía política contemporánea tiene en las democracias liberales occidentales la posibilidad de pensar mecanismos que moderen o maniaten la tensión entre libertad e igualdad. Paso seguido, una tarea para el filósofo político contemporáneo ha sido idear maneras en que la búsqueda de libertad potencie o, al menos, no maniate a la igualdad y la búsqueda de la igualdad potencie o, al menos, no maniate la libertad.Esta aspiración práctica de la filosofía política contemporánea supone aceptar un grado de relativismo. Es decir, la filosofía práctica es relativa al grado de desarrollo de la libertad e igualdad. Es por eso que la filosofía post rawlsiana es erróneamente interpretada como una filosofía donde se privilegia la igualdad (es decir, la búsqueda de justicia como equidad) cuando, en cambio, ha sido una filosofía que ha buscado justificar grados mínimos de igualdad dado que es una tradición de pensamiento que floreció en sociedades donde ya se habían alcanzado (incluso superado) grados mínimos de libertad.En este sentido, para la filosofía política contemporánea post rawlsiana igualdad y libertad son concepciones políticas que se complementan. Es decir, son nociones que no pueden entenderse (o empobrecen su sentido) sin el otro. Pueden pensarse como compartimentos estancos. Esta intuición filosófica ha tenido en el principio de diferencia rawlsiano su expresión más sofisticada o, al menos, más influyente.Paso seguido, ¿es posible elaborar una teoría de justicia distributiva sin primero desarrollar o concebir, explícita o implícitamente, una teoría del valor, es decir, una teoría que justifique por qué aquello que pretendemos redistribuir tiene el valor que le atribuimos en ese proceso distributivo?Aquí, nuestro argumento intentará desarrollar dos partes principales: por un lado, nos preguntaremos si las teorías distributivas de justicia contemporáneas no poseen, aunque sea tácitamente, una teoría del valor. En segundo lugar, nos preguntaremos si una teoría distributiva de justicia podría no tener una teoría del valor que anteceda (tácita o explícitamente) a la justificación filosófica sobre qué distribución de bienes y talentos es justa.En esta cuestión relevante, nuestro punto de partida no será Rawls (1971) sino Ronald Dworkin en "What is Equality? Equality of Resources" (Dworkin: 1981). Dworkin realiza (sin saberlo) una explícita síntesis de los problemas de los modernos debates sobre justicia distributiva en relación a qué es aquello que se distribuye. Dworkin plantea el problema y pretende resolverlo mediante la redefinición de aquello que se distribuye con un nombre: "Clamshell". Es decir, en tanto modifica el nombre del problema (básicamente, cómo llamar a la unidad de cuenta o medio de pago), Dworkin asume que el problema desaparece: "So the divider needs a device that will attack two distinct foci of arbitrariness and possible unfairness. The envy test cannot be satisfied by any simple mechanical division of resources. If any more complex division can be found that will satisfy it, many such might be found, so that the choice amongst these would be arbitrary. The same solution will by now have occurred to all readers. The divider needs some form of auction or other market procedure in order to respond to these problems. I shall describe a reasonably straightforward procedure that would seem acceptable if it could be made to work, though as I shall describe it it will be impossibly expensive of time. Suppose the divider hands each of the immigrants an equal and large number of clamshells, which are sufficiently numerous and in themselves valued by no one, to use as counters in a market of the following sort. Each distinct item on the island (not including the immigrants themselves) is listed as a lot to be sold, unless someone notifies the auctioneer (as the divider has now become) of his or her desire to bid for some part of an item, including part, for example, of some piece of land, in which case that part becomes itself a distinct lot." (Dworkin 1981: página 286)Como mencionamos, la justicia distributiva asume, primero, que existe una distribución de bienes y, segundo, que esa distribución es injusta en tanto es desigual por lo que, tercero, debe ser modificada. La justicia distributiva busca igualar aquello que es injustamente desigual. Es claro que para sostener que es necesario redistribuir lo existente, dado que aquello que existe está desigualmente distribuido (definición que asume que lo justo es una distribución igualitaria, es decir, la justicia como equidad), se parte de una definición o medida, tácita o explícita, del valor de las cosas existentes que son pasibles de distribución. Este es un punto principal del argumento: si Rawls, Dworkin y las teorías posteriores asumen que es necesario redistribuir aquello que existe porque está desigualmente distribuido y, paso seguido, definen la "justicia como equidad" ("Justice as Fairness"), están asumiendo explícitamente que saben cuánto valen las cosas existentes y que, por ende, tienen una manera de medirlo.Paso seguido, la discusión relevante dejaría de ser si los contemporáneos debates sobre justicia distributiva necesitan una teoría del valor previa y debiese pasar a ser exponer y justificar cuál es esa teoría del valor. A poco de comparar las definiciones de la justicia como equidad es posible ver que existe en los distintos exponentes un consenso sobre por qué las cosas valen: las cosas valen por el trabajo que tienen en ella. Eso supone una teoría objetiva del valor o teoría del valor trabajo.Reincorporemos ahora a la discusión el papel del tiempo y la escasez. Dado que un problema central de la idea de contrato social es la ausencia de tiempo, la introducción de la opción de salida es analíticamente relevante porque incorpora la dimensión temporal.La aparición del tiempo presupone un problema grave para las teorías de justicia distributivas en tanto problematiza el sentido de la arbitraria distribución de talentos (aquello que Nozick personificara con el célebre jugador de básquet Wilt Chamberlain (Nozick: 1974)). Podemos recurrir a otro deporte y pensar la situación por el absurdo: hay dos señores, A y B, que viven en el país 1 (EE.UU.) y hay otros dos señores, C y D, que viven en el país 2 (por ejemplo, Brasil). A y C son dos grandes jugadores de Beisbol y B y D son dos grandes jugadores de fútbol. Más aún, A y C tienen un talento idéntico para jugar beisbol y B y D tienen un talento idéntico para jugar fútbol. Sin embargo, A tiene un enorme talento para jugar beisbol en EE.UU. y deviene millonario y D tiene un enorme talento para jugar futbol en Brasil y deviene millonario, mientras que B y C son pobres y anónimos. ¿Cómo se soluciona el problema de la injusta distribución de talentos? Para Dworkin, imponiéndole un impuesto a los millonarios A y D. En cambio, para una versión liberal que difiere del contractualismo estático, dejando que B viaje (es decir, ejerza la opción de salida) a Brasil y que C ejerza la opción hacia EE.UU.Es claro que esta segunda alternativa es más eficiente que la primera pero, más aún, podemos conjeturar que es más eficiente porque también es más justa. ¿Por qué es más justa? Porque asume (tácitamente) una mejor comprensión de la formación del valor en los asuntos humanos y, consecuentemente, introduce (tácitamente) una mejor definición de justicia o de aquello que es justo. ¿Por qué? Porque en lugar de asumir un punto T (el contrato social o posición original con su velo de ignorancia) asume un momento T compuesto por sucesivos Ts, antes y después de un momento inicial donde se firme, simbólicamente o no, el contrato social.Siguiendo a Dworkin, vemos que es necesario marcar la distinción entre igualdad de recursos e igualdad de talentos. Utilizando el ejemplo clásico de Wilt Chamberlain, podemos desagregar el problema a través de una argumentación histórico-analítica. La injusta distribución de talentos, ejemplificado en cómo una persona posee atributos para jugar al básquet (o beisbol) y otro posee atributos para jugar al fútbol, nos introduce en la parte central del argumento: si partimos de T-1, es decir, de aquél momento anterior a la aparición del básquet (o beisbol) como virtud, podemos demostrar que el básquet-beisbol como virtud y el fútbol como ausencia de virtud son creaciones humanas. Paso seguido, la justicia como equidad en la distribución de talentos cae en un sinsentido analítico-histórico.Podemos desarrollar el argumento de la siguiente manera: la elección del básquet como virtud ha sido realizada por la sucesión de personas que encumbraron a una de ellas (en el ejemplo de Nozick, Wilt Chamberlain) con atributos distintos a otro(s). La elección del básquet-beisbol como virtud por sobre el fútbol como ausencia de virtud nada tuvo que ver con las habilidades naturales de uno y otro. Así, un error analítico relevante en Dworkin es atribuir una injusta distribución de talentos naturales a aquello que es una distribución distinta que, espontáneamente, devino en la predilección en una determinada sociedad (en nuestro ejemplo, EE.UU.) del básquet-beisbol por sobre el fútbol.Paso seguido, podemos marcar que en T-1 las personas involucradas en la espontánea decisión acerca de preferir básquet sobre fútbol no tenían manera ni derecho de definir o sugerir una futura compensación para aquellos desafortunados que nacerían, décadas o siglos después, con habilidades para jugar fútbol en un lugar (país o economía) con preferencias por el básquet-beisbol. Por ende, si es claro que en T-1 comienza el proceso que llevará a esa sociedad a preferir básquet-beisbol por sobre fútbol pero, paralelamente, comprendemos que esas personas no tienen manera de entender que en el futuro habrá algo llamado básquet (o beisbol) que será preferido por sobre algo llamado fútbol, luego, se sigue que la búsqueda de una justicia distributiva que compense a los que nacerán sin "talentos naturales" deviene sin sentido.Comprender que las personas son anteriores al básquet o beisbol como virtud (es decir, que puede haber personas sin existir el básquet pero no puede haber básquet sin primero existir personas) expone dos cuestiones: por un lado, no es posible ex ante definir una distribución justa para los "untalented" ya que en T-1 nadie tiene manera de saber qué será percibido como "talento natural" y qué será percibido como ausencia de "talento natural". En segundo lugar, el derrotero analítico histórico refleja que, si es que en algún momento es posible hablar rigurosamente sobre justicia distributiva, ese momento analítico deberá incorporar el tiempo como variable necesaria para la medición del valor o valores que serán hipotéticamente distribuidos. No hay valor por fuera del tiempo, es decir, de los distintos momentos que van (en nuestro ejemplo) de la persona, la interacción de las personas, el básquet como virtud y el fútbol como ausencia de virtud. Si es que hay tal cosa como justicia como equidad, el tiempo es condición necesaria no suficiente.2-Algunas consideraciones parcialesEste trabajo ha introducido conceptos que deberán ser precisados y desarrollados: 1) la justicia distributiva asume una teoría del valor pero 2) no la explícita; 3) toda teoría de justicia distributiva debe poseer una teoría del valor, es decir, una definición de por qué las cosas valen ya que, sin ella, no será posible sostener que A y B han alcanzado un (justo) estado de igualdad ya que poseen la misma cantidad de bienes. Esto se encuentra ligado a una confusión central de la Filosofía Política Contemporánea: 4) la propiedad es posterior a la aparición de los hombres. Por ende, es erróneo focalizar (a la Locke) las discusiones sobre la legitimidad de la apropiación en aquello que existe en el mundo exterior. En realidad, 5) el origen de la propiedad es posterior a la acción humana y, por ende, la principal discusión analítica no debiese estar relacionada a una ética de la apropiación del mundo exterior.Por su parte, 6) la opción de salida constituye la principal condición de un contrato social con 7) una premisa moral: la persona debe actuar como si el otro estuviera en lo cierto y uno equivocado. Por su parte, el ejercicio de la opción de salida como condición política principal contribuye a establecer un contrato social dinámico, donde esa opción de salida supone la posibilidad de denunciar el contrato del cual uno es parte.La aparición de "A Theory of Justice" en 1971 ha posibilitado una nueva discusión sobre la validez del contrato social como concepto ético y político explicativo. Hasta "A Theory of Justice", la idea del contrato había quedado debilitada por la rigurosa y sistemática crítica de la larga tradición liberal anti-contractualista que va desde Hume hasta Hayek. Al reincorporar la tradición del contrato en un lugar central del debate, las modernas teorías de justicia nos han dado la posibilidad de repensar sus problemas y limitaciones. Principalmente, la construcción rawlsiana nos ha dado la oportunidad de repensar el contrato incorporando el sofisticado análisis que ha supuesto el velo de ignorancia en la posición original.La opción de salida no sólo contribuye a la construcción analítica de un contrato social dinámico, más aún, la posibilidad de construir un contrato social en sucesivos momentos contribuye a consolidar la idea de información incompleta y, consiguientemente, genera un argumento para que en T2 (un segundo momento contractual) las partes comprendan que las reglas de juego que emanen de allí deben asumir la imposibilidad de aprehender todas las hipotéticas interacciones humanas. Así, en el momento T2 es cuando se articula parte principal del contrato y es allí donde se consolida una idea central: hay un ámbito X donde el contrato sanciona determinadas normas pero fundamentalmente hay otro ámbito Z donde es imposible prever los alcances de la acción humana y, consecuentemente, se sancionan normas restrictivas que comprenden esa imposibilidad. Paso seguido, la comprensión de las partes sobre la imposibilidad política y moral de legislar sobre un amplio espacio es producto de la pre existencia de un contrato social dinámico, conceptualmente relacionado al ejercicio en To de la opción de salida como mecanismo social primario o básico.Como mencionamos, podemos marcar 3 conceptos principales: 1) el contrato no centraliza el acuerdo sino, en cambio, institucionaliza la opción de salida, pudiéndose definir ésta como "la persona política actúa como si el otro estuviera en lo cierto y ella equivocada"; 2) el ejercicio de salida como opción política posibilita la construcción de diversas polis con diversos modus vivendi; 3) el ejercicio de salida como opción política permanente constituye al contrato como mecanismo dinámico. Así, la idea de contrato no es fundacional porque deviene un elemento dinámico. Esto contribuye a una idea más realista del papel de un contrato en los asuntos humanos.Es decir, lo fundacional es la posibilidad de convivencia a partir de legitimar la salida como opción política y ética. A diferencia del contrato clásico, que ve el fin del estado de naturaleza como un punto de inflexión que, mágicamente, acaba con la guerra de todos contra todos y encuentra la paz, el contrato dinámico genera un incipiente ámbito (y en esto es un punto de inflexión) donde las personas acuerdan que el otro tiene la legítima opción de ejercer la salida. Esta forma de pensar el contrato social tiene dos inmediatos puntos a favor: por un lado es más modesto y por ende más realista sobre la naturaleza humana. En segundo lugar, incorpora la dimensión temporal. Esto significa que el contrato puede modificarse paulatinamente sin necesidad de recurrir a un nuevo punto de inflexión neo revolucionario.BibliografíaDworkin, Ronald: "What is Equality? Equality of Resources, Part 2", Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol 2, 1981: 385-445.Hirschman, Albert (1970): "Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses in the decline of firms, Organizations and States", Harvard University Press.Nozick, Robert (1974): "Anarchy, State and Utopia", New York: basic Books.Rawls, John (1971): "A Theory of Justice", Harvard University Press.Rawls, John: "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, 1985: 223-251.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract" (disponible en internet: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/)*Este artículo fue presentado en la 2° sesión del Seminario Interno de Discusión Teórica 2014, organizado por el Departamento de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad ORT Uruguay.Pedro Isern es profesor del Depto. Estudios Internacionales, FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.Master en Filosofía Política, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Something has changed in watching post-apocalyptic films in recent years. It is hard to pinpoint exactly when, and what exactly the cause might be, but at some point in the last few years the post-apocalypse has gone from an escapist fantasy to a figure of dread. The increasing rate of global warming leading to fires, droughts, and hurricanes; the ongoing Covid pandemic; and the rise of right wing nationalism has transformed the apocalypse from a subgenre of science fiction to a barometer of fears and anxieties. As Robert Tally argues the sense of the future has changed dramatically over the last decade: utopia has been replaced by dystopia in contemporary fiction and film and post-apocalypse has replaced predictions of a miraculous world of tomorrow. This is another way of addressing Fredric Jameson's old adage that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. To which we could add that this imagination is no longer an idle speculation about the future, but immediately lived, as apocalypse seems to inch closer, moving from the distant horizon to the lived present. Perhaps no film illustrates this more than Leave the World Behind a film less about the apocalypse as a distant event than the increasing permutation of apocalyptic fears and anxieties in daily life. Leave the World Behind is a film directed by Sam Esmail that was released on Netflix in December of 2023. It is based on the novel of the same name by Rumaan Alam published in 2020. The film begins when Amanda Sanford (Julia Roberts) makes an impromptu decision to rent a house on Long Island and escape the New York City with her husband Clay (Ethan Hawke) and two children, Archie and Rose. Her decision is predicated as much on a general misanthropy, as Amanda states, "I fucking hate people," as it is on the specifics of their current work and financial situation. Their vacation is an attempt to get away from not just the city, but people altogether. The home they rent is miles from any neighbor or any contact with the world. Over the course of the film isolation goes from being the dream to the nightmare. As the family settles in their rental home they immediately lose WIFI, cable, and cellular phone service, cutting them off from the outside world more than they wanted. Later, when they travel to the beach, an oil tanker runs aground, smashing into the beach. These events do not immediately disrupt their vacation, they endure the first with frustration and watch the second with curiousity, snapping photographs. This changes when late in the night there is a knock at the door, Clay and Amanda open the door to find G.H. Scott (Mahershala Ali) and his daughter Ruth (Myha'la). G.H. introduces himself the owner of the house that they are renting. He explains that they were attending a symphony in New York City when the power went out. They decided to escape to go to their vacation house on Long Island rather than return to their apartment in the city. The very same house that the Sandfords are renting. This leads to an awkward encounter, as owner confronts renter each claiming a right to the house. Because they have only interacted via email, and the entire arrangement of renting the house is through a third party platform, neither group knows or recognizes the other. As G.H., or George, as he prefers to be called, puts it, had they spoken on the phone they would have at least recognized the sound of his voice. Because their relation is mediated through apps and interfaces (Airbnb is implied but never mentioned) they do not know or trust each other even though one party has already exchanged thousands of dollars and the other has let them into their house. The mediation of their relations through technology, house renting apps and email, means that they do not have the base level of trust that could be established through commerce, a fact that is all the more ironic given the intimacy of their mediated relationship, they are sharing the same house. Amanda is initially incredibly distrustful of the Scotts, fearing that they might be trying to run some sort of scam, or worse yet, could be potential child molesters. That George and Ruth are black and Amanda and Clay are white only exasperates the issue. Amanda is for the most part polite enough to mention the issue, but it is implied in her suspicion of George even after he produces a key to the house's liquor cabinet. The distrust in some sense is mutual, later we hear Ruth chastise her father for so readily trusting "white people." The fact that this film is in part produced by Barack and Michelle Obama have led some online to see it as a film fomenting racial division and distrust. This is in part predicated on the longstanding belief on the right that it is mentioning race as a factor of social life that produces racism. However, in the film race is only itself one variant of the general breakdown of social relations. The racial divisions are only a sharper version of what keeps everyone seeking to escape the city and get away from everyone. As the two families bunker down together the events outside of the home get even more strange. All of the events gesture towards a different aspect of a potential apocalypse: the entire communication technology from television to satellite phones seems to collapse; planes drop from the sky and slam into the beach; a drone flies overheard distributing pamphlets that seem to say "Death to America" in Arabic; deer congregate in large numbers in the yard and flamingos arrive in the pool, suggesting that the natural world too is out of balance; a loud sound tears through house, smashing windows; self-driving Teslas smash into each other and pile up on the freeway; and the son, Archie becomes allegedly from a tick bite. Even his sickness takes on strange symptoms, most dramatically a loss of all of his teeth. The logic of the film is more akin to reading the daily paper or following a newsfeed in which there is less an apocalypse than the uneven development of multiple apocalyptic potentials. It is hard to see how these different events constitute one consistent narrative of an apocalypse; instead they seem to gesture towards the multiple possibilities for the world ending, political, technological, and ecological. With each of these events the gathered families discuss theories and speculate about the possible nature of the threat they are facing. It is less a film about a specific vision of social collapse than it is about the inchoate fears of such a collapse. Since the film focuses on the individuals in the house, individuals who are cut off from other social contact, not to mention any source of new or information, we only ever get a limited and partial image of what might be happening in the world beyond the house. What we are left with is just speculation based on very limited and partial information. Without spending too much time on the question of the book versus the movie, it is worth noting that the film never departs from the immediate present of the few days at the rental house. With the exception of the images of the Earth seen from space we never see anything that they do not see. The book which the film is based upon occasionally departs for a sentence or two, cutting forward to tell us that the neighbors die months later in a refugee camp outside of Los Angeles. The book then eventually confirms the reader's suspicions that we are seeing the beginning of a full on pandemic and social collapse. These passages appear in the final sections of the book, the reader eventually learns that they are reading about the beginning of a full on apocalypse in which regular life will never return. This is how the novel recounts Rose, Amanda and Clay's daughter's, visit to a neighbor's house: "She couldn't know, would never know, that the Thornes, the family who lived there, were at the airport in San Diego, unable to make arrangements since there were no flights operating domestically because of a nationwide emergency without precedent, as though precedent were required. The Thornes would never see this house again in their lives, though Nadine, the matriarch, would sometimes dream of it before she succumbed to cancer in one of the tent camps the army managed to erect outside the airport. They'd burn her body, before they stopped bothering with that, as the bodies outnumbered the people left to do the burning."The jump forward and to another context confirms what we have come to expect, that the world as we know it has come to an end. In the film the viewer never knows anything more than the characters, we do not know what will become of them or the world, even as the film gives us more spectacular images of crisis, such as an airplane crashing into the beach. A second major difference is that in the book, the Scott's appearance at the door of the house in the middle of the night happens before any real crisis has taken place. In the novel at this point the only thing that has gone wrong is that the internet does not work, which is hardly a major crisis. In the film the oil tanker runs aground on the first day of Amanda and Clay's family vacation. This not only increases the dread, it confirm the Scott's story that something is very amiss and they are right in seeking shelter. This makes Amanda's suspicion seem all the more anti-social or even racist. The film also proliferates the images of social collapse, adding the drone, and the pile up of self-driving and self-colliding cars on the freeway. There are other differences: Ruth in the book is George's wife not his daughter, and the film introduces Rose's obsession with the television show Friends, a point that will be returned to later. The major difference is how the book and the film utilize the strengths and limitations of their medium to depict the particular situation of dread and uncertainty. The book gives moments of a omniscient third person narrator in a viewpoint that lets us see the enormity of the crisis, letting the reader know what the characters do not, while the film presents more of a spectacle of the crisis, boats, planes, and cars crash and burn, while restricting our viewpoint to the limited knowledge of the central characters. In adapting the story form text to film we see more, we see carnage and explosions, and ultimately know less. The families are not initially in any immediate danger. They have food, water, shelter, even power despite the news of a blackout. The question of what to do is initially an abstract one. It is impossible to know if they should stay in the house or return home. It is hard to know what to do without knowing what is going on. Our daily lives and activities presuppose as their backdrop a world that is as predictable as it is taken for granted. We assume that the internet will work, that stores will be open, and that a house rented through a website will be ours and ours alone. The rationality or irrationality of our actions make sense against the background of a world, or the institutions and structures that shape and define our decisions. When that world becomes uncertain than one does not know how to act. Should one return home to the city, end the vacation, or stay in a place that is safe, stocked with food and has power. It is only Archie's sickness that drives them from the home in search of help. George suggests that they go see Danny, his handyman for help. Earlier Amanda saw Danny at the grocery store stocking up on water and canned goods. He is presented as someone who both knows how to do things, and maybe even knows what is going on. When George and Clay arrive at Danny's house he is less than happy to see them. He advises them to do as he has done, bunker down and protect his family. He admonishes George to do the same, and when George invokes the idea of a neighbor helping a neighbor, of Danny possibly providing medicine to help Archie, they have the following exchange: George, "C'mon now. It's me. We're Friends." Danny, "That's the old way, George. You're not thinking clearly." George, "Danny, What are you saying? You're telling this man not to take care of his son." Danny, "Nothing makes a whole lot of sense right now. When the world does not make any sense I can still do what is rational, which is protect my own." Danny presents himself as the person who has taken stock of the situation and adjusted to the reality of the new world. Although what he offers in terms of theories and explanations, including a reference to Havana Symptom and a Chinese or Russian attack on infrastructure, is not much better than the other speculations that George and Clay offer. His theories maybe more apocalyptic, more extreme in their consequences, but he is still speculating based on limited information. The one thing he does offer, however, is a decisive course of action, one he considers to be rational: protecting his own, protecting property. Friendship, neighbors, social obligations are dismissed as the "old way." The question remains, however, as to what extent this is a new ethos, a new way of living. While the shotgun might be new, "protect my own" has been the dominant mentality, and dominant idea of rationality of everyone in the film so far. From Amanda's vacation plan which begins with the realization "I fucking hate people" to George and Ruth's attempt to go back to their home, everyone is striving to protect their own. Danny's survivalist rhetoric is nothing other than a continuation of the logic of contemporary capitalist society by other means. George and Clay's confrontation with George is intercut with another confrontation; while searching for Rose Ruth and Amanda are confronted by a large, and surprisingly aggressive herd of deer. The deer are intimidating, even menacing, until Rose and Amanda drop their hostility towards each other to aggressively yell back. These two different scenes, one of the theme of man versus man the other as woman versus nature, also define two different ideas of what it means to be rational, everyone for themselves or join together in some act of solidarity. All of which raises the question of the film's title, Leave the World Behind. The phrase is first mentioned as part of the advertising copy for the rental home. It promises an escape from the world. As the film progresses, however, this phrase becomes the central question of the post-apocalyptic culture. At what point should one recognize that normal is not coming back, leave the old world behind, and begin to adapt to a new one. This is one way to make sense of the film's enigmatic, and for some viewers, frustrating ending. Throughout the film, the girl Rose is obsessed with the show Friends. She is watching the show on an ipad as they drive to the rental house. When the internet breaks down she is frustrated in her attempt to watch the final episode, to find closure. It is remarked upon that Rose is obsessed with a show that took place and was filmed before she was born. As Ruth comments on Rose's interest in Friends, "But it's almost... Nostalgic for a time that never existed, you know?" in the final scene of the film Rose ventures to the neighbor's empty house. There she finds their empty survival bunker, a bunker that is stocked with food, water, a greenhouse, and most importantly for Rose, a shelf of DVDs. She finds a boxed set of Friends episodes and finally gets to watch the final episode. Rose gets closure for her particular quest and her closure ends the film. The last image is her face as the familiar theme song begins. It is a fundamentally ambiguous ending. We could interpret this viewing of a final episode as an act of closure of leaving the world of screens and pop culture pleasures behind, preparing for a new world from a new survival bunker. Or we could interpret it in the opposite manner, seeing it as a retreat into precisely the kind of escapist entertainment that have made us all unaware of the mounting dangers, ecological, economic, and political that threaten our world of family vacations and unlimited screen time. It cannot be overlooked that this particular act of closure has to do with not only watching television, but watching a television show that is nostalgia for a world before Airbnb rentals and even before the dissemination of screens, before an acceleration of the isolation of capitalist society. The show's popularity with the generations that have grown up since it aired have as much to do with this nostalgia as they do with its ubiquity on streaming platforms. The object of this nostalgia is perhaps friendship itself. As Ruth says earlier in the film, "But as awful as people might be... nothing's gonna change the fact that we are all we've got." Leaving the world behind is perhaps less a matter of defending one's own than it is recognizing that it is precisely such a logic that destroyed it in the first place. Leaving the world behind is not a matter of giving up all connections to defend one's own, but of finding new forms of solidarity, new connections.

