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This article was co-published with the Guardian.Nine of the 12 members of a high-level congressional committee charged with advising on the U.S.'s nuclear weapons strategy have direct financial ties to contractors that would benefit from the report's recommendations or are employed at think tanks that receive considerable funding from weapons manufacturers, the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft can reveal.While the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (CCSPUS) purports to recommend steps to avoid nuclear conflict, it does nothing to disclose its own potential conflicts of interest with the weapons industry in its final report or at rollout events at think tanks in Washington.The United States will soon face "a world where two nations [China and Russia] possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own," warned the commission's final report, released in mid-October. "In addition," the report charged, "the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared."According to the CCSPUS, this potential doomsday scenario requires the U.S. to make "necessary adjustments to the posture of US nuclear capabilities – in size and/or composition," a policy shift that would steer billions of taxpayer dollars to the Pentagon and nuclear weapons contractors."What we've consistently seen is the nuclear weapons industry buying influence and that means we cannot make serious decisions about our security when the industry is buying influence through think tanks and commissioners they are skewing the debate," said Susi Snyder, program coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons."Instead of having a debate about the tools and materials we need to make ourselves safe," she added, "we're having a debate about which company should get the contracts. And that doesn't make the American people safe or anyone else in the world."The CCSPUS was established two years ago via the annual defense policy bill, and conflicts of interest on the commission were apparent from the beginning. But an analysis by the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft found deep ties between the commission and the weapons industry.The most recognizable member of the CCSPUS is its vice-chair, Jon Kyl, who served as a senator from Arizona from 1995 to 2013 and again in 2018, after the death of John McCain. While this, and more, is included in his biography in the commission's report, what's left out is his more recent employment as a senior adviser with the law firm Covington & Burling, whose lobbying client list includes multiple Pentagon contractors that would benefit from the commission's recommendations.In 2017 Kyl, personally, was registered to lobby for Northrop Grumman, which manufactures the B-21 nuclear bomber that the commission recommends increasing the number the U.S. plans to buy, at a cost to taxpayers of nearly $700 million each.Kyl did not respond to questions about his employment status with Covington & Burling, but the former senator was listed as a "senior adviser" on the firm's website until at least December 1, 2022, nearly 10 months after the commissioner selections for the CCSPUS were announced in March 2022.Another commissioner, Franklin Miller, is a principal at the Scowcroft Group, a business advisory firm that describes Miller as having expertise in "nuclear deterrence," and acknowledges its work in the weapons sector."The Scowcroft Group successfully advised a European defense leader on a strategic acquisition opportunity," says the consulting firm in the "Defense/Aerospace" section of its website. "We have also assisted a major defense firm in pursuing global partnerships and co-production opportunities."Miller did not respond to a request for comment about the identity of the Scowcroft Group's clients.Kyl and Miller are joined on the CCSPUS by retired general John E Hyten, who previously served as the vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the second-highest-ranking member of the U.S. military.While Hyten's biography in the commission's report lauds his extensive military service, in retirement he has worked closely with a number of firms that could benefit immensely from the commission's recommendations.This March he was appointed as special adviser to the CEO of C3 AI, an artificial intelligence company that boasts of working with numerous agencies at the Department of Defense. In June 2022, Hyten was named executive director of the Blue Origins foundation, called the Club for the Future, and as a strategic adviser to Blue Origin's senior leadership. Blue Origin is wholly owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, and works directly with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the air force and the space force on space launch-related capabilities.Hyten's ties to these firms are notable given the CCSPUS report's repeated overtures for improving and investing in space and artificial intelligence capabilities. Specifically, the report recommends the United States "urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture" and take steps to ensure it is "at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI)."Hyten did not respond to a request for comment.The CCSPUS also included think tank scholars whose employers receive significant funding from the arms industry. Two commission members work at the Hudson Institute, which, according to its most recent annual report, received in excess of $500,000 from Pentagon contractors in 2022. This includes six-figure donations from some of the Pentagon's top contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems.On Monday, October 23, the Hudson Institute held an event to highlight the CCSPUS's report that included the two Hudson Institute employees who also served as commissioners. The event unabashedly promoted recommendations from the report that would be a financial windfall for Hudson's funders. The landing page for the event features a photo of a B-21 stealth bomber, the same photo used in the commission report that also recommended that the U.S. strategic nuclear posture be modified to "increase the planned number of B-21 bombers and tankers an expanded force would require."Neither at the event nor in the report is it noted that the plane's manufacturer, Northrop Grumman, is in the Hudson Institute's highest donor tier, contributing in excess of $100,000 in 2022.The Hudson Institute staff who served as commissioners did not respond to requests for comment.Another commissioner, Matthew Kroenig, is a vice-president at the Atlantic Council, a prominent DC think tank which, according to the organization's most recent annual report, is funded by several top Pentagon contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon (now RTX), General Atomics, Saab and GM Defense. The Atlantic Council also receives more than $1 million a year directly from the Department of Defense and between $250,000 and $499,999 from the Department of Energy, which helps manage the nation's nuclear arsenal.These seeming conflicts of interest were not mentioned at any point in the CCSPUS's report or at an Atlantic Council event promoting the report and featuring the same photo of the B-21 used by the Hudson Institute and the commission.Kroenig did not respond to a request for comment.Even commissioners whose careers had included positions that were notably critical of nuclear weapons had recently established ties with firms that profit from the nuclear and conventional weapons industry.Commissioner Lisa Gordon-Hagerty worked for years at the pinnacle of nuclear weapons policy in the U.S., including positions on the national security council, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Department of Energy. She was also the director of the Federation of American Scientists, a non-profit organization known for advocating for reductions in nuclear weapons globally. Her last government position prior to joining the commission was serving as the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for military applications of nuclear science. She resigned from the post in 2020, allegedly after heated disagreements with the secretary of energy, who tried to cut NNSA funding.While much of her career is mentioned in the commission report, what's left out is that Gordon-Hagerty has also been cashing in on her nuclear expertise. After leaving the NNSA, in 2021 she joined the board and became director of strategic programs at Westinghouse Government Services, a nuclear weapons contractor that has been paid hundreds of millions of dollars for work with the Department of Defense and Department of Energy.Gordon-Hagerty did not respond to a request for comment.Like Gordon-Hagerty, fellow commissioner Leonor Tomero had a distinguished career at the highest levels of nuclear weapons policy. According to her bio in the commission report, she was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy and served for over a decade on the House Armed Services Committee as counsel and strategic forces subcommittee staff lead, where her portfolio included the establishment of the U.S. space force, nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear cleanup, arms control and missile defense.Outside government, Tomero was Director of Nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an organization that has repeatedly called for reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Tomero is also on the board of the Council for a Livable World, which explicitly states that its goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons.Yet, in September, Tomero became a vice president of government Relations at JA Green & Company, a lobbying firm whose client list includes a host of military contractors that could see revenues soar if the CCSPUS's recommendations are adopted. Space X, for example — which pays $50,000 every three months to JA Green for lobbying related to "issues related to national security space launch" — would probably benefit mightily from the commission recommendation that "the United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure US access to and operations in space.""No clients of JA Green & Company sought to influence the work of the Commission or the Commission's recommendations in any way," said Jeffrey A Green, president of JA Green, in an email. "We follow all applicable ethics rules and there are no conflicts of interest."None of the potential conflicts of interest between commissioners' financial interests and the policy proposals laid out in their final report were disclosed by the CCSPUS itself within its final report or at any public event highlighting its findings.While many commissioners did not respond to requests for comment, the commission's executive director, William A Chambers, provided a statement on behalf of the CCSPUS and its members."Members of [the commission] were chosen and appointed by Members of Congress based on their national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, law enforcement, the Armed Forces, law, public administration, intelligence gathering, commerce, or foreign affairs," wrote Chambers. "Before they began performing their role as Commissioners, they were instructed on the ethics rules that govern congressional entities and were required to comply with rules set forth by the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives."Chambers did not respond to a request for a copy of the ethics rules.But the opacity about potential conflicts of interest leaves some experts questioning the CCSPUS's recommendations."There's a huge argument raging over what is security, how much does it rely on transparency and, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons, there is a call for greater transparency," said Snyder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. "That light they're asking to shine on China, North Korea and Iran is a light they also need to shine on their own decision-making."

On Saturday, an alleged Israeli airstrike killed five senior members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus. On the same day, an Iraqi Shi'a militia affiliated with Iran launched a salvo of ballistic missiles at Al-Asad base in Iraq, housing U.S. forces, resulting in injuries to U.S. personnel. Normally Iraqi militias use drones or rockets, not the ballistic missiles preferred by the Islamic Republic. These attacks occur at an inflection point for Iran.From Jan. 15 to Jan. 16, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted military strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan, primarily in retaliation for an attack within its borders on Jan. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its branch in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the inciting explosions, which killed close to 90 people in Kerman, Iran, in one of the deadliest terrorist strikes in the Islamic Republic since 1979.Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, vowed the "terrorist attack" would be met with a "harsh response." Yet Iran targeted alleged bases of Kurdish and Baluch separatists in Iraq and Pakistan, respectively, and ISIS remnants in Syria, not Afghanistan. This demonstrates that Tehran feels emboldened to strike any group it deems a threat, using the Jan. 3 attack as a cover. Iran previously showed more restraint responding to domestic terror attacks from 2017 to 2020.An analysis of the string of events that led to Iran's recent retaliation demonstrates that a regional war is erupting in the Middle East after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, even beyond the recent U.S. and UK strikes in Yemen. While the U.S. has yet to acknowledge this fact, the history of terrorist attacks within Iran demonstrates why it believes the fighting is linked to other events and sheds light on how Tehran will lash out.When terrorist attacks occur in Iran, they rarely generate media coverage, showing an unfortunate indifference to Iranian lives. However, Iran too wages its own war on terrorism. An examination of past attacks and how Iran responded demonstrates that the Islamic Republic's "harsh response" — its own counter-terrorism strategy — is an attempt to establish deterrence, as the U.S. and Israel seek to do the same in the region.The spiral of violence in January 2024On Dec. 25, 2023, an Israeli strike killed Iranian general Seyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus. At the same time, the U.S. targeted the Iraqi militia Kataib Hizballah, which cooperates with the Islamic Republic, in retaliation for allegedly launching drones at U.S. forces in Erbil.On Jan. 1, 2024, the U.S. sunk three attacking speedboats in the Red Sea, killing 10 Houthis. On Jan. 2, an Israeli drone strike killed Hamas's deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut. On Jan. 3, the ISIS attack in Iran occurred. On Jan. 4, the U.S. assassinated "Abu Taqwa," a mid-level leader of the Iraqi militia Harakat al-Nujaba in a drone strike in Baghdad, for his role in attacks on American targets in the region, allegedly at the behest of the Islamic Republic. Then the U.S. and UK launched air strikes on Jan. 11 and 17th on Houthi targets all over Yemen, a militia allied with Iran, followed three days later with the Israeli attack in Damascus. The Islamic Republic will see the timing of these attacks as intrinsically linked. The ISIS terrorist attacks occurred near the tomb of General Qassem Soleimani, in his hometown, targeting mourners who had congregated there for the fourth anniversary of his assassination. Soleimani, who headed the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force, was killed in the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, by a U.S. drone strike. There had been speculation about the various actors who may have conducted the attack. From the Islamic Republic's perspective, its enemies are ISIS and its branch in Afghanistan; Arab, Kurdish, and Baluchi separatists; the Iranian exile Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) Organization; as well as Israel and/or the U.S. Iran might very well blame all of those actors for working in unison. The attack in Kerman bore the hallmarks of an ISIS operation and was claimed by the terrorist group. Ethnic separatists usually chose Iranian military targets. Israel tends to conduct targeted assassinations of Iranian scientists, or recently an Iranian general in Syria. But Islamic State's attacks are indiscriminate, and Soleimani did organize the Iraqi militias to combat the terrorist group in Iraq, giving ISIS a reason to retaliate.Between exiles, ethnic rebellions, and ISISAfter 1979, the nascent Islamic Republic had to deal with two problems in its western Kurdistan Province, which has a significant Kurdish population, and its southern Khuzestan province, which has a significant Arab population. Both areas proved problematic as the Iranian state sought to overcome ethnic differences between Persian nationalism and Kurdish and Arab aspirations by reconciling them under the banner of an Islamic Republic.There were a few bouts of violence in the early 1980s, particularly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), but the provinces remained quiet until 2003, when the Bush administration was allegedly responsible for stoking Iranian ethnic rebellions during its War on Terror. An ethnic Sunni Baluch rebellion erupted in addition to dissent in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and among Iran's ethnic Azerbaijani population, which is larger than the population of the republic of Azerbaijan itself.Al-Qaida never struck in Iran, but ISIS, with its virulent anti-Shi'i ideology, attacked the majority Shi'a nation. In June 2017, four ISIS terrorists launched a brazen assault on Iran's parliament, killing 18.Iran's ballistic counter-terrorism strategyIn retaliation, on 18 June, 2017, the IRGC launched six domestically-produced Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, with a range of over 400 miles, against Islamic State targets in Syria's eastern province of Deir Ezzor.While the target may have been ISIS, the strike sent a signal to Riyadh in the aftermath of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's statement that Saudi Arabia would take its "battle" with the Islamic Republic inside of Iranian territory, made at the height of the Saudi-Iranian cold war in the Middle East. The missiles, after all, also had the range to strike Riyadh.The IRGC again launched missiles in early September 2018 against the KDP-I, exiled in bases in Iraq, in retaliation for their alleged attacks on Iranian military forces. In the most recent attack in January, the IRGC launched a dozen ballistic missiles and suicide drones at targets in northern Iraq, claiming it targeted a Mossad base there that was used to organize the Jan. 3 Kerman bombings, killing at least four people. In reality, Iran most likely sought to deter the KDP-I from future attacks.Back in 2018, ISIS attacked an Iranian military parade on Sept. 22 in Ahvaz ("Ahwaz" in Arabic). The al-Ahwaz National Resistance, an umbrella movement for Arab separatist groups, also claimed responsibility for that attack. However, the Ahvaz group had never conducted such a brazen attack before, preferring to sabotage Iran's pipeline facilities, usually at night. ISIS, on the other hand, had attacked Iran's parliament in 2017 in broad daylight.Furthermore, for reasons of domestic consumption, it was more convenient that ISIS was the culprit for the 2018 Ahvaz attack. If Tehran were to blame the Ahvaz group, it would serve as an admission of the government's failure to address the depressed conditions in the Khuzestan province as well as in Kurdistan and Baluchistan — conditions that have led to grievances and pushed some locals to adopt terrorism. Second, the Ahvaz group did not have any military bases outside of Iran to retaliate against.Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles to strike the ISIS-held town of Hajin in eastern Syria. When it lost all of its territory in the east of Syria, ISIS allegedly kept some networks alive in the rebel-held Idlib. Even though the Jan. 3 attack was claimed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) the IRGC justified attacking Syria instead of Afghanistan by claiming that ISKP terrorists receive training in Idlib from ISIS and are then transferred to Afghanistan by the U.S. In reality, an attack on Afghan soil would have disrupted already tense relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan.In the restive Sistan-Baluchestan province, bordering Pakistan, Iranian military forces were targeted twice in domestic terrorist attacks in 2019. The first hit a base of the Basij, the paramilitary force affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, coinciding with the Islamic Republic's celebration of the 40th anniversary of the revolution that brought down the shah. Another attack followed, killing 20 Revolutionary Guards in a suicide bomb operation. Both were claimed by the Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), formed in 2012 to fight on behalf of Baluchi Sunnis, who complained of discrimination by the Shi'a government. The Islamic Republic did not respond to those attacks since this Baluch group operates clandestinely within the Sistan-Baluchistan province and out of the Baluchistan province in Pakistan. At that point, Iran did not want to violate the sovereignty of its neighbor. However, last week it did retaliate for a different set of attacks in mid-December, when the Baluch group attacked an Iranian police station in the town of Rask, killing at least 11 officers.The year 2020 witnessed two major losses for Iran. After Soleimani's death in January 2020, Iran launched 22 Fateh ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing American forces. In December 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in his car by a sophisticated machine gun contraption controlled remotely. Israel and its alleged ally the MeK rarely take credit for the string of assassinations that have targeted Iran's nuclear scientists, with Iran issuing condemnations, but little more. The fact that Iranian allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen have struck Israel or its interests since Oct. 7 serves as an indirect retaliation in their regional conflict.The Islamic Republic has sought to mollify domestic audiences by demonstrating that it retaliated for recent attacks on Iranian soil and will consider its mission accomplished. Further retaliation would jeopardize its gains. Iran has already won a regional conflict by reviving its Hamas-Hezbollah-Houthi "Axis of Resistance" since October. Yet the people of Iran endured a loss.Nevertheless, the recent events have demonstrated the interconnected and interdependent nature of the Middle East, and how a set of attacks in Iran are related to the ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Fifty years is a long enough time to dissipate the impact of war. In the United States, the Vietnam War is no longer much discussed. Scholars still plow the field, but the war that tore America apart, spurred a counterculture movement, killed 57,000 Americans (and vastly more Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians), led to a restructuring of the U.S. military and the all-volunteer force, and was an impetus to Desert Storm no longer shapes the discourse.My students were born in 2002 or 2003; they're voting age. Even those with living grandparents who served in Vietnam don't know much if anything about the conflict. Of course, there have been intervening failures that proved costly, although not on the same scale. But proximity bias — the hard-wired human tendency to accord greater importance to things that are closer than others in time or distance — ensured that the mayhem generated by the Iraq and Afghan Wars would eclipse the awfulness of Vietnam.The Yom Kippur War of 1973 has likewise receded in the Israeli imagination. But its specter is more complex. The 2,500 Israeli soldiers killed (a fraction of the 15,000 Arabs who perished) was three times the per capita human cost of the Vietnam War to the United States. I was in Israel during that time, and everyone knew someone who'd been killed. The war was also far shorter, about 10 days, so the casualty list had an outsized emotional impact. It was not the long slog of Vietnam, but rather an avalanche.Early in the war, Syrian armor destroyed the Israeli tank brigade deployed to the Golan Heights and reached Gesher B'not Yaakov (Jisr Banat Yaqub). Just beyond it was the Jezreel Valley. The prospect of a large Syrian armored formation penetrating the Israeli heartland was as ghastly for Israelis as it must have been thrilling for the Syrians. The United States has never experienced anything like this, including 9/11.In the space of this instant, violence burgeoned. The largest tank battle since World War II, when German and Soviet armored juggernauts collided at Kursk, unfolded on the Golan. Fierce battles developed in the Sinai and then on the left bank of Suez, where Israeli forces encircled an entire Egyptian army. A week into the war, the U.S. launched its largest-ever intra-war arms transfer. For days, U.S. C-5 cargo aircraft touched down at Israeli airfields every six minutes. The airlift, however, occurred after Israel had regained its balance and counterattacked, halting an hour outside of Damascus and holding Egyptian territory — in addition to the Sinai, where Israel stopped the main thrust of Egyptian armor toward the mountains passes and destroyed the advancing units.The war also included other dramatic moments. Apparently believing that the Soviets were preparing to intervene militarily on Syria's behalf, the Nixon administration raised the United States' nuclear readiness level, an extraordinary step. Saudi Arabia led an OPEC oil embargo against the United States that carried profound implications for its economic and political stability for the ensuing decade, bringing the so-called long summer of postwar economic growth to an end and guaranteeing an era of sluggish economic growth and high inflation.The long-term effects of the war on Israel were profound as well. The outcome, despite the phenomenal recovery of Israeli forces under the much maligned but in fact highly competent IDF chief of staff, was traumatically dislocating for an Israeli public accustomed to thinking that its victory in the 1967 war rendered the state immune to Arab military challenge.Within four years, the Labor Party that had dominated Israeli politics in one form or another since 1948 was dislodged. Trust in the old elites was shattered. The intelligence community failed to credit the Egyptian and Syrian commitment to waging war. Across the board there was a conviction that the conditions under which the Arabs would launch an offensive simply did not exist. And Military Intelligence disregarded Mossad's success in recruiting a senior member of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's entourage who underscored that a war was in the cards. Moreover, the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, who had presided over the disaster, had heeded stern guidance from Nixon and Kissinger not to preempt Arab war preparations when these were finally acknowledged 24 hours before the start of hostilities.Whether or not this was a wise call on Washington's part, it certainly increased the butcher's bill Israel was to pay and undermined the Labor government. Meir would come under attack later for having ignored Sadat's peace feelers following the 1969 War of Attrition along the Suez Canal. Sadat, however, tended to frame his overtures as demands for an upfront Israeli withdrawal from all of the Sinai Peninsula, which the Israeli government could not meet. There was plenty of blame to go around. In any case, combined with serious ethnic tensions generated by the political mobilization of Mizrahim — Jews who had immigrated from the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa — the cratering of Labor credibility enabled the ascendance of the Likud Party.Half a century later, what lingering significance does the war have? Israel and Saudi Arabia are negotiating normalization, which will entail a civilian Saudi nuclear capability that is inherently dual-purpose. The Abraham Accords have already normalized Israel's relations with Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco. Egypt and Jordan have longstanding peace treaties with Israel. Syria has been neutered by a long, destructive civil war. Lebanon has ceased to exist as a functioning state and has not engaged Israel in hostilities since 2006. Two eviscerating wars with the United States removed Iraq as a potential combatant of the old rejectionist front.A cataclysmic ground war between Israel and its neighbors has been inconceivable during this veritable Age of Aquarius. But if the Yom Kippur War is no longer relevant, the present irenic reality — excluding the West Bank and Gaza — is largely due to the instrumentalization of that conflict by the Nixon administration for the purpose of peacemaking. One really can't contemplate these developments without implicitly thinking about the 1973 war.Another potent outcome of the war was the diplomatic process that surrounded the ceasefire and the years that followed. Kissinger gets credit for this, not unfairly. He was not one to waste a crisis. He seized the opportunity the war presented to use Sadat's evident interest in joining the Western camp and Israel's reliance on American support to bind each closer to Washington while crowding out the Soviet Union. Although his diplomatic strategy yielded disengagement agreements on both fronts, the fact remains that Egypt and Israel had embarked on a quiet bilateral process even as the guns were still cooling.Sadat had waged the war to shatter the status quo by drawing Israeli blood and bringing the U.S. into the conflict. His goal was the negotiated return of Sinai to Egyptian control. The war, for him, had a clear and well-defined political purpose. Although the seven years that preceded the Camp David Accords were at times touch and go — down to the climactic talks themselves — the so-called peace process would be difficult to imagine without the bloody impetus of 1973. Kissinger's key insight, regrettably abandoned by his successors but seemingly grasped now by Beijing, is that it pays to maintain ties with both sides in a conflict.As the Arab-Israeli conflict has devolved to Israel and the Palestinians, this lesson of the 1973 war has faded for Israel as well. Israel's use of force now has no political objective. Its purpose is solely conflict management and deterrence. To borrow from Lord Carrington's verdict on NATO, it is to keep the Palestinians down, the U.S. out, and wealthy Persian Gulf states in.Yet, perversely, the possibility of change is in the air. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right coalition partners are less interested in managing the level of violence on the West Bank than in informally annexing it. Their commitment to Israeli settlement of the West Bank is greater than their interest in grand geopolitical deals that might boost the Tel Aviv stock exchange but defer redemption of biblical lands. One could construe the hard right's agenda as restoring a true political objective to Israel's fight with the Palestinians.The 1973 war also altered Israeli military doctrine. Planners have recognized that — beginning with that war — Israel has not won any major ones. (Neither has the United States.) The reasons for this are legion, but one stands out: the losers do not concede defeat. They take a licking but keep on ticking. Hence the most recent development in Israel's military doctrine, accorded the acronym Mabam, meaning "the battles between the wars."The idea is that major wars are no longer decisive and will therefore recur periodically. The best course is to delay these wars and weaken adversaries' ability to wage them by fighting draining low-level battles in the interim. This makes some sense, naturally, but militates against any attempt to leverage the fighting to achieve durable peace. This applies to the Palestinians as well. Their violence is expressive, perhaps reflecting their view that there is no conceivable political objective.There's a larger theme here, though. The international system was vastly different in 1973. The Cold War framework in which the United States and Soviet Union conducted their foreign policies and made it possible for Sadat to conduct a war with such a bold but cogent purpose is long gone. We will see whether the U.S.-China in the Middle East recreates it.The leftist post-colonial Arab states that fought Israel are scarcely even remembered. The Israeli state and society that fought the Yom Kippur War, like the America that waged war in Vietnam, no longer exists. The values that animated it no longer shape the nation's thoughts and actions.Fifty years after the war, this should come as no surprise. In the ongoing demonstrations against judicial reform in Israel, one can see veterans of 1973 claiming that their wartime sacrifice would be betrayed by the triumph of the hard right. They are correct, but they're old duffers and out of touch with young Israeli mainstream voters, who, if they dwell on the 1973 war at all, likely see the left as the guilty party. Thus, policy makers, mostly in the West, can noodle about the war's lessons for diplomacy and statecraft, but for Israel — and the Arabs — it's ancient history.

