Suchergebnisse

Are 'grand coalitions' – coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system – good or bad for democracy? This article analyses that question in light of the recent rise of populist parties that large mainstream parties may try to exclude from government by forming grand coalitions with other large mainstream parties. I call this the 'sterilization' logic and note that mainstream parties' ability to do this varies widely. Where parties have previously used grand coalitions primarily according to a 'clientelistic' logic – for example, Austria – mainstream parties may well be unable to rally the party system against insurgent populist challengers. Where mainstream parties have used grand coalitions exceptionally and for major institutional 'renovations' – for example, Germany – the grand coalition remains a viable option for responding to insurgent challenges, though this strategy is also quite risky. This article considers the implications for democracy by tracing recent developments in the context of the euro crisis and the European refugee situation. The major empirical referents are Austria and Germany – two countries with extensive experience and literature about grand coalitions – but the article draws out the implications of the analysis for other European parliamentary contexts.

This article examines how the engagement of diverse religious organisations and individuals in grassroots politics impacts the nature of politics and coalition building through a case study of an urban grassroots political coalition in Australia: the Sydney Alliance. Based on eight-months of exploratory ethnographic fieldwork in one campaign team, this article argues that whilst religious organisations bring significant symbolic and institutional resources to political coalitions, and can be flexible coalition partners, they tend to moderate both conservative and progressive political tendencies within a coalition and demand focused attention from organisers and leaders to manage the coalition dynamics. This article examines the way many religious activists understand their political action to be an inherent and necessary part of their religious practice: problematizing the characterisation common in much social science literature that religious engagement in more progressive politics primarily serves political, and not religious, ends. In doing so, it shows how political action can be directed both outward towards the work, and inward towards the &lsquo ; church&rsquo ; .

AbstractHow do voters sort within an electoral coalition? Voting literatures on ideology, character valence, and issue ownership provide explanations for inter-coalition or inter-party voting, yet the coalition context remains understudied. Do voters in proportional coalition-based systems use the same ideological and issue-based heuristics ascribed to them in two-party systems that favor single-party government? Voting behavior in Italy in the 2000s is used to explore this question. This paper examines what motivates the voters of the large center-left and center-right coalitions, specifically whether ideology, economic issues, or other considerations lead voters to select their party of choice. Results indicate that, on average, voters select a coalition ideologically-proximal and deemed the more competent on issues, while they select a specific party based upon character and reputation issues. Findings thus suggest that voters sort for both coalition and party-specific reasons.

The Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies Coalition is a cooperative venture of 80 national voluntary, health professional, and governmental organizations committed to improving maternal and infant health through education. In the 4 years since its creation, the Coalition has grown in scope and size, established an Executive Secretariat, and begun activities directed at breastfeeding, substance use, injury prevention, genetics, oral health, adolescent pregnancy, and motivation of low-income women. National Coalition educational materials on these subjects are produced by representatives of the national organization members contributing time and their organization's resources. In addition, member organizations sponsor the publication of a quarterly newsletter and other coalition-building materials including an exhibit, slide-tape show, television production kit, and a community organization guide. Combined with State and community enthusiasm for the Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies concept, technical assistance from national members has led to the formation of coalitions in many States--more than 40 States have designated contacts with the national coalition. The State coalitions have undertaken a variety of campaigns; the achievements in 12 States are outlined. Of high priority during the next year will be support of these developing State coalitions through co-sponsorship of regional conferences. The national Coalition will also continue to recognize innovative programs through annual national achievement awards. The Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies Coalition is dedicated to continued development and promotion of educational programs for pregnant women, those planning a pregnancy, and their caregivers until 1990, in support of the health Objectives for the nation.

Gamson's Law-the proposition that coalition governments will distribute portfolios in proportion to each member party's contribution of seats to the coalition-has been one of the most prominent landmarks in coalitional studies since the 1970s. However, standard bargaining models of government formation argue that Gamson's Law should not hold, once one controls for relevant indicators of bargaining power. In this article, we extend these bargaining models by allowing parties to form pre-election pacts. We argue that campaign investments by pact signatories depend on how they anticipate portfolios will be distributed and, thus, signatories have an incentive to precommit to portfolio allocation rules. We show that pacts will sometimes agree to allocate portfolios partly or wholly in proportion to members' contributions of seats to the coalition; this increases each signatory's investment in the campaign, thereby conferring external benefits (in the form of a larger probability of an alliance majority) on other coalition members. Empirical tests support the model's predictions.

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- References -- Chapter 2: The Making and Modus Operandi of the Coalition Government -- Why a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Was formed -- The Parliamentary Maths -- Ideological Compatibility -- Policy Proximity -- The Importance of Personalities and Inter-personal Relationships -- Our Programme for Government -- Agreements to Differ and Deferrals of Decisions -- The Allocation of Ministerial Portfolios -- The Modus Operandi of the Coalition Core Executive -- Conclusion -- References