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Solt, 2nd Floor Spangler Building, dfhe fashionable dfailc: Satisfaction Suaranteed. Prices to Suit (h? Tine:. I Webster's Send a Postal for Specimen Pages, etc. International Successor of the " Unabridged." Dictionary; c THE BEST FOR TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS BECAUSE IN THIS DICTIONARY It is easy to find the word wanted. It is easy to ascertain the pronunciation. It is easy to learn what a word means. It is easy to trace the growth of a word. o _ Sic:—elarrcl of the TJ. S. Supremo Court, of all the State Supreme Courts, of the (■) u. U. Government Printing Ofiice, and of nearly all tho Schoolbooks. Warmly com- I "otl by Stato Superintendents of Schools and other Educators almost without number. 'The Pennsylvania School Journal says:—The Internationa] Webster is a tTCCCuro Itouse of universal knowledge to which all the world, in all its ages, has made ccatri) , and any ono of us may nave it at his elbow. Of itj half hundred bpeoial-cf value and importance, the most attractive to uo i.i itj otymolopy, an un-failin :. i iiirce of interest and enjoyment, ofteu of surpriseand wonder.—OCTOM'EI:, 18%. G. & C. HEKRIA9I CO., Publishers. Springfield, Mass. The College Metcufy. fOL. V. GETTYSBURG, PA., JULY, 1897. No. THE COLLEGE MEfiCUfiY', blished each month during the college year by the Students of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. ■ SMITH, 'g8. : E. FLECK '98. : W. WOODS, '9! STAFF. Editor: E. L. ,KOLLER, '98. Associate Editors : J. H. MEYER, '99. J. H. BEERITS, '99. H, C'. ROEHNER, '99. R. D. CLARE, 1900. Alumni Association Editor: REV. D. FRANK GARLAND, A. M., Taneytown, Md. Business Manager: J. W. WEETER, '99. Assistant Business Manager: j. A. MCALLISTER, '98. T f One volume (tell months), . . . $1.00 1 ERMS ■ j Single copies, . . ' . . 15 Payable in advance .11 students are requested to hand us matter for publication, he Alumni and ex-members of the College will favor us by sending information concerning their whereabouts or any items they may think would be interesting for publication. All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the Business Manager. Matter intended for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address, THE COLLEGE MERCURY, Gettysburg, Pa CONTENTS. COMMENCEMENT WEEK, - 79 BACCALAUREATE SERMON, - - 79 ADDRESS TO Y. M. C. A , 80 CONCERT BY THE MUSICAL CLUBS, 80 JUNIOR ORATORICAL CONTEST, 81 CLASS DAY EXERCISES, 8r CLASS AND FRATERNITY BANQUETS, - - - - 82 COMMENCEMENT ORATIONS, 84 GRADUATES AND HOME ADDRESSES, - - 85 DEGREES CONFERRED, 8? CLASS POEM, '97, --■-• --- .*.* g- UGHTH ANNUAL TENNIS TOURNAMENT, - - - - gg A RESUME OF ATHLETIC MATTERS, - - . 86 COLLEGE LOCALS, . 87 MOVEMENTS OF OUR ALUMNI IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, - SS AMERICA'S NOBLE SON, - " STATE POLITICS IN PENNSYLVANIA. - - - - - 9o COWIWIENCEIVIENT WEEK. SUNDAY, MAY 30 TO FRIDAY, JUNE 4. Commencement is over. The class of '97 have been graduated and have gone. The ex-ercises of the past week have been of the most enjoyable nature, and everything has been done without a flaw—truly a grand success. For the greater part of the week we were fort-unate in having the most perfect days for our Commencement, especially Wednesday, and. this added in no small degree to the magnifi-cent success of the whole occasion. The Senior class who have just been gradu-ated, will indeed be missed from the ranks of old Gettysburg. Their successes in literary matters and in athletics have raised them to such a position in the estimation of all the un-dergraduates that we feel as if the vacancies occasioned in all departments of college ac-tivity by their departure will indeed be hard to fill. While we do not believe in all this talk about "fighting the battle of life," etc., yet the MERCURY hopes that each and every member of the class of '97 will attain the best of success in whatever they undertake. The order of exercises during the week will be followed in the recounting, just as they oc-curred, and the most important events will be given. BACCALAUREATE SERMON. COLLEGE CHURCH, SUNDAY, IO.30 A. M. The Commencement exercises of the Col-lege and Seminary opened in Christ Lutheran church, Sunday morning. The Baccalaureate sermon was delivered by Rev. M. Valentine, D. D. LL,. D., President of the Theological Seminary, to the graduating classes of both institutions. He based his remarks upon the 18th verse of the 4th chapter of the Second 8o THE COLLEGE MERCURY. Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen ; for the things which are seen are temporal ; but the things which are not seen are eternal." The theme of the discourse was based on the right relation of the things of life to per-manent good. Life has its rightful setting in the perspective of eternity. Every life is a failure which is not directed toward the invisi-ble things which endure. The discourse was a masterful one and no partial report could do it justice. Dr. Valentine, in all his many scholarly sermons from the College church pulpit seldom, if ever, surpassed the effort of Sunday, May 30th. ADDRESS"TOT. M. C. A. COLLEGE CHURCH, SUNDAY, 7.3O P. M. In the evening an earnest and forcible ad-dress was delivered to the Young Men's Chris-tian Association of the College, by Hon. W. N. Ashman, of Philadelphia. His discourse was founded on answers to certain objections to religion as raised by men of business and men of science. The speaker argued that the principles and truths of the Christian religion could be fully established when tried by the same tests as are applied in the determination of ordinary busi-ness propositions. The element of the supernatural in religion prevented the application of the rules and methods of scientific investigation where ma-terial facts and substances alone are dealt with. The scientific man is therefore unfair when he applies his methods to the examination of re-ligious questions. The large audience was highly edified with the Judge's clear, forcible, earnest and ex-haustive presentation of the subject. The music at the morning and evening serv-ices was an attractive feature of the session. It was furnished by the highly efficient choir of the church, assisted by Miss Leopold, in-structor of vocal music at Wilson College, who sang several beautiful solos with fine effect, Mr. Segrist, of Lebanon, playing the organ accompaniments. 1 » » CONCERT BT THE MUSICAL CLUBS. BRUA CHAPEL, TUESDAY, EIGHT P. M. The concert this year was a grand success in every way. The audience was without doubt the largest that has ever attended a concert by our musical clubs, and their ability to appre-ciate the selections of the clubs was shown by their judicious applauding, enthusiastic for the humorous songs, and appreciative for the more classic selections. The best selections render-ed were the opening ones of each part, "Schu-bert's Serenade," arranged by C. Kuntze, and "Lead Kindly Light," by Dudley Buck, al-though the humorous encores seemed to elicit the heartiest applause from the boys. Our glee club is to be congratulated upon its excel-lent taste in the selection and rendition of music that is undoubtedly far above that sung by the average glee club; and the college may well feel proud in having had a glee club of such pronounced ability during this year. Four of the eight have been graduated this commencement, Messrs. Ott, White, Arm-strong and Manges, and they will be greatly missed. Our hope is that the next year's class may have excellent material to fill the breach, The stage on Tuesday evening was very taste-fully decorated with potted plants, palms, with the class flower of '97, the daisy. The whole affair was one of beauty, both to the eye and ear. PROGRAMME. PART I. i. Schubert's Serenade, - - arr. C. Kuntze GLEE CLUB. 2. The Serenade, VIOLIN CLUB. 3. Recitation—The Swan Song, Miss GERTRUDE SIEBER, 4. Solo—The Old Grave Digger, • A. G. Henderson MR. MANGES. 5. The Phantom Band, - ' - - A. W. Thayer GLEE CLUB. 6. Violin Solo-Obertass, - - - H. Wieniawski MR. ERDMAN. THK COLLKGK MERCURY. ,r- Lead Kindly Light, Dudley Buck Selected Franz Abt GLEE CLUB. 2. Quartette—(Instrumental) VIOLIN CLUB. 3. Solo—Because I Love You Dear, Mr. NICHOLAS. 4. The Wandering Minstrel's Patrol, - Willis Clark GLEE CLUB. 5. Quartette—(vocal) Selected. Messrs. NICHOLAS, WHITE, KOLLEB and MANGES. . 6. Good Night, - Frank Thayer GLEE CLUB. ORGANIZATIONS. GLEE CLUB. 1st Tenors, C. M. Nicholas, '98 17. W. Ott, '97 1st Bass, E L. Roller, '98 C. T. Lark, '98 2nd Tenors. C. G. White, '97 E. A. Armstrong, 2nd Bass, Lewis C. Manges, '98 Harry Musselman. VIOLIN CLUB. H. B. Erdman, '96 C. T. Lark, '98 John M. Gates, '01 A. T. Smith, '00 ELOCUTIONIST, Miss Gertrude Sieber, '97 PIANIST, Geo. A. Englar, '97 JUNIOR ORATORICAL CONTEST. BRUA CHAPEL,, WEDNESDAY, IO A. M. The contest this year, by the six members f the class of '98, for the Recklig prize iu ora-tory, has been pronounced, by those who are competent judges of such matters, better than any for the past few years. There were but Ex contestants, three from each of the Liter-ary societies, but the number was large enough |o make the exercises interesting and not tire-me. The music for the intermissions was famished by the Harrisburg orchestra. The attendance was very large, and, with the ex-ception of the stir and bustle made by those coming and going, excellent order was ob-served throughout. It might be well to say, a word, to the coming Junior class, that they fcould do well to start early to make their preparations for next year's Junior Oratorical, and not only get their best men to compete, put also see that these men do their best. PROGRAM. MUSIC—' Gay Coney Island March"—M. Levi. PRAYER. MUSIC—"Anita" (Mexican Waltzes)—Barnard. The New Slavery, CHARLES E. FLECK* New Kingston Tragedies of the Present. CHARLES M. NICHOLAS,! Beerett, Md. MUSIC—A Kansas Two Step—Pryor. The Emancipation of Cuba, CHARLES B. KEPHART,* Taneytown, Md. True Nobility, ALBERTUS G. Fuss,t Williamsport, Md. MUSIC—Intermezzo (Cavalleria Rusticana)—Mascagni. America's Noble Son, IRA G. BRINER,* New Bloomfield The Present Social Discontent RALPH L. SMITH,! Pittsburg MUSIC—March, "The Girl of '99"—Zickel. BENEDICTION. *Phrenakosmian. fPhilomathsean. The judges, Dr. Weigle, of Mechanicsburg, Pa.; Rev. A. R. Steck, pastor of St. James Lutheran church, Gettysburg, and Rev. D. W. Woods, pastor of the Presbyterian church, Gettysburg, made their decision as follows : REDDIG PRIZE IN ORATORY. IBA G. BEINEB, New Bloomfield, Pa. WITH HONOEABLE MENTION OF CHAELES E. FLECK New Kingston, Pa. CHAELES M. NICHOLAS Beerett, Md. Mr. Briner's oration, "America's Noble Son," is published in the Literary Department of this issue. CLASS DAY EXERCISES. COLLEGE CAMPUS, WEDNESDAY, 2 P. M. To some, these exercises by the graduating class constitute the most enjoyable feature of the whole Commencement. And they really are a diversion from the somewhat heavy na-ture of the matter of Commencement week. It lias been the custom to hold the exercises on Tuesday evening of Commencement week, but the change to Wednesday afternoon, has certainly been to make it more convenient for everyone concerned. On the occasion of this year's Class Day exercises, everything seemed to join to make them successful in every way. The afternoon was the most pleasant that could have been desired—not too warm and a slight breeze through the branches above the speakers' platform and the audience made these out-door exercises a delightful affair. 82 THE COLLEGE MERCURY. The platform was decorated with the '97 class colors, nile green and pink, and with potted plants, and the class flower—the daisy. Benches and chairs were provided for the large crowd that was present and all were comfort-ably fixed. The music was furnished by the Commencement Orchestra. The Seniors, in cap and gown, were all seated on the speakers' platform, and certainly made an imposing spectacle. In spite of the general strain of humor and roasting notice-able in all the speeches, there was nevertheless an under-current of sadness at parting, deep down beneath this gay exterior of mirth. Many of the parts were excellent, and we are sorry that space will not permit our pub-lishing several of the papers, for a very meagre idea of the character of them can be gotten from the program. PROGRAM. Muster 01' Ceremonies,.:.: :.: :::: BIKLK MUSIC. Class Roll ^!V.K-.::-.:::::y.v.w.v.-.-.v.-:.v.v. WHITE Ivy OMitIo&i:::'.v.»»i:»u:s'.u.'.u»usisn ENGLAR Ivy Poem,.; :.OTT MUSIC. . Ciass History,. '■■'■ • KAIN Class Poem FRIDAY-Our Absent Ones, BUTTON ■ MUSIC. The Loving Cup ERB Conferring of Degrees , MILLER Miintlc Qrationv, .'. LEISENKING Junior Response LABK MUSIC. Presentation of Gifts,. WOLF Prophecy WHEELER MUSIC. At "the close of the exercises, after the mo-tion for adjournment had been put and passed, the class yell was given. (LASS AND FRATERNITY BANQUETS. TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY & THURSDAY NIGHTS. This Commencement was made especially interesting by the several reunions of classes and fraternities, thus bringing back to the old walls those who have been away for many years. Three of the classes, '82, '87 and '93 held reunions, and two of the fraternities, the Alpha Tau Omega, and the Phi Delta Theta. The seniors, also, held their banquet, Thursday night. THE FIRST REUNION OP '93. TUESDAY NIGHT. [Written for the MERCURY by Rev. Diffenderfer, '93.] In reply to the call of the Secretary of the class, Rev. A. J. Rudisill, of New Bloomfield. twenty of the survivors of the class assembled at the Eagle Hotel, on Tuesday evening, June 1st. At 8 p. m., they attended the concerto: the musical clubs in Brua Chapel, in a body. There was a strong temptation to renew old-time customs and habits when some familiar faces entered. An occasional "guy" and out-burst of friendly joking, and a hearty applause for the clubs were the only features of interest. Immediately after the concert was over, the class gathered at the tower door of the chapel and gave their good old yell with a vim and ring, that made the dead spirits of former days arise and hover about them in eager expecta-tion for some old-time trick, or class-rush. At 10.00 p. m., all went to the dining hall of the Eagle Hotel to partake of the splendid "banquet" which "Mine host" Eberhart had prepared. The dining hall was beautifully decorated with plants and palms, and bloom-ing flowers. In the centre of the room, at tie head of the table, was placed a beautiful dis-play of colored electric lights, on a background of Class colors. The bill of fare was elabor-ately prepared, and served in the best style. Mr. Eberhart and his efficient corps of waiter-did all they could to make the banquet a grand success. Well, did we have any fun? There U Niels L. J. Gron, our Danish brother, with his sedate and dignified bearing; dreaming of some fair and beautiful form which had presented to his sight in some far off across the sea. "Niels" looks as genteel refined as ever, ready at a moment's noticett| say "maecanos el evis," etc. Then "Bisl Grimes' calm, sedate, peaceful countenance wondering why Prof. Himes didn't call 011M to recite, as it was his "turn up," and Frank' THE COLLEGE MERCURY. 83 Melanchton Bortner with his favorite ■Penn'a Dutch" brogue, saying to Dr. Martin, "I am sitting on the front row, and never of-fered any criticism, but made that noise.'' And I'Judge" Alleman, with his serious counte-lance and dignified demeanor, wondering 'What the deuce we can get up to start a racket." And "Bill" Vastine, the Catawissa iase ball magnate, singing his beautiful ('falsetto," to "The Old Oaken Bucket," and leclaring that either he or Prof. Nixon must |ake more physical exercise, or travel with a Dime Museum. Then think of "Sail" Tur-ber "kicking" about the bill of fare not pro-biding the extras, "Mumm's Dry," etc., rais-ing a row about everything in general, then laughing at the excitement he had caused. Ime old "Ajax," boisterous and demonstra-te Andrew Jackson Rudisill, who always vas the "noisiest" man about the Dormitory. Then all the others, Geesy, Kline, Hilton, 3aum, "Neudy," "Whiskers" Ehrhart, oh, they were all boys back to college again, and "Diff," the Proctor, as lenient as ever. A beautiful menu card had been engraved by E. A. Wright, the class cut on first page, ind menu in class colors next, toast and offi-cers following: Toast master, Hilton. "Our First Reunion,'' E. Gettier; "Our Alma Mater," G. M. Mffenderfer; "The Future Prospects of a Col-lege Widow," E. E. Parsons; "Daw: What it is, and What it Does," F. M. Bortner; "The Traveller in all Eands," N. L. J. Gron; "Gos-pel: What it is, and what it Does," M. J. nine; "Eife in a University," E. E. Seyfert; "The Blessings of a Bachelor," E. E. Neude-vitz; "High Eife at Washington," J. C. Bow-rs; "Fun we had in College," W. M. Vastine; "Pleasures of a Doctor's Eife," M. S. Boyer; "What '93 Did for Athletics," G. E- Hipsleyj 'Our Honored Dead," W. H. Ehrhart; "Our lost," A. J. Rudisill. In the "wee small" hours of the morning ye adjourned, after having passed a Resolu-tion to meet again in 1900, the same commit-tee to be continued. What a pleasure it was to meet again amid these old familiar scenes; even the town "kids" recognized us and shouted "there goes '93." Let us all endeavor to be present in 1900, if we live, and make it the occasion of our life, and aii epoch in the history of the College. REUNION OP '82. [Written for the MERCURY.] The reunion of '82 was held at the Eagle Hotel, on Wednesdaj' evening of Commence-ment week. The menu was excellent—such as the Eagle knows how to arrange—and all the old fellows who were back enjoyed this part immensely. The banquet was not marked by its lengthy addresses or "toasts," but there was a general good social time had, and the whole affair was very informal. Of course we all had to tell what happened since we met last, and this really constituted a greater pleasure than "toasts" would have af-forded. The proposal of a reunion at Phila-delphia in the near future was met with ap-plause. Of the twenty-three living members of the class, there were thirteen present at the banquet. . REUNION OF '87. [Written for the MERCURY by Rev. H. C. Allemau, '87.] The announced reunion of the class was abandoned because so few of the boys could be present at Commencement this year. Charles E. Stahle, Esq., invited the six faithful who made the pilgrimage to his home Wednesday evening, where an impromptu reunion was en-joyed. Those present were Parr, Crouse, Sny-der, Snively, Wolf and Alleman. After re-freshments the silver class-cup was presented to Harold F. Snyder, the first son of'87, born May 19, 1891. Regrets were read from Hol-zapfel, Coover, Croll, Brame, Fishburn, Fisher, McDermod, Dreibelbis and Bateman. "Non vi sed saepo cadendo" was again ex-tolled, and pledges made for social meetings every year and a reunion every decade. ALPHA TAU OMEtJA BANQUET. WEDNESDAY NIGHT. The Banquet was held at the Eagle Hotel at 11.30. Many of the Alumni of the Chapter ,84 THK COU,EGK MKRCURY. were present, making an attendance of twenty-three in all. The toasts were as follows : Franklin Menges, Ph. D., '86, Toast Mas-ter; Geo. M. Hosack, Esq., "TheFraternity;" L. DeWitt Gerhardt, Esq., '84, "Our Early Days;" Morris T. Brown, '92, "A. T. O. in Business;" F. M. Bortner, Esq., '93, "A. T. O. in the Professions;" Win. O. Nieklas, Esq., '94, "College Reminiscences of an A. T. O.;" W. H. Menges, '96, "The Spirit of Our Alumni;" C. B. Erb, '97, "Our Ladies;" J. A. McAllister, '98, "The Goat." PHI DELTA THETA BANQUET. WEDNESDAY NIGHT. The Hotel Gettysburg was the place of the banquet. The Ahunni of the Chapter helped to add to the spirit of the occasion by their presence. The toasts were as follows : Rev. H. H. Weber, Toast Master. "Why We are Here," Rev. L. S. Black, '88; "Our Position in the Fraternity World," J. S. Eng-lish, '94; Our Alumni Phi's," G. H. Eckels, '95; Our College Phi's," J. H. Beerits, '99; "A Phi's Start in Life," J. W. Ott, '97; "Our Bumper Billy," B. F. Carver, '00; "My New Guardians," Rev. M. J. Killian, Va. Alpha; "Phi Recollections," B. R. Lantz, '94; "Next Year's Chapter," J. C. Markle, '00. SENIOB CLASS BANQUET. THURSDAY NIGHT. A very fitting close to the existence of '97 at Gettysburg, was the Banquet held at the Hotel Gettysburg, on Thursday night. The intention was to have a final reunion of the class and its ex-members before the class leaves. Ten ex-members were invited to be present, some of whom responded. The Ban-quet was a purely informal affair, its object being, as expressed by one of the Seniors, to have "a good time;" and from all accounts they had it. There were twenty present, and little informal addresses were made by R. N. Stable, H. Sheely, and C. G. Smith, M. D., ex-members of'97, and by C. B. Erb, White Hutton and P. J. Shriver, of the graduating class. The menu was an excellent one, and from many sources and for many reasons, we know that everybody had "a good time." (OHMENCEM ENT ORATIONS. BY THE TEN MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING! CLASS, BRUA CHAPEL, THURSDAY, 9 A. M. Up to Thursday, the weather during Com-I mencement week was of the finest, but on the■ morning of Commencement day, it rainedl quite heavily for some time. However, the I audience that assembled in the Chapel to hear the orations, did not seem to be at all fright-ened by the unfavorable condition of the elej rnents and the Chapel was well filled. ORDER OF EXERCISES. MUSIC—March "Corps do Sards"—Oodfrej. PRAYER. MUSIC-Melody in F-Eu.binstein. Latin Salutatory GEORGE F ABEL, Philadelptil Chri-tian Socialism, ELKANAH M, DUCK, Spring Mill The Extiniof the Laborer'sGrievance, ARTHUR B. COBLE, Lyki«| MUSIC— "Pilgrim Chorus" (Tannhaonser)—Wagner. The Unification of Science GEORGE HAY KAIN, Vat| State Politics in Pennsylvania,.HORACE E. CLUTE, Harriskil The Chief Religious Problem of the Age, HENRY R. SMITH, Chamberslui|| MUSIC—March, "The American Girl"—Herbert, Physical Training for the Twentieth Century, CLIFTON G. WHITE, Manhtii| Greece and the European Concert, ROBBIN B. WOLF, Gettysbnil MUSIC—"Bolero" (Spanish Dance)—Moszkowsky. Sixty Years of Queen Victoria, A. GERTRUDE SIEBER, Gettysbin| The Curtitls for To day, with Valedictory, HENRY WOLF BIKLE, Gettysteq| MUSIC -"Im Tiefen Keller" Fantasie—Lovenberg. CONFERRING OF DEGREES BY THE PRESIDENT. MUSIC-March, "Old Club "—Schremser. BENEDICTION. HONORS AND PRIZES. FIRST HONOR. HENRY WOLF BIKLE Gettysburg. GEORGE F. ABEL Philadelphia. ELKANAH M. DUCK Spring Mills. SECOND HONOR. HORACE E. CLUTE, Harrisburg. G. HAY KAIN York. ANNA G. SIEBER, (two years) Gettysburg GR/EFF PRIZE, FOR BEST E9SAV ON 7HE RELIGIOUS FAITH OF ROBERT BURNS. AS SHOWN IN HIS PO*' GEORGE F. ABEL Philadelphia. | WITH HONORABLE MENTION OP HENRY WOLF BIKLE Gettysburg. THE COEEEGE MERCURY. 85 HASSLER GOLD MEDAL, JUNIOR LATIN PRIZE. B>MUND W. MEISENHELDER York. WITH HONORABLE MENTION OF b. L. KOLLER, Hanover. BtALPH L. SMITH Pittsburg BAUM SOPHOMORE MATHEMATICAL PRIZE. feRTHUR S. BRUMBAUGH Roaring Spring. BOS. N. K. HICKMAN Steelton. WITH HONORABLE MENTION OF &ACOB D. SNYDER McKnightstown. J(HIX F. STALEY, Middletown. [WHEN 0. DIEHL Bedminster. MUHLENBERG FRESHMAN PRIZE. FOR BEST GENERAL SCHOLARSHIP. OTHER A. WEIGLE Mechanicsburg. WITH HONORABLE MENTION OF [WILLIAM W. FREY York. BEDDIC PRIZE IN ORATORY. [iKA G. BRINER ; New Blcomfield. WITH HONORABLE MENTION OF EA.RLES E. FLECK, New Kingston. 3ARLES M. NICHOLAS, Berrett, Md. ♦—♦—♦ I GRADUATES AND HOME ADDRESSES. BACHELOR OF ARTS. George Ferdinand Able, Philadelphia, Pa. [Ernest Adelbert Armstrong, Hellam, Pa. [Henry Wolf Bikle, Gettysburg, Pa. :harles Roy Coble, Eykens, Pa. jthur Byron Coble, Lykens, Pa. Elkanah Maximillian Duck, Spring Mills, Pa. [George William Englar, Linwood, Md. Frederick Whipp Friday, Jefferson, Md. White Hutton, Chambersburg, Pa. Bamuel Jacob Miller, Edgemont, Md. John William Ott, Rocky Ridge, Md. Pearl Johnston Shriver, Gettysburg, Pa. Anna Gertrude Sieber, Gettysburg, Pa. Henry Rouzer Smith, Chambersburg, Pa. William Rufus Stahl, Hay's Mills, Pa. Philip Thos.Em'y Stockslager,Funkstown,Md. William Edward Wheeler, Baltimore, Md. [Clifton Glemm White, Manheim, Pa. [obbin Bayard Wolf, Gettysburg, Pa. BACHELOR OF SCIENCE. Horace Edwin Clute, Harrisburg, Pa. Charles Eeroy Boyer Erb, Boyertown, Pa. George Hay Kain, York, Pa. Fran'l'n Schoch Eeisenring,Chambersburg,Pa. r^wis Clarence Manges, Felton, Pa. John Elmer Meisenhelder, Hanover, Pa. Class Motto—Pertinax Animo. Class Colors—Pink and Nile Green. Class Flower—Daisy. Class Yell— Pertinax Animo, Rah ! Rah !.! Rah ! ! ! Ninety-Seven, Ninety-Seven, Gettysburgia. ~*-~^ ♦- DEGREES CONFERRED. COMMENCEMENT DAY JUNE 3. A. M. Prof. H. A. Allison, '94, Rev. R. W. Mottern, '94 " c- p- Bastian, 94, • koehuer, c f. Burns, p Herman, 1. f. Brown, r f. Spealman, r. f Wolf, 1. f. Loudon, r. f. Lawyer, r. t Gettysburg College, Opponents, 273 ::s 63 269 19 12 S". .11 .125 .875 .292 .171 .340 .233 .304 .222 .000 .200 .000 .143 .231 .15fi Pastor of the Quincy charge, in Franklin ounty, Pa. '94- Rev. Matthew S. Kemp, of Hazleton, Pa., has received a call from Smithsburg, Pa. Mr. Kemp graduated last week from Gettys-burg Seminary. '94. Fred. Bloomhardt, of the University of Pennsylvania, spent a short time at his home Tiring the latter part of May. >" AMERICA'S NOBLE SON. JNIOR PRIZE ORATION BY I. G. BRINER. We are to-day standing upon sacred ground. Q the war of '63 these hills and mountains echoed and re-echoed with the cannon's awful roar. For three days the mighty columns of the Southern Confederacy surged against our hues. Sometimes our phalanx faltered. Some-times it broke. But in the final and awful charge, made by Pickett's men, victory was forever emblazoned upon our immaculate ban-ner. To-day, behold ! how changed. The gory and tattered flag has been cleansed by more than three decades of sweet peace and wel-comed prosperity. In our National Cemetery those, who loved their country and their homes better than their lives, now repose in silent sleep. Their tombs are covered with earth's richest mantle. By their side stand stately trees with waving boughs and wide spreading branches. Over them the happy children scatter fragrant flowers, while the sun looks down, from the vaulted sky, and smiles. The relatives and friends of the heroes come close to those mounds and shed a loving and parting tear. But even weeping will not make sacred this ground. In his dedicatory speech Abraham Lincoln said, "We cannot hallow this ground, the brave men living and dead who fought here, have hallowed it far above our powers to add or detract." Not only do we revere and honor the meni-of those who sleep here, but we would hold in grateful remembrance every man who has p'-oven a friend and defender of our national faith and honor. Many there are to whom we can point with pride. Men, who, on the bat-tlefield, exhibited the greatest skill, bravery and courage. Those, when duty called, pressed forward into the thickest of the con-flict, that our freedom might be won and our beloved Union preserved. Those, when en-trusted with national honor, had dignity and manhood enough to keep it pure and unsullied. Among the host of such Americans shines, in undimmed splendor and glory, the name of* Ulysses S. Grant. His deeds of courage and bravery, his genuine high statesmanship and Christian character will ever be remembered and held in high esteem by all men who love the land of the free and the home of the brave. In our sister state, only four weeks ago was dedicated to his memory a beautiful and mas-sive memorial. By this act a premium was placed upon the actions of great and good men. This silent witness, as its beauty is reflected in the peaceful waters of the Hudson, is but a slight token of the Nation's gratitude for him. Historians tell us, as a soldier General Grant stood without a peer. To him was entrusted the closing scenes of an awful conflict. In him the nation saw a leader fearless and un-daunted as well as tender and kind. When his forces stormed Fort Donelson with heavy charges, the commander asked for terms. THE COLLEGE MERCURY General Grant replied : "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I purpose to move immediately upon your works." On the other hand, when Lee was over-powered and the Southern army shattered, it was General Grant who proposed that the soldiers who had horses should retain them. He said, "The men will need them in plowing their fields, when they return to their homes." During the four years of this civil strife he had the confidence and esteem of soldiers and officers. With a unanimity that was never disturbed by an audible voice of dissent, the two million veterans gave to him supremacy over all the other officers under whom they served. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor and Five Forks have immortalized his name among the greatest generals of the earth. How beautiful thus to see blended in one man true humanity, mingled with pure patriotism and undaunted courage. When our beloved country was yet tremb-ling and groaning from the shock received by the Civil war, news came to General Grant that he had been nominated for President of the United States. In his letter of acceptance he penned the words which are sweetest to those who have seen the horrors and ravages of war: ' 'Let us have peace.'' But this man was opposed to even having peace until he was sure it would be universal and abiding. Later in his official capacity he affirms that he would have "no policy to enforce against the will of the people." His entire adminis-tration is a living testimony that these words came forth from a heart radiant with truth. The character of this great man stands out clear and strong. Those that know him best saw in him a man in the truest sense of the term. Other men might be swerved from the path of duty by the temptations so numerous and strong in public life, by disappointed and coveting office seekers, by streams of immor-ality and waves of infidelity, but General Grant turned these discouragements and sins into stepping stones by which he arose to where his character to-day shines with tin-dimmed luster. When he assumed the functions of the Presi-dential office his highest ambition was to prove a worthy and trusted leader. He had learned through the great and far-reaching lessons taught by Jesus of Nazareth, "he that is greatest among you shall be your servant." He possessed abiding confidence! the honesty and intelligence of his coiuitr men, and always retained his deep holdup their affections. With Washington and Li: coin, Grant has an exalted place in our com try's history. When his monument was dedicated tha were present representatives from all brands of our Government, the resident officials < foreign nations, the Governors of the state and the sovereign people from every sectio of our common country. What a glowii tribute thus to pa}' to one who has reachedti; highest pinnacle of human distinction. Tt story of this man's life is worthy the conten plation of the ages. Now that beautiful memorial, honor of this General, Statesman, and Christian Gentleman, risees majesty before us. May it thus point us a individuals, and as a nation, to a higher splie of living, and clearer and more sublime fellow-ship with the God who rules the destiny rf Nations. erected i: President in siletl STATE POLITICS IN PENNSYLYANIl SENIOR ORATION, BY HORACE E. CLUTE, ') In examining the political situation in Pen sylvania we must feel, first of all, the needo! liberal point of view. If our position be thati patriots, we must consider all sides. It is nea less to say that this is, in its very nature, « a party question but one appealing to the leji imate interest of every loyal citizen of ti "laud of Penn." At a time when so much:: terest is being taken in the political affairs! our own Commonwealth, a broad basis for criticism must seem important. A certain gree of conservatism on the one hand, anda the other, an insistence on a full and da light on every part of our political svstea should characterize our consideration. In a question of this kind, the compart view will be found helpful to the broader bas we have referred to. What conditions at problems are met and settled in other state Nor need our range be confined to this con-try. European systems will be found uioreo less rich in political suggestion, when co: pared with our own. And we can readilyni derstand how a foreigner should be able! take this comparative view better perhaps tb any of us. The question touches us • closely. Professor Bryce, an Englishman eminence, furnishes, in his "American Cd THE COLLEGE MERCURY. 