It's now been five days since Hamas staged the most ambitious attack in its history. The Palestinian militants broke through the fence dividing Gaza from Israel and managed to hold territory for several days, killing at least 1200 civilians and Israeli military personnel along the way.
Israel has responded with a devastating attack on Gaza, killing at least 1100 civilians and Hamas fighters in days of airstrikes that are a likely prelude for a ground invasion, the first since 2014.
Tel Aviv's response has received emphatic support from the United States, which has greenlit emergency weapons shipments, moved an aircraft carrier strike group into the eastern Mediterranean, and pledged logistical and intelligence support for Israel as it tries to recover more than 100 hostages taken back into Gaza by Hamas, some of whom are American citizens. Washington has also warned Hamas allies — including Iran and Hezbollah — against entering the fight.
While President Joe Biden has not yet sent troops to join the conflict, the possibility that the United States will wind up at war in the Middle East is now "higher than most people realize," according to Michael DiMino, a researcher at Defense Priorities who worked as a counterterrorism analyst at the CIA during multiple regional crises.
"Once that box is opened — even if due to accident or miscalculation — it can't easily be closed," DiMino argued. "I don't think this Administration wants to get embroiled in a new Middle East hot war for a number of reasons, but sometimes intent isn't enough to prevent things from spiraling out of control."
RS spoke with DiMino to understand if and how the United States can prevent that spiral of escalation. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: You've said that the risk of direct U.S. involvement in this war is higher than most people realize. Can you start by explaining why? What are analysts missing?DiMino: Having spent time working crises in the region, whether it was the Turkish incursion into Syria, or the war in Yemen, or the aftermath of the Soleimani strike, what people miss is that as soon as we start surging forces to the region — naval forces, air assets — as soon as that stuff starts to happen, the playbook for policymakers necessarily has to widen on contingency planning. And that involves direct U.S. involvement in some cases. Also, people are missing the sheer number of variables of things that can happen. Just because the U.S. may have a stated intention to avoid deeper conflict or just because Hezbollah has not committed forces beyond the border, just because the intention is there does not mean that miscalculation, missed signals, and events on the ground can't just force chains of events into action.One thing I would give an example of is the question of unity of command. We can't talk about groups like Hezbollah as these monolithic organizations. They may receive orders not to do something, and you're relying on local command and control nodes to make sure that you don't have a rogue cell of Hezbollah guys that decide to go into Israel or decide to carry out another set of attacks or widen the front in other places. There's all sorts of unity of command issues that can really pressure policymakers into widening the conflict.The Israelis have said that opening a significant additional front would be grounds for U.S. involvement. Even if we don't think that Hezbollah senior leadership is supportive of that, you have to rely on 1000s of fighters and local commanders understanding those priorities as well. Even if we feel confident that the U.S. doesn't want to go further, or we feel confident that certain governments in the region are being at least somewhat restrained in how they're responding to this, I don't think that's enough. From a military and intelligence perspective, I don't think people appreciate the sheer number of variables that go into a very hot, minute-by-minute crisis like this.RS: What might the big fear of escalation be here? Is this fear that there'll be a potential war with Iran? Why should Americans be concerned about the potential for direct U.S. intervention?DiMino: As soon as we make commitments to our partners and allies, and then those commitments get tested, it really pressures policymakers into a shoebox where they feel like in order not to lose U.S. credibility or deterrence capability, we have to respond. I'm not saying it's necessarily likely, but I'm saying it is possible that if we promise to Israel that we will get involved kinetically should Hezbollah decide to commit its forces, and then Hezbollah does so, and then we start conducting strikes in Lebanon, then [the situation could spiral].At that point, I wouldn't be surprised if U.S. forces in Iraq and in Syria became targets of Shia militia groups in those countries, and then I think there would be pressure from Israel to try to support limited action against Iran. Obviously, that would be a disaster for all parties involved, not least the United States. I don't think that this administration wants to do that, but I do think once these events start to roll together and the decision matrices and the timelines that those decisions have to be made on get narrower and narrower, that these kinds of things can happen.I was working in the government during our last couple of rounds of escalation with Iran, and I would say that even in a span of a couple of hours, during those previous crises, we came very, very, very close to a new kind of kinetic involvement in the Middle East. Seeing how quickly those decisions were made and how little time policymakers really have to consider a lot of this, I do think that, even if it's a minimal risk, it's one that we should take seriously and that we should steel ourselves against. We should be holding our policymakers to account to ensure that any kind of involvement that we do provide in the Israel-Hamas context to Israel or other regional partners, that we're doing so with a mind to de-escalate.RS: The White House has pointedly avoided calling for a ceasefire or de-escalation, and even deleted statements to that effect that had been tweeted out. Do you think that's a wise strategy? How do you think those conversations in public might differ from ones in private between U.S. and Israeli officials?DiMino: Behind closed doors, there are going to be calls between U.S. and Israeli officials that I'm sure are centered around saying, "Look, we need you guys to mitigate civilian casualties to the extent that you can." And I think the wheels are already turning on discussions of what the off ramps are here. A lot of this, though, hinges on what we see in the next couple of days. It seems like everybody is waiting with bated breath on whether or not we see an incursion into Gaza. The administration could be cautiously optimistic that, as this new Israeli war cabinet gets put together, maybe some more moderate voices are added to the room that have military and intelligence backgrounds, that they could blunt any more aggressive policy options that would make it harder to de-escalate. The administration is probably working on those relationships right now. I think, though, that the effort is going to be mostly done in private, and it's mostly going to be with an eye to try to mitigate civilian casualties and hopefully have U.S. eyes on whatever kind of planning is going on on the Israeli side.RS: Does the public appearance of being in lockstep with Israel's decisions raise the possibility of escalation with groups like Hezbollah and Iran that might be inclined to see that as a sign of more direct involvement? If there's no distance between the U.S. and Israel, you can see how they might respond to that.DiMino: To a certain extent, some of these groups are always going to see the U.S. and Israel as very closely tied. I'm not sure that steps by the administration in one way or the other would necessarily assuage groups like that. I do think, though, what would be helpful is a little bit stronger signaling to the rest of the region that we do want to de-escalate and that we're willing to work with anybody to do that. At the end of the day, though, decisions by terrorists on the ground are going to be driven by their own organizations and their own ideologies. I don't think there's some statement that any one person can make right now that would necessarily influence to the point where certain decisions that were going to get made aren't made. I think we need to do our best to signal, though, that we want de-escalation in very, very subtle ways. There's been some of that, but we could do more. There's just not much of an appetite for it right now, obviously, given how emotionally charged the situation is on all sides. It's been terrible to witness all of this, and especially at a time when I do think there were some hopes to maybe move the region forward.To some extent, that shows the folly of previous efforts that have been made in the past several presidential administrations. The Abraham Accords left out the issue of Israel-Palestine, and I think that's a massive mistake. That was largely done because people thought that that's the thorniest issue, that we could set it aside and solve 80% of the rest of the equation, but it doesn't work that way. This conflict is so central to the region, and you can't really address any kind of long-term political arrangements in the Gulf or in the Middle East without also addressing it.I know we may be a long ways away from this, but I'm hoping that, through all of this, there may be a renewed understanding that this issue is central to the Middle East. We can't just close our eyes and look away from it. We do need to try to come to a solution that is in the best interest of everybody in the long term. For the U.S. especially, we want to ultimately have a responsible foreign policy that does less in the Middle East. To the extent that we can have reasonable engagement with the Saudis, the Israelis, the Iranians, the Emiratis, whoever else, that's in America's best interest in the long term.

Ali E. Abbas (" Decomposing the Cross Derivatives of a Multiattribute Utility Function into Risk Attitude and Value ") received the M.S. degree in electrical engineering, the M.S. degree in engineering economic systems and operations research, the Ph.D. degree in management science and engineering, and the Ph.D. (minor) degree in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University, Stanford, California. He was a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford. He previously worked for Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He was also involved with several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and was a co-teacher of several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group, Menlo Park, California. He is currently an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a member of INFORMS, a senior member of the IEEE, an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research, and an editor of the DA column in education for Decision Analysis Today. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") holds a joint appointment as professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the Department of Engineering Physics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she chairs the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering. She has directed the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis (formerly the Center for Human Performance in Complex Systems) since 1995. She has more than 20 years of experience in risk analysis for the nuclear power, chemical, petrochemical, and aerospace industries. Before returning to academia, she spent seven years as a consultant at Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. While there, her clients included the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and a number of nuclear utilities, and she prepared testimony for Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings on the safety of the Indian Point nuclear power plants. Dr. Bier's current research focuses on applications of risk analysis and related methods to problems of security and critical infrastructure protection, under support from the Department of Homeland Security. She is also currently serving as a special term appointee for the Infrastructure Assurance Center at Argonne National Laboratory. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 1513 University Avenue, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: bier@engr.wisc.edu . Robert F. Bordley (" Using Bayes' Rule to Update an Event's Probabilities Based on the Outcomes of Partially Similar Events ") is an INFORMS Fellow and a winner of the best publication award from the Decision Analysis Society as well as five major application awards from General Motors. He is a General Motors Technical Fellow with experience in research, planning, quality, marketing, corporate strategy, and procurement. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and was formerly program director of Decision, Risk and Management Sciences at the National Science Foundation. Dr. Bordley has published 75 papers in decision analysis, marketing, and operations management. He has also served as chair of the American Statistical Association's Risk Analysis Section (which now has 1000 members), vice president of the Production and Operations Management Society, and a member of the INFORMS Board and the Decision Analysis Society Council. He earned a Ph.D. and M.S. in operations research and an M.B.A. in finance from the University of California, Berkeley. His primary interests have been in theoretical developments enabling high-impact application of decision analysis in a wide variety of corporate contexts (e.g., engineering design, corporate strategy, procurement, program management, etc.). Address: General Motors, Pontiac Centerpoint Campus North, 585 South Boulevard, Pontiac, MI 48341; e-mail: robert.bordley@gm.com , rbordley@umich.edu . Heidi M. Crane (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is an assistant professor of medicine at the University of Washington (UW) School of Medicine and the associate director of Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research at the UW Center for AIDS Research (CFAR), which promotes research comparing the effectiveness of management strategies for HIV-infected patients in routine clinical practice. She is co–principal investigator (PI) of a PROMIS (Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information Systems) National Institutes of Health Roadmap initiative U01 on measuring patient reported outcomes in clinical care for HIV-infected patients and PI of a National Institute of Mental Health R01 project on measuring and improving adherence for HIV-infected patients in clinical care. She is also medical director of the Madison HIV Metabolic clinic, PI of an American Heart Association grant on myocardial infarction and metabolic complications among patients with HIV, and PI of an Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality grant on comparative effectiveness of antihypertensive and lipid-lowering medication among HIV-infected patients. She provides care and training in the clinical care of HIV-infected individuals, and she also mentors junior investigators in HIV research in the UW Division of Infectious Diseases. Dr. Crane is a member of the Data Management Centers for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases–funded CFAR Network of Integrated Clinical Systems (CNICS) research platform of real-time electronic health record data for 22,000 patients from eight CFARs across the United States, and the International Epidemiological Databases to Evaluate AIDS project's North American AIDS Cohort Collaboration on Research and Design (NA-ACCORD), which merges data on 110,000 HIV-infected individuals in care at 60 sites across the United States and Canada. Dr. Crane leads the CNICS Patient Reported Outcomes Committee and the CNICS and NA-ACCORD myocardial infarction event adjudication teams. Dr. Crane's research focuses on methods to improve clinical care for HIV-infected individuals as well as metabolic and other chronic comorbidities of HIV. She received her internal medicine residency training from Barnes and Jewish Hospitals, and her B.A., B.S., M.D., M.P.H. and Infectious Disease Fellowship training from the UW. Address: Harborview Medical Center, 325 9th Avenue, Box 359931, Seattle, WA 98104; e-mail: hcrane@u.washington.edu . Naraphorn Haphuriwat (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") is a researcher at the National Metal and Materials Technology Center in Thailand. She applies tools including optimization, decision analysis, and process simulation to improve production processes and operations for small and medium enterprises. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering in August 2010. During her doctoral study, she was supported by the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California, where she conducted game-theoretic studies in the applications of security. She also received an honorable mention in the 2004–2005 University Book Store Academic Excellence Award Competition for a project related to computer security. Address: 114 Thailand Science Park, Paholyothin Road, Klong 1, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand; e-mail: naraphoh@mtec.or.th . Joseph B. Kadane (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is Leonard J. Savage University Professor of Statistics and Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Carnegie Mellon University. His research focus is on both foundational issues of Bayesian analysis and applications in many settings. These currently include physics, phylogenetics, air pollution, Internet security, law, and medicine, as well as Internet auctions. He also serves as an expert witness in legal matters. Address: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail: kadane@andrew.cmu.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors: Deterrence, Multiattribute Utility, and Probability and Bayes' Updating ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple-attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Mari M. Kitahata (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is professor of medicine at the University of Washington (UW) School of Medicine, director of Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research at the Center for AIDS Research (CFAR), and principal investigator of the UW HIV Cohort. She has provided care and training in the clinical management of HIV-infected individuals for two decades, and she mentors investigators in HIV research in the UW Division of Infectious Diseases. Dr. Kitahata studies the outcomes of care for persons with HIV infection, and her research has elucidated key determinants of increased survival, including care managed by physicians with HIV expertise and earlier initiation of antiretroviral treatment. The need for observational research to complement the invaluable information provided by randomized controlled trials has grown tremendously, which is why she established the CFAR Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research program at UW in 1995 and was among the first CFARs in the United States to do so. Dr. Kitahata developed the structure and methods to merge comprehensive HIV patient data and biological specimens from multiple settings into a powerful resource for researchers conducting basic, translational, clinical outcomes/comparative effectiveness, and behavioral/prevention research. She has led efforts to establish networks of national and international HIV research collaborations to address the most pressing questions regarding treatment and outcomes for HIV-infected individuals that cannot be answered through smaller cohort studies. Dr. Kitahata directs the Data Management Centers for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases–funded CFAR Network of Integrated Clinical Systems (CNICS) research platform of real-time electronic health record (EHR) data for 22,000 patients from eight CFARs across the United States, and the International Epidemiological Databases to Evaluate AIDS project's North American AIDS Cohort Collaboration on Research and Design (NA-ACCORD), which merges data on 110,000 HIV-infected individuals in care at 60 sites across the United States and Canada. Dr. Kitahata serves on the Board of Directors for the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) HIV Medicine Association, the U.S. Public Health Service/IDSA Guidelines Committee for Prevention of Opportunistic Infections, and the International Training and Education Center on HIV (I-TECH), where she developed a national EHR system for the Haitian Ministry of Health. Dr. Kitahata received her B.S. from Yale University, M.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, internal medicine residency training at the University of California, San Francisco, and M.P.H. and Fellowship training at the University of Washington, where she was a Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholar. Address: University of Washington Medical Center, 1959 NE Pacific Street, UW Box 356423, Seattle, WA 98195-6423; e-mail: kitahata@u.washington.edu . Sanjeev R. Kulkarni (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") is a professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University. He is also an affiliated faculty member in the Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering and the Department of Philosophy. Prior to joining Princeton, he was a member of the technical staff at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. During his time at Princeton, he has held visiting or consulting positions with Australian National University, Susquehanna International Group, and Flarion Technologies. Professor Kulkarni has served as an associate editor for the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, and he is a Fellow of the IEEE. His research interests include statistical pattern recognition, nonparametric statistics, learning and adaptive systems, information theory, wireless networks, and image/video processing. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: kulkarni@princeton.edu . Daniel N. Osherson (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") earned his Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1973. Since then he has taught at Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Università San Raffael, Rice University, and Princeton University. His work centers on probability judgment and learning. Address: Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: osherson@princeton.edu . H. Vincent Poor (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") is dean of the School of Engineering and Applied Science at Princeton University, where he is also the Michael Henry Strater University Professor of Electrical Engineering. He holds a Ph.D. from Princeton. His research interests are in the areas of statistical signal processing, stochastic analysis, and information theory, and their applications to wireless networks and related fields. Among his publications in these areas are the recent books Quickest Detection (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Information Theoretic Security (NOW Publishers, 2009). Dean Poor is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and he is a Fellow of the IEEE, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Royal Academy of Engineering of the United Kingdom. A former Guggenheim Fellow, recent recognition of his work included the Institution of Engineering and Technology Ambrose Fleming Medal, the IEEE Eric E. Sumner Award, and an honorary D.Sc. from the University of Edinburgh. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: poor@princeton.edu . Guanchun Wang (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") received an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He is currently a Ph.D. student in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University. His research interests include statistical learning, information retrieval, and judgment aggregation. He also worked as a summer associate for McKinsey's technology practice. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: guanchun@princeton.edu . Henry H. Willis (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") is a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and the associate director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center. His research has applied risk analysis tools to resource allocation and risk management decisions in the areas of public health and emergency preparedness, terrorism and national security policy, energy and environmental policy, and transportation planning. Dr. Willis serves on the editorial board of the journal Risk Analysis and served on the National Academies of Science Committee on Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals. He earned his Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University and holds degrees in chemistry and environmental studies from the University of Pennsylvania (B.A.) and in environmental science from the University of Cincinnati (M.A.). Address: RAND Corporation, 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail: hwillis@rand.org . Xiting (Cindy) Yang (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") completed her Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University in the area of elicitation, specifically focusing on elicitation of expert knowledge on phylogenies in the format of rooted trees. She is currently a statistical reviewer at the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Her current research focuses on clinical trials and elicitation. Address: U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New Hampshire Avenue, Building 66, Room 2223, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; e-mail: xiting.yang@fda.hhs.gov .

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Ned
Lebow on Drivers of War, Cultural Theory, and IR of Foxes and Hedgehogs









Drawing
on classical political theories, International Relations is dominated by
theories that presuppose interests or fear as dominant drivers for foreign
policy. Richard Ned Lebow looks further back into the history of ideas to conjure up a
more varied set of drives that underpin political action. In this Talk, Lebow, among others, elaborates on
the underpinnings of political action, discusses how war drives innovations in
IR theorizing in the 20th century, and likens himself to a fox,
rather than a hedgehog.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)








What
is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?







Well, the big challenge in international politics is always
how do we keep from destroying one another and that's the negative question.
But it is mirrored by a positive question which is, how do we build community
and tolerance and peace? And that's not exactly the flip side, but that's
always been the big question in IR. And part of that, I think, is how we learn
to manage threatening change. Because in my perspective, that's the driving
force of conflict: ultimately, both World Wars can be attributed to
modernization and its destabilizing consequences. That is also the reason why
it is a falsehood to base theory on that little select slice of history during
the World Wars, extrapolate it, and try to think its universal. Yet that is
what IR theory does: so many theorists, and so many of the people you recently
interviewed, are guilty of doing that. So that's the big question and
certainly, that's what drove me to study IR in the hope that I could make some
small contribution to figuring out some of the answers or partial answers to
these questions.







If we turn to what the central debate should be in
International Theory, well, I would frame this in two parts: the first should
be 'what are the different ways in which we can conceive of international
theory and how, by all of us pursuing it the way we feel comfortable with, we
can enrich the field without throwing bric-a-brac at each other and find ways
of learning from each other?'







A few years ago, I edited a book with Mark Lichbach (Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics
and International Relations) as a rejoinder to King, Keohane and Verba's
book, which we found deeply offensive. It has the narrowest framework and then
they base their understanding on the Vienna school yet they seem to have forgotten
that Hempel and Popper would disavow the positions that King, Keohane and Verba
(KKV) are anchoring themselves in as epistemologically primitive. And the very
examples they give to illustrate 'good science'—Alvarez and his groupaddressing the problem of dinosaur extinction—they fail to see that what
these people did was in fact code on the dependent variable, which is the big
no-no for KKV! And the reason why Alvarez et al were taken seriously, was not because they went through the order
of research that KKV promoted, but rather because they came up with an
explanation for a phenomenon that people have long known about—yet explanations
don't figure at all in KKV's take; they had no interest in mechanisms, it was
all narrow correlations. It's absurd! So we edited the book, and we invited
people who represented different perspectives, but all of whom had evidence and
struggled to make sense of the evidence, to talk to one another and to look at
the problems they themselves find in their positions and how one could learn
broadly from considering this. That's the kind of debate that seems to me is a
useful one. Not who is right or wrong, but how can we learn collectively. And
secondly, I think maybe we need fewer debates, and more good research.











How did you arrive
at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







I suppose it's a combination of people, books, and events, and
being a dog that constantly gnaws on bones and works it through. Very clearly the
Second World War and the Cold War were what brought me to the study of IR. I'm sure
in their absence, considering the counterfactual, I would have gone into Astrophysics,
which was the other field that really interested me.







I think the first concrete influence was as an undergraduate
and then as a graduate, being struck by certain individuals whose minds seemed
to sparkle; and I admired them for that and they became role models. And I
would make myself, intellectually, a little Hans Morgenthau, a little Karl
Deutsch; see the world through their eyes, and play with it. I never really wanted
to make myself into them, but rather to benefit by seeing what the world was
like when seen through their eyes. So in this sense, let me go back and draw on
Boswell, Hughes, and Mill for my answer. They all conceived of identity as
something that's a process of self-fashioning in which we mix and match the
characteristics that we observe in other people. And the purpose of society is
to throw up these role models and provide interaction with them so that we can
constantly be engaging in self-fashioning. And ultimately, we create something
that's novel that other people want to emulate or reject, as the case may be.
And I think that mixing and matching, and ultimately creating a synthesis of my
own, I developed my own approach to things.







The second element of this is to pick problems that engage
me, and stick with them. My first book in IR was about international crises and
I worked on this, it must have been 8, possibly even 9 years. I started out initially
convinced that deterrence theory made sense but wouldn't fit the historical evidence. Then one day, while
playing around, I realized the theory was wrong and by reversing it, I could
understand why it didn't work and see there were very different dynamics at
play. So working on a problem constantly and going back and forth between
theory and empirical findings, you gradually develop your own sense of the
field.







It also helps, over the course of an intellectual lifetime, to
work on different kinds of problems: I've just finished a book on the politics
and ethics of identity; I finished a manuscript up for review on the nature of
causation and different takes on cause; and the previous two books were on
counterfactuals and the origins of war. And I learned something theoretically
and methodologically by throwing myself into these problems and also, in some
cases, by going beyond what one would normally consider the domain of IR to look
for answers. I've often done philosophy and literature in the identity book. I
also go to musical texts: I have a reading of the Mozart Da Ponte Operas as a deliberate
thought experiment to test out ancient regime
and enlightenment identities under varying circumstances to expose what's wrong
with them and to work toward a better approach of Così fantutte. And I
read the music, not only the libretti,
to get at an answer. Of course, when you've been doing it a long time, it keeps
you alive and alert when you look at something new. I'm just finishing my 46th
year of University teaching. It's a long time!







