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Abstract
The article aims to analyze the geopolitical, conflict-related, and strategic interests of Ukraine realized within the framework of the South vector of the state geopolitics through rational and pragmatic cooperation with the trans-regional leader of the region – Turkey. The study aims to identify priority areas of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in the Black Sea region for the effective implementation of geostrategic interests of Ukraine and the regularity of development of political defense systems during crises and modern military-political conflicts. The interdisciplinary approach and methods of analytical and comparative analysis made it possible to study and examine the evolution of the value-ideological loads which dominate the implementation of Eastern or Western geopolitical vectors. The necessity to consider political, social, and conflict-related imbalances and integration constraints revealed the pragmatic direction of equidistant foreign policy implementation in a three-dimensional format. This format involves an alternative vector of bilateral cooperation with Turkey and a joint position, which will ensure accelerated development of Ukraine and help avoid pressure from the European Union and the Russian Federation. The defensive type of geostrategy serves as a common denominator in cooperation between countries, providing more substantial interaction at the level of experience exchange on military operations, military-political conflicts in Syria and the Eastern regions of Ukraine, solving problems with separatist regions, implementing programs for refugees and internally displaced persons, developing a parity promotion of integration of Turkey and Ukraine into the EU.

A debate concerning whether NATO and European forces in the Balkans require radical restructuring considered several arguments: (1) wide-ranging emergency powers of international organizations create an obstacle to democratization versus the need to prosecute notorious war criminals before the intervention is completed; (2) "ad hoc" international arrangements should be replaced with the European-led pre-accession process versus the ongoing challenge of maintaining security in Kosovo; and (3) local institutions are ready to provide security for minorities versus destruction of Bosnian democracy was caused by war, not by the High Representative.

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Is the ineffective protection of international public goods (like an efficient world trading and financial system), and thereby also of interrelated national public goods (like a common market undistorted by anti-dumping laws and other border discrimination), the inevitable fate of humanity? The negative answer to this question in Section I argues that the ineffective protection of international public goods is mainly due to lack of adequate theories, rules and institutions for overcoming the 'collective action problems' in the multilevel governance of interdependent public goods. Section II reviews the competing conceptions of 'international economic law' (IEL) such as public international law approaches, multilevel economic law approaches, 'global administrative law' approaches, 'conflicts law approaches' and 'multilevel constitutional approaches'. Section III argues that - similar to the experience of all democracies that 'national public goods' can be supplied only in a framework of constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial rules and procedures supported by domestic citizens - the multilevel governance of 'international public goods' requires a multilevel constitutional framework for multilevel rule-making and judicial protection of rule of law and constitutional rights accepted and supported by domestic citizens as 'primary' legal subjects of IEL and of a citizen-driven, worldwide division of labour. Section IV concludes that multilevel governance for protecting the national self-interest in international public goods must no longer be designed only as 'foreign policy', but rather as an ever more important part of 'multilevel constitutionalism' for the protection of essential citizen interests. Rather than relying on hierarchical claims (e.g. regarding national primacy of state sovereignty, international primacy of international law over domestic law), the diverse national and international legal regimes must be coordinated with due respect for 'constitutional pluralism', 'deliberative democracy', 'balancing' of competing rights and values, and international duties of cooperation (e.g. among national and international courts of justice). 'Westphalian conceptions' of international law as an instrument for advancing national interests in an anarchic world remain important for protecting 'national public goods' (like national security). Yet, as illustrated by the diverse forms of European law (such as EC, EU, EEA law and the ECHR), more effective protection of interdependent (inter)national public goods requires new forms of multilevel governance and of multilevel constitutional restraints limiting the 'collective action problems' in transforming national into international public goods (e.g. protection of common markets and the environment).

What role does Russia play for Nordic regional cooperation? And how should the Nordic countries behave when there are suddenly two actors who both claim to represent the interests of Russia - the union authorities and the Russian republic? These two questions are discussed in the following article. To study Soviet/Russian Nordic policy, an analytical framework is constructed with the security problem of the USSR as its point of departure. Both "internal" and "external" aspects of national security are taken into consideration according to Barry Buzan's wider security concept. The study concentrates on the period November 1990 to May 1991. The author concludes that it is important that the Nordic countries establish direct contacts with the Russian republic and with individual Russian regions in the vicinity, while keeping the old diplomatic relations with the union government.

This paper deals with four aspects of neutrality. The first is the changing use of the word — from a purely legal concept to a broad political term. Behind this transformation lies a number of factors related to the development of the post-World War II political system. The second aspect bears on the use and understanding of the concept in Swedish foreign policy — and its ensuing role in domestic politics. The third aspect concerns the various kinds of judgement to which the Swedish policy of neutrality has from time to time been exposed. One conclusion is that Swedish policy of neutrality is criticized both on the basis of imprecise definitions of neutrality and because of ambivalence in Sweden's own application of the principle. A fourth and final observation deals with the possibilities for a revised paradigm for neutrality as an effect of the new developments in the European security order.