9i The! IS legit- I lb stec rafc bas ; as .ate :oE mi co: yd ile: tkjl ■an |Cc: I mwealth," an excellent illustration of this, onsiders the working and conditions of j"r political institutions in relation both to Hose of his own country and to each other in |e different sections and Commonwealths in ,is country. He says: "The spirit and force fcarty has, in America, been as essential to lie action of the machinery of government as team is to the locomotive engine. His view i briefly this: "in Europe the parties stand for jiiciples, in America they do not;" in the one 1'issues have never been lacking which Sought their respective principles into opera- En:" in the other "the chief practical issues which once divided the parties have been set-fled." In spite of the heated discussion and the definiteness in issue of the last-presidential campaign, we Americans cannot deny that fhere is much truth in his view and particu-larly as applied to State politics. What great principle does the Republican or the Demo-cratic party stand for in State elections? Does the citizen vote on some State issue or because R: wants his party to get the spoil? Bryce aptly says: "Bringing men up to the polls is like passing a stone roller over stones newly laid on a road." As the angularities in the stones are pressed out so individuality is merged into party. We fear this is what has happened very largely in Pennsylvania. Yet if asked to analyze the present political condition, we should say that it is perhaps nearer a transition, a revolution, from the existing order of things, than a solid-fying in them; recent indications seem to point in that direction. Prominent among these we might mention the withdrawal from power of a. U. S. Senator whose sway has extended for a number of years; though a candidate put forward by a boss took his place it was not without comparatively formidable opposition and the absence of the impliciteness with which many former behests were obeyed; and it is believed by some that if brought up now this candidate could not be elected. It is prob-ably true, as some one suggests, that the pres-ent legislature —the House at least—is more its own than in some former sessions. Citizens Reform Leagues and Associations, though aim-g more especially at municipal reform, show a marked tendency, not always appearing on e surface, to wipe out political corruption. The recent formation of Business Men's Leagues throughout the State, whatever news-papers may say about the aims of the leaders Jf the movement, shows a rebellion on the part 'fa very substantial proportion of our citizen-ship against the existing order of things. The recent exposure, on the part of contractors and others in possession of the facts, the waste of the people's money in "padded" bills, appro-priations, &c, may also be added to the gen-eral indications. We may think that a great hue and cry is raised about the corruption and degradation of Pennsylvania politics, and that the real con-dition is exaggerated. Perhaps the way to get anything like an accurate idea, is to investigate along the line of just what a real reform would mean, how many points it must touch, and how fundamental it must be, to cope with the enormousness of the task. It is not an overstatement to say that the system of bossism has in this State received flattering encouragement. (It is a continuation of the medieval "sale of indulgences" and we need a Luther to expose it!) It is the people we ought to censure, to censure the boss is a waste of breath. Yet we would not say this without two words, one as to the boss, the other from the side of the people. To one who says to us : "We need men of executive ability, bosses if you please," it is sufficient to reply simply by distinguishing the term "leader and boss;" by the former is suggested the idea of one who by natural selection or otherwise leads a new movement, by the latter the foreman of a gang of foreign laborers out in some Western railway cut; the arguments of the one are listened to; the orders of the other are mechanically obeyed. Why do the people endure it? Well, first of all, they have arrayed against them a machine, and to resist its clock-like movement is 110 easy matter. You will perhaps meet one class of persons who speak of "necessary evils." We deny their existence ! There is no reason under the sun, save the weakness of men, why our Commonwealth should not be a perfect Utopia! Eltwood Pomeroy, in the April Arena, char-acterizes another class." "I know of men," he says, "honest, honorable, capable, who have refused to vote for over a quarter of a century. They say it is no use." As cit-izens, however, we must remember that the use of that silent weapon, the ballot, is not only a privilege but a duty. Let us be sure that there are thousands in Pennsylvania who have not in their heart of hearts bowed the knee to the Baal of bossism. Perhaps no bet-ter counsel can be given to the true citizen than the words of the poet: "Be noble and the nobleness that lies In others, sleeping but never dead, Will rise in majesty to greet thine own." ADVERTISEMENTS. Classical Course for the Degree of A. B. II. Scientific Course for the Degree of B. S. III. Post-Graduate Course fcr the Degree of Ph. D. IV. Special Course in all Departments. V. Elective Studies in Junior and Senior Years. VI. New Testament Greek and Hebrew in English Bible Departinj Observatory, Laboratories and new Gymnasium. Four large buildings. All b heated with steam from central plant. Libraries, 25,000 volumes. Fine Museum. Expi low. Department of Hygiene and Physical Culture in charge of an experienced physid Accessible by frequent railroad trains. Location, on BATTLEFIELD of Gettysburg;" pleasant and healthy. PREPARATORY DEPARTMENT, in separate buildings, for I and young men preparing for business or college, under special care of the principal andtl assistants, residing with students in the building. For full particulars, apply for catalog^ HARVEY w. MCKNIGHT, D. D., LL. D., ?m\ F@ras]?(]w*iiiiia (MUtege, Gettysburg

4. La perspectiva de los burócratas: el pensamiento de Octavio Morató sobre la autonomía del BROU y el estatuto de los funcionarios bancarios Octavio Morató fue Gerente del BROU desde 1921 sucediendo a Jorge West. Dejó su puesto de Gerente en 1937, pasando a desempeñarse como Asesor Técnico del Banco hasta su jubilación definitiva en 1940. Fue funcionario del Banco desde su fundación en 1896. Inicia su carrera como Jefe de la sección Responsabilidades, pasa por Teneduría de Libros, Sub-Contador, Contador General, Gerente, Sub-Gerente A, hasta llegar a la Gerencia de la institución en 1921. Morató no sólo fue, además, uno de los economistas más influyentes de su época, referente permanente en cuestiones bancarias y financieras y activo participante en múltiples actividades académicas, políticas y técnicas a nivel nacional e internacional (1). La síntesis del pensamiento de Morató proviene de dos fuentes: la compilación de su actuación en el BROU titulada "Al servicio del Banco de la República y la economía uruguaya" (MORATÓ, 1976) y la conferencia dictada en 1924 en la Caja Nacional de Ahorros y Descuentos. Esta última fue publicada en forma de libro a posteriori, "Los funcionarios de las industrias del Estado" (MORATÓ, 1943). Este material es necesariamente incompleto. Como se consigna en "Al servicio.", Morató conservaba en su archivo personal copia de toda su actuación en el BROU, llenando la misma unos 50 biblioratos formato oficio. De ese archivo se incluyeron en el mencionado libro 52 informes referentes a múltiples cuestiones bancarias, económicas, proyectos de cambio y cuestiones de gobierno de la institución. Por tanto, queda dentro de nuestra exploración aquella zona de la actuación de Morató que el recopilador de "Al servicio ." encontró razonable y pertinente publicar. Por suerte, dicho recopilador (2) fue seguramente alguien que conoció de cerca los temas de mayor importancia para Morató y de los 52 informes publicados, hay 9 que están dedicados precisamente a temas relativos a la defensa de la autonomía administrativa de la institución (3).Esta síntesis tiene dos objetivos:Mostrar el sentido que para Morató comportaba el concepto de autonomía, como una forma peculiar de administración alejada de lo que él llama el"régimen desquiciador de la administración pública" (MORATÓ, 1976: 370).Mostrar los argumentos que empleó Morató para defender las prerrogativas del BROU para administrarse a sí mismo (dentro de lo que establecía la constitución y la tradición administrativa del instituto).4.1. El concepto de autonomía y su sentido en la vida política nacional según Octavio Morató. El punto basal de la defensa que hace Morató de la autonomía administrativa del BROU es su visión histórica de la misma. Es decir, su idea de que la autonomía es un producto peculiar de la historia del país. Como ha sido señalado (SOLARI, FRANCO, 1983), el origen histórico de la descentralización por servicios es algo que progresivamente fue perdiendo peso en los debates sobre las empresas públicas. De ahí la importancia de los argumentos de Morató: su argumentación histórica es una prueba de que en las empresas públicas se estaba creando un estamento muy particular de burócratas. Hay tres grandes ejes en la visión de Morató sobre los entes industriales y su rol en la vida política y económica del país:Hay una "razón histórica y una razón científica" para la autonomía administrativa.La organización autonómica (o ente autónomo) no puede ser tratada como el resto de la administración pública.Un ente autónomo busca la eficiencia de una empresa privada, pero no es una empresa privada.4.1.1. Hay una "razón histórica y una razón científica" para la autonomía administrativaComenzaremos por la conferencia dictada en 1924 en la Caja Nacional de Ahorros y Descuentos sobre el estatuto de los "funcionarios industriales" del Estado. En la misma, Morató defiende la tesis de que los funcionarios de la banca estatal son funcionarios "especiales". El objetivo es refutar la tesis rival según la cual a los mismos debían ser clasificados como funcionarios públicos. En el lenguaje de Morató, las autonomías (que constituyen la forma de organizar la intervención del Estado en la economía) tienen una "razón histórica y una razón científica". Para Morató, la historia impuso nuevas funciones al Estado y en la asunción de las mismas fue necesario delegar ciertos aspectos en corporaciones especializadas con variables grados de libertad para decidir. En un principio hubo autonomía técnica, pero la misma no implicaba autonomía administrativa. En la Instrucción Pública, Facultades de Estudios Superiores, Caridad Pública, etc.; el Poder Ejecutivo era quien nombraba los empleados, fijaba los sueldos, etc. Con la evolución de estos institutos, algunos de ellos comienzan a adquirir grados más elevados de autonomía administrativa en la medida en que por razón de su función perciben algún tipo de renta independiente de los recursos del Estado. Sucesivamente se llega a la constitución de los entes con mayor grado de autonomía, siendo – en la visión de Morató- los bancos República e Hipotecario los únicos con autonomía"completa"."Todas las escalas de autonomía que he descrito, no han resultado de la concepción de un plan general, sino de la gravitación de hechos, en algunos casos, de la ratificación de situaciones especiales creadas por la participación del Estado en empresas de servicio general en otros y del instinto, más que de la visión clara de las conveniencias públicas, en las primeras autonomías creadas; luego, de una concepción superior perfectamente disciplinada, que presidió las confirmaciones que se hicieron, reafirmando la política económica, dentro del terreno práctico de las autonomías, al reorganizar ciertos institutos" (MORATÓ, 1943: 26).Destaca el éxito del modelo organizacional del BROU y cómo dicho éxito"constituyó el más grande y poderoso estímulo para que el Estado se propusiera, con seguridad de éxito, entrar de lleno a detentar la explotación de industrias que estaban en manos de particulares, ya creando privilegios, ya adquiriendo instituciones privilegiadas, u organizándolas sobre la base de monopolios o constituyéndolas en competencia con la industria privada" (MORATÓ, 1943: 14-15).La base de la razón científica estará en la división del trabajo y la especialización de funciones. "Todas estas corporaciones [los Consejos Directivos de los servicios descentralizados] se constituyeron con el fin de entregar una gran parte de la gestión o de las funciones del Estado, a elementos especializados o que se especializaran en ellas, aplicando así la conocida y provechosa fórmula de la división del trabajo. Los consejos o Comisiones tenían, y tienen todavía, autonomía en su función técnica, es decir: en la función primordial, que ha sido objeto o es de su constitución. Naturalmente, la autonomía técnica debía girar dentro de las líneas generales que sus leyes orgánicas habían delineado, pero dentro de ellas, autonomía al fin" (MORATÓ, 1943: 23).Para Morató, división y especialización de funciones encarnan la búsqueda de la"eficiencia" en la administración pública:"(…) del estudio del conjunto de todas esas leyes especiales [las Cartas Orgánicas]y de su comparación se descubre que los grados de autonomía han sido inspirados, en todo tiempo, por estas dos ideas directrices: división del trabajo y la especialización de funciones, como medio de obtener la 'eficiencia' en ciertos ramos de la administración pública; la autonomía es el modo de realizar esos propósitos" (MORATÓ, 1943: 26).Como consecuencia de esta manera de pensar, Morató reclama que la autonomía se considere en toda la extensión del vocablo una vez aprobado el artículo 100 de la Constitución (4): "autonomía de gestión; autonomía de administración, por lo menos dentro de las líneas generales que las leyes especiales que rigen cada instituto y que no han sido derogadas, les ha acordado" (MORATÓ, 1943: 21).4.1.2. La organización autonómica (o ente autónomo) no puede ser tratada como el resto de la administración públicaMorató identifica a la administración pública con el predominio del patronazgo político en el ingreso y en el desarrollo de la carrera administrativa. Esto involucra una forma de organización no científica, irracional, "desquiciada"fruto del manejo "político" de su estructura. Frente a este concepto contrapone el de organización autonómica como aquella en la que es posible poner en práctica la "disciplina científica de la administración". Esto último es producto del hecho de no estar vinculada orgánicamente "al virus disolutivo de la política" (MORATÓ, 1976: 370) y tener la posibilidad de experimentar libremente con diferentes métodos de organización tal como sucede en la empresa privada. Un claro indicador de esta diferenciación está en la contraposición del régimen del BROU (o de los entes autónomos en general) como excepcional frente al de la administración pública como "régimen vulgar". Otro indicador es la constante asimilación que hace Morató del régimen autonómico con el de la empresa privada. Hay dos amenazas que Morató intenta conjurar. Por un lado, el problema del status de los funcionarios de los entes autónomos. Si los funcionarios del BROU son considerados como funcionarios públicos dos problemas enfrentan los administradores del instituto. Primero, el problema de la inflexibilidad del régimen de funcionarios públicos (se pueden contratar libremente pero no despedir libremente). Segundo, el problema de la autoridad de los administradores frente a los funcionarios. Si el ingreso y la carrera están sujetos a la intermediación política, el instituto pierde autoridad frente a sus funcionarios. La otra amenaza que percibe Morató es la posibilidad de que se multipliquen los controles del gobierno sobre las decisiones de los directorios autónomos. Más posibilidad de control central implica, para Morató, enlentecer la toma de decisiones del instituto.En lo que respecta a los funcionarios de los entes industriales, defiende la"condición excepcional" de los funcionarios del Banco (lo cual implica que no pueden ser considerados funcionarios públicos). Justifica esta excepcionalidad en la idea de organización "científica", asimilable en su régimen de ingreso y carrera al de la empresa privada:"Los funcionarios de las industrias del Estado están regidos por reglamentos especiales, dictados por el Directorio de la institución a la cual sirven. Los Directorios resuelven inapelablemente, sobre la situación de los empleados sometidos a su autoridad. Los empleados públicos son agentes del Estado; como tales tienen su representación y autoridad dentro del puesto para el cual han sido nombrados. Los empleados de las industrias del Estado tienen carácter privado y, como las instituciones de que forman parte, están sometidos a las disposiciones del derecho común, como cualquier particular. Los funcionarios de los Bancos de Estado, se encuentran en una posición -de hecho y de derecho- más aproximada a la de los Bancos privados, que a la de los empleados civiles del Estado"(MORATÓ, 1943: 31).En lo que respecta a los controles centrales, Morató critica –durante los años de 1930- algunos institutos creados con el fin de aumentar dichos controles. Tal es el caso del Tribunal de Cuentas. Este organismo fue creado en 1934 con el fin de realizar la vigilancia y superintendencia en todo lo relativo a presupuestos y gestión de la Hacienda Pública (5). En dos ocasiones, Morató escribió acerca de las disposiciones que regían al Tribunal y cómo las mismas afectaban el normal desempeño de las funciones del Banco (octubre de 1934 y agosto de 1936). En noviembre de 1936 Morató redacta un Memorando en el cual reúne sus opiniones sobre el Tribunal y su actuación con relación al BROU. En los primeros dos años de funcionamiento del Tribunal habían surgido frecuentes discrepancias con el BROU en cuanto a la apreciación de problemas de orden técnico-contable y administrativos y sobre las maneras de resolverlos (MORATÓ, 1976: 524-525).4.1.3. Un ente autónomo busca la eficiencia de una empresa privada, pero no es una empresa privadaEn este punto, aparece el otro elemento central de la concepción de ente autónomo. Si bien hay una constante asimilación de la organización y administración a los preceptos seguidos en la empresa privada, un ente autónomo no es una empresa privada. Se orienta a la consecución del lucro, pero no exclusivamente. Y esto porque el ente autónomo es el lugar, por excelencia para Morató, del interés público, entendido como el interés nacional más allá de "la divisa". Cuando Morató trata la defensa de la autonomía presupuestaria del BROU hace especial énfasis en este aspecto:"El Banco de la República no es una institución únicamente comercial, es una institución de carácter público y de utilidad pública. Como institución comercial, consulta los resultados financieros de sus negocios, hasta donde le permite asegurar la permanente solvencia de la institución; como entidad de carácter público, es un formidable punto de apoyo de las finanzas nacionales, del crédito público, del servicio de la circulación monetaria y de la estabilidad de la moneda y del cambio internacional; y, en fin, en su función de servicio público, fomenta el ahorro nacional, organiza toda clase de facilidades que pone a disposición del Estado y de la población en las mejores condiciones de comodidad; atiende los intereses superiores de la producción, del comercio y de la industria, con la multiplicación y diversificación de los servicios administrativos, técnicos e informativos, con el propósito principal de servir esos intereses .[Por tanto] no puede decidirse sobre el peso de los gastos administrativos del Banco de la República, considerados desde el punto de vista comercial, exclusivamente". (MORATÓ, 1976: 121)Y, en tanto el BROU (como ente autónomo) es el locus del "interés público", Morató siempre tiende a identificar el interés del BROU con el "interés nacional".No sólo el Banco debe estar protegido –vía descentralización autonómica- del "virus disolutivo de la política", sino también de las"conveniencias financieras del Estado". Un texto que resume estos 3 aspectos clave de la concepción autonomista de Morató es "El pacto de los partidos tradicionales y sus consecuencias en el Banco de la República" (MORATÓ, 1976). En el mismo hay una dura crítica del autor sobre el "pacto del chinchulín" celebrado entre los representantes batllistas y blancos en el CNA (6. En dicho documento, Morató advierte que las consecuencias del pacto serán el comienzo del fin de la "esencia básica de la formación de los entes autónomos", y en particular el fin de un estilo de dirección a nivel del BROU:"La adhesión del Directorio a la fórmula del Consejo Nacional de Administración, significa:el renunciamiento a la autonomía administrativa, dejándola en manos del Consejo Nacional;la sumisión de los intereses del Banco y los del país, comprometidos también, a las conveniencias financieras del Estado, identificados ambos para hacer frente a las vicisitudes que el tiempo pueda depararle a éste;la destrucción de la organización administrativa, de fundamental importancia para instituciones como el Banco de la República, y su sustitución por el régimen vulgar de la administración pública, donde predominan, no las condiciones de preparación y capacidad, sino las ventajas de interés político. El ingreso a la institución y el ascenso, no serán ya concedidos al más apto; el mejor adaptado triunfará" (MORATÓ, 1976: 369-370).5. ConclusionesPara cerrar la reflexión planteada en la ponencia, quisiéramos destacar tres elementos referidos al pensamiento del actor burocrático en los años veinte y treinta del siglo pasado.En primer lugar, la fuerte compenetración entre el personal jerárquico de carrera de la institución y los Directorios del BROU en la defensa de los "fueros autonómicos" del instituto.En segundo lugar, la relevancia del actor burocrático al momento de asegurar la continuidad de los objetivos para los cuales fueron creados los entes autónomos. Un aspecto no menor cuando se piensa en continuidades a nivel institucional. Para Octavio Morató el problema que está detrás de los cuestionamientos a las libertades administrativas de los entes frente a la administración central, es el desconocimiento de las razones históricas por las cuales los entes fueron dotados de dichas libertades. Consciente de que el formato autonómico es una rareza tanto desde el punto de vista constitucional como de los valores de la sociedad uruguaya, justifica la autonomía por razones "científicas". Por eso, el lenguaje abstracto de la"correlación entre función, gestión y agente" debe interpretarse con cuidado. No se trata de retórica positivista. Es un recurso argumental esgrimido en un momento en el cual la discusión sobre la administración de los entes se producía en forma desconectada con el marco histórico en el cual surgieron los mismos. Por eso Morató describe primero el marco histórico para luego justificarlo en términos"científicos".Por último, la autopercepción del actor burocrático acerca de su rol en la administración. Morató veía al conjunto de los Entes Autónomos Industriales y Comerciales como un espacio privilegiado para la realización del interés público. La clave de esta posibilidad estaba en la autonomía administrativa ya que permitiría una administración independiente del interés partidario. En la visión de Morató un Directorio autónomo es un Directorio que decide en función de los intereses del BROU, a los cuales equipara con los intereses del país. Un Directorio"político", "con divisa", nombrado en base a razones políticas o acuerdos electorales tendría como consecuencia transformar al BROU en una "repartición del Estado, a la manera de una oficina pública, bajo un director que no tiene facultades, atribuciones, ni independencia ni otro criterio que aquel que le permite el pequeñísimo margen de los reglamentos administrativos dictados por el CNA" (MORATÓ, 1976: 371).(1) Carlos Quijano al revisar la actuación del Banco República en la política monetaria de los años veinte comenta: "En ese período de nuestra historia bancaria hay dos o tres presidentes del Banco que actúan con una gran autoridad moral, pero hay un hombre que actúa con gran autoridad técnica, no obstante la modestia de su vida, que es don Octavio Morató, a quien no se le ha hecho la justicia que merece". (QUIJANO, 1995: 266)(2) En el libro referido no se aclara quien fue el recopilador, pero con toda seguridad fue el hijo de Morató, el Dr. Octavio Morató Rodríguez. Fue éste quien desde 1971 se ocupó de realizar gestiones ante el Senado para la publicación de la obra (MORATÓ 1976: 5 – 8). Es razonable pensar que el hijo de Morató conocía de cerca las preocupaciones de su padre dado que nació en 1901, contando con 42 años a la muerte de su padre en 1943.(3) Ver Morató (1976), asuntos nº: 5, 8, 9, 24, 25, 30, 32, 46 y 48.(4) Esta misma postura defendió el directorio del BROU a lo largo de los años de 1920. También coincidieron hombres de los partidos políticos como Martín C. Martínez que veían en el excesivo celo "literalista" de algunos juristas una traba a la realización de todo el potencial de los entes autónomos.(5) El artículo 201 de la Constitución de 1934 prescribe: "La vigilancia en ejecución de los presupuestos y la función de contralor en toda gestión relativa a la Hacienda Pública, será de cargo del Tribunal de Cuentas de la República, que actuará con autonomía funcional, siendo de resorte de la ley que proyectará el mismo Tribunal, la reglamentación de su autonomía, así como la fijación de las atribuciones no especificadas en este capítulo".(6) Téngase presente al leer las críticas de Morató que él mismo era de extracción batllista. 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Montevideo: EBO.PAPADÓPULOS, Jorge.1993. Seguridad Social y política. Montevideo: CIESU.PERROW, CH. 1986. Sociología de las organizaciones. México: MCGRAW-HILL.PETERS, B. Guy. 1999. La política de la burocracia. México: CNCPAP, FCE.PIVEL DEVOTO, J. 1976. Los Bancos 1824-1868. En: Revista Histórica (Publicación del Museo Histórico Nacional) XLVIII (s.d) POWELL, Walter; DIMAGGIO, Paul. 1991. The new institutionalism in organizational theory. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.PROYECTO AGENDA URUGUAY. 2001. Servicios públicos: aportes hacia una política de Estado. Montevideo: Trilce, Centro de Estudios Estratégicos 1815.QUIJANO, Carlos. 1995. La economía uruguaya entre 1880 y 1965. Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes.RAMA, Germán. 1987. La democracia en Uruguay. Buenos Aires: GEL.RAMA, Martín. 1991. El país de los vivos: un enfoque económico. En: SUMA (11) : pp. 7-36.RAMELA DE CASTRO, Ramón. 1923. Entes autónomos: organización administrativa del dominio industrial del Estado. Montevideo : (s.d.)RAMÍREZ, Juan Andrés. 1967. Dos ensayos constitucionales. Montevideo: Ministerio de Instrucción Pública y Previsión Social.RAMOS, Conrado. 2004. Una oportunidad políticamente desaprovechada: La reforma de la Administración Central en el Uruguay. Tesis Doctoral.REAL DE AZUA, Carlos. 1964. El impulso y su freno. Montevideo: EBO.REAL DE AZÚA, Carlos (comp.). 1968. El Uruguay visto por los uruguayos. En:Biblioteca Uruguaya Fundamental. Tomo 1 (36). Montevideo: Centro Editor de América Latina. REAL DE AZÚA, Carlos. 1969. La clase dirigente. Montevideo: Nuestra Tierra. REGISTRO NACIONAL DE LEYES Y DECRETOS. 1932. Año 1931. Montevideo: Diario Oficial.REYES ABADIE, W.; WILLIMAN, C. 1969. La economía del Uruguay en el siglo XIX. Montevideo: Nuestra Tierra.REYES ABADIE, W.; VÁZQUEZ ROMERO, A. 1981. La nueva economía. En:Crónica General del Uruguay (58). Montevideo: EBO.REYES ABADIE, W. (s.f.) Julio Herrera y Obes, el primer jefe civil. Montevideo: La República, EBO. ROCKMAN, Bert. 1992. The new institutionalism and the old institutions. En:Conference on the dynamics of American politics, University of Colorado, feb. 1992.RODRÍGUEZ, Julio. 1969. Los grandes negocios. En: Enciclopedia Uruguaya(29). Montevideo: Reunidos, Arca. RUDOLPH, LL.; HOEBER RUDOLPH, S. 1984. Autoridad y poder en la administración burocrática y patrimonial. En: OSZLAK, Oscar (ed.). Teoría de la burocracia estatal. Buenos Aires: Paidos. SAYAGUES LASO, E. 1991. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo II. Montevideo: FCU.SCHNEIDER, Ben Ross. 1991. Politics within the state. Elite bureaucrats ; industrial policy in authoritarian Brazil. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.SIKKINK, Kathryn. 1991. Ideas and Institutions. Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.SIMONET, Douglas. 1991. La apacible sordidez de la burocracia. Montevideo: PRONADE.SKOCPOL, T.; WEIR, M. 1993. Las estructuras del Estado: una respuesta keynesiana a la depresión. En: Revista Zona Abierta (63/64): pp 74-153.SOLARI, Aldo. 1964. Estudios sobre la sociedad uruguaya. Tomo I. Montevideo: Arca.SOLARI, Aldo. 1965. El tercerismo en el Uruguay. Montevideo: Alfa.SOLARI, Aldo. 1967. El desarrollo social del Uruguay en la posguerra. Montevideo: Alfa.SOLARI, A.; FRANCO, R. 1983. Las empresas públicas en el Uruguay. Montevideo: FCU.TRÍAS, Vivian. 1966. La crisis del dólar y la política norteamericana. La guerra del oro y la diplomacia. Montevideo: El Sol.TRÍAS, Vivian. 1990. Banca y neoliberalismo en Uruguay. Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes, EBO.TROCHÓN, Y.; VIDAL, B. 1993. El régimen terrista (1933-1938). Montevideo: EBO.VARELA, JOSÉ PEDRO. 1969. De nuestro estado actual y sus causas. Montevideo: Arca.WEBER, Max.1992. Economía y Sociedad. Bs. As.: FCE.WEBER, Max. (s.f.) La política como vocación. Fichas del ciclo básico, Nº 30. Montevideo: FCU.WELKER, Juan Carlos. 1944. José Serrato, un ejemplo. Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos.WILLIMAN, José Claudio; et al. 1996. Centenario del BROU. Montevideo: Academia Nacional de Economía.ZUBILLAGA, Carlos. 1979. Las disidencias del tradicionalismo: el radicalismo blanco. Montevideo: ARCA, CLAEH.ZUBILLAGA, Carlos.1982. El reto financiero. Montevideo: ARCA-CLAEH.ZURBRIGGEN, Cristina. 2003. Estado, empresarios y la búsqueda de rentas. El Contralor de Exportaciones e Importaciones 1931-1961. En: Terceras Jornadas de Historia Económica de la Asociación Uruguaya de Historia Económica (AUDHE)Montevideo, 9 al 11 de julio de 2003.ZURBRIGGEN, C. 2006. Estado, empresarios y redes rentistas. Montevideo: ICP – FCS – EBO.