Thirdly, there were a few pivotal books. I read George
Orwell's 1984 and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in the early 50s. Both
of those were very powerful books. I also read in about 1950 - Life Magazine
produced a large volume on WWII and it had fabulous photographs and of course
Life was famous, Robert Capa's photographs, and
the text by John Dos Passos. A big big book that I read and re-read and that
was a powerful influence on me. I'd say the Diary of Anne Frank, when it came
out, which was not all that dissimilar but had a different ending from my own
war experience, and then in high school I read, or struggled to read—I don't
think I understood it—Ideology and Utopia
(full text here) by Karl
Mannheim, and then I read Politics among
Nations and the Twenty Year's Crisis.
And both those books made enormous sense to me at the time. But I think the
book that over the course of my lifetime has had the most influence on me of
anything is Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War (read full text here).











What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?







I am tempted to give you a flippant answer that an expert is
somebody from out of town; what used to be with slides would now be with a PowerPoint
presentation. I think frankly you need to do two things: you need to be
analytically sophisticated and original on the one hand, but to do it well, you
have to have an empirical base. There has to be some problem or set of problems
that you've rolled up your sleeves, looked at the data, talk to the people who
are on the ground doing these things, and you need to go back and forth between
that empirical knowledge and conceptual one. That's success as a social scientist. 







And traditionally, there's
always been another key. You must have one foot in society in which you belong
and another foot outside so you can do it as an outsider as well as an insider.
That's terribly important. I think, in this sense, that Americans are more
parochial than other people. They are good insiders but they are not very good
outsiders and they just don't understand the rest of the world and when you
read what they write about the rest of the world, you wonder what planet they
are living on. If you don't see the rest of the world, you can't look at the
America from another perspective. It's like people who take hegemony seriously;
it's like believing in Santa Claus, except Santa Claus is benign. To gain a
deep experience of the world in itself is a pre-requisite. Do a year abroad in
some other culture. Learn a language. Have a relationship with someone from a
different culture—you begin to learn the languages and all the rest will come.
That's the way to start.











You are
most famous to most people for your Cultural
Theory of International Relations (2008). What does it comprise and can you
say something about its classical roots?







I return to classical theory of conflict and cooperation
because I find that in modern theory, all drives of human action have been
reduced to appetite, and reason to mere instrumentality. The Greeks, by
contrast, believed there were several fundamental drives—drives that affected
politics—and while these included appetite, they weren't just appetite. Reason was more than instrumentality; it also had
the goal of understanding what led to a happy life; then, next to reason and
appetite, the third drive was spirit or self-esteem (the Greek thumos), which is very different and
often opposed to appetite. It is about winning the approbation of others to
feel good about ourselves. The difference between honor and standing—two
variants of self-esteem—is that honor is status achieved within a fixed set of
rules, while standing is whenever you achieve status by whatever means.







Now most existing IR theories are either only built on
appetites—as liberalism and Marxism—or fear. And for the Greeks fear is not a
human drive but a powerful emotion which can become a motive. And when reason
loses control over either appetite or spirit, people begin to worry about their
own ability to satisfy their appetites, their spirit, or even protect
themselves physically. That's when fear becomes a powerful motive. Realism is
of course the paradigm developed around fear. I differ in that my theory
recognizes multiple motives, that are active to varying degrees at different
times. They don't blend the way a solution does in chemistry, but they retain
their own characteristics, even if jumbled together. So my theory expects to
see quite diverse and often conflicting behavior, whereas other theories only
pay attention to state behavior that seems to support their theory, and feel
the need to explain away other behavior inconsistent with their theory. I revel
in these variations. Second, I vary in describing what derives from these
motives as (Weberian) ideal types—which means, something you don't encounter in
the real world, but rather, an abstraction, a fictional or analytical
description, that helps to make sense of the real world but never maps onto it
exactly. So, a fear-based world gives you a very nice description of a
foundation of anarchy. But of course this is an ideal-type world. Fear is only
one motive. You have go to a place where civil order has broken down, like
Somalia or the trenches in WWII, to see fear-based models compete.







Starting from these three motives and the emotion of fear, I
argue that each of these generates a very different logic of cooperation,
conflict and risk-taking; and each is associated with a different kind of
hierarchy. And all of them except fear rely on a different principle of
justice. Just to give an example: for actors—whether individuals or
states—driven by self-esteem, they tend to be risk prone (because honor has to
be won by successfully overcoming ordeals and challenges); it leads to a
conflictual logic because you are competing with others for honor; and it can
be rule-based (although the rules can brake down and move into fear); and the
principle is one of fairness, in contrast to interest or appetite which has a
principle of equality. The hierarchy is one of clientelism, where people honor
those at the top, which, in return, provides practical benefits for those on
the bottom. The Greeks called this hegemonia;
the Chinese had a similar system.







But because any actual system is not an ideal type, we have
to figure out what that mixture is and we can begin to understand foreign
policies. And I try to give numerous examples in the book. And the big turning
point, I argue, is modernity, where it becomes more difficult to untangle the
motives and their discourses. Because in modernity both Rousseau and Adam Smith
try to understand why we want material things, so the two become connected. You
could argue that even in Egyptian times they were connected, in the pyramids,
which are nothing if not erections of self-esteem. But it becomes more
difficult and so, rather than saying, using literary texts, artistic works and
political speeches as a way of determining the relationship, I approached the
problem differently with the examples of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the
Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq. I said let's run a test of seeing how
carefully we can explain the origins and the dynamics of these conflicts on the
basis of interest, on the basis of fear, on the basis of self-esteem. And I
think that's methodologically defensible.



Now the interesting point is that the honor or self-esteem
explanation is gone completely from modern IR explanations but does at least
just a good a job—if not better—at explaining these conflicts I mention above. There is an important sense—and this is my latest book—in which going to war was the dominant way to get recognized as a great power, and I feel that the example of the war in Iraq illustrates that that principle is on the retreat.







I obviously use Greek thinking as a source here of—again, I
wouldn't use the word knowledge—but as a source of insight into human nature
and the recurring problems regardless of society. Some of the great writers and
thinkers cannot be surpassed as sources of knowledge that we as social
scientists are shadows on the cave by comparison. And I find the Greeks
particularly interesting for several reasons. One, they had a richer
understanding of the psyche that moderns who have adduced everything to appetite
and reason to a mere instrumentality, this is, to me, an incredibly narrow,
crude way of thinking of the human mind. And, for whatever reason, they were
gifted with tragedians who pierced to the core of things. So I find them as a
source of inspiration but it's by no way limited to the Greeks. You can pick
great authors from any culture, in any century, and read them and learn a lot.











How
should we understand your cultural theory of international relations in
relation to the 'big' paradigms?







My theory is constructivist, at every level. I can go even further and claim that my theory is
the only constructivist theory.
Alexander Wendt is not a constructivist. If anything, he's a structural
liberal. It did have preexisting identities and has a teleology as he believes
a Kantian world is inevitable— that's quite a statement to make! And I hope
he's right. On the other hand, I define constructivists in a broader way. Most
constructivists start with identities and identities are certainly an important
feature of my work, but my theory rests on a different premise, and that is the
notion of there being certain core values which are germane to politics, and
they vary in relative importance from society to society, and they find
expression in different ways. So it is constructivist, I think, in the Weberian
sense: we have to understand from within the culture what makes things
meaningful. And, in that sense, you could bring in the notion of
inter-subjective reality, but I go beyond it, because other values are always
present in this mix and therefore there's behavior that appears contradictory
that is often misunderstood if you apply the wrong lens to it. So there's a
lack of interdisciplinary understanding as well: you have to look at both to
see how the world works. So cultural theory is constructivist and it allows us
to reframe and expand what constructivism means.







If I apply this constructivist thinking to one of the core
principles in our approach to world politics: what is a cause? I start by
asking, what does 'cause' mean, in physics? Why physics? Because physics is
always the field that political scientists look at, we have 'physics envy', so
to speak. And interestingly, in physics, there is no consensus about what cause
means. Some physicists think that very notion of cause is unhelpful to what
they do. Others are happy with regularities and subscribe to causal thinking. Still
others thing that you need to have mechanisms to explain anything. Still others,
and here statistical mechanics can be taken as a case in point, invoke Kantian
understandings of cause. Within physics there's no argument between people
adhering to these different understandings of 'cause', because you should do
what works! They don't criticize one another. So if they have this diversity,
why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we develop understandings of cause that are
most appropriate to what we do? So I develop an understanding I call 'inefficient
causation' (download full paper here),
sort of playing off of Aristotle. And it is a constructivist understanding, but
it also incorporates elements that are distinctively non-constructivist. And
identities are only a small piece of the puzzle.











Is
there any sense to make of the way IR has evolved over the 20th
century?







I think if you look at some of the central figures, it's
quite easy. There are 2 great cohorts of International Relations theorists.
Those born in the early years of the 20th century comprise Hans
Morgenthau, John Hertz, E.H. Carr, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, Frederick Schuman, and Karl Deutsch—who was
on my dissertation committee together with Isaiah Berlin and John Hertz. The
second cohort is born between about 1939 and 1945, and it comprises Robert
Jervis (Theory Talk #12), Joseph Nye
(Theory Talk #7), Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9), Oren Young, Peter
Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15), Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk#21), Janice Steinberg… And I'll tell you what I think the reasons are for
these groups to emerge at these particular moments: the first cohort lived
through World War I. And did so, fortunately, in at an age where they were too
young to be combatants for the most part, but they certainly had to deal
intellectually and personally with its consequences and then watch the horrors
unfold of the 1930s.







And the second, my own, cohort was born at the outset of the
Second World War. I think, in that group, I may be the only one of them born in
Europe (France). The rest of them were born in the US. And we came of age
during the most acute crisis of the cohort. So I was either in university or
graduate school during the Berlin crisis, during the Cuba crisis, and certainly
had an interest first in the consequences of WWII and how something like this
could happen, and then living through the horrors of the Cold War, not knowing
if indeed one would live through
them. And that created a very strong incentive and focus for our group of
people. Now a surprising number of this second group did their graduate studies
at Yale: Janice Stein, I, Oren Young, Bruce Russet, Krasner, later all at Yale
with Karl Deutsch. The rest, Jervis, Keohane and Krasner at Harvard with Samuel
Huntington. I think you have the odd person who's born somewhere in between –
so, Ken Waltz (Theory Talk #40), for
instance, is younger. He must be a 1920 person, almost exactly in between these
two, just as Ernst Haas.







And I wouldn't be surprised now if there is another cohort
emerging, the people of around the age of Stefano Guzinni, Jens Bartelson,
Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44).
What ties this third cohort together is that they all watched the end of the
Cold War and are coping with its aftermath. So I believe that it's probably two
things: the external environment and the extent to which you're in an
intellectually nurturing institution. And of course for our cohort, it
certainly helped that there were jobs. That was not true of the earlier cohort.
Almost all of them, except E.H. Carr, ended up in the US as refugees. Did you
know Morgenthau started as an elevator boy in New York? Then he got a job
teaching part-time at Brooklyn College because someone fell ill. His wife
cleaned other people's apartments to supplement their income. Then he got a job
at the University of Kansas City, which was a hellhole, and finally Harold
Lasswell got called to Washington for some war work and got Chicago to hire
Morgenthau to replace him.











What is
the issue with the discipline today if, as you noted before, we fail to ask the
most interesting questions and instead focus on method?







Well, it of course depends on which side of the pond you
sit. On the American side of the pond, positivist or game-theoretical
behaviorist or rationalist modeling approaches dominate the literature; it's
just silly, from my perspective. It's based on assumptions which bear no
relationship to the real world. People like it because it's intellectually
elegant: they don't have to learn any languages, they don't have to read any
history, and they can pretend they're scientists discussing universals.
Intellectually, it's ridiculous. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Theory Talk #31) is a classic case in point. He's made a huge
reputation for himself with The War Trap (1981).
That book and the corresponding theory are based on a simple assumption,
namely, that there's a war trap compelling states into war, because initiators
win wars. But just look at the empirical record from 1945 to the present—initiators
lose between 80-90% of the wars they start. And that really depends on the
definition of victory. If you use the real definition, the Clausewitzian one,
you have to ask: do they achieve their political goals through violence? Then
the answer is, even fewer "victories". Well, let's cut them some slack, use a
more relaxed definition: did they beat the other side militarily? Initiators
still lose 78 or 82%—I forget exactly which percentage of their wars. And the
profession right now is so ignorant of history that nobody said 'Wait a
minute!' the day the book came out. Instead IR scholars all focus on this model
and fine-tuning it—it's ridiculous! And well, I don't want to go on with a
critique, but this is a serious problem, for it concerns a huge
misunderstanding regarding one of the most important problems out there.







But what happens now is this kind of thinking metastasizes
throughout the discipline because what students in International Relations or
Political Science more generally are taught are calculus, statistics—and I'm
not against this, one should learn them; I use them myself when I wear my
psychologist hat and do quantitative research and statistical analysis—but they
don't learn languages, they don't learn history, they don't learn philosophy.
They are so narrow! Much of this of course has to do with the reward structure
in the United States. It's clear that the statistical scientists are at the top
of the hill. So, economists transform themselves into scientists; but the
social scientists copy them because there are clear institutional rewards. If
you look at our salaries in comparison to the salaries of anthropologists,
historians—then if you sit at the edge of your chair and look over the abyss
you might see the humanists down there in terms of what they get. So very
clearly, there are strong institutional rewards. Once the positivist crowd got
a lock on various foundations and journals, if you want a job, if you want to
rise up through the profession, students tell me you have to do this stuff. IR
graduate students are bricklayers that get turned out of these universities.
That's the tragedy! It's no longer a serious intellectual enterprise. It's not
connected to anything terribly meaningful.







And mind you, I must say, while on the other, European, side
of the pond there is more diversity (one of the reasons I feel more comfortable
here), at the same time there is a strong tendency to go for a certain
heavy-handed brand of post-modernism. If you don't start an article with a
genuflection to Foucault or De Saussure or Derrida, you don't get published.
And by not looking beyond these 20th century thinkers, people in
Europe are often given credit for inventing things which were common knowledge
for hundreds and hundreds of years. Utterly ridiculous. But in between, there
are of course people who are trying to make sense of the world, including many
people in the positivist tradition who are doing good quantitative research and
trying to address serious problems in the world. The difficulty is that these
two extremes are often people who approach IR as a religion and they think that
their way of doing research is the only way
and they have no respect for others. And that's a kind of arrogance to which,
to me, is a violation of what the university is all about.







Ultimately, what is good theory? One approach would be to
say that a good theory is one that appears to order a domain in a way that is
conceptually rigorous - to the extent that that's even possible - that is
original and that raises a series of interesting questions which haven't been
asked before, but which are amenable to empirical research and finally it
should have normative implications. This is what Hans Morgenthau meant when he
said that the purpose of IR theory is not to justify what policymakers did, but
to educate them to act in ways that would lead to a better and more peaceful
world. And that, I think, is the ultimate goal of IR theory that we should not
lose sight of.











You
indicated that Isaiah Berlin was on your dissertation committee. He famously
tries to explain Tolstoy's philosophy of history (in War and Peace) through the parable of the hedgehog and the fox. If
theorists constraining themselves to one drive underpinning policy choices
would be hedgehogs, how would you see yourself? A fox or a hedgehog?







I am clearly a fox! I do different things. Whether I do them
well is debatable. But I certainly think that I'm a man of many tricks. Of
course the distinction also implies not believing in an overarching truth, and
indeed, I try hard not to think about truth because I don't think you can get
very far when you do. Epistemologically and eclectically, I'm a great believer
that we can never really establish a cause, truth, and knowledge. One of the
great problems here goes back to Plato who was shocked that craftsmen equated
technical ability to produce things with knowledge—Sofia, which is wisdom. And
today you have the problem one step up, so another category of knowledge for
the Greeks was episteme. Aristotle
would describe it as 'conceptual knowledge' or that which might even be
represented mathematically. And the people who would be 'expert' in episteme
think they have sofia and their claim
to being a hedgehog is the same kind of conceit, a form of hubris. Berlin's
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is a very useful and nice concept to
play around with.







Yet it's a bit much to reduce Tolstoy to that tension. You
could do it as a game but it doesn't do much justice because there is so much
else in Tolstoy. He's tilting against the French historians of the 19th
century who have erected Napoleon into this strategic genius. And he does a
very convincing job of showing that what goes on on the battlefield has nothing
whatsoever to do with what Napoleon or anyone else who is wearing a general's
ebullience or theorists hat says. And also, and in this sense, one could see
him as the beginning of subaltern history of social science, he's telling the
story—admittedly about aristocrats, not commoners—but he's telling the story of
ordinary people on the battlefield, not the people making the decisions. So the
war is in a way a background to the lives of the people, focusing our attention
a very humanist way, on people. This, too, is revolutionary for his time.















Professor
Richard Ned Lebow Professor of International Political Theory at the Department
of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential
Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is also a Bye-Fellow of
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy and the
National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the
Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He has
authored and edited 28 books and nearly 200 peer reviewed articles.