Issue 55.4 of the Review for Religious, July/August 1996. ; Revi for Retig ous i, a fo .m for shared res ea on on the lived experience of all who find that the church's rich heritages of spirituality support their personal and apostolic Christian lives. The articles in the journal are meant to be informative, practical, or inspirational, written from a tbeological or spiritual or sometimes canonical point of view. Review for Religious (ISSN 0034-639X) is published bi-monthly at Saint Louis UniversiD, by the Jesuits of the Missouri Province. Editorial Office: 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, Missouri 63108-3393. Telephone: 314-977-7363 ¯ Fax: 314-977-7362 E-Mail: FOPPEMA@SL UVCA.SLU.EDU Manuscripts, books for review, and correspondence with the editor: Review for Religious ¯ 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. Correspondence about the Canonical Counsel department: Elizabeth McDonough OP 1150 Cedar Cove Road ¯ Henderson, NC 27536 POSTMASTER Send address changes to Review for Religious ¯ P.O. Box 6070 ¯ Duluth, MN 55806. Periodical postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri, and additional mailing offices. See inside back cover for information on subscription rates. ©1996 Review for Religious Permission is herewith granted to copy any material (articles, poems, reviews) contained in this issue of Review for Religious for personal or internal use, or for the personal or internal use of specific library clients within the limits outlined in Sections 107 and/or 108 of the United States Copyright Law. All copies made under this permission must bear notice of the source, date, and copyright owner on the first page. This permission is NOT extended to copying for commercial distribu-tion, advertising, institutional promotion, or for the creation of new collective works or anthologies. Such permission will only be considered on written application to the Editor, Review for Religious. for religiou$ Editor Associate Editors Canonical Counsel Editor Editorial Staff Advisory Board David L. Fleming SJ Philip C. Fischer SJ Regina Siegfried ASC Elizabeth McDonough OP Mary Ann Foppe Tracy Gramm Jean Read James and Joan Felling Iris Ann Ledden SSND Joel Rippinger OSB Edmundo Rodriguez SJ David Werthmann CSSR Patricia Wittberg SC Christian Heritages and Contemporary Living JULY/AUGUST1996 *VOLUME55 *' NUMBER4 contents 342 symposium - part 3 Religious Life: Directions for a Future Albert Dilanni SM reviews three stages of religious-life renewal and sets forth those areas for future efforts. 365 expanding vision Internationality: Consciousness Raising and Conversion Janet Malone CND highlights six stages of consciousness raising in the process of a religious group's becoming purposefully international. 373 Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community Finian McGinn OFM presents the challenge of multicultural diversity in religious-life communities and some directions towards resolution. Review for Religious 388 396 new life It's Summer! A Letter to Young Religious Robert P. Maloney CM encourages those who are young to enjoy and use well the gifts of this summertime of life. Emerging Forms of U.S. Religious Life Marlene Weisenbeck FSPA identifies the motivations and the relationships between charism, mission, and ministry in the formation of new communities and styles of consecrated life. 414 425 340 431 436 witnessing I Guess and Fear Donald Macdonald SMM suggests some clarity points in the midst of current confusions in religious life. Force of Habit William Jud Weiksnar OFM reflects upon the sign and symbol value of the simple brown tunic of a Franciscan. departments Prisms Canonical Counsel: General Chapters: Current Legislation Book Reviews .~uly-August 1996 prisms FVhenT/~7 is "enough" enough? It is the common question: Did you get enough to eat? enough to drink? Is the room warm (cool) enough for you? Enough is a hard concept to define in our practical living. If people's perception of their own worth as persons is tied up in their work, when have they worked long enough or hard enough? Some people find it difficult to turn over responsibility to others or "to retire." Enough seems not to have a place in their vocabulary. Others at a younger age let work consume their days and evenings and weekends. They, too, seem oblivious to the possibil-ity of freely chosen limits. We have heard the phrase "get a life" and we know that it can be a criticism to the quick for such people. Besides questions of food and drink and work and rest, enough plays a similarly difficult role in determining security. When are there more lights outside and more locks and alarm systems than we need for reasonable secu-rity? When do we have enough money for travel and its surprises and emergencies? When is there enough money put aside for care of the elderly--others or ourselves? The danger with a money-focus is, as Jesus describes in a story, that our barns are never quite big enough to hold our piled-up wealth. When we consider healthcare in the industrialized countries, we find again the difficulty of knowing when enough medical care has been called upon and when we are moving into extraordinary and sometimes minimally enhancing medical procedures. The subtlety of enough allows us morally to steer our way between the always immoral assistdd suicide and the decision to refuse any extraordinary means to prolong life. Review for Religious For each of us, in our uniqueness, to know how to live enough and move enough and have being enough remains a rich grace-gift to be prayed for. We call the gift which helps us to say "enough" Christian discernment. To be a person who discerns demands that we be people attuned to the working of God's Spirit in our lives. Discernment is not a process of decision making that we stir up on a moment's whim. When we think of people (per-haps including ourselves) as being attuned to God, we mean that they have a serious and ongoing relationship with God in prayer and in reflecting on the Scriptures and God's workings in the world. Such people find themselves growing in a sensitivity, as all lovers do, to the ways of seeing, the desires, and the ways of acting of the one loved. That kind of sensitivity is the power source of our Christian discernment. Because sensitivity is involved, it is not something we learn by rulebooks although Jesus reminds us that "I have come, not to abolish [the law and the prophets], but to fulfill them" (Mt 5:17). As we can appreciate, the process of discerning is not a sometime thing that we can blithely manage at short notice unless we are sensitized lovers of God. The dailyness of prayer and Eucharist are privileged ways for us becoming lovers growing in sensitivity. Today we seem to live with the question of Enough? in many areas of our lives, and our personal decision about enough does not come easy. We need to enter deeply into our Catholic faith and experience Jesus' promise of "another Paraclete." Yet there is one instance of enough which remains a paradox. Can we ever grow enough in God's love that our sensitivity for discernment can say "enough"? David L. Fleming SJ NOTE: On our inside front cover we provide our E-mail address. For some of our domestic and international subscribers, it may give convenient and helpful access to our editorial office. ALBERT DI IANNI Religious Life: Directions for a Future symposium part 3 Today we often hear a question seldom asked before Vatican Council II: "How is it going with your congre-gation?" And We know immediately that the questioner is interested in vocations. Nearly always the answer is: "Quite good in the third world, but bad in the first world." After thirty years of renewal efforts, the average age of most congregations founded before the 20th century is in the 60s for male l~eligious.and in the 70s for female reli-gious. Patricia Wittberg speaks of "catastrophic decline," "collapse," and "probable demise," and Markham, of "mas-sive denial." In the 1960s religious women in the United States numbered over 200,000. They have suffered a 55 percent decline and now number about 90,000. Given their average age we can expect further decline. Male reli-gious have suffered a decline of over 30 percent. We can hedge about these cold facts, but they are a cause for deep concern. A moderate decline in vocations would be man-ageable, but such a steep decline demands that we ask searching questions about the process of renewal. There are disparities within the vocation situation. In the first world, some communities are attracting significant numbers of candidates. They are the newer communities like Mother Teresa's Missionaries of Charity and the Albert Dilanni SM last wrote for us in September-October 1993. He is now superior of the Marist novitiate, Our Lady of Mercy, at 15 Notre Dame Avenue; Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140. Review for Retigio'us Legionaries of Christ. In Mexico the Legionaries are referred to as the. new Jesuits and are subjected to criticisms similar to those launched against Jesuits in an earlier age. (A new group with a similar name, Cruzados de Cristo, has sprung up in Mexico and is enjoying similar vocational success.) The Fellowship of New Religious Communities had sixty-three new Catholic congrega-tions on its 1993 mailing list. There are at least two dozen oth-ers) Most of these groups are traditional in theology, but creative in developing community structures and prayer forms and in their integration of the laity. Even in the third world, vocational growth is not homoge-neous. The .main areas of growth are sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, especially India and Indonesia. Brazil, on the other hand, is either stable or on the decline. The crucial factor seems to be that the churches of Africa and Asia, often surrounded by strong Muslim groups, tend to be more "conservative" of classical Catholic practices and spirituality, while the Brazilian church more than all others has adopted liberationist tendencies. Three Stages of Renewal I believe that we are in the second' phase of a three-step pro-cess in the renewal of religious life since Vatican II. The first step was the explosion immediately after Vatican II, an explosion pro-voked not only by the council but by the secular cultural revolu-tion. It was a time for rejecting all categories and trying to live in the in between. It was a time'of high experimentation in theology and lifestyles, of reexamination of all institutions including the family, traditional morality, and etiquette. In religious life we moved away from whatever seemed rigid, artificial, and stiflingly traditional, in favor of what seemed more dynamic, new, and life-giving. No longer defensive regarding the democratic ideals of the West, we sought to integrate them into our congregational existence. We dismantled structures that were in place for cen-turies, emphasized interpersonal dialogue and individual needs, decentralized authority, created leadership teams, redefined poverty, chastity, and obedience, abandoned institutional aposto-lates in favor of small-group work with the poor or the marginal, and reinterpreted community in terms of sharing quality time together. It was the best of times and the worst of times. It was a time of great creativity especially in the founding of new types J'ul),-./lugust 19~6 Dilanni ¯ ReligiousLife The second stage of the renewal, is the time of the winnowing fan, the stage of sober reassessment. of apostolate--Joan Chittister often stresses this and women's role in it--but also a time of great confusion, of loss of identity, of abandonment of loyalties, of many departures and few arrivals, of decline in morale and fear of the future. The second stage of the renewal, in which we presently find ourselves, is the time of the winnowing fan, the stage of sober reassessment. Recent books and articles from all "over the ideo-logical spectrum are calling for self-criticism and evaluation of the directions taken .by the renewal: Avery Dulles, Elizabeth McDonough, Joan Chittister, Patricia Wittberg, Martin Tripole, Mary Jo Leddy, Judith Merkle, David Nygren and Miriam Ukeritis, and on and on. Almos~ all urge a move beyond the individualism apparent in the so-called "liberal" model. They speak of the need of "common vision" and a "corporate sense" and "criteria by which the validity of their lives can be measured." The authors do not agree on the solution. Some call for a deeper retrieval of the community's charism (if it has a charism); others, for a real communal commit-ment to helping the poor and the oppressed; and still others, like MaryJo Leddy and Joan Chittister, for a move beyond liberalism to something even more radical or revolutionary. The third stage in this renewal process will be, I believe, a time of greater peace, when the good features of the new have been institutionalized and its excesses discarded and Catholics once again view religious life as a way to follow Christ in a more literal way. In this symposium, however, we are still at the stage of sober reassessment, discussing whether we need to shift into a new gear and or just stay on cruise-control. I approach this challenge not in despair but in hope, a hope that arises out of reading the his-tory of religious life. Before the French Revolution (1789) there were 300,000 male religious "in Europe. Forty years after the Revolution this number had decreased by more than two-thirds to 70,000. But in the 1830s a great revival began. Some 600 new Roman Catholic religious congregations were founded in the 19th century, more than at any other period, and the actual number of religious attained historic new heights. The Jesuits, who had been suppressed from 1773 to 1814, flourished as never before. A similar reflowering is not impossible in our time. Review for Religious o The contemporary crisis of religious life has been very deep. It is related to the .attempt to restate the Christian faith for an age called postmodernity. We have been adapting with great strain to a new kind of need for God, not a God of the gaps who fills in for the weaknesses of science, but a God at the center of life, a God who provides depth of meaning and answers our ultimate concern. Directions for a Future: Background Considerations ., George Aschenbrenner SJ felt that in my 1994 book I had set down criteria that might guide a reevaluation of the renewal and an effective move to the future.2 So for the present symposium he assigned me this topic: What are the criteria for judging whether a .proposed change of direction or structure in religious life will be a profitable change? What are the signs of a good change? I have interpreted his question as asking: In what directions should we move, and why? But, before we can entertain the question of directions, some background considerations are necessary. First, we must realize that the theological backdrop to religious life has shifted dra-matically. Up to thirty years ago, all religious, irrespective of their style of life, shared a theological consensus that dated back to the early church. Whether they were hermits, monks and nuns, medieval mendicants, apostolic Jesuit-type religious, or religious of the newer 19th-century type, all religious viewed themselves as primarily engaged in saving souls, their own and those of others. Christianity in general and religious life in particular were given a mystical and eschatological interpretation and were concerned with union with God and "the four last things." Intellectual activ-ity and teaching and care of the sick were important, but were subordinate to a concern for eternal salvation, the "one thing necessary." Since Vatican II, however, chinks have appeared in this higher unity, this sacred canopy, and basic questions have been asked about the meaning of Christianity and the place of religious within it. While the media and some religious focus on controversial issues of church polity like clerical celibacy and women's ordination, the deeper questions are: How should we conceive of our relationship to God? Does salvation begin on earth? What is the meaning of the kingdom of God? Within the mystical-eschatological emphasis, the dominant metaphor for women's congregations was that of becoming a ~uly-Aug~st 1996 Dilanni ¯ Reli~ous L~e "spouse of Christ." To some people of today, this may seem intol-erably sexist, patriarchal or "kyriarchal," but the image contains a core of meaning valid for both men and women. It underscores the need for an affective union with Christ and with a personal God. Mystical language was its common coinage. Commentators spoke of "spiritual marriage" and "transforming union." Many books were written about progress in mental prayer, contempla-tion, and the three stages of the interior life. Today a hunger for spirituality is still alive among religious, witness the popularity of directed retreats and the Ignatian Exercises. It is part of what David Tracy calls an "amazing resurgence in spirituality.''3 Nevertheless, our consuming interest has been elsewhere. Whereas previously religious sought to move outward from a deep interiority, we have preferred to begin with exteriority. Like behaviorists, we have been convinced that action shapes hearts and that congregational renewal would come from movement into relevant apostolates that reexpressed our charism. The "spouse of Christ" model was criticized as a "beautiful soul" spir-ituality, and its practitioners were compared to birds preening themselves. Salvation was brought down to earth, and holiness was linked with wholeness--becoming a well-integrated person-- and with service to others. "Crazy" saints like Philip Neri (who did outlandish things out of humility) were out. The fasting of Catherine of Siena and others has been understood as "holy anorexia" (Rudolph Bell's term), a subconscious protest against male domination. Unless mortification was relational--a sacri-fice involved in one's work for others--it was conside~'ed unhealthy. Better to work for and with the poor than to fast in adoration of God. As a result, a new metaphor for religious life replaced spouse of Christ. It was the image of the prophet at the cutting edge of social and political issues,, breaking new ground in the liberation and humanization of peoples, especially through systemic change in favor of the poor and oppressed. After the Jesuits' dramatic shift toward faith and justice, the charisms of most other active congregations, no matter how diverse, were suddenly found to center on these same concerns. The Roman synod of 1971 called social justice a "constitutive" part of the Christian apostolate, and many interpreted this as meaning that it was to be a necessary component of each apostolate. Most recently, however, a reac-tion has set in. Jesuits like Avery Dulles and Martin Tripole, while Review for Religious agreeing .that social justice should be a fundamental concern of religious life, resist the notion that it is an essential ingredient of each Jesuit apostolate. It is now reported that even Pedro Arrupe SJ, its principal protagonist, had second thoughts about how it was absolutized.4 Strangely, the metaphor of religious as social prophet did not attract numbers of vocations, certainly not in the first world. Marie Augusta Neal admits this and attributes it to fear of its inherent difficulty and risks. But, historically, danger did not deter but rather whetted the appetite of people intent on the religious adventure. Nineteenth-century missionaries like St. Peter Chanel boarded rickety ships on precarious one-way trips lasting eleven months to preach to peoples who had not yet emerged from can-nibalism. Could the resistance to the new prophetic stance be due to something other than fear? Could it be that, however admirable, it is not perceived by Christian consciousness to be at the center of the religious project? In what follows I will set out three directions in which we must move in future efforts toward renewal. The first two are sociological and could apply to almost any social group or cor-porate entity. They are actually dialogues with Wittberg and with Nygren and Ukeritis, whose studies I find revealing. The third direction is theological and addresses some of the questions just raised. Directions for a Future The first direction: An effective religious community must be visible. Recent authors have sounded the alarm that religious life, especially among women, is disappearing as a visible corporate entity, as an institutional presence. Joan Chittister writes that religious communities have "done a great deal to foster the prophetic individuals in their midst," but "at the same time, they have done very little to function as prophetic groups.''5 Elsewhere she dramatizes: "Religious must ask themselves what they stand for as a congregation and who knows it, because if nobody knows it we don't stand for it." She continues: "When we stood for edu-cation, health service, and the care of innocent children, everyone knew it. When we stood for insertion of Catholics into the white Anglo-Saxon world, no one called that political, and everyone knew what we were about, Religious congregations stood as bul-j~ uly-dug~st 1996 Dilanni ¯ Religious Life warks against ignorance, illiteracy, disease, abandonment, and secularism. We turned our resources in those directions. Now we have the best-educated groups in the world, each member of which is regarded with professional respect, and the most invisi-ble congregations.''6 " This is an important point that should guide future planning. If as religious we desire truly to influence others and attract new candidates, we cannot act as disembodied spirits, noncorporeal freedoms, anti-institutional angels. We must witness not only as individuals but as a collective unity. And to do so we must be vis-ible as a collective unity. Clearly, religious were more visible as members of a group when they worked in institutional commit-ments and wore an identifiable religious habit. When they left these institutions and took on secular jobs in social service, when they declined the habit and were absorbed into the crowd, they tended to lose corporate impact of all kinds, even the new one of being socioreligious prophets. "The more its members became unidentifiable," says Wittberg, "the more difficult it became for any order, as a corporate entity, to fulfill its newly defined prophetic role.''7 Another major cause of the current invisibility of religious congregations has been our readiness to embrace contemporary democracy's postmodern move toward absolute egalitarianism and nonelitism. Eager to abdicate every hint of triumphalism, we have become levelers. This is seen in the way we have interpreted Lumen gentium's universal call to holiness, which, according to Wittberg, hit like a bombshell and robbed religious of a sense of distinctive identity. It had this effect because theologians and reli-gious interpreted it politically rather than theologically or spiri-tually. "We are all called to holiness," said the commentators, emphasizing the word all, as if the point of the doctrine were to rule out all talk about more or less effective roads to holiness or about religious life being a way of perfection aspiring to something higher. But is the political point the central thrust of the decla-ration? Should we not place less stress on the "all" and more on what we are all called to, that is, holiness? Should religious not be less worried about standing out (or failing to stand out) and more concerned about redoubling their efforts to achieve holiness within their life and lifestyle? In fact, what happened was that the idea of striving for personal holiness dropped out as the cen-tral concern for religious. Review for Religious The reason for this overemphasis on the political may be due to the church's relative inexperience with democracy and moder-nity. In her sociological study of religious orders; Wittberg con-tends that the 19th-century religious congregations, sharing the restorationist mentality of the church, never really came to grips with the modern thrust toward liberty, fraternity, and equality. Rather, these congregations retreated into a fuga mundi (flight from the world), reinstated 17th-century practices, and lived in a time warp for years. In America this was exacerbated because most religious sprang from and ° worked in isolated immigrant subcultures. It is perhaps because of this that, when Vatican II opened the doors, the congre-gations went overboard in their embrace of the new forms of participative democ-racy. We eagerly adopted its absolute horror of distinctions for fear of elitism and played down all differences between religious and laypersons. As a result we vanished as visible corporate groups purporting to be on a different road to holiness.8 But can this continue? Can the concept of religious life long endure in an atmosphere of hyper-egalitarianism? Would reli-gious life ever have sprung up at all if some persons did not desire to be different and follow Jesus in a more literal way? Wittberg describes religious life as a form of virtuoso or (less frequently) heroic religiosity. Practitioners of virtuoso religiosity are those within a religion who want to go the extra mile. They want to create a zone of intensity within the field of holiness. They p(r-ceive themselves as different and, to some degree, as exemplars. Prospective virtuosi come together, says Wittberg, "in the expec-tation that their participation will help to maintain some collective good--the health and welfare of the destitute, or the conversion of heretics, or even the establishment of a utopia of saints on earth that can serve as a beacon to others.''9 Christianity and other religions have always spawned such virtuosi. Luther dissolved the vows of the monks and declared everyone equal in the quest for holiness, but soon Protestantism was crowded with Pietists, Mennonites, and Anabaptists. Later it was the Shakers and today the Pentecostals. Recently, new virtu-osi groups have mushroomed Within Catholicism: the Legionaries of Christ, the Missionaries of Charity, the Lion ofJuda, Les Fr~res We must witness not only as individuals but as a collective unity. July-August 1996 DiIanni ¯ Religious Life de. St. Jean, the Opus Dei, the Neo-catechumenate, the Focolare, the Sant' Egidio community of Rome, Comunione e liberazione, and so forth. All model themselves on the early Christian com-munity in Acts or the seventy disciples commissioned by Jesus (Lk 10), both of which seem to represent Christianity lived in its highest purity. Like the early Christians, these new groups believe that forming Christians is not easy, but requires being challenged to live one's baptism; requires a formation process, a "way" (some form of RCI& program), a sustaining community, and a partici-pative liturgy. We must accept the fact that as religious we desire to be dif-ferent and follow Christ in a distinctive way. If we are to influence others, to witness as prophets, our commitment must be in some way public and Visible. If this is perceived as a higher way, so be it. Chalk it up to diversity. We cannot blur all distinctions out of a fear of elitism. All groups that aspire for something more are in danger of elitism and must be warned against it, but their enthu-siasm should not be crushed. Members of religious congregations purport to live their Christianity in a way that is differently orga-nized, more regulated, more intense, and at times more difficult than that of other Christians. They will have an impact on oth-ers to the degree that their sacrifice is real and their corporate witness is visible. Whether through all this they always succeed in becoming men and women of God is another question. The second direction: Effective religious community should be inten-tional as opposed to merely associational, and this demands a transcen-dent corporate goal and adequate commitment mechanisms. An intentional community is a community with a purpose for the sake of which members are willing to make significant sacri-fices of their individual preferences. Examples are sports teams and the military. An intentional community is different from an associational community, which admits a plurality of goals and calls for a lesser degree of sacrificing of individual preferences. Intentional communities have a strong sense of direction. This is due to at least two things: a transcendent corporate cause and a set of commitment mechanisms, that is, common sacrificial prac-tices that reinforce commitment at a level deeper than rational persuasion. We will consider these two elements in turn. A transcendent corporate goal: Discussing visibility, we have already dealt with the need for a goal, for being clear on where the Review for Religious group stands. Here I make the further point that the goal must be one that transcends the community itself. I say this because some authors seem to believe that the goal of a community can be inter-nal to ~the community itself. Edwin Keel and Susan Beaudry, for example, propose a third ruling metaphor for religious life, beyond those of the spouse of Christ and prophecy. For them, religious life is best presented under the image of a journey together toward God. They maintain that "what religious have been seeking, whether they realize it or not, and what religious community can offer, is neither surrogate family life, nor friendship, nor the intio macy~of small groupings, but faith companionship on the spiritual journey." 10 They describe the common spiritual journey in terms of a discovery of one's personal vocation before God and an integra-tion of it with that of others. Spiritual maturity is achieved by getting in touch with what Jung calls the Self, which lies deeper than the ego and is the place where we truly meet God. The old perfection model of holiness with its rigid rules tended to flat-ten individual differences and to foster immaturity. The journey image with its new and democratic skills--province assemblies, mission statements, corporate reflection processes, confrontation techniques (all now permanent parts of religious life)--may seem messier, but is psychologically healthier. Community life is like a family going on a trip in a crowded van, constantly negotiating, sometimes bickering, always arriving, never reaching. Some of these spiritual-journey elements are valuable; but I wonder whether the journey can be the dominant metaphor of religious life. Does it not tempt us to remain in an associational model of community, which, to believe tl~e experts, does not endure beyond one generation?I' Does it not come too close to what Gerald Arbuckle has called the "therapeutic" community? Can it generate the needed intensity and direction? For all the benefits of psychology, are not psychological self-absorption and an overly intense regard for the internal aspects of community part of the cause of our present decline? Wittberg says, "'The dominant language of religious life., shifted from theological constructs to social and psychological paradigms,' that were inad-equate to explain what was distinct or desirable about the lifestyle."~2 This has gone so far that in some congregations com-munity members who desire entry into a new local community must first present a written evaluation of themselves from the July-August 1996 Dilanni ¯ Religious Life community they are leaving. In other congregations the .concern for personal autonomy and consensus has at times resulted in the election of effete leaders at the local level. Is there nota middle ground between the not-in-touch-with-their-feelings religious of the past and some present-day religious who have become too self-involved as individuals or as community? In order to form an intentional community, people must come together for the sake of a cause that transcends both themselves and their experience of journeying together. A clearly articulated spiritual or apostolic vision and ideal must draw them on. Each member must partially relinquish his or her personal, vocation in favor of the vocation of the congregation. One's personal project must be trimmed in favor of the community proiect, Older reli-gious tell stories of pioneer days in schools and hospitals when they roomed together in classrooms and toiled almost slave hours. They may stress the pain and suffering, but from the glee with which they tell the stoW we know they would not have exchanged it for the world. Their reward lies in having been part of some-thing greater thanthemselves, protagonists together in a great religious adventure. Commitment mechanisms: Historically, intentional religious groups have been sustained in their resolve not only by clear tran-scendent goals but also by a number of practices that sociologists call commitment mechanisms. These are practices, customs, or rituals that reinforce motivation by solidifying the affective ties between the members. Sociologist Benjamin Zablocki contends that the commitment mechanisms discarded by congregations after Vatican II were actually essential for community survival.~3 The primary types of commitment mechanisms were first developed in the monasteries and then adapted to other forms of religious life. They are (1) common rules and rituals, (2) boundary maintenance, (3) shared sacrifices, and (4) mortification practices. 1. Common rules or rituals include the daily horarium and schedule, spiritual exercises, meals :in common, reading at meals, and grand silence. They are found in the constitutions and in books of customs. 2. Boundary-maintenance mechanisms Fiave the purpose of maintaining a clear distinction between members of the group and other people. Examples of such mechanisms are: wearing a common habit, living together in cloistered convents, bestowing new names, and reducing the visits of family and outsiders. (Today Review for Religious the lack of vocations has spawned the phenomenon of associative membership, which renders the boundaries more fluid and lessens the sense of identity. Most recently commentators are beginning to bemoan an excessive fluidity. Their plea is that such a religious congregation cannot long endure unless there is a strong core group of full-fledged members who are strongly distinguished from others.) 3. Shared sacrifices arise out of involvement in common works of the congregation. Historically there was no stronger source of cohesion than shared sacrifices in behalf of an institute's common apostolates. 4. Mortification practices include such customs as culpas, the chapter of faults, receiving monition, fasting on certain days, taking the discipline, wearing a common habit, and wearing a veil. These worked to strip off an old identity in favor of a new one and in the process helped to cement people into a higher unity. In reviewing these mechanisms I am in no way advocating a return to all or to any of them. On the other hand, religious life cannot prosper without some structures that reinforce motivation at the affective level. To move beyond individualism we need to invent common rituals and symbols that speak to us at the level of the subcon-scious. We cannot build community by teaching a charism only conceptually while leaving it to each member to embody it in his or her own way. If our religious life has no face, our communities will end up being only comfortable hotels. In replacing outdated commitment mechanisms, we must employ new psychological insights and provide adequate room for personal differences. But these new mechanisms must have some relation to past ones. In creating them we must carefully study the older structures to see what purpose they had in the mind of the founder, to discover what aspect of the charism they expressed. The new structures must be more suited to our times, but they must also connect with and incarnate the charism and spirituality of the institute. The role of the superior is a commitment mechanism of tra-ditional religious life that is not often mentioned. We must admit, People must come together for the sake of a cause that transcends both themselves and their experience of journeying together. ~dy-AuKtwt 1996 Dilanni ¯ Religious Life however, that nothing worked better to reinforce collective unity than Mother Superior. The traditional superior, especially when he or she was also the founder, was considered a voice of God. Today, conversely, some 75 percent of religious communities of women have no superior in any traditional sense. Mother Superior has been replaced by the "director" or "animator" or by a "lead-ership team." Such language, it seems to me, confuses two dif-ferent realities, authority and leadership. The first is the attribute of an office; the second, the quality of a person. In some congregations the role of superior has been largely taken over by an appointed middle-management bureaucracy with tendencies to perpetuate itself.~4 One sister has written to me say-i. ng, "Our best leaders are in our cemetery." Without desiring to turn back the clock, I ask: Was there a resonance present in the traditional role of superior that has been lost? If past superiors were legalistic and overbearing, were the best of them not the true spiritual leaders that We still hanker for? Were they not per-sons who loved the congregation and its charism and knew how to stir hearts and shape a vision? Commitment mechanisms are making a comeback in the new congregations and in the new lay religious movements in Europe and Latin America. The Neo-catechumenate, for example, invites members into a "way" (camino), which comprises certain distinct steps, a kind of RCIA for Catholics, through which each mem-ber must pass before they are considered "formed Christians." Some of their techniques involve confrontation and mutual crit-icism. New seminaries using Neo-catechumenal techniques, all called Redemptoris Mater, are springing up in many parts of the world. The Sant' Egidio lay community of Rome invites its mem-bers to sung vespers and a commentary on the Scripture every evening. Many religious congregations use directed retreats and the renewed thirty-day Ignatian Exercises as a more personalized form of commitment mechanism. Other communities have intro-duced formal faith-sharing sessions, a kind of lectio divina in which members Ponder scripture passages or the constitutions together and then discuss them. Patricia Wittberg suggests that it might be profitable to explore the new religious movements to see how traditional Catholic frameworks for "religious virtuos-ity are being reworked, whether consciously or unconsciously. ¯ in order to address the assumptions and values of the late-20th-and early-21 st-century American culture." 1~ Review for Religiou~ Visibility, intentionality, a clear and transcendent goal, and some commitment mechanisms--these are the sociological aspects necessary to be effective as a group. For Wittberg, their lack has been the major reason why the new metaphor of religious as reli-gious prophets has not truly taken hold. Ithas failed to galvanize religious communities, she believes, because contemporary indi-vidualism and pluralism have been allowed to dominate religious life. As a good sociologist, she remains neutral with regard to the desirability of the new metaphor itself. I wonder, however, if this goes far enough. Are there not other and deeper reasons why the new metaphor of religious prophet has not really caught on? If prophecy means being on the cutting edge, the question remains: On the cutting edge of what? of politics? of social betterment? of all this, plus something more? I accept and welcome the model of prophecy, but I do question its content as expounded by many religious at the pres-ent time. I believe that the prophet must identify the deepest assumptions of the age and try to respond to its deepest hungers. Have we; aspiring religious prophets, truly engaged our culture at its deepest levels? This brings me to my third and last statement of direction. Third direction: Effective religious community demands a concept of prophecy that engages the surrounding culture at its deepest levels and responds to its most profound hungers. Wittherg and others believe that because of restorationism the 19th-century church and its many new religious orders did not come to grips with the problems of modernity. My question is: In the prophetic model as currently understood, do we do so even now? I concur with Nygren and Ukeritis, who say that those con-gregations will be revitalized that are "rooted in their relationship with God, and that, in a spirit of fidelity to their founding purpose and responsiveness to absolute human need, confront the current gap between Gospel and the culture.''16 1 agree with Chittister's formal principle that religious congregations must "release every-where in society, at every level, through every individual member, wherever the members are, and whatever separate things they do, the white heat of those congregations' charism in one great cor-porate mind and one easily seen communal heart.''17 We must engage the dominant first-world culture and do so as corporate .t~uly-August 1996 Dilanni ¯ Religious Life entities. We cannot run from it or remain indifferent. But, because we are religious, we must be careful to engage it at its deepest levels and not merely superficially. Historically, religious life flourished precisely when it was perceived as countering a culture's expressed values while answer-ing its deepest hungers. St. Francis of Assisi attracted followers, not because he was in conformity with his times, but because he challenged his times and in this way spoke to its heart of hearts. As we move toward the future, we must ask ourselves: What are the deepest hungers of our culture? Judith Merkle says that "the question which faces religious congregations today is what aspect of reality has the power to most deeply call us to life." 18. This is really the same question, for we are part of our culture, and our own deepest hungers will not differ much from those of the general culture. Some authors answer this question by insisting that we will be called to life by moving away from individualism and becoming a transformative community bent on creating a better world. In their eyes, the deepest need of contemporary culture is to achieve better rela-tionship with the poor, the oppressed, and the marginal; and this will be achieved by eradicating unjust social structures and oppos-ing oppressive ideologies like patriarchy, sexism, and racism. But is such a project sufficient? Is it at the center of religious prophecy? Is it where we address the deepest needs of our culture? Certainly, many of these ethical issues are important. They are a response to Gaudium et spes and in tune with the attempt of the-ologians to develop a more earth-centered interpretation of the kingdom. This new notion of the kingdom does not contradict the traditional view, but complements it. It asks us not to allow our desire for heaven to blind us to our duty to extirpate crass injus-tices in this world. In this view, the kingdom is not only a future heaven but the actual presence of God's power for transforming the world. So the religious project, the kingdom, has two loci. But, in many religious congregations, has the sociopolitical not become the solitary day-to-day focus? Is this not why the so-called prophetic model attracts so few first-world candidates? Have we not gone the route of liberal Protestantism, which in its social-gospel emphasis is fast losing ground to the Pentecostals and Evangelicals? In their nonparticipation and shifts of loyalty, are not lay Christians trying to tell us something? Review for Religious Can a religious congregation survive if its primary, all-inclu-sive goal is to solve complex and intractable social and moral issues? I doubt it. This is so especially when, in practice if not in theory, God is reduced to being a ground for human generativity or creativity in the social arena. Sociopolitical issues are impor-tant and can even be construed as religious in nature, but they are not at the center of the religious project. The center of the religious project is clear and simple: to affirm the existence and the love of God. This is true especially in our times, in which the major event has been the "death of God," the conviction that the idea of God is either meaningless or even detrimental. The first attitude comes from the side of science and the second from an existential-ist philosophy of life. The scientific picture as taught in many universities is one of a world that evolved by sheer chance from a big bang to con-scious, reflective beings. If through some. accident all conscious beings are destroyed, the Godless universe would be bereft of consciousness, and being would be a perpetual winter, In the sci-entistic worldview, sheer chance takes the place of God, and human life is voided of any objective meaning or purpose. Moral ¯ systems' become games contrived by human 'beings to bring about the maximal satisfaction of desires while avoiding conflict. The moral game is born of an enlightened egoism. For existentialists, following Nietzsche, religion must be ban-ished because it is repressive and life-denying and robs us of rad-ical freedom. It imposes an objective moral system that does not allow us to create values. We must choose between a life of free-dom and a God of enslavement. "Man dies at the touch of the Absolute," says Merleau-Ponty. One way in which existentialist atheism shows up in our culture is in its penchant for absolutiz-ing choice. No matter how dire the consequences, Americans will plump for choice on any issue. If there is no God, then each indi-vidual can be God, not only in general but at every moment and in every decision. This combination of scientific atheism and an existentialist absolutizing of individual power and choice has given rise, as Nietzsche predicted, to a sense of meaninglessness, to nihilism, to The center of the religious project is clear and simple: to affirm the existence and the love of God. July-August 1996 DiIanni ¯ Religious Life the banalizing of life, to the "unbearable lightness of being," The death of God has ushered in the death of man (and woman). Choosing and consuming, consuming and choosing, modern men and women are stranded on the anorexia-bulimia line--on the endless shuttle between fullness and emptiness." Is this all there is?" they ask. And many teenagers commit suicide or random murder, and others just keep on dancing. "Even more than athe-ism," says Walter Kasper, "the nihilism that flows from atheism is the real mark of the age."~9 This nihilism or voiding of meaning has its positive side. It is the modern expression of the hunger for God. It is in providing a lived response to this hunger that contemporary religious life will achieve its true prophetic role. Beyond all else, religious life must be a drumbeat proclaiming that God exists, that God's love for us through Jesus is unconditional, that it sustains us in suffering and continues beyond our death. The way for religious to engage the surrounding culture effectively is to witness that, far from crush-ing life, God alone gives it ultimate meaning and sense. I believe that at least two things must be retrieved by religious to help them achieve this truly religious end: interiority and, along .with it, an ardent desire to relate to the personal God who transcends the world. By interiorityI mean a new emphasis on the life of prayer and reflection and on being teachers of the spiritual life. Pierre Hadot, a French historian of philosophy, is influencing sophisticated the-ologians like David Tracy into bringing spirituality into the cen-ter of theology. He criticizes modern theology for its sharp division between theory and spiritual practice. Hadot insists that, unlike people of earlier times and of non-Western cultures, we Western moderns have not allowed theology to express itself in spiritual exercises. The old Stoics had spiritual exercises for com-ing into contact with the Logos, and this was one reason why Simone Weil loved the Stoics. The modern segmenting of the-ology and praxis--seen, for example, in the dropping of devo-tions since Vatican II--is one reason for the deep hunger for spirituality today. R~ligious must once again emphasize growth in personal holiness and speak to people about their experience of prayer, about their interior praxis with God. Our formation pro-grams must not fail to impart a sense that each person has 'a spir-itual life in which it is possible to make progress through prayer. Joan Chittister is correct when she insists that we cannot "confuse work with prayer, good intentions with the spiritual life:''2° Review for Religious We must regain a sense of the personal God who transcends the world, but with whom we can enter into intimate union. In a 1989 America article I spoke of our need to love God as well as our neighbor and said that the love of God cannot be totally expressed through neighbor love, Several weeks later, in a letter to the edi-tor, J. Robert Hilbert sJ wrote that "one must be careful" in draw-ing a distinction between love of God and love of neighbor. "God," he says, "is not an 'other' in the sense of a categorical object to be spoken of in parallel with other objects of my knowl-edge and love. It is rather precisely in God's transcendentality as the absolute Other that love of God and love of neighbor come together in a unique and necessary oneness.''2~ I do not know if such talk of God as the "absolute Other" does the job of maintaining the necessary balance between the immanence and transcendence of God. I am sure, however, that in their return to spirituality contemporary Christians are rebelling against attempts to blur the distinction between the love of God and the love of neighbor, even though both are absolutely necesshry and intimately intertwined. Classically God has been conceived of as higher than and dis-tinct from the world, a Creator who does not need us but who loves us even beyond our death and asks us to requite that love. In ~our effort to rethink the notion of God in a way acceptable to modernity, we must avoid the danger of turning God into some underlying catalyst for our doing :good, an ~lan vital or wisdom force. In the last thirty years, so many theologians liberationists, feminists, process theologians, all striving to develop an idea of a God who is intrinsic to our lives--may have fallen into just this trap, Have they not carried too far the idea that we are God's project for social betterment, that in some Hegelian way the Absolute is working through our creativity to achieve a world of peace and justice? I have two problems with the current political and this-worldly interpretations of the kingdom. The first is with the type of pol-itics it generally espouses, and the second with the primacy of politics itself. ¯ First, does not the particular type of politics espoused by some religious carry a great deal of questionable ideological baggage? A "politically correct" reading is .given to work with the poor and oppressed. The abortion question is often studiously avoided. Feminist publications of the most radical sort are taken seriously. 3~uly-August 1996 Dilanni ¯ Religious Life Environmentalism is fast becoming a new religion among some religious, while they fail to realize that it has become extremely big business filling many already fat pockets. A listening ear is not lent to the arguments of those who distinguish between good and bad ways of helping the poor, arguments presented in thoughtful books like Marvin Olasky's Tragedy of American Compassion. And yet anybody who is truly concerned about the poor should also be attentive to the ways in which, with the best of motives, we may be locking them into a perpetual victimhood. But, beyond these particular issues, I think there is an overem-phasis on the sociopolitical in general. Social justice and the fos-tering of the earthly kingdom is not the whole gospel nor even the center of it. The hunger for another justice beyond social justice is never altogether absent from the human heart, Social justice is important, of course, because it is the minimum, upon which an earthly Christian community can be built. When it is dramat-ically absent, we cannot remain passive. When it is dramatically absent for many years for great numbers of people, it can for a time even be a consuming passion. But we must be careful that the gospel not be totally reduced to it. For the fact remains that we die eventually and that no program of social justice exists that can prevent our death or provide meaning to our dying. Beyond social justice, the church must have something to say also, perhaps especially, to those who are about to conclude their earthly life.22 Most religious, no matter how radical their politics, do retain a strong belief in a transcendent and personal God and a faith in the resurrection of the dead. But often this does not appear to be the main focus of their life and action. Unsure of the existence~ of the devil, many religious are very adept at naming the demonic. They are sure that sin has changed and we now better understand what constitutes real sin and real virtue, Evil, they think, is not located primarily in personal sins of commission, but in 'political and economic structures and in the sins of omission that keep these structures in place. Along with this perception, they have the conviction that the new technological possibilities available to us bring new responsibilities. Thus, they are fond of repeating that, since it is now possible for the first time to feed everyone, we have a special duty to create political structures and delivery sys-tems to implement this possibility. There is doubtless much to be said in favor of this, but, religiously speaking, it contains little that is new. Systemic and structural change is simply a new aspect Review for Religious that the perennial Christian demand of love of neighbor and of the stranger has assumed today. There remains the caveat of humility: that we not think we possess the answers to complex structural problems of politics and economics and that we curb the thought that we can ever build utopia on earth. In spite ofmy theoretical recognition of social justice's impor-tance and in spite of my practical efforts, past and present, in behalf of civil rights and of the poor, I believe that, from a reli-gious point of view, the social project remains ,superficial. Metaphysically, it is ultimately uninteresting. Cornel West, the brilliant black theology professor at Harvard Divinity School, often discusses social issues on Boston television. One day he was especially aroused and ended his speech with: "My brothers and sisters, this is the real important stuf!!" I shook my head and thought: Millions of people are dead and everyone is going to die. How can a theologian give such ultimate importance to this transient consciousness show we call the world? I am more in tune with Wilfrid Duffy SM, a priest-poet friend of mine afflicted with Parkinson's, whom I took to visit Michelangelo's statue of Moses in Rome. Disappointed with Moses' worldly appearance, he wrote a poem called "The Death of Moses" which ends with these words: ~ There was no dirge-- Just hard marble, noble features, Well-spaced fingers and toes, a certain strength, and some magnificence. But no d~sert; no voice of God, Unless I was not listen.ing. Perhaps it was I who had died. In the sociopolitical vision of the kingdom as practiced by some, where is the magic Of Bernini's sculpture of St. Teresa of Avila in rapture with God? What is the meaning of fasting, prayer, personal mortification, the Eucharist, confession, the drama of conversion and grace, justification, of Jacob wrestling with an angel? Interiority and mystery seem to get short shrift in the cur-rent version of the prophetic vision, as do original sin and personal sanctification and, yes, even ultimate salvation. Have we learned the Marxist lesson too well? Annette Pelletier IHM asks some poignant questions in this regard. "Have any., of the adaptations since Vatican II pro-claimed to the people of God the basic message that grace works? yuly-August 1996 Dilanni ¯ Reli~ousLife Politics, justice, and even morality cannot be the absolute center of the religious-life agenda. What else will or can ever change the present identity crisis of consecrated persons and their various congregations into an opportunity for reform, revitalization, and renewal if not the power of Mystery to fascinate but also to convert? Has this pri-mal experience of the Judeo-Christian tradition fallen by the way-side?" She continues: "Since Vatican II, adaptation and renewal have bridged the gap between the world and the consecrated life, but of what metal has that bridge been forged? Could it be that in bridging the gap an essential element of the identity of persons consecrated to God some-how got lost? What credible and clear evi-dence do religious women and men give to show that contact with the Holy somehow, mysteriously, does make a difference?" She quotes Richard Fragomeni saying that "the Christian tradition ultimately stands in silence before the operation of grace, the wonder of surprise, and the movement of a power beyond that of human consciousness and performance.''23 To be truly prophetic in the religious sense, religious life requires an integration of these two points of view about the king-dom-- the mystical-eschatological and the sociopsychological-- both of which have their roots in the gospel. The first rightly stresses the need for a mystical union with God' in this life and the hope for ultimate union with God hereafter. The first com-mandment, said Jesus, is that we love God with our whole heart. On the other hand, the Jesus we meet in prayer and in the Scriptures is the very embodiment of a God of compassion. Jesus reveals that Yahweh is not a "generic" God (Brueggemann), but a God who is interested in justice. To be involved with the God of Jesus is to be involved with the poor and the marginal of this world. We cannot be satisfied with urging them to suffer in the hope of an eternal reward in heaven. And yet secularism remains the deepest problem of the dom-inant culture, and it is at the center of the religious project. It is in grappling with this aspect of our culture that religious ,;rill truly and most deeply engage it. The deconstructionists are hard at work trying to be rid of all "metanarratives," and the pragma-tists are banishing any attempt to ground any~statement as true, A valedictorian at Harvard recently said: "At Harvard they teach Review for Religious you that you can hold any value you want, as long as you don't hold it to be true." Television is not far behind. It continues to dis-place the deep and serious with celebrity, with hi-tech gossip, and with the tolerance morality of the talk shows. I strongly applaud Joan Chittister's suggestion that we must be corporately visible, but the principal goals she sets--educating the world about °the new social questions of the age, about sexism, racism, the environment, and multiculturalism, about the whole agenda of political correctness--all remain at the level of politics and sometimes debatable politics. There is justice and justice. Politics, justice, and even morality cannot be the absolute center of the religious-life agenda. But coming to grips with an atheis-tic secularism can, for it is a directly theological and religious issue. What is more countercultural, to say that we are going to save planet Earth or to say that Jesus rose from the dead and that this makes all the difference? Which answers our deepest and most ultimate concerns? Which, metaphysically speaking, and which, from a religious point of view, is more interesting? Perhaps the last thirty years of religious life have been fruit-ful after all. With T.S. Eliot we may be able now to cease our exploration, return home, anddiscover the place for the first time. For in thirty years we have changed and perhaps only now have the wisdom to plan a renewal and a future. In our planning for the 21st century, can we not truly join action and contemplation, this-worldly love and the inystical-eschatological--envisage, that is, a close friendship between oneself as prophet and oneself as spouse of Christ? And can we not then send them both off on a splendid quest that we might call, according to the metaphor Qf Keel and Beaudry, "a journey together toward God"? Notes * See Patricia Wittberg, The Rise and Fall of Catholic Religious Orders (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 269. 2 See Albert DiIanni, Religious Life as Adventure (Staten Island: Alba House, 1994). 3 William R. Burrows's interview with David Tracy in America, 14 October 1995, p. 16. 4 See Martin R. Tripole, "The Roots of Faith-and-Justice: Critical Assessment," Review for Religious 54, no. 5 (September-October 1995): passim. s Joan Chittister, "Religious Life Today: Response to Kerkhofs," Religious Life Review 32, no. 4' (1993): 203. Dilanni ¯ Religious Life 6 Joan Chittister, "Religious Orders," National Catholic Reporter, 18 February 1994, p. 16. 7 Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. 239. s The findings of Nygren and Ukeritis also seem to confirm that the flight to democracy was not well thought out: "Assumption~ regarding the applicabilit~ of democratic forms of governance to religious life were made with little or no conversation regarding the appropriateness of this move. Centuries-old notions of obedience were dismissed and replaced with concepts such as ,listening to the Spirit' which, while challenging, lack a history of experience to provide a context that produces consis-tency in form or process" (David Nygren and Miriam Ukeritis, The Future of Religious Orders in the United States [FORUS] [Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993], p. 240). 9 Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. 27. ,0 Edwin L. Keel SM and Susan Beaudry PM, "Journeying to God Together," Review for Religious 53, no. 3 (May-June 1994): 441. 1, See Elizabeth McDonough, "The Past Is Prologue: Quid Agis?" Review for Religious 51, no. 1 (January-February 1992): 82, and also Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. 193. ,2Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. 256. 13 See Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. xi. 14On developments of this sort, see Elizabeth McDonough, "Beyond the Liberal Model: Quo Vadis?" Review for Religious 50, no. 2 (March- April 1991), pp. 172-173 and 176-177, and her "Past Is Prologue," pp. 79- 82. In the latter article she is using material from Patricia Wittberg, Creating a Future for Religious Life (New York: Paulist Press, 1991). ,s Wittberg, Rise and Fall, p. 270. ,6 .Nygren and Ukeritis, FORUS, p. 244. ,7 Chittister, "Religious Orders," p. 16. 18 Judith A. Merkel, Committed by Choice (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992), p. 54. ,9 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p. ll. 20 Chittister, "Religious Orders," p. 17. 2,America, 2 September 1989, p. 127. 22 It is unjust to ask some to struggle to the death for a future utopia to be enjoyed only by others in the future. Even the Marxist philosopher Theodore Adorno was exercised by this problem and insisted that there must also be a justice for the dead. 23 Annette M. Pelletier, "Fascination with the Holy--and Conversion," Review for Religious 53, no. 4 (July-August 1994): 562-563,565. Review for Religious JANET MALONE Internationality: ConsciousnessRaising and Conversion nternationality in religious congregations has a price, and .l. congregations that in recent years have called themselves inter-national are now in the various stages of conversion requisite to being purposefully international or what Catherine Harmer has called intentionally international. At this point it is important for them to keep their eyes open to internationality's richness, for the changes and conversion that are requisite to being truly interna-tional bring the difficulties--the price--very much to the fore. Ways of Coping Change can be scary, and becoming an international congre-gation has been quite difficult for many communities, to the point where certain resistances have surfaced as ways of coping with this new "crisis." In working with such congregations, I have noted various ways of coping. Some groups want to downplay the full connotation of internationality in its mission sense of supra-nationality even when in fact, with acceptance and incorporation of some different cultures and nationalities, a new congregational culture has already come into being that, in many ways, goes well beyond being the mere sum of its older and newer parts. Other congregations that have called themselves international by reason of their physical expansion into other nations now deal Janet Malone CND wrote "Coming Home: The Journey Within" for our May-June 1995 issue. Her address is 24-1002 Dufferin Avenue; Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; S7H 2C1 Canada. ~uly-August 1996 Malone ¯ Internationality with subtle and varying aspects of resistance throughout their congregations. In still other congregations, the resistance has been quite subtle, with efforts by some members to have their congregations refer to themselves, not as "international," but as "multicultural" or "intercultural" or as congregations "with an international character." Some congregations seem ready to rescind the appellation of internationality because of the cost in terms of both personal and corporate conversion. They would justify this retrograde step by emphasizing that they are not really international because they are present in only.a few other nations. On the other hand, if a congregation purposefully decides to become or to remain an international one, it most likely must go through, both personally and corporately, an actual step-by-step process of conversion. This involves consciousness raising. The Process of Consciousness Rai sing In this article I want to highlight the different stages of con-sciousness raising. Being consciously aware of these stages can help change "hearts of stone to hearts of flesh" (Ez 36:26) in the process of becoming purposefully international. In my January- February 1992 article "Internationality--At What Price?" I spoke about conversion; herein I shall elaborate on what I now see as the intermediate steps of consciousness raising in the conversion process. Sometimes the dominant culture is replaced by another group's culture with the result that the oppressed become the oppressor. When that happens, a congregation--using power in a way that creates scarcity, and marginalization--plays'the game of musical chairs. Whether the oppression is conscious or not, those with power marginalize others and continue the injustice. It is normal for there to be resistances, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes as a congregation becomes truly international, for various members are at different stages of consciousness awareness (and conversion) in their own. enculturation, acculturation, and inculturation. It has been my experience in worki.'ng with inter-national groups that resistance to change in the form of preju-dices and stereotypes comes from very sincere people who feel threatened by the unknown and wonder how the proposed changes will affect them. Like most things in life, consciousness Review for Religious raising does not happen all at once. Rather, it is a process of awareness and evaluation of hitherto unperceived injustices that preclude the changes necessary for conversion. The rhythm of consciousness raising is different for different individuals, and it holds a particular challenge for those in lead-ership roles in a congregation. These need to be somewhat com-fortable with the unknown, with taking risks. Only then can they encourage the members to take some requisite steps toward becoming comfortable with the attitudinal and structural changes that can eliminate subtle oppressions of which many members may be quite unaware. In so doing, they model equality and mutuality. Consciousness raising he.lps to bring about real change in the attitudes of individuals and in congregational structures that reflect the dominant culture. Consciousness raising gradually brings a group to an honest evaluation of the ways of being and doing in the group that, in many instances, are distinctive of the domi-nant, founding group. Such an evaluation can then lead to the necessary changes in praxis. Stages of Consciousness Raising Adapting the work of Gaylor and Fitzpatrick, I will now high-light six differeht stages of consciousness raising in congregations becoming purposefully international. Not linear, these six stages in consciousness raising tend to overlap in a helical fashion. The first stage, the "no big deal" stage, is characterized by per-plexity and sometimes denial that there is a problem, This can be experienced by both sides of the internationality challenge: those who are the majority and see no oppression whatsoever and those who--unaware of it or only minimally aware--are the receivers of such oppression. Thus, there can be outright denial of the injustice and dismissal of any claims of it or a trivializa-tion of the injustice. For example, in a mixed-language group where there is "whisper" translation, people in the majority group may interrupt a minority speaker in midsentence and demand immediate translation. On the other hand, members of the major-ity group may carry on a full conversation among themselves while translation is being provided for the minority group. Members of a majority find it difficult to see this kind of problem even when it is pointed out. The minority group may see this as ,the way things have always been and display a certain ffuly-August 1996 Malone ¯ Internationality passivity or resignation. In both instances there is no awareness or almost none in this "~no big deal" stage. If, however, a congrega-tion is really serious about its internationality, then each language group, regardless of numbers, deserves a sacred space to under-stand and be understood. At this stage, discrepancies between the majority's demands and the needs of the minority can be trivialized by the majority with such statements as "Oh, it wasn't intentional" and by the minority with "They don't mean to be rude." In both instances there is no consciousness or only a minimal awareness of injustices and oppression, subtle or otherwise. The second, "eye-opening" stage occurs when a member of either group, the majority or the minority, experiences such types of oppression with some discomfort. Itis very easy here to revert back to the "no big deal" stage, but at .this second stage both groups can see previously status-quo experiences in a new light. Consciousness is being raised; as Ecclesiastes 3 observes, the "sea-son" for it has come. Experiences that were seen as normal are now evaluated some-what differently. Still, this evaluation is fragile. If, as a member of the dominant group, I am not much impressed by this new eval-uation, then I. may become ambivalent and protective of the sta-res quo. If I am a member of the minority group, I may not speak out on an injustice for fear of being rejectedand labeled a trou-blemaker. Members of the majority may realize for the first time that they refer to a minority group from a developing nation as "cute" and "innocent," with "so much to learn." In this stage they come to a deeper insight into what they are really saying. The third, "on the fence" stage is that point where, although: individuals or groups in an international congregation now se,e unequivocally the injustices within the congregation towards cer-tain groups, they still do not have the courage to "walk their talk." They still try to curry favor with both sides. Being "on the fence," they maneuver between the two sides without taking a firm stand on the side of the oppressed. Although it is important to see both sides of any situation, still it is critical at certain times to get "off: the fence." The warn-ing of Jesus about being lukewarm resounds here. For example, in a congregation which has called itself international, a particular group lobbies to change that term to something like intercultural because it thinks, that will solve the discontent of some of the Review for Religious majority group. Without a critical analysis of the issues involved, many congregation members may stay "on the fence" and not try to explore possible resistances underneath. The fourth, "coming home" stage of consciousness raising is that point where an individual or a group in the international congregation moves to making public various convictions on issues integral to internationality. It is the point where the personal convictions expressed heretofore only in safe, private spaces are now shared in more public places within the congregation, although still in rather circumspect ways. This stage is both diffi-cult and challenging because "the medium becomes the message." For example, a per-son or a group may submit to the congre~ gational leadership a proposal for specific structural changes to enhance the congre-gation's internationality. The private has become public, but not as yet within the public forum of a chapter or assembly of the total congregation. The fifth, "passion" stage of conscious-ness raising is a .more integrated stage involving both head and heart. Persons immediately come to mind who have had a passion for certain truths: "I have a dream."; "Ask not what your country can do for you."; "Go and gather up the drops of blood . " This stage challenges individuals and groups to lace their reasoned and dispassionate discourse with some emotion, such as anger at instances of oppression and injustice. When expressed construc-tively and nonviolently, such anger can be an energy and .catalyst for change. For example, at international meetings where an impasse has been reached because of fears and resistances, a spe-cial meeting might be called to get at these fears and blocks to any change. The danger here can be that the only interventions rec-ognized in the group are those which focus solely on "defini-tions," "constitutions," and "canon law." The challenge is to get underneath the words to the energy of the emotions. Only when the stories of personal experiences around such feelings are shared is there any movement in the group toward some deeper con-scious awareness. Members of the majority may realize that they refer to a minority group from a developing nation as "cute" and "innocent," with "so much to learn." Malone ¯ Internationality Patience and waiting are also critically important in this stage; planting the seeds of change and waiting for them to blossom is what being prophetic is all about. It is the process of going from "mine" to "ours." For example, an important component of being international is to have an international communications office and journal, both of which are grassroots and decentralized so that inculturation can gradually occur from the bottom up. It may take some time for that dream to move from being "mine" to "ours" in an international group because of many different variables, some of which may be subtle efforts to hold on to the status quo. The sixth and last stage, "acceptance/appropriation/incorpora-tion," is the crux of consciousness raising. It is that season in the life of a congregation where being international is not just the decision of a chapter or decision-making body. Rather, it is the season where internationality is the lived reality in the group. Such acceptance/appropriation/incorporation leads to a sense of equality and mutuality in the congregation and is reflected in both personal and corporate attitudinal and structural changes. Personal Conversion Having surveyed the stages of consciousness raising about biases, prejudices, stereotypes, and resultant injustices and oppres-sion, we now explore their implications for conversion. Personal conversion may take many different shapes including intellectual, moral, and spiritual conversion. Although conversion, like con-sciousness raising, is not a linear process but in many ways a gift of the grace of G6d, yet this helical process has some distinct aspects. Intellectual conversion interfaces directly with the stages of consciousness raising. It is a seeing with new eyes that continuing to support or collude with oppressive structures and ways of being in one's congregation is wrong. Now morally aware of behaviors in these matters that are actually sinful, the members of the dom-inant group must become morally aware also of their passivity in not speaking out about an ol6pressive status quo. An attitudinal shift must occur that moves them to do something about the injus-tice, be that something ever so small in the large scale of things. When people perceive the general pattern of increased aware-ness and its call for moral conversion, they may notice the :pattern in groups not only where they oppress others but also where oth- Review for Religious ers oppress them. They should notice, too, that it is very easy for the oppressed to become the oppressors in other circumstances. Unless there is a conscious intent to break the cycle of oppression, ¯ it is likely to continue. Spiritual conversion calls members of a congregation to live the gospel in .a radical way, such that there can be true love, for-giveness, and reconciliation as the different ways of oppressing come to light. Such conversion is countercultural when there is reconciliation and not revenge. "Love is patient, kind, not jealous, does not seek its own interests, is not quick-tempered, and does not brood over injury. It does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices with.the truth" (1 Co 13:4-6). Corporate Conversion Corporate conversion requires changes within the organiza-tional structures of the congregation so thfit the sense Of mutuality and equality will exist both in word and in the lived praxis. Catherine Harmer details the structural changes required to become intentionally international. These changes are summa-rized here: 1. Each of the different provinces/regions/cultural entities in a congregation has the necessary autonomy to make local decisions regarding ministry choices, personnel changes, formation, and finances. 2. The leadership in each province/region/area should normally be made up of the people of that country. 3. International congregational committees and task forces must include representatives from all areas. 4. General chapters must also be representative of the total congregation not bnly in attendance but also in plan-ning and staff. 5. Provision must be made to accommodate diverse lan-guage groups at such meetings. 6. The members of the central administration of the con-gregation must reflect its internationality. 7. The founding group should eventually cease to domi-nate in all aspects of the congregational life. Conclusion Some congregations, ~n their beginnings, were not founded as international groups.