Related
links








Read the
first chapter of Lebow's The Tragic
Vision of Politics (2003) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow & Kelly's Thucydides and
Hegemony: Athens and the United States (Review of International Studies
2001), here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's Deterrence and Reassurance:
Lessons from the Cold War (Global Dialogue 2001) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Long Peace, the End of the
Cold War, and the Failure of Realism (International Organization, 1994)
here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading
the Lessons Correctly (Political Science Quarterly 1983) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Theory Talk #75: Tarak Barkawi on IR after the West, and why the best work in IR is often found at its marginsIn this Talk, Tarak Barkawi discusses the importance of the archive and real-world experiences, at a time of growing institutional constraints. He reflects on the growing rationalization and "schoolification" of the academy, a disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized within a university audit culture, and the future of IR in a post-COVID world. He also discusses IR's contorted relationship to the archive, and explore future sites of critical innovation and inquiry, including the value of knowledge production outside of the academy. PDF version of this TalkSo what is, or should be, according to you, the biggest challenge, or principal debate in critical social sciences and history?Right now, despite thinking about it, I don't have an answer to that question. Had you asked me five years ago, I would have said, without hesitation, Eurocentrism. There's a line in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe where he remarks that Europe has already been provincialized by history, but we still needed to provincialize it intellectually in the social sciences. Both sides of this equation have intensified in recent years. Amid a pandemic, in the wreckage of neoliberalism, in the wake of financial crisis, the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the events of the Trump Presidency, and the return of the far right, the West feels fundamentally reduced in stature. The academy, meanwhile, has moved on from the postcolonial to the decolonial with its focus on alternative epistemologies, about which I am more ambivalent intellectually and politically. Western states and societies are powerful and rich, their freedoms attractive, and most of them will rebound. But what does it mean for the social sciences and other Western intellectual traditions which trace their heritage to the European Enlightenments that the West may no longer be 'the West', no longer the metropole of a global order more or less controlled by its leading states? What kind of implications does the disassembling of the West in world history have for social and political inquiry? I don't have an answer to that. Speaking more specifically about IR, we are dealing now with conservative appropriations of Eurocentrism, with the rise of other civilizational IRs (Chinese, European, Indian). These kinds of moves, like the decolonial one, foreground ultimately incommensurable systems of knowing and valuing, at best, and at worst are Eurocentrism with the signs reversed, usually to China. I do not think what we should be doing right now in the academy is having Chinese social sciences, Islamic social sciences, Indian social sciences, and so on. But that's definitely one way in which the collapse of the West is playing out intellectually. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?By the time you get to my age you have a lot of debt, mostly to students, to old teachers and supervisors, and to colleagues and friends. University scholars tend not to have very exciting lives, so I don't have much to offer in the way of events. But I can give you an experience that I do keep revisiting when I reflect on the directions I've taken and the things I've been interested in. When I was in high school, I took a university course taught by Daniel Ellsberg, of the Pentagon Papers. As many will know, before he became involved in the Vietnam War, and later in opposing it, he worked on game theory and nuclear strategy. I grew up in Southern California, in Orange County, and there was a program that let you take courses at the University of California, Irvine. I took one on the history of the Roman Empire and then a pair of courses on nuclear weapons that culminated with one taught by Ellsberg himself. I actually had no idea who he was but the topic interested me. Nuclear war was in the air in the early 1980s. Activist graduate students taught the preparatory course. They were good teachers and I learned all about the history and politics of nuclear weapons. But I also came to realize that these teachers were trying to shape (what I would now call) my political subjectivity. Sometimes they were ham handed, like the old ball bearings in the tin can trick: turn the lights out in the room, and put one ball bearing in the can for each nuclear warhead in the world, in 1945 this many; in 1955 this many; and so on. In retrospect, that's where I got hooked on the idea of graduate school. I was aware that Ellsberg was regarded as an important personage. He taught in a large lecture hall. At every session, a kind of loyal corps of new and old activists turned out, many in some version of '60s attire. The father of a high school friend was desperate to get Ellsberg's autograph, and sent his son along with me to the lecture one night to get it. It was political instruction of the first order to figure out that this suburban dad had been a physics PhD at Berkley in the late '60s and early '70s, demonstrating against the Vietnam War. But now he worked for a major aerospace defense contractor. He had a hot tub in his backyard. Meanwhile, Ellsberg cancelled class one week because he'd been arrested demonstrating at a major arms fair in Los Angeles. "We stopped the arms race for a few hours," he told the class after. I schooled myself on who Ellsberg was and Vietnam, the Cold War, and much else came into view. Meanwhile, he gave a master class in nuclear weapons and foreign policy, cheekily naming his course after Kissinger's book, I later came to appreciate. I learned about RAND, the utility of madness for making nuclear threats, and how close we'd come to nuclear war since 1945. My high school had actually been built to double as a fallout shelter, at a time when civil defense was taken seriously as an aspect of a credible threat of second strike. It was low slung, stoutly built, with high iron fences that could be closed to create a cantonment. We were not far from Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station and a range of other likely targets. All of this sank in as I progressed in these courses. Then one day at a strip mall bookstore, I discovered Noam Chomsky's US foreign policy books and never looked back. At Cambridge, I caught the tail end of the old Centre of International Studies, originally started by an intelligence historian and explicitly multi-disciplinary. It had, in my time, historians, lawyers, area studies, development studies, political theory and history of thought, and IR scholars and political scientists. Boundaries certainly existed out there in the disciplines. But there weren't substantial institutional obstacles to thinking across them, while interdisciplinary environments gave you lots of local resources (i.e. colleagues and students) for thinking and reading creatively. What would a student need to become a kind of specialist in your kind of area or field or to understand the world in a global way? Lots of history, especially other peoples' histories; to experience what it's like to see the world from a different place than where you grew up, so that the foreign is not an abstraction to you. I think another route that can create very interesting scholars is to have a practitioner career first, in development, the military, a diplomatic corps, NGOs, whatever. Even only five years doing something like that not only teaches people how the world works, it is intellectually fecund, creative. People just out of operational posts are often full of ideas, and can access interesting resources for research, like professional networks. How, in your view, should IR responding to the shifting geopolitical landscape?  The fate I think we want to avoid is carrying on with what Stanley Hoffmann called the "American social science": the IR invented out of imperial crisis and world war by Anglo-American officials, foundations and thinkers. Very broadly speaking, and with variations, this was a new world combination of realism and positivism. This discipline was intended as the intellectual counterpart to the American-centered world order, designed, among other things, to disappear the question of race in the century of the global color line. The way it conceived the national/international world obscured how US world power worked in practice. That power operated in and through formally sovereign, independent states—an empire by invitation, in the somewhat rosy view of Geir Lundestad—trialed in Latin America and well suited to a decolonizing world. It was an anti-colonial imperium. Political science divided up this world between IR and comparative politics. This kind of IR is cortically connected to the American-centered world fading away before our eyes. It is a kind of zombie discipline where we teach students about world politics as if we were still sitting with the great power peacemakers of 1919 and 1944-45. It is still studying how to make states cooperate under a hegemon or how to make credible deterrence threats in various circumstances. Interestingly, I think one of the ways the collapse of US power is shaping the discipline was identified by Walt and Mearsheimer in their 2013 article on the decline of theory in IR. In the US especially but not only, IR is increasingly indistinguishable from political science as a universal positivist enterprise mostly interested in applying highly evolved, quantitative or experimental approaches to more or less minor questions. Go too far down this road and IR disappears as a distinct disciplinary space, it becomes just a subject matter, a site of empiricist inquiry. Instead, the best work in IR mostly occurs on the edges of the discipline. IR often serves as cover for diverse and interdisciplinary work on transboundary relations. Those relations fall outside the core objects of analysis of the main social science and humanities disciplines but are IR's distinctive focus. The mainstream, inter-paradigm discipline, for me, has never been a convincing social science of the international and is not something I teach or think much about these days. But the classical inheritances of the discipline help IR retain significant historical, philosophical and normative dimensions. Add in a pluralist disposition towards methodology, and IR can be a unique intellectual space capable of producing scholars and scholarship that operate across disciplines. The new materialism, or political ecology, is one area in which this is really happening right now. IR is also a receptive home for debating the questions thrown up by the decolonial turn. These are two big themes in contemporary intellectual life, in and beyond the academy. IR potentially offers distinct perspectives on them which can push debates forward in unexpected ways, in part because we retain a focus on the political and the state, which too easily drop out of sight in global turns in other disciplines. In exchange, topics like the new materialism and the decolonial offer IR the chance to connect with world politics in these new times, after the American century. In my view, and it is not one that I think is widely shared, IR should become the "studies" discipline that centers on the transboundary. How do we re-imagine IR as the interdisciplinary site for the study of transboundary relations as a distinct social and political space? That's a question of general interest in a global world, but one which few traditions of thought are as well-equipped to reflect on and push forward as we are.That's an interesting and forceful critique which also brings us back to a common thread throughout your work: questions of power and knowledge and specifically the relation between power and knowledge in IR and social science. I'm interested in exploring this point further, because so much of your critique has been centered on how profoundly Eurocentric IR is and as a product of Western power. Well, IR's development as a discipline has been closely tied to Western state power. It would seem that it has to change, given the shifts underway in the world. It's like Wile E. Coyote in the Road Runner cartoons - he's run off the cliff. His legs are still moving, but he hasn't dropped, yet. That said, there's no singularly determinate relation between power and the historical development of intellectual traditions. Who knows what kind of new ideas and re-imagining of IR's concepts we might see? As I say, I think one reflection of these changes is that we're already seeing North American IR start to fade into universal quantitative social science. As Hoffmann observed, part of IR's appeal was that the Americans were running the world, that's why you started a social science concerned with things like bipolarity and deterrence, and with analyzing the foreign policy of a great power and its interests and conflicts around the world. Nowadays the Americans are at a late Roman stage of imperial decline. Thinking from the command posts of US foreign policy doesn't look so attractive or convincing when Emperor Nero is running the show, or something altogether darker is waiting in the wings. IR is supposed to be in command of world politics, analyzing them from on high. But what I've seen over the course of my education and career is the way world politics commands IR. The end of the Cold War torpedoed many careers and projects; the 1990s created corps of scholars concerned with development, civil war and humanitarian intervention; in the 2000s, we produced terrorism experts (and critical terrorism studies) and counterinsurgency specialists and critics, along with many scholars concerned in one way or another with Islam. What I have always found fascinating, and deeply indicative, about IR is the relative absence until relatively recently of serious inquiry into power/knowledge relations or the sociology of knowledge. In 1998 when Ole Waever goes to look at some of these questions, he notes how little there was to work from then, before Oren, Vitalis, Guilhot and others published. It's an astounding observation. In area studies, in anthropology, in the history of science, in development studies, in all of these areas of inquiry so closely entangled with imperial and state power, there are long-running, well developed traditions of inquiry into power/knowledge relations. It's a well-recognized area of inquiry, not some fringe activity, and it's heavily empirical, primary sourced based, as well as interesting conceptually. In recent decades you've seen really significant work come out about the role of the Second World War in the development of game theory, and its continuing entwinement with the nuclear contest of the Cold War. I'm thinking here of S.M. Amadae, Paul Erickson, and Philip Mirowski among others. The knowledge forms the American social science used to study world politics were part and parcel of world politics, they were internal to histories of geopolitics rather than in command of them. Of course, for a social science that models itself on natural science, with methodologies that produce so-called objective knowledge, the idea that scientific knowledge itself is historical and power-ridden, well, you can't really make sense of that. You'd be put in the incoherent position of studying it objectively, as it were, with the same tools. IR arises from the terminal crisis of the British Empire; its political presuppositions and much else were fundamentally shaped by the worldwide anti-communist project of the US Cold War state; and it removed race as a term of inquiry into world politics during the century of the global color line. All this, and but for Hoffmann's essay, IR has no tradition of power/knowledge inquiry into its own house until recently? It's not credible intellectually. Anthropologists should be brought in to teach us how to do this kind of thing. You've been at the forefront of the notion of historical IR, and in investigating the relationship between history and theory – why is history important for IR?Well, I think I'd start with the question of what do we mean when we say history? For mainstream social science, it means facts in the past against which to test theories and explanations. For critical IR scholars, it usually means historicism, as that term is understood in social theory: social phenomena are historical, shaped by time and place. Class, state, race, nation, empire, war, these are all different in different contexts. While I think this is a very significant insight and one that I agree with, on its own it tends to imply that historical knowledge is available, that it can be found by reading historians. In fact, for both empiricism and historicism there is a presumption that you can pretty reliably find out what happened in the past. For me, this ignores a second kind of historicism, the historicism of history writing itself, the historiographical. The questions historians ask, how they inquire into them, the particular archives they use, the ways in which they construct meaning and significance in their narratives, the questions they don't ask, that about which they are silent, all of these, shape history writing, the history that we know about. The upshot is that the past is not stable; it keeps changing as these two meanings of historicism intertwine. We understand the Haitian revolution now, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas, entirely differently than we did just a few decades ago.That raises another twist to this problem. Many IR scholars access history through reading historians or through synthetic accounts; they encounter history by and large through secondary sources. One consequence is that they are often a generation or more behind university historians. Think of how Gaddis, for instance, remains a go to authority on the history of the Cold War in IR. In other disciplines, from the 1980s on, there was a historical turn that took scholars into the archives. Anthropologists and literary scholars used historians' tools to answers their own questions. The result was not just a bunch of history books, but entirely new readings of core questions. The classic example is the historical Shakespeare that Stephen Greenblatt found in the archives, rather than the one whose texts had been read by generations of students in English departments. My point here is that working in archives was conceptually, theoretically significant for these disciplines and the subjects they studied. For example, historical anthropology has given us new perspectives on imperialism. While there is some archival work in IR of course, especially in disciplinary history, it is not central to disciplinary debates and the purpose is usually theory testing in which the past appears as merely a bag of facts. In sum, when I say history and theory, I don't just mean thinking historically. I mean actually doing history, being an historian—which means archives—and in so doing becoming a better theorist. Could you expand on these points by telling us about your recent work on military history? I think that military history is particularly interesting because it is a site where war is reproduced and shaped. Military history participates in that which it purports only to study. Popular military histories shape the identities of publics. Staff college versions are about learning lessons and fighting war better the next time. People who grow up wanting to be soldiers often read about them in history books. So our historical knowledge of war, and war as a social and historical process, are wrapped up together. I hope some sense of the promise of power/knowledge studies for larger questions comes through here. I'm saying that part of what war is as a social phenomenon is history writing about it. It's in this kind of context that the fact that a great deal of military history is actually written by veterans, often of the very campaigns of which they write, becomes interesting. Battle produces its own historians. This is a tradition that goes back to European antiquity, soldiers and commanders returning to write histories, the histories, of the wars they fought in. So this question of veterans' history writing is in constitutive relations with warfare, and with the West and its nations and armies. My shorthand for the particular area of this I want to look into is what I call "White men's military histories". That is, Western military history in the modern era is racialized, not just about enemies but about the White identities constructed in and through it. And I want to look at the way this is done in campaigns against racialized others, particularly situations where defeats and reverses were inflicted on the Westerners. How were such events and experiences made sense of historically? How were they mediated in and through military history? I think defeats are particularly productive, incitements to discourse and sense making. To think about these questions, I want to look at the place of veterans in the production of military histories, as authors, sources, communities of interpretation. My sandbox is the tumultuous first year of the Korean War, where US forces suffered publically-evident reverses and risked being pushed into the sea. In a variety of ways, veterans shape military history, through their questions, their grievances, their struggles over reputation, their memories. This happens at many different sites and scales, including official and popular histories, and the networks of veterans behind them as well as other, independently published works. Over the course of veterans' lives, their war throws up questions and issues that become the subject of sometimes dueling and contradictory accounts. Through their history writing, they connect their war experience to Western traditions of battle historiography. They make their war speak to other wars. This is what military history is, and how it can come to produce and reproduce practices of war-making, at least in Anglo-American context. Of course, much of this history writing, like narrations of experience generally, reflects dominant ideologies, in this case discourses of the US Cold War in Asia. But counter-historians are also to be found among soldiers. The shocks and tragic absurdities of any given war produce research questions of their own. At risk of mixing metaphors, the veterans know where the skeletons are buried. They bear resentments and grievances about how their war was conducted that become research topics, and they often have the networks and wherewithal to produce informed and systematic accounts. So as well as reproducing hegemonic discourses, soldier historians are also interesting as a new critical resource for understanding war.This shouldn't be that surprising. In other areas of inquiry, amateur and practitioner scholars have often been a source of critical innovation. LGBTQ history starts outside the academy, among activists who turned their apartments into archives. Much of what we now call postcolonial scholarship also began outside the academy, among colonized intellectuals involved in anti-imperial struggles. Let me close this off by going back to the archive. There are really rich sources for this kind of project. Military historians of all kinds leave behind papers full of their research materials and correspondence. The commanders and others they wrote about often waged extended epistolary campaigns concerned with correcting and shaping the historical record. But more than this, by situating archival sources alongside what later became researched and published histories, what drops out and what goes in to military history comes into view. What is silenced, and what is given voice? We can then see how the violent and forlorn episodes of war are turned into narrated events with military meaning. What is the process by which war experience becomes military history?Given the interdisciplinary nature of your work, what field you place yourself in? And are there any problems have you encountered when writing and thinking across scholarly boundaries?In my head I live in a kind of idealized interdisciplinary war studies, and my field is the intersection of war and empire. Sort of Michael Howard meets Critical Theory and Frantz Fanon. This has given me a particular voice in critical IR broadly conceived, and a distinctive place from which to engage the discipline. The mostly UK departments I've been in have been broadly hospitable places in practice for interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, so long as you published rather than perished. Of course, interdisciplinary is a complicated word. It is one thing to be multi-disciplinary, to publish in the core journals of more than one discipline and to be recognized and read by scholars in more than one discipline. But work that falls between disciplinary centers, which takes up questions and offers answers recognized centrally by no discipline, that's something harder to deal with. I thought after Soldiers of Empire won prizes in two disciplines that I'd have an easier time getting funding for the project I described earlier in the interview. But I've gotten nowhere, despite years of applications to a variety of US, UK, and European funders. Of course, this may be because it is a bad project! My point, though, is that disciplines necessarily, and even rightly, privilege work that speaks to central questions; that's the work that naturally takes on significance in disciplinary contexts, as in many grant or scholarship panels. I think another point here is the nature of the times. Understandably, no one is particularly interested right now in White men's military histories. What I think has really empowered disciplines during my time in the UK academy has been the intersection with audit culture and university management. Repeated waves of rationalization have washed over the UK academy, which have emphasized discipline as a unit of measurement and management even as departments themselves were often "schoolified" into more or less odd combinations of disciplines. Schoolification helped to break down old solidarities and identities, while audit culture needed something on which to base its measures. The great victory of neoliberalism over the academy is evident in the way it is just accepted now that performance has to be assessed by various public criteria. This is where top disciplinary journals enter the picture, as unquestionable (and quantifiable) indicators of excellence. Interdisciplinary journals don't have the same recognition, constituency, or obvious significance. To put it in IR terms, Environment and Planning D or Comparative Studies in Society and History, to take two top journals that interdisciplinary IR types publish in, will never have the same weight as, say, ISQ or APSR. That that seems natural is an indicator of change—when I started, RIS—traditionally welcoming of interdisciplinary scholarship—was seen as just as good a place to publish as any US journal. Now RIS is perceived as merely a "national" journal while ISQ and APSR are "international" or world-class. This kind of thing has consequences for careers and the make-up of departments. What I'm drawing attention to is not so much an intellectual or academic debate; scholars always disagree on what good scholarship is, which is how it is supposed to be. It is rather the combination of discipline with the suffocating culture of petty management that pervades so much of British life. Get your disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized in an audit culture environment, and you can really expand. For example, the professionalization of methods training in the UK has worked as a kind of Trojan Horse for quantitative and positivist approaches within disciplines. In IR, in the potted geographic lingo we use, that has meant more US style work. Disappearing is the idea of IR as an "inter-discipline," where departments have multi-disciplinary identities like I described above. The US idea that IR is part of political science is much more the common sense now than it was in the UK. Another dimension of the eclipse of interdisciplinary IR has been the rise of quantitative European political science, boosted by large, multiyear grants from the ERC and national research councils. It's pretty crazy, strategically speaking, for the UK to establish a civilizational scale where you're always behind the US or its European counterparts. You'll never do North American IR as well as the North Americans do, especially given the disparity in resources. You'll always be trending second or third tier. The British do like to beat themselves up. Meanwhile, making US political science journals the practical standard for "international excellence" threatens to make the environment toxic for the very scholarship that has made British IR distinctive and attractive globally. The upshot of that will be another wave of émigré scholars, which the British academy's crises and reform initiatives produce from time to time. Think of the generation of UK IR scholars who decamped to Australia, an academy poised to prosper in the post-covid world (if the government there can get its vaccination program on track) and a major site right now of really innovative IR scholarship. To return to what you mentioned earlier regarding the hesitancy to go to the archives, this is also mirrored in a hesitancy to do serious ethnography, I think as well. Or there's this "doing ethnography" that involves a three-day field trip. This kind of sweet-shop 'pick and mix' has come to characterize some methodologies, because of these constraints that you highlight…A lot of what I'm talking about has happened within universities, it's not externally imposed or a direct consequence of the various government-run assessment exercises. Academics, eagerly assisted by university managers, have done a lot of this to themselves and their students. The implications can be far reaching for the kind of scholarship that departments foster, from PhDs on up. More and more of the UK PhD is taken up with research methods courses, largely oriented around positivism even if they have critical components. Already this gives a directionality to ideas. The advantage of the traditional UK PhD—working on your own with a supervisor to produce a piece of research—has been intellectual freedom, even when the supervisor wasn't doing their job properly. It's not great, but the possibility for creative, innovative, even field changing scholarship was retained. PhD students weren't disciplined, so to speak. What happens now is that PhD students are subject to a very strict four year deadline, often only partially funded, their universities caring mainly about timely completion not placement and preparation for a scholarly career, a classic case of the measurement displacing the substantive value. The formal coursework they get is methods driven. You can supervise interdisciplinary PhD research in this kind of environment, but it's not easy and poses real risks and creates myriad obstacles for the student. A strange consequence of this, as many of my master's students will tell you, is that I often advise them to consider US PhDs, just in other disciplines. That way, they get the benefit of rigorous PhD level coursework beyond methods. They can do so in disciplines like history or anthropology that are currently receptive both to the critical and the transnational/transboundary. That is not a great outcome for UK IR, even if it may be for critically-minded students. Outside of a very few institutions and scattered individuals, US political science, of course, has largely cleansed itself of the critical and alternative approaches that had started to flower in the glasnost era of the 1990s. That is not something we should be seeking to emulate in the UK.So yes, there's much to say here, about how the four year PhD has materially shaped scholarship in the UK. There is generally very little funding for field work. Universities worried about liability have put all kinds of obstacles in the way of students trying to get to field work sites. Requirements like insisting that students be in residence for their fourth year in order to write up and submit on time further limit the possibilities for field work. The upshot is to make the PhD dissertation more a library exercise or to favor the kind of quantitative, data science work that fits more easily into these time constraints and structures. Again, quite obviously, power sculpts knowledge. It becomes simply impossible, within the PhD, to do the kinds of things associated with serious qualitative scholarship, like learn languages, spend long time periods in field sites and to visit them more than once, to develop real networks there. Over time this shapes the academy, often in unintended ways. I think this is one of the reasons that IR in the UK has been so theoretic in character—what else can people do but read books, think and write in this kind of environment? As I say, the other kind of thing they can do is quantitative work, which takes us right back to the fate Walt and Mearsheimer sensed befalling IR as political science. Watch for IR and Data Science joint degrees as the next step in this evolution. Political Science in the US starts teaching methods at the freshman level. They get them young. We have discussed the rather grim state of affairs for the future of critical social science scholarship, at least in the UK and US. To conclude – what prospects for hope in the future are there?Well, if I had a public relations consultant pack, this is the point at which it would advise talking about children and the power of science to save us. I think the environment for universities, political, financial, and otherwise may get considerably more difficult. Little is untouchable in Western public life right now, it is only a question of when and in what ways they will come for us. The nationalist and far-right turns in Western politics feed off transgressing boundaries. There's no reason to suspect universities will be immune from this, and they haven't been. In the UK, as a consequence of Brexit, we are having to nationalise, and de-European-ise our scholarships and admissions processes. We are administratively enacting the surrender of cosmopolitan achievements in world politics and in academic life. This is not a plot but in no small measure the outcome of democratic will, registered in the large majority Boris Johnson's Conservatives won at the last general election. It will have far reaching consequences for UK university life. This is all pretty scary if you think, as I do, that we are nearer the beginning then the end of the rise of the right. Covid will supercharge some of these processes of de-globalization. I can already see an unholy alliance forming of university managers and introvert academics who will want to keep in place various dimensions of the online academic life that has taken shape since spring 2020. Often this will be justified by reference to environmental concerns and by the increased, if degraded, access that online events make possible. We are going to have a serious fight on our hands to retain our travel budgets at anywhere near pre-pandemic levels. I'm hoping that this generation of students, subjected to online education, will become warriors for in-person teaching. All of this said, it's hard to imagine a more interesting time to be teaching, thinking and writing about world politics. Politics quite evidently retains its capacity to turn the world upside down. Had you told US citizens where they would be on January 6th, 2021 in 2016, they would have called you alarmist if not outlandish. I think we're in for more moments like that. Tarak Barkawi is a professor of International Relations at LSE. He uses interdisciplinary approaches to imperial and military archives to re-imagine relations between war, armed forces and society in modern times. He has written on the pivotal place of armed force in globalization, imperialism, and modernization, and on the neglected significance of war in social and political theory and in histories of empire. His most recent book, Soldiers of Empire, examined the multicultural armies of British Asia in the Second World War, reconceiving Indian and British soldiers in cosmopolitan rather than national terms. Currently, he is working on the Korean War and the American experience of military defeat at the hands of those regarded as racially inferior. This new project explores soldiers' history writing as a site for war's constitutive presence in society and politics.PDF version of this Talk

Daniel Deudney on Mixed Ontology, Planetary Geopolitics, and Republican Greenpeace



This is the second in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 






World politics increasingly abrasions with the limits of state-centric thinking, faced as the world is with a set of issues that affect not only us collectively as mankind, but also the planet itself. While much of IR theorizing seems to shirk such realizations, the work of Daniel Deudney has consistently engaged with the complex problems engendered by the entanglements of nuclear weapons, the planetary environment, space exploration, and the kind of political associations that might help us to grapple with our fragile condition as humanity-in-the world. In this elaborate Talk, Deudney—amongst others—lays out his understanding of the fundamental forces that drive both planetary political progress and problems; discusses the kind of ontological position needed to appreciate these problems; and argues for the merits of a republican greenpeace model to political organization.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)







What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



The study of politics is the study of human politics and the human situation has been—and is being—radically altered by changes in the human relationships with the natural and material worlds. In my view, this means IR and related intellectual disciplines should focus on better understanding the emergence of the 'global' and the 'planetary,' their implications for the overall human world and its innumerable sub-worlds, and their relations with the realization of basic human needs. The global and the planetary certainly don't comprise all of the human situation, but the fact that the human situation has become global and planetary touches every other facet of the human situation, sometimes in fundamental ways. The simple story is that the human world is now 'global and planetary' due to the explosive transformation over the last several centuries of science-based technology occurring within the geophysical and biophysical features of planet Earth. The natural Earth and its relationship with humans have been massively altered by the vast amplifications in dispersed human agency produced by the emergence and spread of machine-based civilization. The overall result of these changes has been the emergence of a global- and planetary-scale material and social reality that is in some ways similar, but in other important ways radically different, from earlier times. Practices and structures inherited from the pre-global human worlds have not adequately been adjusted to take the new human planetary situation into account and their persistence casts a long and partially dark shadow over the human prospect.



A global and planetary focus is also justified—urgently—by the fact that the overall human prospect on this planet, and the fate of much additional life on this planet, is increasingly dependent on the development and employment of new social arrangements for interacting with these novel configurations of material and natural possibilities and limits. Human agency is now situated, and is making vastly fateful choices—for better or worse—in a sprawling, vastly complex aggregation of human-machine-nature assemblies which is our world. The 'fate of the earth' now partly hinges on human choices, and helping to make sure these choices are appropriate ones should be the paramount objective of political scientific and theoretical efforts. However, no one discipline or approach is sufficient to grapple successfully with this topic. All disciplines are necessary. But there are good reasons to believe that 'IR' and related disciplines have a particularly important possible practical role to play. (I am also among those who prefer 'global studies' as a label for the enterprise of answering questions that cut across and significantly subsume both the 'international' and the 'domestic.')



My approach to grappling with this topic is situated—like the work of now vast numbers of other IR theorists and researchers of many disciplines—in the study of 'globalization.' The now widely held starting point for this intellectual effort is the realization that globalization has been the dominant pattern or phenomenon, the story of stories, over at least the last five centuries. Globalization has been occurring in military, ecological, cultural, and economic affairs. And I emphasize—like many, but not all, analysts of globalization—that the processes of globalization are essentially dependent on new machines, apparatuses, and technologies which humans have fabricated and deployed. Our world is global because of the astounding capabilities of machine civilization. This startling transformation of human choice by technological advance is centrally about politics because it is centrally about changes in power. Part of this power story has been about changes in the scope and forms of domination. Globalization has been, to state the point mildly, 'uneven,' marked by amplifications of violence and domination and predation on larger and wider scales. Another part of the story of the power transformation has been the creation of a world marked by high degrees of interdependence, interaction, speed, and complexity. These processes of globalization and the transformation of machine capabilities are not stopping or slowing down but are accelerating. Thus, I argue that 'bounding power'—the growth, at times by breathtaking leaps, of human capabilities to do things—is now a fundamental feature of the human world, and understanding its implications should, in my view, be a central activity for IR scholars.



In addressing the topic of machine civilization and its globalization on Earth, my thinking has been centered first around the developing of 'geopolitical' lines argument to construct a theory of 'planetary geopolitics'. 'Geopolitics' is the study of geography, ecology, technology, and the earth, and space and place, and their interaction with politics. The starting point for geopolitical analysis is accurate mapping. Not too many IR scholars think of themselves as doing 'geography' in any form. In part this results from of the unfortunate segregation of 'geography' into a separate academic discipline, very little of which is concerned with politics. Many also mistake the overall project of 'geopolitics' with the ideas, and egregious mistakes and political limitations, of many self-described 'geopoliticans' who are typically arch-realists, strong nationalists, and imperialists. Everyone pays general lip service to the importance of technology, but little interaction occurs between IR and 'technology studies' and most IR scholars are happy to treat such matters as 'technical' or non-political in character. Despite this general theoretical neglect, many geographic and technological factors routinely pop into arguments in political science and political theory, and play important roles in them.



Thinking about the global and planetary through the lens of a fuller geopolitics is appealing to me because it is the human relationship with the material world and the Earth that has been changed with the human world's globalization. Furthermore, much of the actual agendas of movements for peace, arms control, and sustainability are essentially about alternative ways of ordering the material world and our relations with it. Given this, I find an approach that thinks systematically about the relations between patterns of materiality and different political forms is particularly well-suited to provide insights of practical value for these efforts.