~ In recent years they may have called July-August 1996 Malone * Internationali~ themselves international because of their "physical" expansion to different nations. They go through birthpangs when this acci-dental internationality becomes a purposeful or intentional inter-nationality. This article has affirmed that various resistances to the new and the temptation to go back to the "good old days" are a nor~ mal part of such a new birth. This process, for both personal and corporate conversion, has been clarified by the application of Gaylor and Fitzpatrick's stages of consciousness raising to the matter of becoming a truly international congregation. References Jean Alvarez. "Prejudice in Religious Congregations." Human Development, Winter 1983. Christine C. Gaylor and Annelle Fitzpatrick. "The Stages of Consciousness Raising." Human Development, Fall 1987. Catherine Harmer. "Internationality: Intentional or Accidental." Review for Religious 52, no. 1 (January-February 1993): 111-118. Janet Malone. "Internationality--At What Price?" Review for Religious 51, no. 1 (January-February 1992): 109-117. Dorcas Surely, there was time to miss what might be missed: garments made, acts of charity attested to by friends and neighbors, the complexities of a simple style, feel of wool well-woven, the breathless moment prior to a newborn's angry cry. Then, did you hesitate at all on that gruff apostle's word before, gazelle-like (how else), you leapt from there to here? Leonar~i Cochran OP Review for Religious FINIAN McGINN Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community ~nheaot happens when a community evolves from a homoge- us ethnic group to a heterogeneous ethnic group? Do the inner structures of the group change? Do they have to change; if so, how far? How can we change structures to meet the multi-cultural needs of the members? Do we have any models of recent attempts toward multiculturalization of institutions? With more Hispanic and southeast Asian membership in U.S. religious com-munities, what are the areas of greatest tension? How do we pre-pare our members for a multicultural institution? Is there a different type of preparation for the older members than for the younger? Does the same phenomenon happen to public educational institu-tions, businesses, and large corporations? These are but a few of the issues confronting provincials in the United States as they realize that they have been writing more letters in Spanish to their members than those of the previous administration and that they see more and more Vietnamese-- survivors of the fall of Saigon in 1975--in their houses of forma-tion. What has happened to the province we entered in the 1950s? At that time most of us were German, Italian, Polish, and Irish-- predominantly Westerners of European descent. Now, in the mid 1990s, we have become pluralistic, much more ethnically diverse, and the old ways of doing things have begun to change. As ministers of the local :church, most of us have witnessed our parishes and other apostolates change demographically, but we Finian McGinn OFM serves as vicar provincial for the Santa Barbara province of the Franciscan friars. His address is 1500 34th Avenue; Oakland, California 94601. ffuly-August 1996 McGinn * Toward Multiculturalizin~ a Reli~ous Communi~ have failed to look inward at our own religious communities. We have tried to prepare the people in our areas of work by inviting experts to give inservices and workshops to inform the parish-ioners about the new reality they face and to help them understand the new refugee and immigrant neighbors in their midst. We have applied multicultural solutions to our apostolates, but we have failed to prescribe them for our own religious communities. Immigrants and Refugees in General What are the differences of today? Ethnographers tell us that the Hispanic, the southeast Asian, and the African American have different ways of looking at the family, at community life, work, interpersonal relationships, prayer; recreation, decision making, and at many other issues which are essential to religious life. Even though 'we see out communities beginning to change demo-graphically we continue to do what we have been doing for years. Superiors are becoming aware that many of the strategies that were used before are no longer effective today because of the dif-ferent cultural values held by the members. Is there agreement on a common hierarchy of values? How does a superior take into consideration the Asian notion of "sav-ing face" in his or her decision making? If the culture affirms dependence and docility, how does one teach independence, assertiveness and confrontation? If the culture emphasizes family, interpersonal relationships with persons of the same culture and close-knit ingroupings, how does it embrace a larger community of muhiethnic members? How do different cultural groups view the vows; how do they see religious obedience? How much does a province change to accommodate the new cultures? .Multiculturalizing in the United States presents a rather polit-ically sticky problem. At present the United States offers a con-text where xenophobia is quite present. Historically we have gone from the melting pot model to a nonwelcoming model and from: "Come but assimilate quickly" to "Don't come and, in fact; you're not welcome!" Today movements against immigration are strong; foreigners are looked upon as inferior, their culture deficient, their language an obstacle to the acquisition of English. The province is aware of and perhaps may even pick up these negative attitudes by contagion or osmosis. Minority candidates who lived in the society where antiimmigration propaganda is prevalent Review for Religious approach the province wondering in what manner they will be received. R. Otheguy, commenting on the melting pot notion of the United States, remarks: "Because of their experience with racism in this country, many Hispanics have long ago given up hope of disappearing"--of blending into U.S. society. Baker takes the reasoning a step further and concludes that Hispanics found in multiculturalism a way to become at least somewhat American and keep their cultural values at the same time. He states, "Because of the [Hispanic's] history of being the victim of racism, the result may be the prevention of assimilation and integration with a consequent need to embrace some form of multicultural-ism for survival, security, status, and self-enhancement." Ethnic minorities themselves speak of additive biculturalism and bilingualism (Cummins, 1989). The melting pot paradigm has stressed a subtractive aspect: "Acquire English and lose your native language! Assimilate into U.S. society and forget your own culture; it's a deficit." Ethnographers and multiculturalists, on the other hand, speak of English-plus and acculturation to the host cul-ture. "ApprEciate your own language and learn English too. Take on the good U.S. cultural values, but don't lose your own culture in the process!" Most minorities lean toward maintenance of their language and culture as they adapt them-selves to the U.S. resettlement process (Lambert & Taylor). Paulo Freire describes the approach whereby the dominant culture wit-tingly or unwittingly attempts to impose the mainstream culture on new arrivals as "cultural invasion . a form of cultural domi-nation." Hopefully today's religious community advocates the addi-tive approach. As in many of these issues, however, it is much easier to speak about it than to do it. How do different cultural groups view the vows; how do they see religious obedience? How much does a province change to accommodate. the new cultures ? A Pluralistic Religious Community in Missionary Lands After some years in a missionary area, the superior general of a congregation in Rome insists that groups of a congregation 3~uly-August 1996 McGinn ¯ Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community from different nations in a foreign missionary country form one province. Each small group initially came to the mission country and received a portion of the mission territory within which to work. Members of the same ethnic group struggled with the lan-guage together, worked together, prayed together, evangelized the territory together, and accepted and formed native vocations. After some years this group and others in the missionary nation are asked to begin to form one entity together with the native religious of the area. This is an extremely difficult process and almost always poses a threat to both the foreigners and the native-born religious. The foreigners are no longer the majority in the group. They brought the faith, founded the missions, trained and even baptized and formed the native religious. In fact, they are still held in awe by the native religious members of the congregation. The foreigners are older and have been trained in a different the-ology of mission. The native religious, members of the host cul-ture, know the nation and its culture much better ,than do the foreigners. They have definite ideas on what should be done in their own country but are afraid to offend the foreigners who have given them the faith in the first place. This leads to a cultural impasse. To form the one entity from many disparate groups and to agree upon a common set of values is fraught with tension. In the United States In religious communities of the United States, however, usu-ally the majority membership of the institution is of white west-ern European stock; they are members of the host culture who have been living religious life for some time and have reached a consensus or implicit agreement upon certain common values of the institution. The tension arises as other multiethnic members become a sizeable minority, become visible, and begin to make their voices heard within the membership. How do the new mem-bers fit in? How does the larger group make room for them? What interior and exterior changes must take place to allow this to happen? How Other Institutions Meet the Challenge Businesses are learning new strategies to capitalize on inter-national markets and to improve communication with foreign Review for Religious nationals. Many public school districts, impacted by the influx of immigrants and refugees, offer classes, inservices and workshops on understanding cultural differences to relate with parents and members of the minority community and to enhance crosscul-tural communication. Business and education are presently publishing ma6~y books and articles dealing with multicultural differences and ways of adapting to and understanding people of other cultures. We, as religious, have not yet tapped these sources for our own com-munities. Business Since the Peace Corps in the early 1960s, many types of cross-cultural training programs have been designed to prepare indi-viduals for life in another culture. The goal of such programs is to help the business organization reduce and' prevent business losses and personal trauma. Harris and Moran. describe at least four models of training in cross-cultural orientation programs, ranging from lectures and readings about the culturel through simulation activities and sen-sitivity training to a cultural awareness model which seeks to develop one's ability to recognize ~cultural influence~ in personal values, behaviors, and cognitions. The goals of any training in cultural awareness are the following: a)to develop one's skill in diagnosing .difficulties in intercultural communication, b) to teach one when to suspend judgment when confronted with behavior which appears odd, c) to help one become aware of one's lack of sufficient knowledge of the other culture, and d) to increase one's motivation to learn more about the culture and the people. Public School Districts Public schools train cultural staff persons in cross cultural com-munication and hire. experts of the target 'cultural groups to present orientation and inservice to administrators and both certificated and classified personnel. These inservices and workshops are offered to both new and veteran teachers and staff. The host culture is compared to the immigrant or refugee culture. Culture brokers and the cultural specialists explain the areas of possible tension and/or misunderstanding; differing'values are examined, discussedL, 3-7-7- .~dy-Aug~tst 1996 McGinn ¯ Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community and understood. The goal of the process is twofold. It seeks to offer awareness and understanding of the newly arrived ethnic group and to examine the behavior of the teachers, administrators, and staff toward this group. James A. Banks distinguishes between two types of curricula in the schools: the manifest curriculum and the hidden curriculum. It is the hidden curriculum which is more cogent and which impo.ses the implicit norms and values of the school. Hopefully, the process of cultural awareness will shed some light on the hidden values and norms of the institution. Steps Religious Groups Are Taking By far one of the most multicultural communities in the United States and elsewhere is the international community of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary. From its very foundation it has been international and universal in scope. It has no set policy governing ethnicity in the local house, yet from the beginning of the institute, its communities have been from different countries, ethnic groups, and cultures. Members of the institute have con-sistendy affirmed the intention that wherever possible, their com-munities be international in membership. Although they do not have formal courses in international living, the administration does try to provide the members with experiences locally, provincially, and at the general level that will expose them to the reality of living in a multicultural commu-nity. In recent years, two continuing formation programs have helped the members deepen this expression of international, mul-ticultural living in community: They also have regional meetings and meetings of administrators. "All of these gatherings, while addressing specific questions, give the opportunity for the sisters to get to know one another and to build up understanding and relationships. [The gatherings] deepen the sense of our being from many different places and our unity in diversity" (MOtte). It should be noted that in the gatherings the sisters use three linguae francae--French, Spanish, and English as official languages dur-ing the meetings. Maryknoll , Maryknoll has developed its Cross-Cultural Training Services for those who wish to discern theircall and prepare for cross- Review for Religious cultural ministry. A team of experts directs a month-long, inten-sive preparation, including a week retreat, for those planning to work abroad. The topics discussed during the training include culture and society, adjustment to a new culture, strategies for surviving culture and language shock, spirituality, inculturation, and discernment. As always, Maryknoll continues to offer a realistic prepara-tion to both religious and lay persons who find themselves called to a global ministry. Much of the content studied in the training sessions is vital and, with a little adaptation, can easily be used in workshops for religious institutions in the United States which are in the process of becoming multiethnic. Content of a Multicultural Awareness Program Should any province wish to set up a program to make itself more multicultural there shoul~t be certain key components of the content area. The actual training program could range from lectures, workshops to an institute, or any combination of the three. The speakers at the events should be experts in various areas of ethnic studies, preferably not members of the partici-pating religious group. In the world of language-minority students, J. Cummins speaks of certain "dimensions" necessary for the empowerment of minorities. The dimensions mentioned in Cummins's paradigm for empowerment touch the very center of multicultural living. They can easily be adapted from an educational institution to a reli-gious community. Cummins stresses four essential dimensions: language, collaboration, reciprocity, and advocacy. A. Language. The language issue is important. Theoreticians speak of language shock as. they describe, the early years of a person's resettlement in the United States. Bilingualists stress :the incor-poration of one's home language into the life of the school and its curriculum. The inclusion of the minority language and culture into the school has significant effects on the personality, attitudes, and the social and emotional well being of the students and their parents. The language issue in a religious community is also of impor-tance. The minority candidate must feel at ease in the language of the .host country. At times, both community and ministry err by failing to allow sufficient time f6r the acquisition of higher cog- 3~dy-.4ug~t 1996 McGinn * Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community The emotional drain of trying to live in a society that speaks one's second language is stressful for the minority religious. nitive and academic vocabulary to emerge in second-language acquisition, and, satisfied with the conversational idiom which we hear daily, tell the newly arrived religious, "There's a great need in the ministry for a Spanish-speaking religious. You know enough English now, get to work in a barrio parish. Fulfill our need in the Spanish-speaking ministry!" (The language learner, too, may become impatient with the slowness of the acquisition process and, in his or her impatience, opt to begin ministry sooner than he or she should.) This may be a great boon for the ministry of the province, but not for com-munity life. We have deprived the candi-date and the religious community of the depth and the wisdom which both can bring to community living. In this area it seems much better to err on the side of more English. rather than less. The'emotional drain of trying to live in a society that speaks one's second lan-guage is stressful for the minority religious. No matter how proficient one is in L2, there are times when learners simply shut down. Teachers, those who have studied abroad, and linguists describe the state of one who has paid attention all day to academic discourse in the weaker language and in the evening simply blanks out and is unable to comprehend even the simplest of phrases in L2. Larson and Smalley describe language shock as a component of culture shock that has profound effects on one who is trying to acquire the lan-guage of the host society. Rese~irchers point out that the disori-entation caused by language shock can induce a whole syndrome of rejection. The newly arrived must cope with the new stress and therefore must divert attention and energy from learning the second language. The learner begins to reject speakers of the tar-get language. These speakers become the source of his or her dis-orientation and, therefore, he or she has difficulty forming identifications necessary to learn the language of the host coun-try. The problem becomes even more complex if the learner per-ceives, erroneously or otherwise, that the speakers of the target language reject the learner and his or her culture .and language. Language has many paradoxical uses. Instead of opening doors, it can close them. It can,; at times, be used as a wall, or a Revlew for Religious defense to unite a group or to keep others out. Knowingly or unknowningly, fluently bilingual speakers will use the language which other members of the community do not understand to keep them out of the circle or to provide a feeling of belonging for themselves. Unless one knows the linguistic code--he or she can-not enter the inner circle. Opportunities to study the languages of the members of the community should also be offered and even encouraged for the majority members of the religious congregation. Bialystok and Hakuta treat the types of motivation in second-language learning and come to the conclusion that few of us learn a second lan-guage as an end in itself. Most of us learn it "to gain access, through verbal interaction, to cultural dealings with people who lay claim to that language." As most of us can read a language better than we can speak it, community liturgies and prayer of the hours could be said on alternate days in either language if the members of the local com-munity were in the process of~becoming bilingual. Fine language courses with new, nonthreatening and nonbelittling methodol-ogy are offered in practically every large city of the country. Corollary 1. Spending the time and energy in the attempt to learn a language used by a large number of the religious congregation (that of the host country and that of the minority cultures) is a good investment by the province in community life. B. Collaboration. Cummins claims that where the culture of the family is not given status in the school and communities and parents are kept powerless, then inferiority and lack of school progress may result. When there is parental collaboration with the teacher there is usually success. Religious communities at times tend to take the culture of origin of the member for granted and in no way envision it as a factor in the religious formation of the individual. We tend to think that their mother and dad are like our mother and dad and that their home is like our home. With the advent of people from many diverse areas of the world, the assumption no longer works if it ever did. The following is an example from education of this type of reasoning. A successful middle-school teacher recently remarked: "I just assumed that their home was like my home and for two years in middle school I demanded at least thirty minutes of written homework. Then I visited one of the homes. It was a revelation. ~dy-August 1996 McGinn ¯ Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community The.home and local community of the culturally different are areas that the religious province cannot afford to ignore. In a two-bedroom apartment three families were living (around 16 individuals). There was no quiet space, very lit.de furniture, and little ones were scurrying all around. If any homework could be done, it would be done at the kitchen-table, the only table in the home. This would be done while the five elders were watching television at the same time in the same room. I began to realize that doing homework in'a home such as that one was notan easy task. The example was not characteristic of only one family but of the vast majority of families of Hmong students at that school." Awareness of the culture and the val-ues of the minority religious is essential. Conchita Delgado-Gaitan has many stud-ies that analyze learning experiences in the home and parental strategies used to impart knowledge and values to the chil-dren. She compared the home strategies with those used by the school of the dom-inant culture to discover convergence or dissonance. She studied the linkage between the culture of the home and that of the school. The home and local community of the culturally different are areas that the religious province cannot afford to ignore. Culture shock, discussed in most cultural orientation work-shops, is not as easily remedied as one might think. This psychic ~hock is the anxiety which results from the disorientation encoun-tered upon entering a new culture. Larson and Smalley describe how essential characteristics of good mental health are often lost just by moving into a new culture. Extreme symptoms of culture shock may pass relatively quickly as ways of coping with the new environment are acquired. More subtle problems, however, may persist and produce stress which can last for years. Paul Pedersen, in his recent book, A Handbook for Developing Multicultural Awareness, confirms that culture shock is likely to last over the visitor's entire stay in an unfamiliar culture, reappear in a variety of forms, and not be limited to an initial adjustment. Spindler and Spindler, of Stanford University, have been train-ing people in ethnographic evaluation of educational environ, ments for many years. Cultural therapy, the term the ,Spindlers use to describe a procedure of reflective, cross-cultural analysis of Review for Religious individuals of different cultures through personal encounters, has become quite famous. The aim of the therapy is to promote cross cultural and intracultural behavioral understanding. The process involves open dialogue between people of different cultures (teacher and student or a member of the host culture and one of the cultural minority). It seeks to reveal to the educator and to the minority student unconscious biases and cultural ethnocentrism. Trueba shows how culture shock experienced by the culturally diverse can have an effect on the members of the host culture, and he observes: "Therefore, it is extremely important for teach-ers to realize that they are experiencing cultural shock when they try to function effectively with children who do not share their values and expectations. Academic success requires, then, that both teachers and students build learning environments in which success is possible for both." How can we make the local reli-gious communities places which assure success and fairness for all members of whatever culture? With each of the four dimensions paternalism on the part of the member of the host culture is a temptation, Among members of the religious institute, the environment should be one of equal-ity. A paternalistic attitude in this process would promote a depen-dency which would impede empowerment and fail to promote success. On the other hand, members of the religious commu-nity who have lived in other countries and those who have strug-gled to acquire another language--of host country or of the language minority--are equipped to act as culture brokers and even cultural therapists in helping to make the new culture more familiar and less strange and in creating an atmosphere which insures fairness and success. Corollary 2. Awareness of the new cultures in the religious community should be encouraged. Study of one's own culture and that of other members of the community should be pro-moted. Appreciation of the ethnic diversity of the community by listening and telling stories without ethnocentric bias and judgment will hopefully develop respect for the legitimate cultural differences of the religious community. C. Reciprocity. Cummi~as's third dimension stresses the fact that the language minority student must not simply receive the new knowledge passively but there should be a reciprocal inter-action, a dialogue in which the minority students bring their rich-ness to the process. 3n~uly-August 1996 McGinn ¯ Toward Multicultu~alizing a Religious Community In a religious community this type of sharing appears to be difficult to attain. It demands that those who have lived in the host country all their lives and have been in the religious com-munity for many more years must begin to listen to the new ones and look at the goals and mission of the congregation from their perspective. It requires a change of attitude. In a nonjudgmental manner, one can begin to act as an ethnographer and discover new realities and appreciate the vibrant faith and the beauty in approaches to the sacred which have not been part of one's own history. To do this one must allow a forum for the culturally dif-ferent and listen to them with respect. They become the teachers. Bilingual members and members who have lived in mission lands are an asset to the religious community. Religious of diverse cultures are at different levels of acculturation, and the bilingual and former missionary members of the community are equipped to act as bridge makers in opening the dialogue between the older religious of the host country and those who are culturally diverse. Corollary 3. Reciprocity is a step toward healing the rem-nants of cultural shock. "I struggle to understand and appre-ciate the minority religious' culture, language, approach to the divine, family, and community, and the newly arrived struggle to appreciate my culture, language, approach to the divine, family, and community." ~Many demands are involved in the process, but the struggle leads to mutual respect and understanding. D. Advocacy. In a school setting, Cummins insists that the majority teachers become advocates for the language minority children. Many of the instruments used in the evaluation of minor-ity students are based and standardized on the language of the majority population, and it is often easy to detect types of insti-tutionalized racism in the school and even in the hidden curric-ula. Therefore, the minority student needs someone who is able to open doors, give advice, and accompany him or her in situations which involve power and status relationships between dominant and dominated groups at different levels of a society. When we apply this to a religious community, we can begin to consider the customs of the congregation and its particular provincial statutes to discover cultural differences which could render harmonious living difficult. Advocacy involves seeing that house libraries have sufficient current books and periodicals in the mother tongue and insisting upon minority representation at Review for Religious various levels of formation and administration even to the actual selection of superiors who are open, tolerant and appreciative of other cultures represented in the community. Benjamin Schwarz states: "Dissatisfied minorities want, at a minimum, a real voice in determining their future--but a real voice for the minority means real sacrifice for the majority." Corollary. 4. Those who enjoy acceptance in the dominant society and who are comfortable with the everyday life in the religious community spontaneously offer direction and knowledgeable advocacy. They also help to provide a voice for the ethnic minority members of the community. Toward Multiculturalization Developing multicultural awareness in a community requires many changes. Pedersen concludes his work for cross-cultural counselors by stating that the many changes involved "will pro-duce a widening ripple effect as these changes bring about other changes." He continues: "We are moving toward a future that requires us to understand persons who are different from our-selves, whatever our culture might be. Developing multicultural awareness is the strategy for our survival as well as our growth in meeting the diverse needs of a multicultural global village." In a recent letter to all the friars, Herman Schaluck the gen-eral of the Order of Friars Minor, told his brothers that the new projects which the order has embarked upon in Africa, Thailand, and the former Soviet Union were intentionally international and multicultural in makeup to sign a new way of thinking. In spite of the difficulties inherent in the understanding of an international, multicultural fraternity, the order seeks this new quality of liv-ing together. The general explains: "Paul insistently states (Ga 6) that it is not a matter of being Jews or pagans, of being cir-cumcised or uncircumcised, but of being a 'new creature.' Life in an international [multicultural] fraternity is therefore not some-thing of secondary importance or a question of strategic maneu-vering: it is rather already evangelization itself by way of example." An Apostolic Challenge We considered a number of apparently hypothetical ques-tions about a religious community evolving from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous grouping. What happens? What changes ~uly-August 1996 McGinn ¯ Toward Multiculturalizing a Religious Community occur? Can it be done? Suppose we did design workshops and planning sessions on cross-cultural awareness for the total com-munity from the insights offered by education, business, and the training programs~for foreign missionaries. Suppose, to.o, we set up processes within the provincial structures for dialogue, reciprocity, and advocacy. Would the program be successful? Certainly many changes would occur, and change is almost always tension-filled and difficult to accept. However, it would be quite exciting to embark upon such a journey. It would demand much tolerance, patience, and charity on the part of the total member-ship to ensure that the program would succeed. What a sign of forgiveness, openness, trust, and conversion such a religious com-munity could offer the world around it. The approach would cer-tainly be countercultural. Only the members themselves know whether they are willing to do this. Perhaps a religious community is the only institution which can meet this challenge. I have spent many years trying to con-vince public schools, public school districts, and even welfare departments to become more multicultural but to no avail. Conversion, forgiveness, sacrifice, patience, understanding, and charity are woven into the very fabric of religious life. These are the same virtues required to make an institution multicultural. We religious are called to be a sign. Perhaps we Can be a sign to U.S. society that actually e pluribus unum is realizable. Bibliography Baker, C. Foundations of Bilingt~.al Education and Bilingualism. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1993. Banks, J.A., and McGee Banks, C.A., eds. Multicultural Education. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1989. Bialystok, E., and Hakuta, K. In Other Words. New York: Basic Books, 1994. Cummins, J. Empowering Minority Students. Sacramento: CABE, 1989. Delgado-Gaitan, C. "Traditions and Transitions in the Learning Process of Mexican Children: A Ethnographic View." In Spindler, G. and L. (eds.) Interpretive Ethnography of Education: At Home and Abroad. Hillsdale: Laurence Erlbaum, 1987a. Delgado-Gaitan, C. "Parent Perceptions of School: Supportive Environments for Children." In Trueba, H. (ed.) Success or Failure? Learning and the Language Minority Student. Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1987b. Review for Religious Delgado-Gaitan, C~, and' Trueba, H. Crossing Cultural Borders: Education for Immigrant Families in America. New York: Falmer, 1991. Freire, P. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury, 1970. Freire, P. The Politics of Education. Boston: Bergin and Garvey, 1985. Hanley, K., csj. Cross Cultural Training Services. Maryknoll, New York, Harr.is, ER., and Moran, R.T. Managing Cultural Differences. Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1991. Lambert, W.E., and Taylor, D.M. Coping with Cultural and Racial Diversi~y in Urban America. New York: Praeger, 1990. Larson, D.N., and Smalley,'W.A. Becoming Bilinguak A Guide to Learning Language. California: William Carey Library, 1972. Law, E.H.E The VVolf Shall Dwell with the Lamb. St. Louis: Chalice Press, 1993. Motte, personal correspondence, 1995. Otheguy, R. "Thinking about Bilingual Education: A Critical Appraisal." Harvard Educatiorial Review 52 (3), 1982. Pedersen, P. A Handbook for Developing Multicultural Awareness: Alexandria: A~. erican CounselingAssociation, 1994. Schaluck, H., OFM. "On the Way Towards a New Era," May 8. Prot. 083!.19. S'chwarz, B. "The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export." The Atlantic Monthly 275 (5), 1985. Spindler, G., and Spindler, L., eds. Pathways to Cultural Awareness. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994. Trueba, H.T., Jacobs, L., and Kirton, E. Cultural Conflict and Adaptation: The Case of Hmong Children in American Society. New York: Falmer, 1990. JUST PUBLISHED-- The Best of the Review - 5 The Church and 'Consecrated Life (see insert at back of book for ordering) "At a time when hope for religious life and its future is once again on the rise, the articles in this book offer an exceptional and much needed panorama of the critical issues of renewal faced by contemporary men and women religious. Elizabeth McDonough and David Fleming have done us an enormous favor in bringing together the Best of the Review in this area. I recommend this book enthusiastically; its authors take us another step along the journey to that future for religious life for which we all long." --Se~nSammon FMS Vicar General Marist Brothers, Rome 3~uly-August 1996 new life ROBERT E MALONEY It's Summer! A Letter to Young Religious J My dear brothers and sisters, It is wonderful to be young. At least, most of us who have grown older think so! Young adulthood is the summer of life; autumn and winter follow only later. In the vibrant years of youth, heart, respiration, and physical strength are at their peak efficiency. Our inner drives, too, are fully alive: our quest for meaning, our longing for deeper rela-tionships, our yearning to create a better future. I am writ-ing today to encourage you who are young to enjoy, and use well, the gifts of this summertimh in your life. Youth has many striking advantages. As the superior general of a community, I often see these in the lives of young religious, both men and women. Let me describe some of them briefly. First, youth has drive and enthusiasm. It is good to rejoice in youth's vigor. I can remember a period in my life when I could interview ~tudents all day long, prepar.e classes until late at night, be up again at five the next morning for prayer and the Eucharist, and then teach a full schedule. The day arrived when I could no longer do that. But I still look back with happy memories on the vibrant energies of youth. Young people can give with zest. And they want to give their lives to something'worth-while. They seek a cause, and when they find one they Robert P. Maloney CM serves as superior general of the Vincentians. His address is Congregazione della Missione; Via dei Capasso, 30; 00164 Roma, Italy. Revie~ for Religious ? launch into it with enthusiasm. ,Their dreams, their~hopes, their vision of the future have not yet been dimmed by bitter experi-ences, or failures, or the harsh fact' that much of reality changes quite slowly. Young people gaze at the world's needs and believe that they can make a contribution. Second, youth has imagination and spontaneity. Young people bring new horizons to communities~ They have the capacity to envision new solutions, They often feel free from rigid categories or structures that have become creaky or clumsily reinforced over the years. They find it easy to identify with the words of Vincent' de Paul that "love is inventive even to infinity.''1 They are willing to "dream the impossible dream." Spontaneity is one of the refreshing aspects of youth. Young people say unexpected things. They question practices that some of us older people never had any doubts about. At times we may find that. their questions make us uncomfortable or defensive. But we should by no means be quick to interpret youth's spontaneity as a sign of aggres-siveness; rather, it often comes from a genuine desire to seek the truth. Third, youth is able to change. Those of us who are older have ploughed deep furrows. It becomes increasingly harder for us to climb out of the ruts we have dug. The furrows of the young are shal-lower. They can be ploughed over. Their direction can be changed so that new waters run through them and new life sprouts up. That is why good initial formation is important for the young. They are pliable enough to ~hink new thoughts, learn new.ways, and create new things. Of course, youth has its struggles too, its gnawing problems. Let me dwell just for a moment on a few of these. Because youth is searching, it is often uncertain about its goals or even its values. Experience tells us that, today especially, young people have diffi-culty making a permanent commitment. There is so much rapid change in society, there is so much disillusionment with those whose values the young may once have prized, that they find it hard to decide where to sink their roots. This means that young people are often confused. They are grappling with the meaning of their live~i They are hesitant about making a definitive commitment. Experience tells us that, today especially, young people have difficulty making a permanent commitment. ff~uly-August 1996 Malone~ * It's Summer? One of the greatest challenges in ministry today is to present attractive, even risky, alternatives to young people and accom-pany them in the difficult task of deciding, Several recent studies point out that young'people seek explicit religious goals, intense community life and solidarity, and explicit and worldwide service to the most needy. Young people can certainly find these goals realized in the call to follow Christ faithfully and to give them-selves to the church's preferential option for the poor. Young people often struggle with thei~ sexuality. Of course, those of us who are older are engaged in the same~struggle too. But the young experience in an~ awakening way strong physical drive; sex-ual energy, a desire for close, intimate relationships. And, unfor-tunately, the turbulent years of adolescence often do not come to a calm, peaceful resolution, but rather to a negotiated truce, after which war may soon break out again. It is~helpful for those of us who live in community to recognize that this is a basic human story, not just ours. It is also important for the young to speak about their sexual struggles with great simplicity with a wise spiritual guide. Youth lacks experience. This is an inevitable fact. All of us expe~ rience life's joys and its sorrows only gradually. Growth takes time. Yet there is a deep knowledge and love that come only from experience. There is gold that can be refined only in the fire. Of Course, not everyone who experiences life's joys and .suf-ferings grows, But, on the other hand, no one grows without a healthy dose of realistic experience. Our ongoing formation pro-grams must. help young people reflect on their experience and grow from it. Having said all this, let me acknowledge that I have painted with broad strokes. Some of the gifts that I have described as characterizing young people are often found in good measure in those who are older too. Likewise, some of the problems that have briefly touched on above plague not just the young, buvalso their elders. Today let me lay before you, young religious, a series of chal-lenges. As .the superior general of an apostolic community, I find that these are the most important things in my heart as I think of the many young men and women who long to live religious life generously today. I call them challenges because my own per-sonal experience, with its frequent failures, tells me they are not easy to respond to deeply. Review for Religious Be deeply rooted in the person of Jesus. This seems obvious, but there is nothing more important that as an older brother I could say to you. "Remember," St. Vincent de Paul once wrote, "that we live in Jesus Christ by the death of Jesus Christ and that we ought to die in Jesus Christ by the life of Jesus Christ and that our life ought to be hidden in Jesus Christ and full of Jesus Christ and that in order to die like Jesus Christ it is necessary to live like Jesus Christ.''2 The Gospels ring with this conviction: Jesus is the absolute center. "I am the way, the truth, and the life," Jesus says. "No one comes to the Father except through me." "I am the vine." "I am the gate." "I am the shepherd." "I am the light." "I am the true bread come down from heaven. The one who feeds on my flesh and drinks my blood will live forever.''3 Let me simply recall to you today the wonderful prayer attributed to St. Patrick: Chri]t be with me, Christ within me, Christ behind me, Christ before me, Christ beside me, Christ to win me, Christ to comfort and restore me. Christ beneath me, Christ above me, Christ in c~'uiet, Christ in danger, Christ in hearts of all that love me, Christ in mouth of friend and stranger. I recommend two principal means for focusing on the per-son of Jesus, The first is daily meditative prayer. Make Christ the center of that prayer, especially the crucified Lord. Engage in a well-defined period of reflective prayer each day (for example, a half hour), and let the Lord capture your mind and your heart. The second means--and it is not completely distinct from the .first--is to find, love, and serve Christ in the person of the poor. They are our lords and masters. Jesus li~es on in them in a special way, particularly in the crucified peoples. It is so easy for the "world," and for us too, to become numb to their plight: the 5.7 million people of Haiti, who have been so poor for so long that their pain is no longer news; the 2.5 million Bosnian refugees, victims of "ethnic cleansing"i the 1.5 million Somalians on the edge of death by starvation; the countless Rwandans who have been brutally slain. Our contemplation of the crucified Lord can-not remain merely a pious exercise, nor can it be simply medita-tion on a past event. The Lord lives on in his members. He is .~uly-Auffust 1996 Maloney ¯ It's Summer? crucified in individual persons and in suffering peoples. The call is to see him and to serve him there. "When I was hungry you gave me to eat. When Iwas thirsty you gave me to drink.When I was naked you clothed me" (Mt 25:35-36). Learn from. the poor, and be inventive in serving them. I say this to you very directly: it is only the simple and hum~ ble who really grow in the Lord's life. Only0 they can learn the depths of God's wisdom. The saints knew this very well because they had made the gospel teachings their own. That is why the founders of communities urge. all their members to grow in sim-plicity and humility. Learn especially from the poor. They can teach all of us about gratitude for small gifts, about patience in waiting, about hoping against hope, about loving those around us, even in the midst of suffering and oppression, and about shar-ing the little that we have with our brothers and sisters. It is only when we have learned from the poor that we can be inventive in serving them. It is they who will explain to us their deepest needs, and then we can bring them gifts that will really be helpful. Your creativity and imaginativeness as young people will be nourished by what you can learn from them. They will be a life-giving source in your ongoing formation. I encou