The other key focus of my research has been around extending a variety of broadly 'republican' political insights for a cluster of contemporary practical projects for peace, arms control, and environmental stewardship ('greenpeace'). Even more than 'geopolitics,' 'republicanism' is a term with too many associations and meanings. By republics I mean political associations based on popular sovereignty and marked by mutual limitations, that is, by 'bounding power'—the restraint of power, particularly violent power—in the interests of the people generally. Assuming that security from the application of violence to bodies is a primary (but not sole) task of political association, how do republican political arrangements achieve this end? I argue that the character and scope of power restraint arrangements that actually serve the fundamental security interests of its popular sovereign varies in significant ways in different material contexts.



Republicanism is first and foremost a domestic form, centered upon the successive spatial expansion of domestic-like realms, and the pursuit of a constant political project of maximally feasible ordered freedom in changed spatial and material circumstances. I find thinking about our global and planetary human situation from the perspective of republicanism appealing because the human global and planetary situation has traits—most notably high levels of interdependence, interaction, practical speed, and complexity—that make it resemble our historical experience of 'domestic' and 'municipal' realms. Thinking with a geopolitically grounded republicanism offers insights about global governance very different from the insights generated within the political conceptual universe of hierarchical, imperial, and state-centered political forms. Thus planetary geopolitics and republicanism offers a perspective on what it means to 'Think Globally and Act Locally.' If we think of, or rather recognize, the planet as our locality, and then act as if the Earth is our locality, then we are likely to end up doing various approximations of the best-practice republican forms that we have successfully developed in our historically smaller domestic localities.





How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR?



Like anybody else, the formative events in my intellectual development have been shaped by the thick particularities of time and place. 'The boy is the father of the man,' as it is said. The first and most direction-setting stage in the formation of my 'green peace' research interests was when I was in 'grade school,' roughly the years from age 6-13. During these years my family lived in an extraordinary place, St Simons Island, a largely undeveloped barrier island off the coast of southern Georgia. This was an extremely cool place to be a kid. It had extensive beaches, and marshes, as well as amazing trees of gargantuan proportions. My friends and I spent much time exploring, fishing, camping out, climbing trees, and building tree houses. Many of these nature-immersion activities were spontaneous, others were in Boy Scouts. This extraordinary natural environment and the attachments I formed to it, shaped my strong tendency to see the fates of humans and nature as inescapably intertwined. But the Boy Scouts also instilled me with a sense of 'virtue ethics'. A line from the Boy Scout Handbook captures this well: 'Take a walk around your neighborhood. Make a list of what is right and wrong about it. Make a plan to fix what is not right.' This is a demotic version of Weber's political 'ethic of responsibility.' This is very different from the ethics of self-realization and self-expression that have recently gained such ground in America and elsewhere. It is now very 'politically incorrect' to think favorably of the Boy Scouts, but I believe that if the Scouting experience was universally accessible, the world would be a much improved place.



My kid-in-nature life may sound very Tom Sawyer, but it was also very Tom Swift. My friends and I spent much of our waking time reading about the technological future, and imaginatively play-acting in future worlds. This imaginative world was richly fertilized by science fiction comic books, television shows, movies, and books. Me and my friends—juvenile technological futurists and techno-nerds in a decidedly anti-intellectual culture—were avid readers of Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury, and Robert Heinlein, and each new issue of Analog was eagerly awaited. While we knew we were Americans, my friends and I had strong inclinations to think of ourselves most essentially as 'earthlings.' We fervently discussed extraterrestrial life and UFOs, and we eagerly awaited the day, soon to occur, we were sure, in which we made 'first contact.' We wanted to become, if not astronauts, then designers and builders of spaceships. We built tree houses, but we filled them with discarded electronics and they became starships. We rode bicycles, but we lugged about attaché cases filled with toy ray guns, transistor radios, firecrackers, and homemade incendiary devices. We built and fired off rockets, painstaking assembled plastic kit models of famous airplanes and ships, and then we would blow them apart with our explosives. The future belonged to technology, and we fancied ourselves its avant garde.



Yet the prospect of nuclear Armageddon seemed very real. We did 'duck and cover' drills at school, and sat for two terrifying weeks through the Cuban Missile Crisis. My friends and I had copies of the Atomic Energy Commission manuals on 'nuclear effects,' complete with a slide-rule like gadget that enabled us to calculate just what would happen if near-by military bases were obliterated by nuclear explosions. Few doubted that we were, in the words of a pop song, 'on the eve of destruction.' These years were also the dawning of 'the space age' in which humans were finally leaving the Earth and starting what promised to be an epic trek, utterly transformative in its effects, to the stars. My father worked for a number of these years for a large aerospace military-industrial firm, then working for NASA to build the very large rockets needed to launch men and machines to the moon and back. My friends and I debated fantastical topics, such as the pros and cons of emigrating to Mars, and how rapidly a crisis-driven exodus from the earth could be organized.



Two events that later occurred in the area where I spent my childhood served as culminating catalytic events for my greenpeace thinking. First, some years after my family moved away, the industrial facility to mix rocket fuel that had been built by the company my father worked for, and that he had helped put into operation, was struck by an extremely violent 'industrial accident,' which reduced, in one titanic flash, multi-story concrete and steel buildings filled with specialized heavy industrial machinery (and everyone in them) into a grey powdery gravel ash, no piece of which was larger than a fist. Second, during the late 1970s, the US Navy acquired a large tract of largely undeveloped marsh and land behind another barrier island (Cumberland), an area 10-15 miles from where I had lived, a place where I had camped, fished, and hunted deer. The Navy dredged and filled what was one of the most biologically fertile temperate zone estuaries on the planet. There they built the east coast base for the new fleet of Trident nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the single most potent violence machine ever built, thus turning what was for me the wildest part of my wild-encircled childhood home into one of the largest nuclear weapons complexes on earth. These events catalyzed for me the realization that there was a great struggle going on, for the Earth and for the future, and I knew firmly which side I was on.



My approach to thinking about problems was also strongly shaped by high school debate, where I learned the importance of 'looking at questions from both sides,' and from this stems my tendency to look at questions as debates between competing answers, and to focus on decisively engaging, defeating, and replacing the strongest and most influential opposing positions. As an undergraduate at Yale College, I started doing Political Theory. I am sure that I was a very vexing student in some ways, because (the debater again) I asked Marxist questions to my liberal and conservative professors, and liberal and conservative ones to my Marxist professors. Late in my sophomore year, I had my epiphany, my direction-defining moment, that my vocation would be an attempt to do the political theory of the global and the technological. Since then, the only decisions have been ones of priority and execution within this project.



Wanting to learn something about cutting-edge global and technological and issues, I next went to Washington D.C. for seven years. I worked on Capitol Hill for three and a half years as a policy aide, working on energy and conservation and renewable energy and nuclear power. I spent the other three and a half years as a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, a small environmental and global issues think tank that was founded and headed by Lester Brown, a well-known and far-sighted globalist. I co-authored a book about renewable energy and transitions to global sustainability and wrote a study on space and space weapons. At the time I published Whole Earth Security: a Geopolitics of Peace (1983), in which my basic notions of planetary geopolitics and republicanism were first laid out. During these seven years in Washington, I also was a part-time student, earning a Master's degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University.



In all, these Washington experiences have been extremely valuable for my thinking. Many political scientists view public service as a low or corrupting activity, but this is, I think, very wrong-headed. The reason that the democratic world works as well as it does is because of the distributive social intelligence. But social intelligence is neither as distributed nor as intelligent as it needs to be to deal with many pressing problems. My experience as a Congressional aide taught me that most of the problems that confront my democracy are rooted in various limits and corruptions of the people. I have come to have little patience with those who say, for example, rising inequality is inherent in capital C capitalism, when the more proximate explanation is that the Reagan Republican Party was so successful in gutting the progressive tax system previously in place in the United States. Similarly, I see little value in claims, to take a very contemporary example, that 'the NSA is out of control' when this agency is doing more or less what the elected officials, responding to public pressures to provide 'national security' loudly demanded. In democracies, the people are ultimately responsible.



As I was immersed in the world of arms control and environmental activism I was impressed by the truth of Keynes's oft quoted line, about the great practical influence of the ideas of some long-dead 'academic scribbler.' This is true in varying degrees in every issue area, but in some much more than others. This reinforced my sense that great potential practical consequence of successfully innovating in the various conceptual frameworks that underpinned so many important activities. For nuclear weapons, it became clear to me that the problem was rooted in the statist and realist frames that people so automatically brought to a security question of this magnitude.



Despite the many appeals of a career in DC politics and policy, this was all for me an extended research field-trip, and so I left Washington to do a PhD—a move that mystified many of my NGO and activist friends, and seemed like utter folly to my political friends. At Princeton University, I concentrated on IR, Political Theory, and Military History and Politics, taking courses with Robert Gilpin, Richard Falk, Barry Posen, Sheldon Wolin and others. In my dissertation—entitled Global Orders: Geopolitical and Materialist Theories of the Global-Industrial Era, 1890-1945—I explored IR and related thinking about the impacts of the industrial revolution as a debate between different world order alternatives, and made arguments about the superiority of liberalist, internationalist, and globalist arguments—most notably from H.G. Wells and John Dewey—to the strong realist and imperialist ideas most commonly associated with the geopolitical writers of this period.



I also continued engaging in activist policy affiliated to the Program on Nuclear Policy Alternatives at the Center for Energy andEnvironmental Studies (CEES), which was then headed by Frank von Hippel, a physicist turned 'public interest scientist', and a towering figure in the global nuclear arms control movement. I was a Post Doc at CEES during the Gorbachev era and I went on several amazing and eye-opening trips to the Soviet Union. Continuing my space activism, I was able to organize workshops in Moscow and Washington on large-scale space cooperation, gathering together many of the key space players on both sides. While Princeton was fabulously stimulating intellectually, it was also a stressful pressure-cooker, and I maintained my sanity by making short trips, two of three weekends, over six years, to Manhattan, where I spent the days working in the main reading room of the New York Public Library and the nights partying and relaxing in a world completely detached from academic life.



When it comes to my intellectual development in terms of reading theory, the positive project I wanted to pursue was partially defined by approaches I came to reject. Perhaps most centrally, I came to reject an approach that was very intellectually powerful, even intoxicating, and which retains great sway over many, that of metaphysical politics. The politics of the metaphysicians played a central role in my coming to reject the politics of metaphysics. The fact that some metaphysical ideas and the some of the deep thinkers who advanced them, such as Heidegger, and many Marxists, were so intimately connected with really disastrous politics seemed a really damning fact for me, particularly given that these thinkers insisted so strongly on the link between their metaphysics and their politics. I was initially drawn to Nietzsche's writing (what twenty-year old isn't) but his model of the philosopher founder or law-giver—that is, of a spiritually gifted but alienated guy (and it always is a guy) with a particularly strong but frustrated 'will to power' going into the wilderness, having a deep spiritual revelation, and then returning to the mundane corrupt world with new 'tablets of value,' along with a plan to take over and run things right—seemed more comic than politically relevant, unless the prophet is armed, in which case it becomes a frightful menace. The concluding scene in Herman Hesse's Magister Ludi (sometimes translated as The Glass Bead Game) summarized by overall view of the 'high theory' project. After years of intense training by the greatest teachers the most spiritually and intellectually gifted youths finally graduate. To celebrate, they go to lake, dive in, and, having not learned how to swim, drown.



I was more attracted to Aristotle, Hume, Montesquieu, Dewey and other political theorists with less lofty and comprehensive views of what theory might accomplish; weary of actions; based on dogmatic or totalistic thinking; an eye to the messy and compromised world; with a political commitment to liberty and the interests of the many; a preference for peace over war; an aversion to despotism and empire; and an affinity for tolerance and plurality. I also liked some of those thinkers because of their emphasis on material contexts. Montesquieu seeks to analyze the interaction of material contexts and republican political forms; Madison and his contemporaries attempt to extend the spatial scope of republican political association by recombining in novel ways various earlier power restraint arrangements. I was tremendously influenced by Dewey, studying intensively his slender volume The Public and its Problems (1927)—which I think is the most important book in twentieth century political thought. By the 'public' Dewey means essentially a stakeholder group, and his main point is that the material transformations produced by the industrial revolution has created new publics, and that the political task is to conceptualize and realize forms of community and government appropriate to solving the problems that confront these new publics.



One can say my overall project became to apply and extend their concepts to the contemporary planetary situation. Concomitantly reading IR literature on nuclear weapons, I was struck by fact that the central role that material realities played in these arguments was very ad hoc, and that many of the leading arguments on nuclear politics were very unconvincing. It was clear that while Waltz (Theory Talk #40) had brilliantly developed some key ideas about anarchy made by Hobbes and Rousseau, he had also left something really important out. These sorts of deficiencies led me to develop the arguments contained in Bounding Power. I think it is highly unlikely that I would have had these doubts, or come to make the arguments I made without having worked in political theory and in policy.



I read many works that greatly influenced my thinking in this area, among them works by Lewis Mumford, Langdon Winner's Autonomous Technology, James Lovelock's Gaia, Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents (read a related article here, pdf), Jonathan Schell's Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, William Ophul's Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity... I was particularly stuck by a line in Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (pdf), that we live in a 'spaceship' like closed highly interconnected system, but lack an 'operating manual' to guide intelligently our actions. It was also during this period that I read key works by H.G. Wells, most notably his book, Anticipations, and his essay The Idea of a League of Nations, both of which greatly influenced my thinking.



This aside, the greatest contribution to my thinking has come from conversations sustained over many years with some really extraordinary individuals. To mention those that I have been arguing with, and learning from, for at least ten years, there is John O'Looney, Wesley Warren, Bob Gooding-Williams, Alyn McAuly, Henry Nau, Richard Falk, Michael Doyle (Theory Talk #1), Richard Mathew, Paul Wapner, Bron Taylor, Ron Deibert, John Ikenberry, Bill Wohlforth, Frank von Hippel, Ethan Nadelmann, Fritz Kratochwil, Barry Buzan (Theory Talk #35), Ole Waever, John Agnew (Theory Talk #4), Barry Posen, Alex Wendt (Theory Talk #3), James der Derian, David Hendrickson, Nadivah Greenberg, Tim Luke, Campbell Craig, Bill Connolly, Steven David, Jane Bennett, Daniel Levine (TheoryTalk #58), and Jairus Grove. My only regret is that I have not spoken even more with them, and with the much larger number of people I have learned from on a less sustained basis along the way.

                                    



What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?



I have thought a great deal about what sort of answers to this question can be generally valuable. For me, the most important insight is that success in intellectual life and academia is determined by more or less the same combination of factors that determines success more generally. This list is obvious: character, talent, perseverance and hard work, good judgment, good 'people skills,' and luck. Not everyone has a talent to do this kind of work, but the number of people who do have the talent to do this kind of work is much larger than the number of people who are successful in doing it. I think in academia as elsewhere, the people most likely to really succeed are those whose attitude toward the activity is vocational. A vocation is something one is called to do by an inner voice that one cannot resist. People with vocations never really work in one sense, because they are doing something that they would be doing even if they were not paid or required. Of course, in another sense people with vocations never stop working, being so consumed with their path that everything else matters very little. People with jobs and professions largely stop working when they when the lottery, but people with vocations are empowered to work more and better. When your vocation overlaps with your job, you should wake up and say 'wow, I cannot believe I am being paid to do this!' Rather obviously, the great danger in the life paths of people with vocations is imbalance and burn-out. To avoid these perils it is beneficial to sustain strong personal relationships, know when and how to 'take off' effectively, and sustain the ability to see things as an unfolding comedy and to laugh.



Academic life also involves living and working in a profession. Compared to the oppressions that so many thinkers and researchers have historically suffered from, contemporary professional academic life is a utopia. But academic life has several aspects unfortunate aspects, and coping successfully with them is vital. Academic life is full of 'odd balls' and the loose structure of universities and organization, combined with the tenure system, licenses an often florid display of dubious behavior. A fair number of academics have really primitive and incompetent social skills. Others are thin skinned-ego maniacs. Some are pompous hypocrites. Some are ruthlessly self-aggrandizing and underhanded. Some are relentless shirkers and free-riders. Also, academic life is, particularly relative to the costs of obtaining the years of education necessary to obtain it, not very well paid. Corruptions of clique, ideological factionalism, and nepotism occur. If not kept in proper perspective, and approached in appropriate ways, academic department life can become stupidly consuming of time, energy, and most dangerously, intellectual attention. The basic step for healthy departmental life is to approach it as a professional role.



The other big dimension of academic life is teaching. Teaching is one of the two 'deliverables' that academic organizations provide in return for the vast resources they consume. Shirking on teaching is a dereliction of responsibility, but also is the foregoing of a great opportunity. Teaching is actually one of the most assuredly consequential things academics do. The key to great teaching is, I think, very simple: inspire and convey enthusiasm. Once inspired, students learn. Once students take questions as their own, they become avid seekers of answers. Teachers of things political also have a responsibility to remain even-handed in what they teach, to make sure that they do not teach just or mainly their views, to make sure that the best and strongest versions of opposing sides are heard. Teaching seeks to produce informed and critically thinking students, not converts. Beyond the key roles of inspiration and even-handedness, the rest is the standard package of tasks relevant in any professional role: good preparation, good organization, hard work, and clarity of presentation.





Your main book, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (2007), is a mix of intellectual history, political theory and IR theory, and is targeted largely at realism. How does a reading and interpretation of a large number of old books tell us something new about realism, and the contemporary global?



Bounding Power attempts to dispel some very large claims made by realists about their self-proclaimed 'tradition,' a lineage of thought in which they place many of the leading Western thinkers about political order, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and the 'global geopoliticans' from the years around the beginning of the twentieth century. In the book I argue that the actual main axis of western thinking about political order (and its absence) is largely the work of 'republican' thinkers from the small number of 'republics', and that many of the key ideas that realists call realist and liberals call liberal are actually fragments of a larger, more encompassing set of arguments that were primarily in the idioms of republicanism. This entails dispelling the widely held view that the liberal and proto-liberal republican thought and practice are marked by 'idealism'—and therefore both inferior in their grasp of the problem of security-from violence and valuable only when confined to the 'domestic.' I demonstrate that this line of republican security thinkers had a robust set of claims both about material contextual factors, about the 'geopolitics of freedom', and a fuller understanding of security-from-violence. The book shows how perhaps the most important insights of this earlier cluster of arguments has oddly been dropped by both realists (particularly neorealists) and liberal international theorists. And, finally, it is an attempt to provide an understanding that posits the project of exiting anarchy on a global scale as something essentially unprecedented, and as something that the best of our inherited theory leaves us unable to say much about.



The main argument is contained in my formulation of what I think are the actual the two main sets of issues of Western structural-materialist security theory, two problematiques formulated in republican and naturalist-materialist conceptual vocabularies. The first problematique concerns the relationship between material context, the scope of tolerable anarchy, and necessary-for-security government. The second problematic concerns the relative security-viability of two main different forms of government—hierarchical and republican.



This formulation of the first problematic concerning anarchy differs from the main line of contemporary Realist argument in that it poses the question as one about the spatial scope of tolerable anarchy. The primary variable in my reconstruction of the material-contextual component of these arguments is what I term violence interdependence (absent, weak, strong, and intense). The main substantive claim of Western structural-materialist security theory is that situations of anarchy combined with intense violence interdependence are incompatible with security and require substantive government. Situations of strong and weak violence interdependence constitute a tolerable (if at times 'nasty and brutish') second ('state-of-war') anarchy not requiring substantive government. Early formulations of 'state of nature' arguments, explicitly or implicitly hinge upon this material contextual variable, and the overall narrative structure of the development of republican security theory and practice has concerned natural geographic variations and technologically caused changes in the material context, and thus the scope of security tolerable/intolerable anarchy and needed substantive government. This argument was present in early realist versions of anarchy arguments, but has been dropped by neorealists. Conversely, contemporary liberal international theorists analyze interdependence, but have little to say about violence. The result is that the realists talk about violence and security, and the liberals talk about interdependence not relating to violence, producing the great lacuna of contemporary theory: analysis of violence interdependence.



The second main problematique, concerning the relative security viability of hierarchical and republican forms, has also largely been lost sight of, in large measure by the realist insistence that governments are by definition hierarchical, and the liberal avoidance of system structural theory in favor of process, ideational, and economic variables. (For neoliberals, cooperation is seen as (possibly) occurring in anarchy, without altering or replacing anarchy.) The main claim here is that republican and proto-liberal theorists have a more complete grasp of the security political problem than realists because of their realization that both the extremes of hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible with security. In order to register this lost component of structural theory I refer to republican forms at both the unit and the system-level as being characterized by an ordering principle which I refer to as negarchy. Such political arrangements are characterized by the simultaneous negation of both hierarchy and anarchy. The vocabulary of political structures should thus be conceived as a triad-triangle of anarchy, hierarchy, and negarchy, rather than a spectrum stretching from pure anarchy to pure hierarchy. Using this framework, Bounding Power traces various formulations of the key arguments of security republicans from the Greeks through the nuclear era as arguments about the simultaneous avoidance of hierarchy and anarchy on expanding spatial scales driven by variations and changes in the material context. If we recognize the main axis of our thinking in this way, we can stand on a view of our past that is remarkable in its potential relevance to thinking and dealing with the contemporary 'global village' like a human situation.





Nuclear weapons play a key role in the argument of Bounding Power about the present, as well as elsewhere in your work. But are nuclear weapons are still important as hey were during the Cold War to understand global politics?



Since their arrival on the world scene in the middle years of the twentieth century, there has been pretty much universal agreement that nuclear weapons are in some fundamental way 'revolutionary' in their implications for security-from-violence and world politics. The fact that the Cold War is over does not alter, and even stems from, this fact. Despite this wide agreement on the importance of nuclear weapons, theorists, policy makers, and popular arms control/disarmament movements have fundamental disagreements about which political forms are compatible with the avoidance of nuclear war. I have attempted to provide a somewhat new answer to this 'nuclear-political question', and to explain why strong forms of interstate arms control are necessary for security in the nuclear age. I argue that achieving the necessary levels of arms control entails somehow exiting interstate anarchy—not toward a world government as a world state, but toward a world order that is a type of compound republican union (marked by, to put it in terms of above discussion, a nearly completely negarchical structure).



This argument attempts to close what I term the 'arms control gap', the discrepancy between the value arms control is assigned by academic theorists of nuclear weapons and their importance in the actual provision of security in the nuclear era. During the Cold War, thinking among IR theorists about nuclear weapons tended to fall into three broad schools—war strategists, deterrence statists, and arms controllers. Where the first two only seem to differ about the amount of nuclear weapons necessary for states seeking security (the first think many, the second less), the third advocates that states do what they have very rarely done before the nuclear age, reciprocal restraints on arms.



But this Cold War triad of arguments is significantly incomplete as a list of the important schools of thought about the nuclear-political question. There are four additional schools, and a combination of their arguments constitutes, I argue, a superior answer to the nuclear-political question. First are the nuclear one worlders, a view that flourished during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and held that the simple answer to the nuclear political question is to establish a world government, as some sort of state. Second are the populist anti-nuclearists, who indict state apparatuses of acting contrary to the global public's security interests. Third are the deep arms controllers, such as Jonathan Schell, who argue that nuclear weapons need to be abolished. Fourth are the theorists of omniviolence, who theorize situations produced by the leakage of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-state actors who cannot be readily deterred from using nuclear weapons. What all of these schools have in common is that they open up the state and make arguments about how various forms of political freedom—and the institutions that make it possible—are at issue in answering the nuclear-political question.

                                                                                                                

Yet one key feature all seven schools share is that they all make arguments about how particular combinations and configurations of material realities provide the basis for thinking that their answer to the nuclear-political question is correct. Unfortunately, their understandings of how material factors shape, or should shape, actual political arrangements is very ad hoc. Yet the material factors—starting with sheer physical destructiveness—are so pivotal that they merit a more central role in theories of nuclear power. I think we need to have a model that allows us to grasp how variations in material contexts condition the functionality of 'modes of protection', that is, distinct and recurring security practices (and their attendant political structures).



For instance, one mode of protection—what I term the real-state mode of protection—attempts to achieve security through the concentration, mobilization, and employment of violence capability. This is the overall, universal, context-independent strategy of realists. Bringing into view material factors, I argue, shows that this mode of protection is functional not universally but specifically—and only—in material contexts that are marked by violence-poverty and slowness. This mode of protection is dysfunctional in nuclear material contexts marked by violence abundance and high violence velocities. In contrast, a republican federal mode of protection is a bundle of practices that aim for the demobilization and deceleration of violence capacity, and that the practices associated with this mode of protection are security functional in the nuclear material context.