1. IntroducciónEn la ponencia se abordarán las relaciones entre instituciones y desarrollo económico focalizando en el problema de la autonomía administrativa de los entes autónomos en Uruguay. El llamado "dominio industrial y comercial" del Estado era la principal herramienta de intervención estatal en la economía en las tres primeras décadas del siglo (lo siguen siendo hoy en día, aunque de una manera diferente). El proceso de construcción de dicho dominio arranca con la fundación del BROU en 1896. La intención original por la cual se dio autonomía administrativa al instituto fue separar la administración de problemas complejos, de las angustias políticas o financieras de los gobiernos. Construir institutos de intervención en la economía que no estuvieran sujetos al juego de la "política menuda" (al decir de Carlos Real de Azúa) fue uno de los propósitos orientadores en la forja de los Entes Autónomos. Este principio fue imaginado como un mecanismo que permitiría una intervención racional del Estado en la economía privilegiando los criterios técnicos de actuación sobre los políticos. Sin embargo, la autonomía administrativa presentaba un problema crucial para el andamiaje institucional del Estado: no estaban previstos en la constitución de 1830. Al momento en que se reforma la constitución (hacia 1917) el problema aparece a los legisladores como un tema de difícil resolución. El artículo 100 de la constitución que entra en vigencia en 1919 pretende dar una solución a esta anomalía. Sin embargo, la solución propuesta deja en manos de la ley la reglamentación definitiva de la autonomía administrativa de cada ente Autónomo. Esta resolución no logra corregir los problemas previos y plantea otros que deberán ser resueltos por los gobiernos sucesivos. Un elemento clave de los intentos de los gobiernos por abordar la definición de la autonomía administrativa durante los años de 1920 es que se encontrarán con la oposición de los mismos Entes Autónomos, los cuales no querrán ceder en cuanto al grado de autonomía alcanzado previamente. En éstos, y especialmente en el más antiguo que era el BROU, se había forjado una fuerte cohesión entre los Directorios y los principales funcionarios de carrera que lideraban el instituto.Los gobiernos se enfrentan a un nuevo actor, el actor burocrático que pugna por mantener la situación de autonomía, consolidada en los años previos a 1920.En el trabajo original de investigación que sustenta esta ponencia, el objetivo central era describir el primer impulso racionalizador del Estado uruguayo. En esta ponencia abordaremos un aspecto crucial de ese primer impulso que fue el surgimiento dentro de las empresas públicas de un personal jerárquico con características particulares. Nuestra principal hipótesis es que al amparo de la autonomía administrativa surgió un estamento de burócratas con una clara conciencia de su rol en la política democrática. Intentaremos mostrar cómo este grupo de "high civil servants" se percibía a sí mismo como un grupo necesario y diferente del actor político. Creemos que esta hipótesis ilumina un aspecto poco estudiado de la construcción del Estado uruguayo y sus mecanismos de intervención en la economía y la sociedad. Tradicionalmente se ha estudiado el rol de los políticos, de los empresarios, de los trabajadores y las diferentes formas de articulación de estos actores en la conformación de las estructuras del Estado uruguayo. Nosotros quisiéramos agregar un actor más, el cual creemos tiene su propia historia para contar, y que es el actor burocrático.El foco de nuestra ponencia estará en el Banco República y en la figura de su primer gerente de carrera, don Octavio Morató.A continuación, delimitaremos las dimensiones analíticas que empleamos para abordar nuestro objeto de estudio. Nos limitaremos a enunciar las principales hipótesis con las cuales interrogaremos el material empírico recolectado. El lector que así lo quiera, puede profundizar el marco teórico en el libro de próxima aparición (BAUDEAN, 2011).De la reflexión de Max Weber sobre la burocracia tomamos el énfasis que éste hace en la importancia del marco legal en la construcción de los roles que llevarán a cabo políticos y burócratas y en la definición de las características organizacionales de la burocracia. Con esta idea como guía abordaremos el marco constitucional y legal que dio forma al sistema de empresas públicas en su origen y particularmente al Banco República. Del institucionalismo de corte estructuralista, tomamos la hipótesis según la cual en el momento en que el Estado conquista cierta autonomía en el manejo de problemas específicos se convierte en arena del conflicto social (EVANS, RUESCHEMEYER, 1985). Esta hipótesis nos conducirá a precisar cuáles eran los aspectos críticos de la autonomía administrativa que generaban conflicto entre burocracia y clase política. La reflexión de Rudolph y Hoeber Rudolph (1984) nos hará profundizar en laimportancia del manejo del poder hacia el interior de la organización. En este sentido, intentaremos mostrar cuáles eran los problemas que Directores y altos burócratas del BROU veían en la posibilidad de mayores controles por parte del poder político en el manejo interno de la organización.La reflexión de Morstein Marx (1963) sobre el high civil service nos llevará a darle especial importancia al pensamiento del actor burocrático. De aquí el foco en el pensamiento de Octavio Morató. Dicho pensamiento será interpretado como un indicador de la autopercepción que los altos burócratas tenían sobre su rol en la política democrática.Por último, de la corriente neo-institucionalista (MEYER, ROWAN, 1991) nos interesará explorar la hipótesis según la cual las organizaciones son construidas y modeladas en su estructura y funcionamiento por los valores y principios institucionalizados prevalecientes en las sociedades donde están insertas. Esta hipótesis permite prever que las organizaciones que se alejan de dicho entorno de valores y principios institucionalizados encontrarán problemas en su consolidación y legitimación. En consecuencia, el trabajo de reconstrucción histórica realizado enfatiza en los conceptos institucionalizados a lo largo del siglo XIX sobre la estructura del Estado, el valor político y social de la burocracia y la organización del sistema financiero. La idea de la autonomía administrativa obtenía legitimidad de ciertos principios institucionalizados sobre las finanzas así como entraba en conflicto con otros vinculados a la relación entre los partidos y sus bases sociales. 2. El problema de investigación en su contexto históricoEl período que va desde la década de 1870 hasta la segunda década del siglo XX es el momento histórico de la consolidación y centralización del poder estatal. En el mismo se pasa desde un Estado de cuño liberala un Estado interventor en la economía. El corolario de este proceso es la institucionalización de la democracia con la constitución de 1919. Con esta reforma se inician la depuración de los procesos electorales y los arreglos institucionales que conducirán a la coparticipación de los partidos tradicionales en la administración.En las primeras décadas del siglo XX, con Batlle y Ordoñez en la presidencia (1), se consolidan las principales instituciones que mediarán en la intervención en la economía por parte del Estado: las empresas públicas o entes autónomos(2). Dichos entes eran, precisamente, autónomos en un país cuyos cimientos constitucionales prefiguraban un estado "unitario y centralista" al decir de historiadores y constitucionalistas. Dicha autonomía, implicaba que los directorios de los entes tenían potestad de "libre, franca y general administración": capacidad de designar y destituir funcionarios y de elaborar su propio presupuesto. Los directorios, a su vez, eran designados por el Ejecutivo con previa venia del Senado(3). Sin embargo, según la constitución de 1830 -en curso al momento de la creación de los primeros entes- el poder Administrador recaía en el Ejecutivo. Es así que la descentralización administrativa y la creación de una burocracia estatal autónoma comienza en Uruguay con elementos emparentados con las reformas que por la misma época (1870-1920) se implementaban en Europa y Estados Unidos (RAMOS, 2004). El elemento en común es el problema de"resolver el cómo se deberá producir la politización y despolitización simultánea que se debe operar al interior del sistema Ejecutivo de gobierno" (RAMOS, 2004). Es decir, el problema de cómo construir una burocracia meritocrática relativamente autónoma de los vicios de la política, pero al mismo tiempo capaz de servir a los gobiernos democráticamente elegidos. Sin embargo, el origen del concepto de autonomía tiene una historia que se hunde en los problemas del Estado uruguayo en el siglo XIX. En particular, el problema de generar una estructura estatal con autonomía financiera de los sectores económicamente dominantes en el país. El Banco República fue pensado –entre otros fines- para resolver este problema. En la coyuntura marcada por la crisis de 1890, uno de los problemas centrales que proponía una institución bancaria vinculada al Estado radicaba en la desconfianza que este vínculo despertaba en los sectores que dominaban el crédito a nivel local. En un sistema de patrón oro, dicho grupo tenía múltiples mecanismos para desestabilizar el normal desarrollo de una nueva institución estatal. La autonomía de la que gozará por ley el BROU (desde 1896) fue una fórmula de compromiso, fruto de la debilidad del Estado frente al capital financiero local. Dicha autonomía aseguraba a éstos últimos que la nueva institución no iba a ser manipulada para sofocar las angustias financieras de los gobiernos.Ahora bien, hay dos elementos escasamente subrayados en toda su importancia en lo que respecta a esta creación institucional (la descentralización vía la creación de entidades autónomas).En primer lugar, que esta idea se constituyó en una verdadera tradición en nuestro país. Pero lo más importante es que esta tradición de autonomía (4) fue defendida y fundamentada en conceptos de eficiencia organizacional e interés público por las mismas empresas, sus directorios y altos jerarcas (especialmente en el caso del BROU que será el foco de interés de esta ponencia). Esto es de resaltar porque –en el lenguaje teórico que emplearemos- es un indicador del temprano desarrollo de un actor burocrático con conciencia de un rol diferenciado del actor político partidarios así como de otros actores sociales.En segundo lugar, el BROU fue a la postre el modelo sobre el cual se inspiraron el resto de las empresas públicas del período. Con la fundación del BROU el concepto de autonomía administrativa aparece por primera vez en su máximo grado de expresión (Sayagues Laso, 1991, 225-253). Batlle y Ordoñez vislumbró en la formula organizacional de la autonomía una forma eficiente de administrar organismos complejos y sujetos a la sospecha de "manejo político" y la respetó, difundió y alentó. El concepto de autonomía se volvió problemático cuando se le quiso dar estatuto constitucional. La primera solución es la del artículo 100 de la constitución de 1919. La misma fue una solución incompleta. Desde la entrada en vigencia de la constitución llevó a polémicas tanto a nivel jurídico como entre las nuevas empresas y el Poder Ejecutivo. Tras varios intentos frustrados de reglamentación del artículo 100 a lo largo de la década de 1920, el mismo quedó sin reglamentar. El Consejo Nacional de Administración (5) (CNA) era quien tenía a cargo la supervisión general de los entes. En sucesivas reformas constitucionales, la tradición autonómica persiste y se desarrolla a nivel constitucional (1934, 1942 y 1952). Pero persistirá manteniendo características diferentes a las originales. En 1983, Solari y Franco escribían que las autonomías de las empresas públicas fueron altas hasta 1930 (6) y que con la constitución de 1934 comienzan a verse limitadas, cerrándose un ciclo de re-centralización hacia la constitución de 1967. Asimismo sugieren que el estudio de las autonomías a posteriori de 1967 es más complejo de lo que parece si uno se guía exclusivamente por el marco legal (7).Ahora bien, poco se sabe de los debates y tensiones que se generaron en el período histórico que va de 1920 a 1933, momento en que la autonomía de las empresas públicas es fuertemente criticada. ¿Cuáles fueron las posiciones de políticos y burócratas en torno a la autonomía?, ¿cuáles eran los grandes temas que se discutieron?, ¿qué alternativas se planteaban para dar solución a los conflictos generados? En el resto de la ponencia abordaremos dos temas que permiten responder parcialmente las preguntas planteadas. Primero, la sanción constitucional de la autonomía administrativa de los entes autónomos (1917-1919). Este es el marco legal que da pie a los encuentros y desencuentros entre el BROU y el Poder Ejecutivo durante el período de duración de la segunda constitución que tuvo el país (1919-1933). Encuentros y desencuentros que estarán pautados por la discusión del alcance que la nueva constitución daba a la autonomía del instituto (particularmente en lo referente a la elaboración y sanción de su presupuesto) y la definición del estatuto de sus funcionarios (el debate acerca de si los mismos debían ser considerados funcionarios públicos o especiales). Segundo, profundizaremos en la perspectiva burocrática sobre estos problemas. Para ello abordaremos el pensamiento de Octavio Morató, gerente del BROU entre 1921 y 1937. (8)3. La autonomía administrativa del dominio industrial del Estado y la reforma de la constituciónEl marco en el que se debatió y se procesó la reforma que culminó en la constitución de 1919 fue una coyuntura donde se superpusieron nuevos y viejos problemas. Como lo expone Benjamín Nahum (NAHUM, 1998: 53-54), dicha coyuntura estuvo marcada por la resolución de al menos tres grandes problemas.En primer lugar, la experiencia de la guerra civil había puesto de manifiesto la necesidad de superar las limitaciones que la primera constitución oponía al sufragio. En segundo lugar, los nuevos entes autónomos creados no estaban "previstos ni regulados" por la vieja Constitución.En tercer lugar, y vinculado al problema anterior, la Constitución de 1830 era excesivamente centralista y ponía en manos del Presidente de la República una suma de poder que lo convertía en figura clave en la sociedad. Esta centralización era un problema para la democracia y la reforma constitucional debía dar una respuesta.En virtud de esta agenda, la discusión de dicha constitución fue uno de los momentos ideológicos más importantes del siglo XX en Uruguay (PANIZZA: 1990). Básicamente se discutió todo el andamiaje institucional que ordenaba la vida política del país. El problema jurídico que representaba la existencia de organismos y servicios tuvo un largo proceso de discusión que derivó en la redacción del artículo 100 de la Constitución de 1919. Veremos las diferentes posiciones sobre el problema a continuación.3.1. Posiciones sostenidas a nivel parlamentario sobre el problema de la descentralización (previo a la Constituyente de 1917) Veremos un resumen de las principales posiciones sostenidas en los debates parlamentarios tal como las resume Sayagués en el "Tratado de Derecho Administrativo" (1991: 144 y 145).Básicamente se sostuvieron tres criterios diferentes frente al problema de los nuevos organismos y servicios descentralizados: Posición 1. Las Cartas Orgánicas creadas mediante la ley eran inconstitucionales cuando consagraban una descentralización amplia.El principal argumento giraba en torno a la defensa del Poder Ejecutivo como "jefe superior de la administración" y al cual la ley no podía quitar las potestades que la Constitución le atribuía expresamente (dictar reglamentos, nombrar y destituir empleados públicos) para cederlas a las autoridades de los nuevos entes. Por otra parte, se cuestionaba fuertemente el hecho de que los presupuestos de gastos de algunas organizaciones (caso del BROU) pudiesen ser sancionados por sus propios directorios o con aprobación del Poder Ejecutivo, desconociendo de esta forma la competencia del Parlamento para autorizar los gastos públicos.Posición 2. Las Cartas Orgánicas creadas por la ley eran constitucionales. Esta posición fue mantenida por quienes defendieron la creación de los entes en el Parlamento (fuertemente por el sector batllista, pero también por blancos principistas como Martín C. Martínez). Resume Sayagués Laso (1991b: 145): "Se argumentaba diciendo que el Presidente era el jefe superior de la administración general de la República, pero no de las administracionesespeciales que el legislador crease; por tanto, concluíase que la ley podía dar amplios poderes de decisión a las autoridades de esos servicios. Un razonamiento análogo los llevaba a limitar la competencia del Poder Legislativo en materia presupuestal". (énfasis original).Posición 3. Las Cartas Orgánicas creadas por la ley no eran constitucionales ni inconstitucionales, sino EXTRACONSTITUCIONALES. Esta posición fue defendida por algunos legisladores que votaron favorablemente la creación de los nuevos entes. Se argumentaba que la Constitución de 1830 no preveía la descentralización administrativa por servicios, que comenzó a desarrollarse a posteriori por la vía de los hechos y por circunstancias especiales. En consecuencia, "el texto constitucional no la había permitido ni prohibido, sino simplemente ignorado"(SAYAGUÉS LASO, 1991: 145) .Los grandes temas que dividían las opiniones se centraban en:Los poderes de decisión de los directorios de los entes y su relación con la posición institucional del Poder Ejecutivo.La autoridad de la ley para crear dichos servicios frente a la autoridad de la Constitución misma.La competencia del Parlamento frente a los presupuestos de gastos de dichos servicios.Como puede observarse, se trata de una compleja mezcla de problemas jurídicos por una parte, y otros que van directamente a la relación entre política y administración. Estaba en juego la progresiva constitución de áreas de la administración que –de seguir las pautas de desarrollo que mantenían- podrían constituirse en arenas de decisión con alta independencia de los partidos en materias económicas, financieras y sociales. El problema radicaba en la precaria situación que tenía el Parlamento frente a estos nuevos segmentos de la administración.3.2. La Convención ConstituyenteHubo coincidencia entre los constituyentes en que la nueva Constitución consagrase el principio de la autonomía y en que el proyectado Consejo Nacional de Administración (CNA) tuviese a su cargo la superintendencia de dichos organismos. Las mayores divergencias surgieron en torno a la definición de la autonomía y a la conveniencia o no de extenderse sobre la misma en el texto constitucional. Existía diversidad de situaciones en los grados de autonomía que tenían los organismos y servicios descentralizados y también en la independencia económica que podían llegar a tener frente al Ejecutivo. Esto condujo a que no prosperara entre los constituyentes la idea de Martín C. Martínez de darle un contenido preciso al concepto mismo de autonomía. Predominó la idea de que sería la ley la que fijaría la extensión de la autonomía en cada caso. En consecuencia, el reconocimiento constitucional de la descentralización se redujo a un solo artículo (artículo 100) (8), no explicitándose el alcance de la autonomía. Esto generó la necesidad de definir con mayor precisión la relación entre el CNA y los diversos entes mediante la ley. Dado que preexistían diversas opiniones a nivel político sobre el tema y que los entes tenían posición tomada en defensa de la autonomía, se generaron debates y enfrentamientos mientras duró la Constitución de 1919 que nunca llegaron a resolverse en forma coherente y unificada.Pese a estos problemas, el artículo 100 fue un logro en varios sentidos. Constitucionalizó el proceso de descentralización administrativa que se había iniciado al margen de la Constitución de 1830. Con ello consagró un amplio traspaso de poderes de administración hacia los Consejos Directivos o Directorios de los entes.3.3. Las bases legales del conflicto entre gobierno y burocraciaTeniendo en cuenta estas disposiciones constitucionales, el problema estaba en resolver qué pasaba con las previas Leyes Orgánicas de los entes y servicios descentralizados: el artículo 100, ¿derogaba o no esas leyes? En caso afirmativo: ¿en qué medida se había operado dicha derogación? (SAYAGUÉS LASO, 1991:151).El BROU (9) se amparaba en la frase "serán administrados por Consejos Autónomos" para considerar derogadas de las previas Leyes Orgánicas todo lo referente a los controles administrativos que eventualmente el Ejecutivo pudiera imponer en el gobierno del instituto. Asimismo, en la postura institucional del BROU se consideraba como taxativos todos los casos de intervención del CNA enumerados en la segunda parte del artículo 100. En general, la postura de los entes fue acompañada por la doctrina jurídica de la época, siendo la mayor discrepancia el tema de las potestades presupuestales (donde juristas como Demichelli, Ramela de Castro y Martín C. Martínez mantenían posturas diferentes) (SAYAGUÉS LASO, 1991: 152). Por su parte, el Poder Ejecutivo (fundamentalmente el CNA) y el Parlamento sostuvieron la tesis de que el artículo 100 consagraba solamente el principio de la autonomía, dejando la precisión del alcance de la misma en manos del legislador. En consecuencia, mientras no se dictase la ley reglamentaria se deberían considerar vigentes todos los artículos de las previas Leyes Orgánicas que preveían intervenciones del Ejecutivo o el Parlamento en la administración de los entes. Esta divergencia dio lugar a enfrentamientos entre los poderes y las empresas. En nuestra opinión –pese a no tener evidencia contundente al respecto- las empresas se vieron en la obligación de exagerar sus fueros autonomistas debido a que la constitución de 1919 implicaba por primera vez la coparticipación de ambos partidos tradicionales en la conducción de temas administrativos de gobierno. Es plausible que las empresas -frente a un CNA que contenía en su interior a representantes de la oposición por primera vez- buscasen separar más radicalmente su administración de las injerencias de los poderes como forma de preservar el amplio margen de maniobra al que estaban acostumbradas.(1) Más precisamente, en su 2da presidencia: 1911 – 1916.(2) Luego de 1933 y en un contexto económico y político diferente, las empresas públicas también serán usadas con fines regulatorios junto a otros andamiajes institucionales destinados a tal fin.(3) Este modelo, que es el que corresponde a la 1era Carta Orgánica del Banco de la República (1896), se repitió –con variantes que delimitaban diversos grados de autonomía- para las empresas públicas creadas durante la 2da presidencia de Batlle.(4) Tradición que tuvo tiempo de madurar y permear la conciencia de los burócratas de carrera del Banco República por lo menos a lo largo de 3 décadas (desde la fundación del instituto hasta entrada la década de los '30).(5) Según la constitución de 1919 el Poder Ejecutivo se dividía en dos organismos: Presidente y Consejo Nacional de Administración con funciones específicas y diferenciadas.(6) Una prueba tangencial de ello son los debates con los gobiernos que se verán en el cuerpo central de esta tesis.(7) "Hasta esta última fecha [1967], sin embargo, la autonomía real frente al poder ejecutivo era elevada salvo en los casos, cada vez más frecuentes, de pérdida de la autonomía financiera . Sin embargo, la cuestión de la autonomía y su disminución no es tan simple. En forma paralela a la causa financiera se va produciendo también un proceso de pérdida de la autonomía real frente a los partidos políticos. Estos cada vez recurren con más fuerza al sector empresarial estatal, como recurso político. La paradoja es que dada la estructura de los partidos, la pérdida de autonomía frente a ellos puede traducirse muy a menudo en el surgimiento de la posibilidad de afirmar la autonomía frente al poder ejecutivo, inclusive en casos de imposibilidad de autofinanciamiento". Más adelante concluyen: ".surge la interrogante sobre si lo más característico del período actual es la disminución generalizada de las autonomías, lo que en algunos aspectos parece evidente, o una compleja transformación por la cual antiguas autonomías reales han sido sustituidas por otras diferentes, pero no menos reales" (SOLARI, FRANCO, 1983: 94-95).(8) Artículo 100: "Los diversos servicios que constituyen el dominio industrial del Estado, la instrucción superior, secundaria y primaria, la asistencia y la higiene públicas serán administrados por Consejos Autónomos. Salvo que sus leyes los declaren electivos, los miembros de estos consejos serán designados por el Consejo Nacional. A este incumbe destituir a los miembros de los consejos especiales con venia del Senado, ser juez de las protestas que originen las elecciones de los miembros electivos, apreciar las rendiciones de cuentas, disponer las acciones competentes en caso de responsabilidad y entender en los recursos administrativos según las leyes".(9) Junto con el BROU, también defendían dicha posición los entes autónomos que tenían en lo previo un grado similar de autonomía. *Profesor de Fundamentos de la Investigación Social, Métodos de investigación y Taller de Monografía.Depto de Estudios InternacionalesFACS – ORT Uruguay(ma.baudean@gmail.com). BIBLIOGRAFÍAABERBACH, J.; PUTNAM, R. ; ROCKMAN, B. 1981. Bureaucrats and politicians in western democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.ACEVEDO, Eduardo. 1934. Anales históricos del Uruguay. Tomo IV. Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos.Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay [Raúl Montero Bustamante]. (s.f.) El Banco República en su Cincuentenario. 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The Mercury October, 1908 HEW THOSE WHO HELP US. The Intercollegiate Bureau of Academic Costume. Cotrell & Leonard, ALBANY, N. Y. Makers of CAPS AND GOWNS i'o Gettysburg College, Lafayette, Lehigh, Dickinson, State College, Univ. of Penn B.i Ivnnia, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, "Wellesley, Bryn Mawr and the others. Class Contracts a Specialty. Correct Hoods ^ Degrees. Right Now is not too soon for the senior, the college man, to let us know whether he would be interested in any sort of an office, sales, tech-nical or teaching position. Your choice of location and lines of business. Twelve offices covering the entire country, each operat-ing a department for college men. Write stating line of education and location desired. Hp.pGrB©B THE MERCUKY. extent brought under the influence of a force over which he has little or no control. So great is the power of tradition, that many are wondering what really is the attitude of the present undergraduates in ques-lions of truth and falsehood, than which nothing can be of greater importance, if the practical end of a college course is to be "training good members of society." Do our students have any dominating sense of honor, or are they predominantly gov-erned by the stray survivals of an impalpable and damaging tra-dition ? Behold, says the world to the college, you have received our choicest young men, you are training those who are to be the iiower of our citizenship, the leaders of men, yet you surround them with an atmosphere smirched with the vestiges of a past which knew neither the glory nor the honor of our democracy. The skeptic sees in the little college world only a false and de-cisive transcript of the larger world. He wonders when students will cease their imitation of the small boy, who one minute reads the riot-act of manly independence, and the next pleads the baby-act of thoughtless irresponsibility. He wonders when fac-ulties will cease their skipping about from "in loco parentis" to '.he "on honor" theory. Those best able to learn the attitude of students toward ques-tions of truth and falsehood find much that is encouraging. None set for college officers a standard of honor so sensitively' high. Disingemiousness in a professor the students find intol-erable, and once discovered it may mean the permanent blasting of his usefulness. A man may lack extraordinary personal .•harm, he may yet gain and keep the confidence of the students by scrupulous candor in all his intercourse with them, but lack of this element of frankness is sure to call forth their condem-nation. In no department of life can you find a loftier standard than the one which students have set for themselves in their athletic "iiaining. If athletics were not accomplishing anything else that is worth while, the fact that they get and keep a lot of young men "in training," renders justifiable their demand for con-tinued support. To the extent of rigidity has the standard of honor in .atliletic training been elevated. A student has no J THE MERCURY. purer means of branding himself than the breaking of training. And what body of more mature men has a finer sense of what constitutes leadership? No one, therefore, need seriously fear that undergraduates are without a keen ethical perception. And yet, in spite of these healthy signs, we cannot disregard 'he discouraging observations of a scrutinizing world. It sees in the average undergraduate such little sense of proportion: open and gentlemanly as he is, he appears honest and honorable only in spots. A manufacturer requires that into the product of his plant his workmen shall put honest material and honest toil,—his success depends upon that requirement. Need we wonder that he should grow impatient with our institutions of learning, which claim to enroll the choice youth of an enlightened country, when so much of the work turned out by them has the ear-marks of dishonesty, —not to speak of the vast amount of work that is never done at all? Can the college rightly expect much sympathy from the man of business, when he observes so many annually leaving col-lege walls who have never learned the real meaning of work, never practiced strenuous industry or appreciated the value of iime? The community would not feel so keenly disappointed with the growing numbers who go to college more for the social life than for learning, if that social life were invigorated to a greater extent by the moralities which govern society at large, :md if it had at least a more certain tendency to promote the greatest of all arts, the art of living. Is the judgment of the world too harsh ? Is it not too exact-ing to demand that youthful immaturity be subjected to the ligid standards which logic and the community at large seem to approve ? Only those yet under the charm of tradition—be they slumni, faculty or undergraduates—look with complacency upon the happy-go-lucky codes the extravagances and distortions of our colleges. But happily the number of these is decreasing, and never before, we believe, has the time been so propituous for the obliteration of this damaging tradition. This is true even among the undergraduates themselves. They ma}' not be desir-ing increased supervision or more stringent regulation, but a great majority of them stand ready to be released from false-standards and to adopt sound and sane ones in their stead. C THE MERCURY. Is it just that the picked young men of America should any longer be brought into and permitted to perpetuate a delusive-atmosphere? An atmosphere in which acts of obvious dis-honesty and vice and inhumanity are socially elevated and put into good repute, when the perpetrators should be put into bad repute, certainly deserves no place in an enlightened country 'ike our own. Undergraduates are free to confess that in their excesses quite frequently they are but following custom and can oiler no other excuse; and by their very manner many of them indicate that a higher standard is struggling to gain ascendency. Who shall assist them in completely throwing off the cruel rhackles of tradition, or must they effect their own deliverance? If the purifying and the uplifting of college honor is to pro-gress, along sane and invigorating lines, what greater service can be rendered the undergraduates than to place among them a vigorous, guiding personality,—not a college officer, but one who, sympathizing with the students' own point of view, can liberate Ihem and act as their interpreter and guide. THREE SENSES, BUT A COMPLETE SOUL. MARY HAY HIMES, 'OS. JELEN KELLEB'S name is already too familiar to each of you to need a special introduction. The world of to-day knows it well and has accorded to its owner not a little fame because of her attainments. Though Miss Keller has to do without both hearing and sight she has achieved a position among her fellowmen which we must, in the circum-stances, recognize as surprising. She is now twenty-seven years old and her education has served to make her a writer of no mean ability. She is a college girl, having been graduated from Radeliff with the degree of A.B., in 1904, and she is now entering upon a career of service io bo wrought both by her own hands and through influencing ••(hers to favor and aid beneficent undertakings. But whatever THE MJ5RCURY. rhe does she will not neglect the task of improving her mind and she will continue to write. She has had the unusual privilege of knowing intimately many of the great men of her day such as Phillips Brooks who was her main instructor in things religious, Henry Drummond the mem-ory of whose strong warm handclasp she likened to a benediction, Oliver Wendell Holmes whom she called her beloved poet, John (Treanleal' Whitticr in whose home she visited the summer before he died, Edward Everett Hale whose friendship helped her over many of the rough places, Mark Twain from whose lips she read one or two of his good stories, and Joseph Jefferson who acted for her in private the most striking parts of a number of his plays ro that her education even in this line is not so defective as one might naturally suppose. Of these, her friends, she has written: "In a thousand ways they have turned my limitations into beau- : if ill privileges and enabled me to walk serene and happy in the shadow cast by my deprivation." Books have meant much more in Helen Keller's education than in that of others for they serve to bring knowledge to her which comes to an ordinary person through his eyes and ears. She has read widely and is thoroughly familiar with a large num- .,er of the best works in prose and poetry. She says literature is her "Utopia for no barrier of sense shuts her out from the dis-course of her book-friends. All these things have broadened and enriched Helen Keller's mind so that she is well fitted to exercise her natural bent to writing which lias won for her the excellent place that she oc-cupies in the literary world. She has written for many of this country's best periodicals and has been asked to speak in state legislatures and at hospital dedications in the cause of the deaf and blind! Her book called "The Story of My Life," has been sold by the thousands, and her articles which have lately been oublished in the "Century" are of unique merit. It seems nowise unfit ihat Miss Keller should be regarded as one of the most wonderful women that have ever lived when we note that she has attained this high position in spite of the fact that she has been deprived of the two of the five senses which are of such paramount importance to each one of us that we depend on them almost entirely, paying hardly any attention to the cul- 10 THE MERCURY. tivation or use of the three upon which she must depend alto-gether. Some of the knowledge which would generally come to one through his eyes and ears is brought to Helen Keller by taste, touch, and smell. Through these three senses sounds and shapes penetrate her consciousness and by certain mental processes of adding, multiplying, comparing what these senses bring her she gets definite ideas of whole objects, distance, degree and differ-mce. But there are concepts whose getting belongs to hearing or sight so particularly that we would think it impossible for a deaf-blind person to obtain them, no matter how high might be the cultivation of his three remaining senses. A great gulf here opens dividing the deaf-blind person from the hearing and seeing world. Yet in the case of Miss Keller we find no gulf there, for her soul in its activity and completeness reaches out and fills up the void. She makes use of the analogy between the material and the soul worlds and from the very fulness of her inner life is able to "mploy that whicli in her case has no correspondent without, to give her knowledge of that which her senses can never reveal. So far as the appreciation of music is concerned, she may have far better understanding of its nature than many a person with bearing ears but without any soul-intelligence to interpret what, through them, comes to him. We are made to feel this from her own account: "Sweet, beautiful vibrations exist for my touch even though they travel through other substances than air to i-each me. So I imagine sweet, delightful sounds and the artis-tic arrangement of them which is called music, and T remember '.hat they travel through the air to the ear conveying impressions somewhat like mine. I also know what tones are since they are perceptible factually in a voice." Her ideas of things which are revealed to us through our eyes are not lacking in clearness. She thus describes the way she gets her concept of color: "I have talked so much and read so much about colors that through no will of my own I attach mean-ings to them just as all people attach certain meanings to ab-stract terms like hope, idealism, monotheism, intellect, which cannot be represented truly by visual objects." Again she says: "The flash of thought and its swiftness explain the lightening's THE MEUCLTRY. H flash and the sweep of a comet through the heavens. My mental .-ky opens to me the vast celestial spaces and I proceed to £11 them with the images of my spiritual stars. I recognize truth by the clearness and the guidance that it gives my thought, and knowing what that clearness is I can imagine what light is to the eye. The utmost bound to which my thought will go is the horizon of my mind. From this horizon I imagine the one which the eye marks." It is only when we awake to self-consciousness that we begin to think. The awakening of the soul must come before we can know how to use the knowledge which reaches us through our reuses. There are persons who, having all five senses yet walk blind in the midst of the beauty which can only be seen through • lie windows of the soul. "Our blindness," says Helen Keller^ '•'changes not a whit the course of inner realities. Of us it is as true as it is of the seeing that the most beautiful world is always entering through the imagination. Faith is a mockery if it Reaches us not that we may construct a world unspeakably more complete and beautiful than the material world. And I, too, may construct my better world, for I am a child of God, an in-heritor of a fragment of the Mind that created all worlds." Indeed as we read the works of Helen Keller we often be-come conscious of the flutter of the spirit wings and we feel that in her flights of soul we axe somehow uplifted and refined. All this tells a wonderful story about the real nature of the soul, its dignity, energy, and power. It puts to route those phi-losophers who would hold this wonderful part of man subject to the petty rule of flesh, who claim that the possession of all five senses is necessary for a full and complete knowledge,—that the soul is dependent upon sense for its full life. It shows the soul to be something separate and apart from the body in which it dwells and utterly independent of it. The loss of any of the senses affects one's soul as little as the loss of a hand or foot would affect his personality. The soul has wonderful capabilities of growth and action which nothing but its own will need limit. Nothing need be a prison-house to the spirit, such power does it possess. It has KIeh unexplainable and wonderful qualities as man has always been drawn by his nature to reverence and worship—truly he 12 TUB MERCURY. bas been made a little lower than the angels. It is the soul which each man must respect within himself. Of what significance, then, is this in disclosing the nature of" the life of the sonl? If the soul is not affected by the small changes as they occur in the body, will the final destruction of the body by death lay chains upon the spirit and drag it down to nothingness? If man were a merely natural being, Nature's des-tiny would be his also; but we have seen that the soul is super-natural, able to mount over the barriers imposed upon the na-tural, and therefore deserving a different fate. What then do we face but immortality ? If eternity be not for the soul, man's very greatness, his capacity for thought and action and for ideals were direst mockery! Is it not rather that the soul sojourns-here for a time in the physical body as in a prison from which death will set it free to dwell forever in that unseen world where its real interests are and where it will remain after all earthly end material things have passed away? Having the great gift of eternity and a soul active and power-ful to do what it will, does not one's destiny rest in his own hands? If he learns to enjoy the soul-world by thinking of it here and earning a place in it surely happiness will await him in the future. We have seen that Helen Keller is making wonderful use of" her powers and know that she is building firm and strong. Her wonderfully courageous fight stands a firm rebuke to our sloth-ful spirits, and her victories in overcoming the obstacles in her way hold great encouragement for those on the verge of despair. THE MERCURY. 13.-. A CLEAR AND A GLOOMY DAY AT COLLEGE. L. W. TAYLOR, '08. HE day dawns gloomily, and at the last possible moment the heavy-eyed student rolls out of bed and gazes through a streaming window into the dense fog which has settled over all the campus, hiding from view every beautiful feature of the place. No vigorous heart-beats stir his torpid blood as he buttons his raincoat about him in anticipa-tion of the weary trip to breakfast and the not-altogether enjoy-able chapel service following. But such a day must be endured, and the only remedy is to dispel the gloom and forget the rain—if possible. The college student is an adept at this and although all is dismal without. the dormitories seem filled with merriment. The pipes are pro-duced, and dense clouds of smoke soon arise and fill the atmos-phere as though in opposition to the clouds of mist outside. Here and there groups of students settle down to a friendly game of cards, while others, perhaps, coil upon a pile of cushions to enjoy an interesting book. From various quarters comes the tinkling of mandolins and guitars, sometimes accompanied by snatches of song. But despite all this assumed gayety, everyone feels a spirit of' depression which he cannot well shake off. It follows him about, hinders him in his work, making all seem drudgery, and lurks nearby in his pastime although it may be forgotten for a short while. And as evening approaches, this feeling of confinement becomes worse and worse until it is well nigh unbearable, and darkness 'settles down over a restless and disconcerted person who feels that the day has gone for naught. But bow different the clay which dawns brightly upon a fresh, green world. The student arises early, wakened by the gay ••hatter of birds, and the bright sunbeams which stream in through his window. He springs up with energy and feels the-oright red blood coursing through his veins and filling his whole being with the joy of life He faces the day with eagerness, and the spirit of achievement is strong within him. Chapel appears .ess odious, and he looks forward to recitatior«^kl^teas^£?«'**^^ | GETTYSBURG COLLEGE | i Gettysburg, Pa, - LIBRARY - 14 THE MERCDET. Such a clay fills the whole place with gayety and college seems u veritable paradise in which youth and energy abound. The pastimes are now out in the open where no walks confine, and where fresh breezes bring health and vitality to all. The tennis courts -are filled with white-garbed figures, while from Nixon irield resounds the crack of the bat as it sends the leather sphere out to some expectant hand. The brawny arms of clean-limbed f.thletes of the more classic sort,can be seen flashing in the sun-light as they circle the track with strong strides. Others indulge their freedom by strolling out over the battle-field, some in quest of botany specimens, some in the interests of geology, and many simply for the invigoration afforded by the pure air and sunshine. When darkness falls, the students are still loath to confine themselves within four walls, and so they stroll along the streets of the historical college town, and perchance when the moon .•ioods the campus with soft light, they gather on the steps of '•Old Dorm" and sing, or enjoy the peace of evening in medita-tive silence, thus ending n day filled with many joys and rich in life for all. j* SHOULD THE SCHOOL TERM IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS BE REDUCED TO EIGHT MONTHS? L. VAN DOREN,. '09. 8HE question of reducing the school, term in the public-schools from nine to eight months has been uppermost among the questions that have been troubling the minds of the men who have to attend to the welfare of our schools. The school term should not be reduced to eight months, be-cause the general age of the pupil in the public schools is under twelve years, and they are at the very age when they are learn-ing the rudiments of the different branches and getting the foun-dation upon which to build their lives; also they are at that age when they most easily forget what they are being taught, for THE MEKCURY. 15 their past experiences are few and they are continually passing through new experiences, which tend to drive out the training they are receiving from day to day in the school room. There-fore, to reduce the school term to eight months would be giving ;Jiese forces one extra month in which to work, and it would take twice that time to replace what would be lost, so instead of gain-ing a month it would be losing three. Also when the child is out of school he is free from the disci-pline which there exists. Some may say, he is under the home-rule. That is very true but the home-rule is in very few cases as strict as the discipline of the school room, and it can not be as stringent, for every one knows that in the school room the child ■s continually under the eye of his teacher, whereas at home, if he were there, for nine times out of ten after school hours he is roaming around with his comrades and is under no discipline at all—his parents have their domestic duties to attend to and are unable to keep a close watch upon him. So to give the child one month more of freedom from school-room discipline would not be to his advantage, but rather it would be detrimental to his childhood training. It is undoubtedly true that the children become very tired of being shut up in the school room during the spring and long to be free to roam wherever they may choose, and this very long- 'ng suggests a reason for not reducing the school term to eight months. The fact that a large number of the children loiter around after school hours with their companions is no reason for not reducing the school term, but the fact that they do not loiter inerely with their child companions but instead, around the street corners and other places is an argument against it. Here they come in contact with all kinds of people and see what those, some years older than they, are doing, such as smoking and chew-ing, and hear obscene language which is extremely disadvanta-geous to the training of the moral elements in the child. When the child sees or hears these things what does he do? Does he run away? No, he docs the exact opposite; he remains longer than he would otherwise have done, he is not satisfied with what hehasscenor heard but he wishes to see and hear more, and it docs not stop with the mere seeing and hearing; the child wishes to be like those who do these things, and thinks he is elevated to a 1G THE MERCURY. Uglier plane if he takes a smoke or uses curse words. He is sadly mistaken, for instead of being elevated, he is being de-graded. Therefore if the school term were reduced to eight months, he would be given one month more in which to mingle with this element, which works against his moral character. Thus there are three reasons, and very essential reasons too. why the school term in the public schools should not be reduced to eight months. In the first place the child would be deprived of a month's training in the fundamentals when it is the most opportune time; secondly, he would be free from the school-room discipline an extra month, and lastly, he would be given one more month in which to associate with that class of persons who stand on the street corners and in other public places. SIMILARITY OF PURSUITS THE BASIS OF FELLOWSHIP. G. L. KIEFFER, '09. XDIVIDUALS in this world are all prone to seek com-panions. The kind of companions sought varies in proportion to the degree of development of the indi-vidual. These individuals that mutually agree to en-joy each other's fellowship must certainly have as their posses-sion some common ground, where all differences disappear. This r-ommon ground quite frequently proves to be a similarity of pur-suit. In harmony with this fact is the old saying: "Birds of a feather flock together." Who has not seen, or read about, the old country store gathering. Here the farmer is wont to meet his neighbor for an evening's fellowship, mutually desired and en-joyed. This fact of similarity of pursuits being the basis of fellow-ship is not alone true of the laboring class. It is also true of the cultured class. The coffee house in the days of Ben Johnson was the fellowship club of the literary lights of that age. Here they met and enjoyed each other's wit and humor as well as shared each other's troubles. THE MERCURY. 17 The fact that similarity of pursuits is the basis of fellowship is ; hewn in the manner in which those who are following the same line of work are banded together. We, to-day, have the great labor unions' as an outgrowth of this among the laboring class. In higher walks of life are found this association and that asso-ciation. Banded together for each other's protection and develop-ment, these unions and associations are quite a factor, working for the betterment of humanity's condition of life. The strong characters thus intimately associated with the weak possess a great opportunity for living a life according to their Master's com-mands. Granted these associations carry with them evils, never-theless the benefits outweigh them. Therefore, in time past as well as at the present time, indi- \iduals who have had the common ground of similarity of pur-suits have banded themselves together in order that they might enjoy each other's fellowship. In all walks of life this has been true. It is likewise true that the benefits to the individuals of these bonds of fellowship can hardly be estimated. THE INEXORABLE IN THE WORLD. HESSE, '09. JWENTY and one half centuries ago, there lived, in beau-tiful Greece, a childlike and simple hearted people, but endowed with intellects that shone as the stars in their own wonderful heavens. Of experimental science they had none, but their intuition and reason led them to experience the loftiest thought and the profoundest emotions that fill the imman breast. They attained the heights of intellect we must strive in vain •■ompletely to comprehend, and they laid the foundation for modern culture in its length and breadth. They reveled in meta-physical speculations, they looked through the stars and through the multitudinous phenomena of earth, and saw within the com-plexity of all a oneness which they called the universe. Nor is there a theory of modern science or philosophy which in its 18 THE MERCURY. broad outlines they had not conceived. In the sixtli century before Christ there was taught the doctrine of creation by evolu-tion, the nebular hypothesis, the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy, the sphericity of the earth, the fact of sex in plants, as well as in animals, and their theory of music has never been changed. They recognized order, plan, and design in this cosmos of theirs, and so affirmed mind as its author. As those old Greeks had grasped the fundamental conceptions which are necessary to understand natural law in the material universe, so, too, by a native insight they grasped the ethical principles of the world. They felt themselves to be free-willed personalities, but they saw with crystaline vision that man, in order to find safety and perfect freedom, must have a will sub-servient to the laws set in order by the Divine Creative Mind, and that a will out of harmony with these laws incurs peril, tem-poral and external. During those early days the laws in physics, optics, chemistry. ,«md biology were unknown, and will was recognized as the only force capable of initiating motion. Accordingly, those old 'Greeks created, by their vivid imagination, gods invested with power to rule over certain definite spheres of human activity. Nevertheless, they were conscious that back of even Father Zeus liimself, there was a mysterious, an inexorable something, to which, with their most vivid imagination, they could not assign a personal existence in the home of the gods on high Olympus. The Greek philosopher was struck with awe, as he contemplated this mystery underlying his fanciful explanation of the move-ments in nature. He realized the presence of a force which lie oould not attribute to the capricious gods. He felt the cold hand of stern necessity, of unbending compulsion, that inexorable Power, which is no respector of persons, and to which all crea-tion is obedient, the great cause of the perpetuity of the world. He saw it manifested in (lie composition of the elements and represented graphically by the starry heavens. To him it was Ihe soul of all natural phenomena and the absolute authority over the hearts of men. The Greeks, in their thought were striving to represent this inexorable Power, and to that end, created a word. They spoke of it as avayKrj and to it they resigned self. Sopocles, in THE MERCURY. 19 that magnificent tragedy, "Oedippus Bex," says, "Not even the gods fight against amy/c^. And Aeschylus, in the Promotheus Bound, tell how, in the beginning, poor pitiable mortals were crashed through their ignorance of natural laws and forces, hav-ing no power of development, and that at length rejected and given over to destruction by the Olymphic Zeus. He tells how, in their blindness to the means of development which avayK^ afforded, they suffered untold pain and woe. They failed to re-alize that existence is a struggle in which the victory is not to tiie strong but to those whose souls are atune with the eternal plan of progress. Mortals seemingly were helpless, but upon re-ceiving fire, "the teacher of every useful art," there was opened to them illimitable resources. Science was born, and by learning. dowly and painfully, the workings of the universe, man was raised to a higher plane of living. Centuries have rolled by, and man himself has become a god. AVe have advanced until we are conscious that all natural forces invite us to rise higher in material development by cdping with opposition. The idea of limitation and the laws of nature that stand seemingly in opposition to our physical, mental, and moral development may be considered as the dark avay/o? of the ancient Greeks, and yet in reality it is merely the necessary op-position by which action is made possible. There could be no flight of birds, if it were not for the change-less law of gravitation and the defiance of ethereal space. Our fouls could not soar to higher worlds, and, in our intellectual and • loral struggles we should fail, but for the very defiance we meet. 't is the order of things yet to some, it is so dark and fearful. But why should it be? It is but rational to accept the limita-tions which He who made the world has set as the boundaries of-human activity. Endowed with an immortal soul and placed in, a vast theatre of struggle, a man so often surrenders to the evils, that he meets. His confidence in the All Wise fails, he rebells,. and succumbs to fate. The purpose of the Infinite remains obscure, but the wisdom of' ihe plan which he has adopted is being revealed and its justice, •indicated, as age after age pushes back the horizon of knowl-edge. We are now standing in the morning twilight of a new era of thought, and, as we read the message of the past, we see 20 'J'KE MERCURY. the problems which perplexed the ancient mind, in a measure ceing solved. As solution follows solution, there opens to our view mysteries of wider scope. Human interests are essentially the same, but humanity drinks from a larger cup of bliss than ever before. As dark shadows disappear and the boundaries of Ignorance recede, we enlarge our horizon. The periphery of the universe expands, and in realms growing still more vast avoy/07 the inexorable, appears, as a legion of mysterious forces and influences, drawing out and showing human aspira-tions in an intricacy of thought and action. No longer do we. as did the children of Mars, march to certain death upon the field of battle and call it fate. But, while understanding so much of the mystery of existence from the starry heavens to the microscopic world, while recognizing the reign of law as inexora-ble, we know comparatively nothing of the problems that re-main. There are principles we can not fathom for they grow darker as we seek their significance. These are appalling fea-tures that bind and hold the race in their iron grasp. Society hems us in on every side. There are boundaries im-movable. The individual, born to act within his sphere, the physical, mental, and spiritual limitations of which there is ab-solutely no hope of crossing, is as really hound by the hand of fate, as was Promotheus of old. We are doomed to play our role in the drama of life within a certain narrow sphere. The law of heredity and our personal contact with the outer world bind and keep us closer than would the eye of a jealous Grecian deity. We are under the law, and violation of natural laws brings about unnatural conditions. Perpetration of deeds, unnatu-ral, breeds in humanity tendencies to repeat crime even to the fifth generation. This, indeed, is determinism. It is the avayKrj of the nncient Greeks. They whom such fate overtakes are of mortal ones most to be pitied. The old Grecian idea of avay/oj comprehends all such, yet the principle is that of eternal justice which is enthroned high above the limitations of man's understanding. Stern necessity, the inexorable bond which obtains in this uni-verse of law and order must be considered as the hand board di-recting man. It points out a perilous way, but it will lead, Rventually, to more perfect human relations. ITIJS MERCURY. The harmonious stream of existence follows inexorable law. .All is harmony, yet unintelligible to the passing multitudes, who-through selfishness and by acts of rebellious will toll a sad knelL and depart forever. But, the imperishable stream flows on. He who would be wise embarks and.acts according to the light he has. Outside of the light, or in realms unexplored, there is abso-hitely no mercy for him who seeks to break the limitations set by law. The ancient Greeks with their partial insight bowed in sub-mission before the inexorable; not only they, but their Olympian gods as well. Dim and hazy, felt rather than seen, and having no habitation as did Zeus, this illimitable power never became anthropomorphic. It was never a Father into whose face they amid look- and say, "Thy will be done." Rather they surren-dered to an unknown, impersonal necessity whose decree was in-evitable We recognize the same power manifesting itself in the physical world, and we call it natural law; and in the world of humanity, we call it, in the fine phrase of Matthew Arnold, "The power in history, not ourselves, which makes for righteous-ness." FEUDS IN OUR RURAL COMMUNITIES, bo|raa^!'*' [ GEfTYSBURG tc__ Gettysburg, Pa. LIBRARY - - 26 THE MERCURY. and the principal works dealing with the Confessions of the Church. In practical theology we have the complete works of Luther, devotional books, sermons and treatises, some in pamph-let form, others in the original manuscript. Some of the authors represented in Systematic Theology are, Dorner, Martensen, Miiller, Beck, Sprecher, Schleiermacher and JSTitzsch. Commentaries are by Meyer, Keil, Bretheau, Hengs-tenberg, Tholuck and others. Philosophy is also extensively represented both in histories and complete works on the subject. It contains the works of nearly all the great German philosophers, such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Shopenhauer, Lotze, V. Harman, Wundt, and others. Besides these comprehensive works thre are many German and Englisl treatises and dissertations on philosophical subjects. Another and doubtless the most exhaustive department is So-ciology. In this department the productions of Dr. Stucken-berg form an important and valuable feature. Along with his works are found all the most noted German contributions to the science as well as many other historical and systematic pro-ductions of authors of different nationalities. Some of the au- Ihors represented are Marx, Lange, Wagner, Schaffle and Blunt-schli. Among the many works on History are found the following: Macauley's, "History of England," Humes', "History of Eng-land," Tierre's, "History of the Consulate and Empire of Na-poleon," Gibbons' Complete AYorks, Fronde's, "History of Eng-land." Also a large number of works dealing especially with Church History, such as. Millman's, "Latin Christianity," His-tories of Protestant Theology and works dealing with the Ameri-can Church. Some of the authors represented are jNTeandet'. Jleppe, Bohringer, Schaff and Planck. Tn the collection of biographies are those of all the great re-ligious, intellectual and political leaders, such as St. Augustine, Melanchthon, Schleiermacher, Martensen, Henhofer, Humbold, Tholuck,Webster, Beecher, Burke, Scott, Garrison, Garrick, Mar-tineau and others. The encyclopaedias and dictionaries form an important fea-ture of the library, especially along the lines of Theology and Sociology. Although some of these works are not the latest and THE MERCURY. 27 most up-to-date editions, the majority of them are still recog-nized as authority in their particular departments. Such is Herzog's "Theologische Beal-Encyklopadie." Besides this partially classified material there is of course a large amount of miscellaneous material, such as works and trea-tise on Natural History and Geography. There is also some fic-tion and high class English and German literature. The works of Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Heine, Jean Paul Bitter, Shakes-peare, Milton and others are found complete. AT SUNSET. BY ARTHUR CHRISTOPHER BENSON. How pure, how spare the hues that lie O'er these wide plains, from sky to sky! . As tho some brush, of airy skill, Had washed, had tinted, field and hill. Soon falls the change; the daylight dies; The dusk o'erbrims her boundaries; The sun flares westward, fiercely rolled 'Mid purple islets ridged with gold. Air me, ah me! alike they fade— Brief space of sun, swift lapse of shade; The wistful eye, that saw and loved, The heart so strangely, sweetly moved. Yet, tho the creeping dusk enfold My faint-hued hopes, my dreams of gold, At last, her patient journey trod. This trembling soul shall leap to God. —Prom the Daily Mail (London). I H E ERCURV Entered al the Posloffice at Gettysburg as second-class Matter. VOL. XVI GETTYSBURG, PA., OCTOBER, 1908 No. 5 Editor in-Chief P. F. BLOOMHARDT, '09 Exchange Editor H. REY WOLF, '09 Business Manager CHARLES L. KOPP, '09 Ass't Bus. Managers G. C. KNIPPLE, '10 PAULS. AIILLER, '10 Assistant Editor CHARLES F. V. HESSE, '09 Associate Editors SAMUEL FAUSOLD, '10 EDWARD N. FRYE, '10 Advisory Board PROF. C. F. SANDERS, A. M. PROF. P. M. BIKLE, PH.D. PROF. C. J. GRIMM, PH. D. Published each month, from October to June inclusive, by the joint literary societies of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. Subscription price, one dollar a year in advance ; single copies 15 cents. Notice to discontinue sending THE MERCURY to any address must be accompanied by all arrearages. Students, Professors and Alumni are cordially invited to contri-bute. All subscriptions and business matter should be addressed to the Business Manager. Articles for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address THE MERCURY, GETTYSBURG, PA. EDITORIALS. The words of welcome to the new students, as published in the Gettysburgian pleased us very much. We are pleased even more on account of the enthusiasm, which, if possible, is greater than that manifested during previous years. It is the spirit of "Greater Gettysburg" entering into every phase of college life. The vari-ous activities of our college have been well presented to the new men, and they, in turn, have re- THE MERCURY. 29 spondecl with that well known heartiness requisite to the well-being of a new man. A Gettysburg man will be impelled to branch, out, taking in all possible advantages, or elese he will be (ompelled to plod his more narrow path with ever increasing difficulty. This is as it should be. It is not merely a rule gov-erning college activities, but is a universal law. It seems, in-deed, needless to devote further discussion to this topic. We would rather compliment the new men as being able to see readily what we mean to suggest. We would therefore say to all new men, faithful class work joined with good faith, as shown by the way you take up the subsidary features of college life, will lead to the summum bonum. Literary attainment is the most valuable asset in a liberal education. By its means we learn of a man's physical, mental, and heart-life all at once. Each professor under whom you have literary work will take special interest in you, especially when you aim to produce something worthy of recognition in the MERCURY. And besides, all the professors and students will ; rd your trivial imperfections with increased charity, when you show by your effort that you mean to succeed. Let each man busy himself, not alone to gain these advantages, but let him go in for all there is in the performance of duty, and other things will come to him in due time. Join one of the literary societies and aim to have your work there be of a high stand-ard. The MERCURY is watching for the best from the best men. Number yourself with the best. If you are willing to do these Things, Gettysburg has great pleasures in store for you. Year after year, the importance of joining a literary society and of taking an active interest in such work has been much, dis-cussed. But in recent years this importance has not been real-ized as it should be. It is merely talked about. It has not been so very long ago that literary work occupied a high place in the sphere of college activities whilst our successes in athletics were not so marked. Of late, however, we are inclined to believe chat the reverse of this has been true. We would in no wise discourage the great interest in athletics which has meant so much to Gettysburg's teams, but we would also claim for liter- .30 THE MF.BCURY. ary work the proper attention and interest due to its real im-portance in college life. Few men who go through college are ignorant of this importance for it is a real necessity in the mak- :rjg of a cultured man, but the attention of most men is so en-grossed in other ways that the society work is neglected to their own disadvantage as well as to the injury of the respective so-cieties. In our opinion, everyone who enters college should strive to become as well-rounded a man as possible,—by this we mean that he should take advantage of as many varied lines of work as he can; for instance,—he is as much at fault who be-comes a grind in his regular work required by the faculty as the man whose attention is entirely held by other things to the detri-ment of his class standing. He whose interest is limited to ath-letics alone will fail of becoming a broadly cultured man just as easily as the literary "shark" who has no time for athletics. So. for this reason, we would urge every new man, not to fail to join one or the other of our literary societies, and, once having joined, not to let his interest wane. The result of his labors will surely be evident before his graduation. BOOR REVIEVS. \BE Social Secretary, David Graham Philips, Philo 11, 5. Among the many books of present day American life written by this author, this volume is the most captivating. We hear much of the struggles of the newly-rich to enter the social circles at Washington and the con-trast of the social life of America's capital with the customs of foreign courts. "The Social Secretary" presents such pictures of present-day Washington society life that all the best Ameri-can traits are revealed and compared favorably with the polished :nanners of foreigners. The book is written very attractively in the form of a diary. It is not a very large book nor is it dif-ficult reading. What would otherwise be but a dull description is enlivened by several real love incidents which are superin-tended by a natural, sensible American mother of the right sort. ■I'l-TB afERCURY. 31 It also shows to what extent the affairs of the nation are affected by the influence of the social circles at the capital. The Bar Sinister, Richard Harding Davis, Philo 11, 7. This bhort story of dog life is one that will appeal to all lovers of ani-mals. It belongs to that class of recent fiction in which dumb brutes are given the position usually accorded to the hero or heroine. In this book, a bull terrier named "Kid" is given the place of honor. It is a delightful story of how "Kid's" noble blood showed up in spite of the disadvantages which were met until at last he carries off all the prizes in the kennels. The: little book is written in a peculiarly tough dialect which suits I lie nature of the dog very well and shows a noble heart within the dumb breast. The tale is made more attractive by the fact (as stated by the author) that',it is founded on truth. There is a real original dog as well as the other character in the story. It makes pleasant reading for a half hour's recreation. The House of Fulfillment, by George Martin Madden, Philo 11, 7, is a book of much interest to the reader, who loves char-acter sketches. In it the two extremes of human nature are set forth, the romantic and the stern, the light and free-going nature of the Southerner, and cold rigid Presbyterian of the North. Alexina Blair, the product of these two extremes, is of special interest. She is to be admired for the stand which she takes in relation to her uncle, Austen Blair, and her care for her weak charactered mother. There is a thread of love story running "hrough the latter part. The reader will find the book very agreeable and will be very much inspired by the spirit displayed in some of the characters. The Blaclc Bag, by Louis Joseph Vance, Philo 11, S. This novel gives an account of some very exciting adventures of a voung man in London. Philip Kirkwood, while pursuing his studies in painting, receives the news that he is made penniless by the San Francisco disaster. Hence he prepares to return to-the United States and help his partner. Almost at the moment of his departure, his services are solicited by a man of doubtful appearance, to take charge of his daughter, a young lady of about eighteen. Upon doing this, he misses his steamer and has some very thrilling experiences. The author thoroughly under- 32 THE MERCURY. ttands the different phases of life in London and depicts his fharacters well. The reader's interest is aroused at once and never lags. He follows every detail, reading every part with the closest attention, even though it is drawn out in many places to the point of attenuation. This fact shows the author's skill as a writer Another fascinating point in the novel is, that one is in doubt as to how he feels toward the young man; sometimes he is ready to condemn, and again to admire him. The book is full of action from beginning to end and can be read with rapidity. The Orphan, by Clarence E. Mulford. Philo 11, 8. Clarence E. Mulford does not give his readers a story of "domestic inter-est" notwithstanding its title, The- Orphan. On the contrary the orphan of the story is a cowboy and something of a "bad man.'" The scenes are laid in the arid Southwest. Above all things this is a story of dramatic and exciting incidents. In the beginning the or-phan has become an outlaw. Under unexpected circumstances, the Sheriff and he come face to face. In the sequel the man of lavr learns that the orphan, whom he has been pursuing relentlessly. is probably not so black as he is painted. Further dramatic de-velopments ensue on the introduction of the Sheriff's sister. The orphan rescues her from Apaches. But why go on? Mr. Mul-ford has written an exceptionally good story of action, repro-ducing the atmosphere of the alkali country, ami portraying the characters with sufficient clearness and care to make them stand out. The Orphan is to be read for the thrills and excitement, of which there is an abundance. Need it be said that the Sheriff's sister pays back her debt to the orphan by converting him from the evil courses of his life ? Mr. Mulford has written a worthy successor to "Bar-20," and this is the same kind of a breezy, outdoor, vivid stoiy of incident and action. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. THE BEST PEN F03 GUIEGE ME There's no pen that gives such all-round satisfaction as Conklin's Self-Filling Fountain Pen. It's the best pen for College Men. When an ordinary fountain pen runs dry in the middle of a word, it means you've got to stop right there, hunt up a rubber squirt gun, fill your pen to overflowing, clean both pen and dropper, wash your hands, and then endeavor as best you can to collect your lost CrescentJI train of thought It's different with CONKLIN'S JSSh FOUNTAIN PEN "THE PEN WITH THE CRESCENT-FILLER" To fill, just dip it in any ink, press the Crescent-Filler, and the Conklin is filled and ready to write instantly. 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EMIL ZOTHE COLk^tEM3 ENGRAVER, DESIGNER, AND MANUFACTURING JEWELER 722 Chestnut St, Phila. SPECIALTIES : MASONIC MARKS, SOCIETY BADGES, COLLEGE BUTTONS, PINS', SCARF PINS, STICK PINS AMD ATHLETIC PRIZES Ail Goods ordered through G. F. Kieffer, CHARLES S. MUMPER. HEAL,KB IJV FTT5?_^TT*TITT!R"S P,CTURE FRAMES OF ALL SORTS ** ™""N * * W •ATVJSfy REPAIR W0HK DONE PROMPTLY I WILL ALSO BUY OR EXCHANGE ANY SECOND-HAND FURNITURE NO. 4 CHAIYIBERSBURG STREET, GETTYSBURG, PA D. J. SWARTZ DEALER IN COUNTRY PRODUCE, GROCERIES, CIGARS AND TOBACCO. GETTYSBURG. SHOES REPAIRED —BY— j. \i. 8°Hep» 115 Baltimore St., near Court House GOOD WORK GUARANTEED. —IS— J. {. iVfUlfPE^ Your PhotograDher ? If not, why not? 41 BALTIMORE ST., GETTYSBURG, PA. 8EFT0N I FLEMMING'S LIVERY, Baltimore Street, First Square, Gettysburg,'Pa. Competent Guides for all parts of the Battlefield. Arrange-ments by telegram or letter. Lock Box 257. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. W. T. BRUBAKER, Manager. Midway between Broad St. Station and Reading Terminal on Filbert St. A convenient and homelike place to stay while in the city shopping. An excellent restaurant where good service combines with low prices. ROOMS $1.00 PER DAY AND UP. The only moderate priced hotel of reputat.on and consequence in 3?±iila.cLelpIaJLa THE . Mode^steamuundry . . OF YORK . . Offers the COLLEGE STUDENTS first-class work at Special Low Prices. E. C. STOUFFER, Local Agt. C. D. SMITH, Prop. COMPILER IMPRINT ON JOB WORK MEANS TA3TT WORK CAREFULLY DONE. MENU CARDS, LETTER HFAOS, WINDOW POSTERS. ENVELOPFS, DANCE CARDS TICKETS, Programs of all kinds. Everything- the College Man wants in Paper and Ink. Specially designed work. Latest Effects in Paper,, done in Colors along lines of College Men's Associations. Catalog and Book work. The Gettysburg Compiler will keep old and new students in touch with, town and college life.