What emerges from such an approach to ideas about the relation between nuclear power and security from violence is that the epistemological foundations for any of the major positions about nuclear weapons are actually much weaker than we should be comfortable with. People often say the two most important questions about the nuclear age are: what is the probability that nuclear weapons will be used? And then, what will happen when they are used? The sobering truth is that we really do not have good grounds for confidently answering either of those two questions. But every choice made about nuclear weapons depends on risk calculations that depend on how we answer these questions.





You have also written extensively on space, a topic that has not recently attracted much attention from many IR scholars. How does your thinking on this relate to your overall thinking about the global and planetary situation?

                                                                                                          

The first human steps into outer space during the middle years of the twentieth century have been among the most spectacular and potentially consequential events in the globalization of machine civilization on Earth. Over the course of what many call 'the space age,' thinking about space activities, space futures, and the consequences of space activities has been dominated by an elaborately developed body of 'space expansionist' thought that makes ambitious and captivating claims about both the feasibility and the desirability of human expansion into outer space. Such views of space permeate popular culture, and at times appear to be quite influential in actual space policy. Space expansionists hold that outer space is a limitless frontier and that humans should make concerted efforts to explore and colonize and extend their military activities into space. They claim the pursuit of their ambitious projects will have many positive, even transformative, effects upon the human situation on Earth, by escaping global closure, protecting the earth's habitability, preserving political plurality, and enhancing species survival. Claims about the Earth, its historical patterns and its contemporary problems, permeate space expansionist thinking.



While the feasibility, both technological and economic, of space expansionist projects has been extensively assessed, arguments for their desirability have not been accorded anything approaching a systematic assessment. In part, such arguments about the desirability of space expansion are difficult to assess because they incorporate claims that are very diverse in character, including claims about the Earth (past, present, and future), about the ways in which material contexts made up of space 'geography' and technologies produce or heavily favor particular political outcomes, and about basic worldview assumptions regarding nature, science, technology, and life.



By breaking these space expansionist arguments down into their parts, and systematically assessing their plausibility, a very different picture of the space prospect emerges. I think there are strong reasons to think that the consequences of the human pursuit of space expansion have been, and could be, very undesirable, even catastrophic. The actual militarization of that core space technology ('the rocket') and the construction of a planetary-scope 'delivery' and support system for nuclear war-fighting has been the most important consequence of actual space activities, but these developments have been curiously been left out of accounts of the space age and assessments of its impacts. Similarly, much of actually existing 'nuclear arms control' has centered on restraining and dismantling space weapons, not nuclear weapons. Thus the most consequential space activity—the acceleration of nuclear delivery capabilities—has been curiously rendered almost invisible in accounts of space and assessments of its impacts. This is an 'unknown known' of the 'space age'. Looking ahead, the creation of large orbital infrastructures will either presuppose or produce world government, potentially of a very hierarchical sort.  There are also good reasons to think that space colonies are more likely to be micro-totalitarian than free. And extensive human movement off the planet could in a variety of ways increase the vulnerability of life on Earth, and even jeopardize the survival of the human species.



Finally, I think much of space expansionist (and popular) thinking about space and the consequences of humans space activities has been marked by basic errors in practical geography. Most notably, there is the widespread failure to realize that the expansion of human activities into Earth's orbital space has enhanced global closure, because the effective distances in Earth's space make it very small. And because of the formidable natural barriers to human space activity, space is a planetary 'lid, not a 'frontier'. So one can say that the most important practical discovery of the 'space age' has been an improved understanding of the Earth. These lines of thinking, I find, would suggest the outlines of a more modest and Earth-centered space program, appropriate for the current Earth age. Overall, the fact that we can't readily expand into space is part of why we are in a new 'earth age' rather than a 'space age'.





You've argued against making the environment into a national security issue twenty years ago. Do the same now, considering that making the environment a bigger priority by making it into a national security issue might be the only way to prevent total environmental destruction?



When I started writing about the relationships between environment and security twenty years ago, not a great deal of work had been done on this topic. But several leading environmental thinkers were making the case that framing environmental issues as security issues, or what came to be called 'securitizing the environment', was not only a good strategy to get action on environmental problems, but also was useful analytically to think about these two domains. Unlike the subsequent criticisms of 'environmental security' made by Realists and scholars of conventional 'security studies', my criticism starts with the environmentalist premise that environmental deterioration is a paramount problem for contemporary humanity as a whole.



Those who want to 'securitize the environment' are attempting to do what William James a century ago proposed as a general strategy for social problem solving. Can we find, in James' language, 'a moral equivalent of war?' (Note the unfortunately acronym: MEOW). War and the threat of war, James observed, often lead to rapid and extensive mobilizations of effort. Can we somehow transfer these vast social energies to deal with other sets of problems? This is an enduring hope, particularly in the United States, where we have a 'war on drugs', a 'war on cancer', and a 'war on poverty'. But doing this for the environment, by 'securitizing the environment,' is unlikely to be very successful. And I fear that bringing 'security' orientations, institutions, and mindsets into environmental problem-solving will also bring in statist, nationalist, and militarist approaches. This will make environmental problem-solving more difficult, not easier, and have many baneful side-effects.



Another key point I think is important, is that the environment—and the various values and ends associated with habitat and the protection of habitat—are actually much more powerful and encompassing than those of security and violence. Instead of 'securitizing the environment' it is more promising is to 'environmentalize security'. Not many people think about the linkages between the environment and security-from-violence in this way, but I think there is a major case of it 'hiding in plain sight' in the trajectory of how the state-system and nuclear weapons have interacted.



When nuclear weapons were invented and first used in the 1940s, scientists were ignorant about many aspects of their effects. As scientists learned about these effects, and as this knowledge became public, many people started thinking and acting in different ways about nuclear choices. The fact that a ground burst of a nuclear weapon would produce substantial radioactive 'fall-out' was not appreciated until the first hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950s. It was only then that scientists started to study what happened to radioactive materials dispersed widely in the environment. Evidence began to accumulate that some radioactive isotopes would be 'bio-focused', or concentrated by biological process. Public interest scientists began effectively publicizing this information, and mothers were alerted to the fact that their children's teeth were become radioactive. This new scientific knowledge about the environmental effects of nuclear explosions, and the public mobilizations it produced, played a key role in the first substantial nuclear arms control treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and in space. Thus, the old ways of providing security were circumscribed by new knowledge and new stakeholders of environmental health effects. The environment was not securitized, security was partially environmentalized.



Thus, while some accounts by arms control theorists emphasize the importance of 'social learning' in altering US-Soviet relations, an important part of this learning was not about the nature of social and political interactions, but about the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. The learning that was most important in motivating so many actors (both within states and in mass publics) to seek changes in politics was 'natural learning,' or more specifically learning about the interaction of natural and technological systems.



An even more consequential case of the environmentalization of security occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. A key text here is Jonathan Schell's book, The Fate of the Earth. Schell's book, combining very high-quality journalism with first rate political theoretical reflections, lays out in measured terms the new discoveries of ecologists and atmospheric scientists about the broader planetary consequences of an extensive nuclear war. Not only would hundreds of millions of people be immediately killed and much of the planet's built infrastructure destroyed, but the planet earth's natural systems would be so altered that the extinction of complex life forms, among them homo sapiens, might result. The detonation of numerous nuclear weapons and the resultant burning of cities would probably dramatically alter the earth's atmosphere, depleting the ozone layer that protects life from lethal solar radiations, and filling the atmosphere with sufficient dust to cause a 'nuclear winter.' At stake in nuclear war, scientists had learned, was not just the fate of nations, but of the earth as a life support system. Conventional accounts of the nuclear age and of the end of the Cold War are loath to admit it, but it I believe it is clear that spreading awareness of these new natural-technological possibilities played a significant role in ending the Cold War and the central role that nuclear arms control occupies in the settlement of the Cold War. Again, traditional ways of achieving security-from-violence were altered by new knowledges about their environmental consequences—security practices and arrangements were partly environmentalized.



Even more radically, I think we can also turn this into a positive project. As I wrote two decades ago, environmental restoration would probably generate political externalities that would dampen tendencies towards violence. In other words, if we address the problem of the environment, then we will be drawn to do various things that will make various types of violent conflict less likely.





Your work is permeated by references to 'material factors'. This makes it different from branches of contemporary IR—like constructivism or postmodernism—which seem to be underpinned by a profound commitment to focus solely one side of the Cartesian divide. What is your take on the pervasiveness and implications of this 'social bias'?



Postmodernism and constructivism are really the most extreme manifestations of a broad trend over the last two centuries toward what I refer to as 'social-social science' and the decline—but hardly the end—of 'natural-social science'. Much of western thought prior to this turn was 'naturalist' and thus tended to downplay both human agency and ideas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century—partly because of the influence of German idealism, partly because of the great liberationist projects that promised to give better consequence to the activities and aspirations of the larger body of human populations (previously sunk in various forms of seemingly natural bondages), and partly because of the great expansion of human choice brought about by the science-based technologies of the Industrial Revolution—there was a widespread tendency to move towards 'social-social science,' the project of attempting to explain the human world solely by reference to the human world, to explain social outcomes with reference to social causes. While this was the dominant tendency, and a vastly productive one in many ways, it existed alongside and in interaction with what is really a modernized version of the earlier 'natural-social science.' Much of my work has sought to 'bring back in' and extend these 'natural-social' lines of argument—found in figures such as Dewey and H.G. Wells—into our thinking about the planetary situation.



In many parts of both European and American IR and related areas, Postmodern and constructivist theories have significantly contributed to IR theorists by enhancing our appreciation of ideas, language, and identities in politics. As a response to the limits and blindnesses of certain types of rationalist, structuralist, and functional theories, this renewed interest in the ideational is an important advance. Unfortunately, both postmodernism and constructivism have been marked by a strong tendency to go too far in their emphasis of the ideational. Postmodernism and constructivism have also helped make theorists much more conscious of the implicit—and often severely limiting—ontological assumptions that underlay, inform, and bound their investigations. This is also a major contribution to the study of world politics in all its aspects.



Unfortunately, this turn to ontology has also had intellectually limiting effects by going too far, in the search for a pure or nearly pure social ontology. With the growth in these two approaches, there has indeed been a decided decline in theorizing about the material. But elsewhere in the diverse world of theorizing about IR and the global, theorizing about the material never came anything close to disappearing or being eclipsed. For anyone thinking about the relationships between politics and nuclear weapons, space, and the environment, theorizing about the material has remained at the center, and it would be difficult to even conceive of how theorizing about the material could largely disappear. The recent 're-discovery of the material' associated with various self-styled 'new materialists' is a welcome, if belated, re-discovery for postmodernists and constructivists. For most of the rest of us, the material had never been largely dropped out.



A very visible example of the ways in which the decline in appropriate attention to the material, an excessive turn to the ideational, and the quest for a nearly pure social ontology, can lead theorizing astray is the core argument in Alexander Wendt's main book, Social Theory of International Politics, one of the widely recognized landmarks of constructivist IR theory. The first part of the book advances a very carefully wrought and sophisticated argument for a nearly pure ideational social ontology. The material is explicitly displaced into a residue or rump of unimportance. But then, to the reader's surprise, the material, in the form of 'common fate' produced by nuclear weapons, and climate change, reappears and is deployed to play a really crucial role in understanding contemporary change in world politics. 



My solution is to employ a mixed ontology. By this I mean that I think several ontologically incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts the human world. These 'unlikes' are inescapable parts of any argument, and must somehow be combined. There are a vast number of ways in which they can be combined, and on close examination, virtually all arguments in the social sciences are actually employing some version of a mixed ontology, however implicitly and under-acknowledged.



But not all combinations are equally useful in addressing all questions. In my version of mixed ontology—which I call 'practical naturalism'—human social agency is understood to be occurring 'between two natures': on the one hand the largely fixed nature of humans, and on the other the changing nature composed of the material world, a shifting amalgam of actual non-human material nature of geography and ecology, along with human artifacts and infrastructures. Within this frame, I posit as rooted in human biological nature, a set of 'natural needs,' most notably for security-from-violence and habitat services. Then I pose questions of functionality, by which I mean: which combinations of material practices, political structures, ideas and identities are needed to achieve these ends in different material contexts? Answering this question requires the formulation of various 'historical materialist' propositions, which in turn entails the systematic formulation of typologies and variation in both the practices, structures and ideas, and in material contexts. These arguments are not centered on explaining what has or what will happen. Instead they are practical in the sense that they are attempting to answer the question of 'what is to be done' given the fixed ends and given changing material contexts. I think this is what advocates of arms control and environmental sustainability are actually doing when they claim that one set of material practices and their attendant political structures, identities and ideas must be replaced with another if basic human needs are to going to continue to be meet in the contemporary planetary material situation created by the globalization of machine civilization on earth.

                                  

Since this set of arguments is framed within a mixed ontology, ideas and identities are a vital part of the research agenda. Much of the energy of postmodern and many varieties of critical theory have focused on 'deconstructing' various identities and ideas. This critical activity has produced and continues to produce many insights of theorizing about politics. But I think there is an un-tapped potential for theorists who are interested in ideas and identities, and who want their work to make a positive contribution to practical problem-solving in the contemporary planetary human situation in what might be termed a 'constructive constructivism'. This concerns a large practical theory agenda—and an urgent one at that, given the rapid increase in planetary problems—revolving around the task of figuring out which ideas and identities are appropriate for the planetary world, and in figuring out how they can be rapidly disseminated. Furthermore, thinking about how to achieve consciousness change of this sort is not something ancillary to the greenpeace project but vital to it. My thinking on how this should and might be done centers the construction of a new social narrative, centered not on humanity but on the earth.





Is it easy to plug your mixed ontology and interests beyond the narrow confines of IR or even the walls of the ivory tower into processes of collective knowledge proliferation in IR—a discipline increasingly characterized by compartimentalization and specialization?



The great plurality of approaches in IR today is indispensible and a welcome change. The professionalization of IR and the organization of intellectual life has some corruptions and pitfalls that are best avoided. The explosion of 'isms' and of different perspectives has been valuable and necessary in many ways, but it has also helped to foster and empower sectarian tendencies that confound the advance of knowledge. Some of the adherents of some sects and isms boast openly of establishing 'citation cartels' to favor themselves and their friends. Some theorists also have an unfortunate tendency to assume that because they have adopted a label that what they actually do is the actually the realization of the label. Thus we have 'realists' with limited grasp on realities, 'critical theorists' who repeat rather than criticize the views of other 'critical theorists,' and anti-neoliberals who are ruthless Ayn Rand-like self aggrandizers. The only way to fully address these tendencies is to talk to people you disagree with, and find and communicate with people in other disciplines.



Another consequence of this sectarianism is visible in the erosion of scholarly standards of citation. The system of academic incentives is configured to reward publication, and the publication of ideas that are new. This has a curiously perverse impact on the achievement of cumulativity. One seemingly easy and attractive path to saying something new is to say something old in new language, to say something said in another sect or field in the language of your sect or field, or easiest of all, simply ignore what other people have said if it is too much like what you are trying to say. George Santyana is wide quoted in saying that 'those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.' For academics it can unfortunately be said, 'those who can successfully forget what past academics said are free to say it again, and thus advance toward tenure.' When rampant sectarianism and decline in standards of citation is combined with a broader cultural tendency to valorize self-expression and authenticity, academic work can become an exercise in abstract self expressionism.



Confining one's intellectual life within one 'ism' or sect is sure to be self-limiting. Many of the most important and interesting questions arise between and across the sects and schools. Also, there are great opportunities in learning from people who do not fully share your assumptions and approaches. Seriously engaging the work and ideas of scholars in other sects can be very very valuable. Scholars in different sects and schools are also often really taking positions that are not so different as their labels would suggest. Perhaps because my research agenda fits uncomfortably within any of the established schools and isms, I have found particularly great value in seeking out and talking on a sustained basis with people with very different approaches.





My final question is about normativity and the way that normativity is perceived: In Europe and the United States, liberal Internationalism is increasingly considered as hollowed out, as a discursive cover for a tendency to attempt to control and regulate the world—or as an unguided idealistic missile. Doesn't adapting to a post-hegemonic world require dropping such ambitions?



American foreign policy has never been entirely liberal internationalist. Many other ideas and ideologies and approaches have often played important roles in shaping US foreign policy. But the United States, for a variety of reasons, has pursued liberal internationalist foreign policy agendas more extensively, and successfully, than any other major state in the modern state system, and the world, I think, has been made better off in very important ways by these efforts.



The net impact of the United States and of American grand strategy and particularly those parts of American brand strategy that have been more liberal internationalist in their character, has been enormously positive for the world. It has produced not a utopia by any means, but has brought about an era with more peace and security, prosperity, and freedom for more people than ever before in history.



Both American foreign policy and liberal internationalism have been subject to strong attacks from a variety of perspectives. Recently some have characterized liberal internationalism as a type of American imperialism, or as a cloak for US imperialism. Virtually every aspect of American foreign policy has been contested within the United States. Liberal internationalists have been strong enemies of imperialism and military adventurism, whether American or from other states. This started with the Whig's opposition to the War with Mexico and the Progressive's opposition to the Spanish-American War, and continued with liberal opposition to the War in Vietnam.



The claim that liberal internationalism leads to or supports American imperialism has also been recently voiced by many American realists, perhaps most notably John Mearsheimer (Theory Talk #49). He and others argue that liberal internationalism played a significant role in bringing about the War on Iraq waged by the W. Bush administration. This was indeed one of the great debacles of US foreign policy. But the War in Iraq was actually a war waged by American realists for reasons grounded in realist foreign policy thinking. It is true, as Mearsheimer emphasizes, that many academic realists criticized the Bush administration's plans and efforts in the invasion in Iraq. Some self-described American liberal internationalists in the policy world supported the war, but almost all academic American liberal internationalists were strongly opposed, and much of the public opposition to the war was on grounds related to liberal internationalist ideas.



It is patently inaccurate to say that main actors in the US government that instigated the War on Iraq were liberal internationalists. The main initiators of the war were Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Whatever can be said about those two individuals, they are not liberal internationalists. They initiated the war because they thought that the Saddam Hussein regime was a threat to American interests—basically related to oil. The Saddam regime was seen as a threat to American-centered regional hegemony in the Middle East, an order whose its paramount purpose has been the protection of oil, and the protection of the regional American allies that posses oil. Saddam Hussein was furthermore a demonstrated regional revisionist likely to seek nuclear weapons, which would greatly compromise American military abilities in the region. Everything else the Bush Administration's public propaganda machine said to justify the war was essentially window dressing for this agenda. Far from being motivated by a liberal internationalist agenda the key figures in the Bush Administration viewed the collateral damage to international institutions produced by the war as a further benefit, not a cost, of the war. It is particularly ironic that John Mearsheimer would be a critic of this war, which seems in many ways a 'text book' application of a central claim of his 'offensive realism,' that powerful states can be expected, in the pursuit of their security and interests, to seek to become and remain regional hegemons.



Of course, liberal internationalism, quite aside from dealing with these gross mischaracterizations propagated by realists, must also look to the future. The liberal internationalism that is needed for today and tomorrow is going to be in some ways different from the liberal internationalism of the twentieth century. This is a large topic that many people, but not enough, are thinking about. In a recent working paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ikenberry and I have laid out some ways in which we think American liberal internationalism should proceed. The starting point is the recognition that the United States is not as 'exceptional' in its precocious liberal-democratic character, not as 'indispensible' for the protection of the balance of power or the advance of freedom, or as easily 'hegemonic' as it has been historically. But the world is now also much more democratic than ever before, with democracies old and new, north and south, former colonizers and former colonies, and in every civilizational flavor. The democracies also face an array of difficult domestic problems, are thickly enmeshed with one another in many ways, and have a vital role to play in solving global problems. We suggest that the next liberal internationalism in American foreign policy should focus on American learning from the successes of other democracies in solving problems, focus on 'leading by example of successful problem-solving' and less with 'carrots and sticks,' make sustained efforts to moderate the inequalities and externalities produced by de-regulated capitalism, devote more attention to building community among the democracies, and make sustained efforts to 'recast global bargains' and the distribution of authority in global institutions to better incorporate the interests of 'rising powers.'





Daniel Deudney is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He has published widely in political theory and international relations, on substantive issues such as nuclear weapons, the environment as a security issue, liberal and realist international relations theory, and geopolitics.





Related links



Deudney's Faculty Profile at Johns Hopkins
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2012) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney et al's Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China (2011 Transatlantic Academy report) here (pdf) 
Read the introduction of Deudney's Bounding Power (2007) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era (1999 book chapter) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Who Won the Cold War? (Foreign Policy, 1992) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security (Millennium, 1990) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential (WorldWatch Institute Paper, 1981) here (pdf) 









Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8233 Security Council Seventy-third year 8233rd meeting Saturday, 14 April 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10891 (E) *1810891* S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 2/26 18-10891 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: I have been following closely the reports of air strikes in Syria conducted by the United States, France and United Kingdom. Last night at 10 p.m. New York time, the United States President announced the beginning of air strikes with the participation of France and the United Kingdom, indicating they were targeting the chemical-weapons capabilities of the Syrian Government to deter their future use. The statement was followed by announcements from Prime Minister May and President Macron. The air strikes were reportedly limited to three military locations inside Syria. The first targets included the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre at Al-Mazzah airport in Damascus, the second an alleged chemical-weapons storage facility west of Homs and the third an alleged chemical-weapons equipment storage site and command post, also near Homs. The Syrian Government announced surface-to-air missile responsive activity. Both United States and Russian sources indicated there were no civilian casualties. However, the United Nations is unable to independently verify the details of all those reports. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is my duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general. The Charter is very clear on these issues. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I call on the members of the Security Council to unite and exercise that responsibility, and I urge all members to show restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate matters and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. As I did yesterday (see S/PV.8231), I stress the importance of preventing the situation from spiralling out of control. Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent, and the suffering it causes is horrendous. I have repeatedly expressed my deep disappointment that the Security Council has failed to agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I urge the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and fill that gap, and I will continue to engage with Member States to help to achieve that objective. A lack of accountability emboldens those who use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity, and that in turn further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons, as well as undermining the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The seriousness of the recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma requires a thorough investigation using impartial, independent and professional expertise. I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in undertaking the required investigation. The team is already in Syria. I am informed that its operations plan for visiting the site is complete and that the Mission is ready to go. I am confident it will have full access, without any restrictions or impediments to its performance of its activities. To repeat what I said yesterday, Syria represents the most serious threat to international peace and security in the world today. In Syria we see confrontations and proxy wars involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militias, foreign fighters from all over the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law in general, in utter disregard of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. They have lived 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 3/26 through a litany of horrors, atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on. At this critical juncture, I call on all States Members to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the norms against chemical weapons. If the law is ignored, it is undermined. There can be no military solution to the crisis. The solution must be political, and we must find ways to make real progress towards a genuine and credible political solution that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity and freedom, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I have asked my Special Envoy to come to New York as soon as possible to consult with me on the most effective way to accelerate the political process. The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia has called this emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the aggressive actions of the United States and its allies against Syria. This is now our fifth meeting on the subject in a week. President Putin of the Russian Federation made a special statement today. "On 14 April, the United States, with the support of its allies, launched an air strike on military and civilian infrastructure targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. An act of aggression against a sovereign State on the front lines in the fight against terrorism was committed without permission from the Security Council and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles of international law. Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria's Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent. Not a single local resident could confirm that such an attack had occurred. "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has sent experts to Syria to investigate all the circumstances. However, a group of Western countries cynically ignored this and took military action without waiting for the results of the investigation. "Russia vehemently condemns this attack on Syria, where Russian military personnel are helping the legitimate Government to combat terrorism. "The actions of the United States are making the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria even worse, inflicting suffering on civilians, for all intents and purposes enabling the terrorists who have been tormenting the Syrian people for seven years, and producing yet another wave of refugees fleeing the country and the region in general. The current escalation of the Syrian situation is having a destructive effect on the entire system of international relations. History will have the last word, and it has already revealed the heavy responsibility that Washington bears for the carnage in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya." Russia has done everything it could to persuade the United States and its allies to abandon their militaristic plans threatening a new round of violence in Syria and destabilization in the Middle East. Today, and at the Council meeting we called yesterday (see S/PV.8231), the Secretary-General expressed his concern about how events are developing. Washington, London and Paris, however, preferred to let the calls for sanity go unheard. The United States and its allies continue to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for international law, although as permanent members of the Security Council they have a special duty to uphold the provisions of the Charter. It was a disgrace to hear an article of the United States Constitution cited as justification of this aggression. We respect the right of every State to honour its own fundamental law. But it is high time that Washington learned that it is the Charter of the United Nations that governs the international code of conduct on the use of force. It will be interesting to see how the peoples of Great Britain and France react to the fact that their leaders are participating in unlawful military ventures that invoke the United States Constitution. These three countries constantly lean towards neocolonialism. They scorn the Charter and the Security Council, which they attempt, shamelessly, to use for their own unscrupulous purposes. They do no serious S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 4/26 18-10891 work in the Council. They refuse to consult with us, while falsely assuring everyone of the opposite. They are undermining the Council's authority. The alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma has been cited as the excuse for this aggression. After an inspection by our specialists, Russia's representatives stated unequivocally that no such incident took place. Moreover, people were found to have taken part in staging the incident, which was inspired and organized by foreign intelligence services. After the matter emerged, the Syrian authorities immediately invited experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to try to establish all the circumstances through a field mission to Douma. The visa formalities were dealt with quickly and security guarantees given. As the air strikes began, the specialists were already in Syria and preparing to begin their work. I would like to remind Council members and everyone else that on 10 April (see S/PV.8228), when our draft resolution (S/2018/322) on ensuring the security of the work of the OPCW's special mission was blocked, we were assured that there was no need for such a document. They said that no additional effort on the part of the Security Council was necessary to ensure that the mission could reach Douma and conduct an investigation of the chemical incident. Now, however, we can see that we were absolutely right. Yesterday, some of our colleagues — some out of naivety and others out of cynicism — told us that this situation had allegedly arisen owing to the lack of an independent investigative mechanism. The aggression today has shown, as we said, that this had nothing whatever to do with it. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mission (JIM) was in place during last year's attack on the Al-Shayrat airbase, but that did not stop the United States from launching a missile attack. After that, the JIM spent six months tailoring its conclusions to justify the strike. We have said over and over again that they do not need any investigations. They did not need them then and they do not need them now. The organizers of the aggression did not even wait for the international organization that is authorized to establish the basic facts to do so. Apparently they had established and instantly identified the perpetrators, after disseminating rumours about them through social networks with the help of the militias they sponsor and the non-governmental organizations that are their clients. This was backed up by mythical secret intelligence. Their masks — or rather the White Helmets — have come off once again. We have become accustomed to the fact that their efforts to achieve their dubious geopolitical aims, the aggressor countries deliberately blame the so-called Assad regime for every evil. There has been a trend recently to shift the blame onto Russia, which, as they tell it, has been unable to restrain Syria's so-called dictator. All of this goes according to a tried-and- true formula, whereby a provocation results in a false accusation, which results in a false verdict, which results in punishment. Is that how these people want to conduct international affairs? This is hooliganism in international relations, and not on a petty scale, given that we are talking about the actions of key nuclear Powers. Several missiles were aimed at the research centre facilities in Barzeh and Jamraya. There have been two recent OPCW inspections there with unrestricted access to their entire premises. The specialists found no trace of activities that would contravene the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria's scientific research institutions are used for strictly peaceful activities aimed at improving the efficiency of the national economy. Do they want Syria to have no national economy left at all? Do they want to kick this country — only a few years ago one of the most developed in the Middle East — back into the Stone Age? Do they want to finish whatever their sanctions have not yet accomplished? And yet they still contrive false breast-beating about the sufferings of ordinary Syrians. But they have no interest in ordinary Syrians, who are sick of war and glad about the restoration of the legitimate authorities in the liberated territories. Their aggressive actions merely worsen the humanitarian situation that they claim to care about so deeply. They could end the conflict in Syria in the space of 24 hours. All that is needed is for Washington, London and Paris to give the order to their tame terrorists to stop fighting the legitimate authorities and their own people. The attacks were aimed at Syrian military airfields that are used for operations against terrorist organizations, a highly original contribution to the fight against international terrorism, which, as Washington never tires of saying, is the sole reason for its military presence in Syria, something that we are extremely doubtful about. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that those in the West who hide 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 5/26 behind humanitarian rhetoric and try to justify their military presence in Syria based on the need to defeat the jihadists are in fact acting in concert with them to dismember the country, a design confirmed by the categorical refusal of the United States and its allies to assist in the restoration of the areas of Syria that have been liberated by Government forces. Their aggression is a powerful blow and a threat to the prospects for continuing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations, which, despite the real difficulties, is moving forward, albeit at varying speed. Why do they bother endlessly pinning all their hopes on the Geneva process when they themselves are driving it straight towards yet another crisis? We urge the United States and its allies to immediately halt their acts of aggression against Syria and refrain from them going forward. We have proposed a brief draft resolution for the Council's attention on which we request that a vote be held at the end of this meeting. We appeal to the members of the Security Council. Now is not the time to evade responsibility. The world is watching. Stand up for our principles. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today. This is the fifth Security Council meeting in the past week in which we have addressed the situation in Syria. A week has gone by in which we have talked. We have talked about the victims in Douma. We have talked about the Al-Assad regime and its patrons, Russia and Iran. We have spent a week talking about the unique horror of chemical weapons. The time for talk ended last night. We are here today because three permanent members of the Security Council acted. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in punishment and not in a symbolic show of force. We acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its crimes against humanity. We can all see that a Russian disinformation campaign is in full force this morning, but Russia's desperate attempts at deflection cannot change the facts. A large body of information indicates that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April. There is clear information demonstrating Al-Assad's culpability. The pictures of dead children were not fake news; they were the result of the Syrian regime's barbaric inhumanity. And they were the result of the regime's and Russia's failure to live up to their international commitments to remove all chemical weapons from Syria. The United States, France and the United Kingdom acted after careful evaluation of those facts. The targets we selected were at the heart of the Syrian regime's illegal chemical-weapon programme. The strikes were carefully planned to minimize civilian casualties. The responses were justified, legitimate and proportionate. The United States and its allies did everything they could to use the tools of diplomacy to get rid of Al-Assad's arsenal of chemical weapons. We did not give diplomacy just one chance. We gave it chance after chance. Six times. That is how many times Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions to address chemical weapons in Syria. Our efforts go back even further. In 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), requiring the Al-Assad regime to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. Syria committed to abiding by the Chemical Weapons Convention, meaning that it could no longer have chemical weapons on its soil. President Putin said that Russia would guarantee that Syria complied. We hoped that this diplomacy would succeed in putting an end to the horror of chemical attacks in Syria, but as we have seen from the past year, that did not happen. While Russia was busy protecting the regime, Al-Assad took notice. The regime knew that it could act with impunity, and it did. In November, Russia used its veto to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the main tool we had to figure out who used chemical weapons in Syria. Just as Russia was using its veto (see S/PV.8107), the Al-Assad regime used sarin, leading to dozens of injuries and deaths. Russia's veto was the green light for the Al-Assad regime to use these most barbaric weapons against the Syrian people, in complete violation of international law. The United States and our allies were not going to let that stand. Chemical weapons are a threat to us all. They are a unique threat — a type of weapon so evil that the international community agreed that they must be banned. We cannot stand by and let Russia trash every international norm that we stand for, and allow the use of chemical weapons to go unanswered. Just as the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons last weekend was not an isolated incident, our response is part of a new course charted last year to deter future use of chemical weapons. Our Syrian strategy has not changed. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 6/26 18-10891 However, the Syrian regime has forced us to take action based on its repeated use of chemical weapons. Since the April 2017 chemical attack at Khan Shaykhoun, the United States has imposed hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities involved in chemical-weapons use in Syria and North Korea. We have designated entities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that have facilitated chemical-weapons proliferation. We have revoked the visas of Russian intelligence officers in response to the chemical attack in Salisbury. We will continue to seek out and call out anyone who uses and anyone who aids in the use of chemical weapons. With yesterday's military action, our message was crystal clear. The United States of America will not allow the Al-Assad regime to continue to use chemical weapons. Last night, we obliterated the major research facility that it used to assemble weapons of mass murder. I spoke to the President this morning, and he said that if the Syrian regime should use this poison gas again, the United States is locked and loaded. When our President draws a red line, our President enforces the red line. The United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement. Last night, our great friends and indispensable allies shouldered a burden that benefits all of us. The civilized world owes them its thanks. In the weeks and months to come, the Security Council should take time to reflect on its role in defending the international rule of law. The Security Council has failed in its duty to hold those who use chemical weapons to account. That failure is largely due to Russian obstruction. We call on Russia to take a hard look at the company it keeps, live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Council, and defend the actual principles the United Nations was meant to promote. Last night, we successfully hit the heart of Syria's chemical weapons enterprise, and because of these actions we are confident that we have crippled Syria's chemical weapons programme. We are prepared to sustain this pressure if the Syrian regime is foolish enough to test our will. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): These are uncertain times and today we deal with exceptional circumstance. Acting with our American and French allies, in the early hours of this morning the United Kingdom conducted coordinated, targeted and precise strikes to degrade Al-Assad's chemical weapons capability and deter their future use. The British Royal Air Force launched Storm Shadow missiles at a military facility some 15 miles west of Homs, where the regime is assessed to keep chemical weapons in breach of Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A full assessment has not yet been completed, but we believe that the strikes to have been successful. Furthermore, none of the British, United States or French aircraft or missiles involved in this operation were successfully engaged by Syrian air defences, and there is also no indication that Russian air defence systems were employed. Our action was a limited, targeted and effective strike. There were clear boundaries that expressly sought to avoid escalation, and we did everything possible, including rigorous planning, before any action was undertaken to ensure that we mitigated and minimized the impact on civilians. Together, our action will significantly degrade the Syrian regime's ability to research, develop and deploy chemical weapons and deter their future use. The United Kingdom Prime Minister has said that we are clear about who is responsible for the atrocity of the use of chemical weapons. A significant body of information, including intelligence, indicates that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack we saw last Saturday. Some of the evidence that leads us to this conclusion is as follows. There are open source accounts alleging that a barrel bomb was used to deliver the chemicals. Multiple open source reports claim that a regime helicopter was observed above the city of Douma on the evening of 7 April. The opposition does not operate helicopters or use barrel bombs. And reliable intelligence indicates that Syrian military officials coordinated what appears to be the use of chlorine in Douma on 7 April. No other group could have carried out this attack. Indeed, Da'esh, for example, does not even have a presence in Douma. The Syrian regime has been killing its own people for seven years. Its use of chemical weapons, which has exacerbated the human suffering, is a serious crime of international concern as a breach of the customary international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and that amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. Any State is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 7/26 take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force for the United Kingdom is humanitarian intervention, which requires that three conditions to be met. First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief. I think that the debates in the Council and the briefings we have had from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and others have proved that. Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. I think that the vetoes have shown us that. Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim. I think we have heard both in my intervention in Ambassador Haley's how that has also been met. The history of the Syrian conflict is a litany of threats to peace and violations of international law. The Security Council has met 113 times since the Syrian war started. It was therefore not for want of international diplomatic effort that we find ourselves in this position today. After a pattern of chemical-weapons use since the outbreak of the conflict, Al-Assad defied the international community in 2013 by launching a sarin gas attack on eastern Ghouta, which left more than 800 people dead. Despite the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) and despite four years of patient engagement, Syria continues to use chemical weapons against its people and has failed to answer a long list of serious questions. The only conclusion we can reach is that Syria has not declared or destroyed all of its chemical weapons, despite its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is not assertion on our part but a matter of record, and I draw the Russian Ambassador's attention to his points about Barazan and Jimrya. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) still has unanswered questions and discrepancies. He knows this. We all know this. The Council was briefed by the OPCW Director-General. Resolution 2118 (2013) decides in the event of non-compliance to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Yet on 28 February 2017, when the United Kingdom together with France, proposed a draft resolution (S/2017/172) taking measures under Chapter VII short of the use of force, Russia vetoed (see S/PV.7893). The very least the Security Council should have been able to do was to follow up on the findings of the report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism by extending its mandate. Yet four times Russia vetoed different proposals from different Council Members to do just that. The Syrian regime and it supporters are responsible for the gravest violations of international humanitarian law in modern history. They have used indiscriminate weapons, notably barrel bombs and cluster munitions, against civilians, and they have deliberately targeted medical facilities and schools, as well as humanitarian personnel and civilian objects. They have used sieges and starvation as methods of warfare, accompanied by attacks on opposition-held civilian areas. The regime has persistently obstructed humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. Tens of thousands of people have been illegally detained, tortured and executed by the regime. This is one of the most serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime we have ever faced. A State party has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has defied the Security Council, and it has broken international law. Repeated attempts over several years to hold them to account have been met with Russian obstruction and resistance. In the Security Council, we have repeatedly attempted to overcome this obstruction without success. We are faced with a litany of violations, no sense of guilt, no sense of regret, no sense of responsibility, a shameful record, wrapped in a mix of denial, deceit and disinformation. I would invite those like the Russian Ambassador who speak about the Charter to consider the following. It is hard to believe that it is in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter to use or condone the use of chemical weapons, and in the United Kingdom's view it cannot be illegal to use force to prevent the killing of such numbers of innocent people. I will take no lessons in international law from Russia. Despite all the foregoing, we would like to look forward. The United Kingdom, together with France and the United States, will continue to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis. My French colleague will say more about our work in a few moments. We believe that it must comprise four elements. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 8/26 18-10891 First, Syria's chemical weapons programme must be ended and the chemical weapons stockpiles destroyed once and for all. Secondly, there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities and compliance with all Security Council resolutions, including those that mandate humanitarian access. Thirdly, the regime must return to the Geneva talks and agree to engage on the substantial agenda put forward by the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Fourthly and finally, there must be accountability for the use of chemical weapons and other war crimes in Syria. The Secretary-General rightly highlighted the political process. We propose that, as we members of the Security Council will all be together next weekend in the retreat with the Secretary-General very kindly hosted by Sweden, we use that opportunity to reflect on next steps and the way back to the political process. And with our allies, we stand ready to work with all members of the Security Council towards this end. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): A week after the chemical massacre in Douma and a day after last night's strikes, I want to say again straight away to those who pretend to wonder that France has no doubt whatsoever about the responsibility of the Al-Assad regime in this attack. This morning we made public a notice comprising information collected by our intelligence services. We dismiss those who try once again to challenge what is obvious and to disguise the facts before the world. For years now, Bashar Al-Assad, with the active support of his allies, has been devising a strategy of destruction designed to crush any opposition with contempt for the most basic principles of humanity and at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Syria. We saw it in Aleppo, in Homs, in eastern Ghouta. For years, the Syrian regime has used the most terrifying weapons of destruction — chemical weapons — to massacre and terrorize its civilian population. We had another demonstration of this in Douma, as we had seen before in Khan Shaykhun, Sarmin, Telemens and Qaminas, where its responsibility was clearly established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). No one can say he or she did not know. For years, the Syrian regime has systematically and repeatedly violated all its international obligations. The list of such violations is long; it is overwhelming. We all know them: violations of all international chemical-weapons obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria has been a party since 2013, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of such weapons against civilians; violations of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality; violations of successive Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and, by the same token, of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; finally, the use of chemical weapons against civilian populations constitutes a war crime within the meaning of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In August 2013, the Secretary-General even described the use of chemical weapons as a crime against humanity. In view of the repeated and proven violations by the Damascus regime of all the rules on which our security is based, France has consistently called for strong action by the international community. We have made every effort to ensure that these horrors do not remain without consequences at the United Nations and the OPCW and that they are stopped. The Security Council had undertaken by successive resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) to impose coercive measures within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the event of new violations. It has been prevented from acting in conformity with its commitments because of the vetoes systematically used by Russia. By making such systematic use of its veto in the Security Council, Russia has betrayed the commitment it made to the Council in 2013 to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal. The Security Council's blockade of the mass atrocities committed in Syria is a deadly and dangerous trap from which we must escape. When it ordered the 7 April chemical attack, the Syrian regime knew exactly to what it was exposing itself. It wanted to once again test the international community's threshold of tolerance and it found it. In the face of this attack on the principles, values and rights that are the basis of United Nations action, silence is no longer a solution. We cannot tolerate the downplaying of the use of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger to the Syrian people and to our collective security. We cannot let the deadly genie of proliferation out of its bottle. We had clearly warned Al-Assad's regime and its supporters that such a transgression would not remain without reaction. We have acted in 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 9/26 accordance with our role and responsibility. We have done so in a controlled, transparent framework, taking care to avoid any escalation with the actors present on the ground. The President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France have spoken on this subject. Some who for years have flouted the most elementary rules of international law now assert that our action is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. I would remind them that the Charter was not designed to protect criminals. Our action is fully in line with the objectives and values proclaimed from the outset by the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization's mission is "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". This action was indeed necessary in order to address the repeated violations by the Syrian regime of its obligations — obligations stemming from the law, treaties and its own commitments. Finally, our response was conceived within an proportionate framework, with precise objectives. The main research centre of the chemical weapons programme and two major production sites were hit. Through those objectives, Syria's capacity to develop, perfect and produce chemical weapons has been put out of commission. That was the only objective, and it has been achieved. My country, which knew at first hand the devastating effects of chemical weapons during the First World War, will never again allow impunity for their use. We will never stop identifying those responsible, who must be brought to justice. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we launched last January. Allow me to stress this point: last night's strikes are a necessary response to the chemical massacres in Syria. They are a response in the service of law and our political strategy to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. To be more specific, we have four imperatives on the Syrian issue that are in the immediate interest of Syrians, but also in the interest of the entire international community, as the Secretary-General reminded us, and I want to thank him for his briefing. Let me recall those four imperatives. First, the Syrian chemical-weapons programme must be dismantled in a verifiable and irreversible way. We must spare no effort to establish an international mechanism for establishing responsibility, to prevent impunity and to prevent any repeat attempts to the Syrian regime to use chemical. Secondly, terrorism must be eradicated by permanently defeating Da'esh. That is a long-standing commitment that still requires genuine effort to ensure a definitive victory. Thirdly, there must be a ceasefire throughout the Syrian territory and humanitarian access to the civilian populations, as required by Security Council resolutions. We need full and unhindered humanitarian access in order to help people in need, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, it is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys safely reach eastern Ghouta on a daily basis. Fourthly, we need a crisis-exit strategy, with a lasting political solution. We can sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis only through an inclusive political solution on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). We have been calling for that for seven years. It has never been so urgent to implement it and to relaunch genuine negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to achieving a political transition in Syria. Only that road map will allow us to finally emerge from the Syrian impasse. France is ready to tackle it, as of today, with all those who are ready to put all their efforts to that end. In that spirit, at the initiative of France and in line with President Emmanuel Macron's statement tonight, we will submit as soon as possible a draft resolution on those different aspects with our British and American partners. Today I ask Russia, first and foremost, to call on the Damascus regime to enter into a plan for a negotiated solution so that the long-lasting suffering of Syrian civilians can finally be brought to an end. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Just yesterday we were gathered in this Chamber for a meeting on the situation in Syria, during which China made clear its position on the issue of Syria, expressed profound concern about the further escalation of the tensions in Syria and made a clarion call for a political solution to the issue of Syria (see S/PV.8231). I would like to restate the following. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 10/26 18-10891 China has consistently stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes and against the use of force in international relations. We advocate respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military actions that circumvent the Security Council contravene the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations, and would hamper the settlement of the Syrian issue with new compounding factors. We urge all the parties concerned to refrain from any actions that may lead to a further escalation of the situation, to return to the framework of international law and to resolve the issue through dialogue and consultation. China believes a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation of the suspected chemical-weapons attack in Syria is necessary in order to arrive at a reliable conclusion that can withstand the test of history. Until that happens, no party must prejudge the outcome. There is no alternative to a political settlement in resolving the Syrian issue. The parties concerned in the international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator and should work together unremittingly towards a political settlement of the Syrian issue. I would like to restate that China stands ready to continue its positive and constructive role in the efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Syrian issue in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East and in the world at large. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan expresses its serious concern about the sharp escalation of the situation in Syria. We call on all parties to prevent further military escalation and take effective steps aimed at restoring confidence and establishing peace and ensuring security in the long-suffering land of Syria on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We called yesterday and the day before yesterday, and every time when we have observed increasing tensions, in this Chamber for responsible action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Who else, if not Council members, should show the world an example of compliance with the principles and provisions of the Charter? We are telling others to strictly follow international law and order, but sadly, yesterday we witnessed a different example. Whatever action taken under whatever good pretext cannot and will not justify the military use of force. Violence carried out against violence will never bring about peace and stability. Kazakhstan's position has always been, and continues to be, that military action is the last resort, to be used only in cases approved by the Security Council. There was no approval by the Council of the military strikes that took place yesterday. "Humanity hoped that the twenty-first century would herald a new era of global cooperation. This, however, may turn out to be a mirage. Our world is once again in danger and the risks cannot be underestimated. The threat is a deadly war on a global scale. Our planet is now on the edge of a new cold war that could have devastating consequences for all humankind." (S/2016/317, annex, p.2) That is an exact quote from the manifesto of my President, entitled "The World. The Twenty-First Century", of 31 March 2016. Just yesterday Secretary- General António Guterres confirmed, to our regret, that the Cold War is back with a vengeance (see S/PV.8231). Kazakhstan appeals to the parties to adhere to both the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We think that the time has come for serious talks encouraging the United States and the Russian Federation, given their standing as the co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group and their respective influence on the parties, to move actively in the direction of finding middle ground and a political settlement to the conflict in Syria. The United Nations has a vital role to play in convening those negotiations and helping the parties resolve their disputes. My delegation is also extremely concerned about recent developments and the lack of unity among Security Council members with regard to the chemical attack in Syria. From its early days of independence, through a series of practical steps, Kazakhstan has consistently promoted peace initiatives in the international arena to achieve disarmament, non-proliferation and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and strongly condemns their development, testing and use. I repeat: Kazakhstan strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 11/26 It is important to conduct a thorough, objective and impartial investigation into all aspects of the alleged chemical attack in Douma so as to enable the international community to render a fair verdict against the perpetrators, in full compliance with international law. The Government and other parties must thoroughly execute their obligations to comply with the relevant recommendations made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations by accepting designated personnel, while providing for and ensuring the security of the activities undertaken by such personnel. We would like to remind the members of the Council that Kazakhstan's principled position is not only to condemn in the strongest terms the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, in particular against the civilian population, but also to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means. President Nazarbayev stressed in his manifesto that the main tools for resolving disputes among States should be peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-inference in the domestic affairs of other States. Preventing the escalation of conflict and ending wars are the most challenging tasks; there are no other reasonable options. World leaders must treat such tasks as the highest priority on the global agenda. We must also respect the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter. We urgently need a political solution. Only a political, diplomatic approach, dialogue and confidence-building measures in the spirit of the Charter and Security Council documents on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace can bring about proper results. We therefore call upon the international community to show political will to overcome differences and resume negotiations, in the belief that only a United Nations-led political transition in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) can end the Syrian conflict, which, in turn, can advance only if the Council is united. There is great need to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further the Geneva negotiations in order to see positive results. All parties at the international, regional and Syrian levels should support an immediate ceasefire and seriously and objectively move forward without any preconditions within the framework of the International Syria Support Group, under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Geneva. We believe that the Syrian people are capable of determining their own future. However, achieving their aspirations for democracy, reconstruction and stability is impossible without genuine international support to contain the negative impact of spoilers and to help Syrians combat terrorism and build their State on a firm and stable foundation. Kazakhstan has always stood for dialogue and the resolution of international conflicts. All parties must ensure that the situation does not further deteriorate. Military means will not work; only political solutions will succeed. My President warned that there will be no winners in any modern war, as everyone will be on the losing side. He proposed to work towards the total elimination of war and a world without conflict. Finally, we again call upon all relevant parties to persist in diplomatic efforts, seek political solutions, engage in dialogue and support the United Nations as the main mediation channel. Kazakhstan is ready to work with all colleagues to preserve peace and security on the basis of mutual understanding, goodwill and determination to make the world a safer place. Mr. Radomski (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Poland views the recent events in the context of repeated chemical-weapons attacks against Syria's civilian population as a consequence of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators so far. The lack of an appropriate response encourages a greater number of attacks with the use of weapons that are both banned under international law and blatantly inhumane. In such circumstances the international community cannot remain passive. It should take all the necessary measures to prevent such attacks from being repeated in the future, in particular against a defenceless civilian population. At the same time, the competent international bodies should take decisions that will enable the perpetrators to be identified and brought to justice. We fully understand the reasons behind the action taken last night by the United States, the United Kingdom and France against Syrian chemical-weapons capabilities. We support that action, as it is intended to deter chemical-weapons attacks against the people of Syria. Let me underline that it is the primary responsibility of the Security Council to set up an S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 12/26 18-10891 investigative mechanism to examine the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that context, we reiterate our disappointment with the politically motivated Russian veto on the proposal for establishing an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Poland will continue its international efforts aimed at the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The use of such weapons is unacceptable and should be prosecuted vigorously in every instance and location in which they are used. Poland calls for refraining from actions that could escalate the situation. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank you, Sir, for convening today's important meeting. I also thank the Secretary- General for his briefing. The conflict in Syria is now in its eighth year. That is longer than the Second World War. President Al-Assad is responsible for one of the worst and most enduring humanitarian disasters of our time. From the beginning of the crisis, we have witnessed terrible violations and violence and a flagrant lack of respect for international law, in particular by Syrian Government forces. We must also never forget the atrocities committed by Da'esh. As the Secretary-General stated yesterday, we have witnessed "systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law tout court — in utter disregard for the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter". Indeed, there are numerous and flagrant violations of Security Council resolutions, international protocols and conventions Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in Syria. The Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that the Syrian authorities were responsible for four chemical-weapons attacks, and Da'esh for two. The use of such weapons is abhorrent, intolerable, a war crime and a crime against humanity. That is why, as has been noted here before, the international community banned their use in the international armed conflict more than a century ago. Subsequent developments have confirmed the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as a norm of customary international law. We will spare no effort to end the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable; there can be no further impunity. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to act in response to threats to international peace and security. It is our joint responsibility to uphold the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. It is our common legal and moral duty to defend the non-proliferation regimes that we have established and confirmed. That is best done through true multilateralism and broad international consensus. In that regard, we welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon's Fact-finding Mission to Syria and we look forward to its findings. It is regrettable that the Council was unable to come together and agree on a timely, clear and unified response to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria. We regret that Russia, again this week, blocked the Council from setting up a truly impartial and independent attribution mechanism. That has contributed to the situation in which we find ourselves now. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Deterrence and prevention of their use is the concern of the entire international community. We therefore share the rage and anger and are appalled by the repeated use of such weapons in Syria. It is necessary to rid Syria of chemical weapons once and for all, and hold those responsible accountable. At the same time, as the Secretary-General said in his statement yesterday, there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and international law in general. We are at a dangerous moment. We call for restraint and for avoiding any acts that could escalate, or further fuel, tensions. We need to avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond are exhausted. We worked tirelessly so that no stone was left unturned in efforts to find a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibility in accordance with the Charter. We have shared a proposal with Council members to achieve that objective by inviting the Secretary-General to come back to the Council with a proposal. In order to be successful, diplomacy needs to be backed by clear demands. The Secretary-General called on the Council to take action, but regrettably the Council could not unite. It was indeed a missed opportunity, but we stand ready to continue those efforts. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 13/26 In the light of all that has now happened, it is more critical than ever to avoid an escalation and revert to the track of diplomacy for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015). We reiterate our total support for the United Nations-led political process, which urgently needs to be reinvigorated, as well as the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) for the cessation of hostilities. Humanitarian access can wait no longer. A sustainable political solution is the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian people. Let us all then rally around that objective. Let us redouble our efforts and put an end to the long, brutal and meaningless conflict once and for all. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): I would like to begin by thanking the Secretary-General for his briefing today. Both yesterday and today, he spoke of the litany horrors that the Syrian population has experienced in the past seven years, of which the chemical-weapons attacks are among the most gruesome. The world hardly needs reminding of the unspeakable suffering that countless Syrian men, women and children have endured. It is a suffering that comes at the hands of Al-Assad and his allies. The Syrian regime has left the world no doubt as to its willingness to unleash terror on its own population. The repeated use of chemical weapons counts as the most cynical expression of that campaign. Just a week ago, the world was yet again confronted with reports of chemical-weapons use — that time in Douma. All the while, the Russian Federation has made clear to the world its readiness to stand by Al-Assad every step of the way. It has blocked draft resolutions in the Council that could have stopped the violence. I call upon all members of the Security Council to support a collective, meaningful response to the use of chemical weapons. But even if the Council fails to act, it should be clear to the world that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Against the background of past horrors and the unabated risk of recurrence, the response by France, the United Kingdom and the United States is understandable. The response was measured in targeting a limited number of military facilities that were used by the Syrian regime in the context of its illegal chemical-weapons arsenal. The action taken by those three countries made clear that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. Last night's response was aimed at reducing the capabilities to execute future chemical attacks. But do not let the Syrian regime and the Russian Federation think for a moment that we will waver in our pursuit of full accountability for the perpetrators of past chemical attacks. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism, so that the culprits of those heinous attacks can be identified and held accountable. We call on the Russian Federation to stop opposing that. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. The Kingdom of the Netherlands strongly believes that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Impunity cannot, and will not, prevail. However, should the Council continue to suffer from the paralysis inflicted by a single permanent member, we must not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the top of the United Nations Organization, and we have a powerful General Assembly. Both have to consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes every option to establish an independent and impartial mechanism, whether within the framework of the United Nations framework or of other relevant international organizations, as long as it results in a mechanism that can establish who is responsible, so that the perpetrators can subsequently be held to account. Any new mechanism should build upon the important work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the ongoing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission. It is therefore crucial that the Mission have complete and unhindered access to all information and sites it deems necessary to conduct its investigations with regard to the attack with chemical weapons in Douma last weekend. The international norms against the use of chemical weapons must be respected, and the Syrian people must be relieved from the violence, hardship and injustice that has haunted them for so long. To that end, we call for a political solution and an immediate cessation of violence, as agreed upon earlier by the Council, as well as full, unhindered and immediate humanitarian access. We reiterate our determination to achieve justice for the victims. The need to collectively stand up for the fate of the Syrian people is now more apparent than ever. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and participation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 14/26 18-10891 in this meeting. Bolivia would also like to thank the Russian Federation for its initiative in convening this emergency meeting of the Security Council. Today is a dark day in the history of the Council. Three permanent members have made the decision, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to take unilateral action against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State Member of the Organization. Bolivia would like to clearly and categorically express its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical substances as weapons, as it is unjustifiable and criminal wherever and whenever it happens, by whomever, given it constitutes a serious crime against international law and international peace and security. Those responsible for committing such terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Bolivia continues to demand a transparent and impartial investigation to determine who the culprits are. Aside from that topic, the purpose of this meeting is linked to the fact that, as I stated, three permanent members of the Council have used force in breach of the Charter. It is impossible to combat the alleged violation of international law by violating international law. Bolivia is surprised by the fact that, given that, they have a greater a greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the permanent Council members bypass the United Nations when it suits them. They advocate for multilateralism as long as it serves their purposes and then simply discard it. When multilateralism is no longer in their interest, it no longer concerns them. This is not the only case in which, sadly, unilateral action has been used. We recall, and will not tire in recalling, such use in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011. Any such action must be authorized by the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations. All unilateral actions run counter to international law, as well as to the values and principles of the Charter. Bolivia rejects the use and the threat of the use of force. Unilateral actions not only respond to the specific interests of those who carry them out, but are also measures that are — allow me to use the word — imperialist. It so happens that the empires that we mentioned earlier consider themselves morally superior to the rest of the world. They consider themselves exceptional and indispensable, and therefore believe that they are above the law and international law, but in reality the interest of those who unilaterally use force and violate the Charter is not to advance democracy or freedom or to combat the use of chemical weapons. Their goal is to expand their power and domination. What we have witnessed over the past few hours is an attack on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which has not begun the work that was scheduled to begin today. A unilateral attack is an attack on multilateral organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is an attack on the Council and its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It is an attack on the Charter, and it is an attack on the entire international community. I wonder, with regard to the permanent members that used force just a few hours ago, how much money have they invested in arming and training the armed groups in Syria? What natural resources are they after? With what moral authority will they be able invoke the Charter in the future? Sadly, the history of violating the purposes and principles of the Charter is a long one. We mentioned Libya and Iraq, which were recent cases. The unilateral decision concerning Jerusalem also sent another absolutely clear signal of the lack of respect for international law. Who are the ones selling weapons to those who are bombing civilians in Yemen? Who are the ones who rejected the Paris Agreement on climate change? Who are the ones who stepped away from the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration? Who are the ones who build walls? We nevertheless believe that it is also important to talk about history over the long term. Above all, we have been experiencing the consequences of the havoc wreaked by some of the colonialist Powers and of their disdain for international law in the Middle East that dates back over 100 years. We are currently reliving the same scenario in Syria, characterized by total disregard for international law. To a certain extent, we relived it, for example, when the United Kingdom refused to return the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands to Argentina or when the Chagos Archipelago issue was not resolved. I hope that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning that matter will be respected. In other words, we are talking about a whole range of policies that are detrimental to international peace and security. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 15/26 The Permanent Representative of the United States said that the United States, her country, has its finger on the trigger — "locked and loaded". Of course, we clearly heard her words with a great deal of concern and sadness. We know that the United States has aircraft carriers, satellites, smart bombs and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and we also know that it has nothing but scorn for international law. But we have this — we have the purposes and principles of the Charter, and ultimately, as history has shown time and again, those principles will prevail. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing at the beginning of this meeting. The State of Kuwait believes in and is committed to the Charter and principles of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whereby it can act on behalf of Member States to carry out that mandate. Article 25 stipulates that the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. What we have witnessed in the Syrian crisis is an impasse concerning the international community's efforts and the flagrant violation of its resolutions. We have followed very closely and with great concern the dangerous developments in Syria relating to recent military operations in response to the use by the Syrian authorities of chemical weapons prohibited by international law. We underscore that those developments are the result of the impasse in the international community's efforts embodied by the Security Council to reach a political settlement to the bloody conflict in Syria, which has gone on for more than seven years. It has led to hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Syrians and resulted in the major destruction of civilian infrastructure in several cities. The chemical weapons issue long enjoyed a unified approach in the Council, which condemned the use of all chemical weapons in Syria regardless of who uses such weapons. Moreover, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013) unanimously, imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in case of the non-compliance of various parties with its provisions or the continued use in Syria of chemical weapons, which, as we have said, are internationally banned weapons. In order to ensure the implementation of that resolution, in August 2015 the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine those responsible for any crime involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In fact, the Mechanism identified the perpetrators of such crimes on several incidents. The unfortunate divide in the positions of the Council encouraged the parties to the crisis to continue their violations of resolutions of international legitimacy, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions. The most recent resolution 2401 (2018), adopted unanimously, is another example of resolutions being violated. It calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to allow for humanitarian access to the besieged areas. Unfortunately, that humanitarian resolution was not implemented, as we know. The State of Kuwait regrets this escalation and calls on members to overcome their differences within the Security Council and to restore the unity of the Council so that it can shoulder its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We also call on members to bridge the existing gap by establishing a new, independent, impartial and professional mechanism to investigate the use of any chemical weapons in Syria and to determine who is accountable for such crimes. We reiterate our full readiness to participate in any effort aimed at achieving a compromise among the positions of members of the Council so as to ensure that those who are responsible for these crimes will be held accountable and punished, and to preserve the non-proliferation regime. It is certain that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis. Intensive efforts must be made to spare the Syrian people further suffering. We reiterate our principled and firm position regarding the Syrian crisis, which is in line with the position of the League of Arab States calling for the preservation of the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria; putting an end to acts of violence and the killing; avoiding bloodshed; saving Syrian lives; and reaching a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the United Nations on the basis of the 2012 Geneva First Communique, and resolution 2254 (2015), through a process of political transition S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 16/26 18-10891 with the involvement of all Syrian parties so that the Syrian people can achieve their legitimate aspirations. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I would like to thank the Peruvian presidency for responding quickly to the request for the holding of this meeting, and we would like to express our appreciation to Russia for making the request. It would have been a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the Council if it had failed to meet in the light of what transpired yesterday. We also thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his presence today. For those of us who are elected members of the Security Council, the responsibility is indeed extremely heavy, to the point of being unbearable. Let us not forget that we are here representing 193 countries, to which, like permanent members, we have made solemn promises that are generally encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations. For those of us who are members of the African Union, an organization that for obvious historical reasons attaches huge importance to scrupulous adherence to the principles of the Charter, the obligation that we have to tell the truth and to stand up and be counted for peace is also enormously heavy — all the more so when the parties involved, from our own national perspective, are friends. It was only yesterday that the Secretary-General urged Member States to act responsibility in these dangerous circumstances and stressed the need to avoid the serious situation from spiralling out of control (see S/PV.8231); indeed, he repeated the same sentiment today. We have also been repeatedly expressing our concern that the dynamic in Syria could lead to devastating consequences not only nationally, but regionally and internationally. No doubt, the strike undertaken by the three countries yesterday appears not to have led to the situation spiralling out of control. We do not take that lightly, even though it might be difficult to be consoled by that fact in the light of the potential danger we still face. That is why we call for maximum restraint, the exercise of wisdom and a quick return to dialogue among the major powers that have enormous influence on the current situation in Syria. As we stressed yesterday and previously, it is absolutely vital to resume the path of diplomacy. The alternative is without a doubt catastrophic beyond our imagination. We hope that no one wants to see that happen, but it could if we do not act together with a huge sense of urgency to defuse the current tension and reduce further military escalation. By no means do we overlook the genesis of this tragedy we are facing. It has to do with the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma. At least, that is what ratcheted up the tension, leading to what took place yesterday, which is difficult to defend as being consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. But there is also one point that makes it difficult for us to understand what took place yesterday. The Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is arriving, or, as just said by the Secretary-General, has already arrived in Syria to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons, which is the cause of all this tension. In the light of that, you must excuse us, Mr. President, if we were a little perplexed. While the priority of the time is clearly to avert the further escalation of the latest development, we are not underestimating the importance of ensuring accountability for any confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should be allowed to conduct a thorough investigation to establish the facts related to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma. The sustainable way to end impunity, which we believe is extremely important, to deter and stop the use of chemicals as weapons is through united and concerted action, including through an attribution mechanism that the Council could and must set up. That has become all the more critical now, when, as we all know, truth is becoming very difficult to establish. An opportunity has been created for parties and even individuals to claim the veracity of their own facts. We know that we are all disappointed by the current deadlock, but that should not justify overlooking the obligation to adhere to the principles of the Charter. Let me conclude by referring to what the Secretary-General said yesterday. I wanted to refer to it again because it reflects the truth and is, therefore, worth repeating: "[T]he Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present." (S/PV.8231, p. 2) That is why we must appeal to the members of the Security Council, especially the Permanent Five, to help create a situation where diplomacy would have the upper hand and the primacy of politics will be our guide for coming out of what is a troubled moment in our 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 17/26 recent history. The Geneva process and Special Envoy de Mistura need the unqualified support of the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his statement, which clearly illustrates the perspective of the United Nations on this issue. What took place last night was clearly not a surprise to any member of the Security Council. It remained to establish only the day and the time. In fact, as we said in our statement yesterday (see S/PV.8232), we are concerned about the rhetoric that we are hearing and where it will lead us. It has now led us to where we feared and did not want to go — military attacks against Syria. Yesterday in this Chamber, Secretary-General António Guterres spoke about the memory of the Cold War, which in fact returned with a vengeance in the early hours of the morning, reminding the peoples of the world of the conflict of interests that still exists between two blocs. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has followed with great concern the reports on the attacks carried out by the United States, with the support of the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom. According to estimates, the coalition fired more than 100 cruise missiles and air-to-ground missiles from two United States naval ships stationed in the Red Sea, as well as from tactical warplanes that overflew the Mediterranean and B-1B bombers from another area. The coalition launched a coordinated attack on three targets, which included a scientific research centre in an area of Damascus, a facility to the west of Homs and a command post near that facility. While surgical and very selective, last night's strikes are a violation of Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles and norms of international law. It is important to recall that, according to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members of the Council must therefore refrain from creating situations of insecurity and instability. The Security Council should not highlight or disregard the fact that those strikes may have unpredictable and potentially tragic consequences for the Middle East by encouraging or justifying the development of nuclear programmes in order to prevent any further aggression. Experts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are already in Douma to carry out investigations. Until we have reliable and irrefutable proof of the alleged chemical attack in Douma last week, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is of the view that no aggression can be justified. Our delegation also reiterates that, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, in the case of any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it is imperative to seek a solution first and foremost through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means. History continues to show us that military interventions never resolves conflicts but, instead, cause them to proliferate and to continue, causing devastation and destruction. We must ensure that that does not happen again in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic. We again point out that the military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its consequences today should be a clear lesson to the international community. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea opposes the use of force in international relations. We accept its use only when it is in line with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. As we have already said, in the case of Syria, it would not bring about any substantial change in the overall situation in the country. We reiterate that political agreement is the only viable way to find a lasting solution to the Syrian problem. All the parties involved must resolve their differences through dialogue, agreement and consultation. That process requires the support of the international community. The failure of diplomacy only exacerbates the suffering of the Syrian people and is the highest expression of the Security Council's failure. Equatorial Guinea continues to believe that, in order to fully clarify the 7 April events in Douma, a thorough, impartial and objective investigation must be carried out in order to reach a reliable conclusion. We urge the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to promptly carry out an investigation and to report to the Security Council on its conclusions as soon as possible. We also again reiterate the urgent need to establish, under the auspices of the Secretary- General, a professional, independent and transparent investigative body to attribute responsibility for and identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons so that those responsible, whoever they are, are brought to international justice. Only in that way can that thorny issue achieve consensus and unity among the members of the Security Council. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 18/26 18-10891 I conclude my statement by reiterating the unequivocal position of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, which is that we wholeheartedly condemned the use of chemical weapons by whomever. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Cote d'Ivoire would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and for his briefing on the latest developments in Syria following the air strikes carried out by certain members of the Security Council during the night of Friday, 13 April. Côte d'Ivoire requests all the actors involved in the Syrian conflict at the various levels to show restraint and not to further complicate the disastrous situation in which the Syrian people find themselves. Weapons and bombs have struck Syria too often in disregard for our collective action towards peace. Is it necessary to recall that, by signing the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the founding Members sought to establish a new world order based on multilateralism and its resolve to make peace a universal common good, the maintenance of which was entrusted to the United Nations and the Security Council as its primary responsibility? The Secretary- General has just reminded us of that. In every situation in which the Charter of the United Nations has guided the action of the international community, respect for its principles has always enabled us to overcome the most inextricable challenges, thereby preventing many disasters for humanity. Based on its strong conviction in the virtues of multilateralism, my country therefore believes that resorting to force in order to maintain international peace and security must be authorized by the Security Council in order to preserve its essential legal authority and to thereby prevent any deviation or abuse. Only a Security Council that is strong and representative of our time will be able to mobilize all Member States of the United Nations in support of its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Côte d'Ivoire would therefore like to express its deep concern over the inability of the Council to relaunch the dialogue in Syria and to sideline the supporters of a military solution. Côte d'Ivoire would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, no matter who is responsible, and we call for the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to attribute responsibility and to bring those responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice in the appropriate international tribunals. In that context, my delegation reiterates its support for the investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to shed light on the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma in eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire once again urges the members of the Security Council to unite with a view to putting an end to their differences and to effect the establishment of this mechanism to establish responsibility, which all the members of the Council would like to see set up. Côte d'Ivoire would like to reassert its conviction and its position of principle that the response to the crisis in Syria cannot be a military response. Quite to the contrary; it must be sought in the framework of dialogue and an inclusive political process, as envisioned in the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015). The time has come to decisively give every opportunity for dialogue a chance and to make sure that the Council is in step with history. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. Peru notes with great concern the developments in Syria. In the face of military action, as a response to information on the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population in the country, we reiterate the need to keep the situation from spiralling out of control and causing a greater threat to stability in the region and to international peace and security. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons as an atrocity crime. For that reason, we have supported the urgent deployment to Syria of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, as well as the establishment of a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial attribution mechanism. We regret the stalemate in the Security Council and our inability to take a decision on the issue. In that regard, Peru encourages the Secretary-General to redouble his efforts in accordance with the prerogatives entrusted to him in the Charter of the United Nations with a view to helping to resolve the stalemate in the Council and to establish the attribution mechanism. Peru believes that any response to the crimes committed in Syria, as well as a solution to the conflict in Syria overall, must be consistent with the Charter, with international law and with the Council's resolutions. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 19/26 As the Secretary-General has reminded us, the Council is the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is up to its members to act in unity and to uphold that responsibility. Peru joins the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to all Member States to act with restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation reaffirms its commitment to continue working in order to achieve sustainable peace in Syria, to guarantee protection for the civilian population, to ensure that there is no impunity for atrocious crimes, as well as to help defuse the situation. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I should like to respond to the remarks made by the Ambassador of Bolivia about the United Kingdom. We have no doubt about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and surrounding maritime areas. Successive British Governments have made clear that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islanders voted overwhelmingly to maintain their current constitutional arrangements with the United Kingdom. Turning to the Chagos archipelago, the United Kingdom is participating in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice, even as we disagree with jurisdiction in that case. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I will be very brief and limit myself to reading out what it says in the special declaration on the question of the Malvinas Islands, signed by all the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Heads of State and Government: "Reiterate their strongest support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and the permanent interest of the countries of the region in the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland resuming negotiations in order to find — as soon as possible — a peaceful and definitive solution to such dispute, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations .". That would include in particular General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I welcome the presence of the Secretary- General at this very important moment in the history and the work of the Security Council. In his important statement yesterday, the Secretary-General warned that the Cold War had returned (see S/PV.8231). That is exactly right. We all agree with the relevance of this remark. I take this opportunity to recall those who relaunched the logic of the Cold War. Of course, we all remember, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, that a number of philosophical books were published here in this country, including The End of History and the Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama. Another author, American thinker Samuel Huntington, wrote an essay entitled The Clash of Civilizations. Those two works marked the return of the Cold War logic. Indeed, the message of those two books was as follows: To the people of the world, you must take the American approach and surrender to the American will or we will attack you. "My way or the highway", as the American saying goes. That marked the return of the Cold War philosophy. Lies serve no purpose. They serve the person who lies once and only once. Lies deceive only once. When a lie is repeated it becomes exposed and exposes the person who is lying. My colleague the Ambassador of France announced that the aggression of his country, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, was carried out on behalf of the international community. If that is the case, I wonder which international community my colleague the French Ambassador is speaking of. Is he speaking of a real international community that S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 20/26 18-10891 actually exists? Has the international community that he represents authorized this tripartite aggression against my country? Did their Governments obtain a mandate from this international community to attack my country? My American, French and British colleagues claimed that they have bombarded centres for the production of chemical weapons in Syria. If the Governments of these three countries knew the actual location of these production centres that they claim to have bombarded, why did they not share that information with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? Why did they not share this information with the Fact-finding Mission in Damascus before attacking my country? It is just a question I am putting to the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like to assure Council members that the OPCW investigation team arrived today at noon. Obviously, the team was delayed for a full day getting from Beirut to Damascus before the attack, for reasons that we do not know, as though the team was asked not to go to Damascus until after the bombing took place. But the team did reach Damascus today at noon and will hold a meeting in two hours, at 7 p.m., Damascus time, with the local authorities. My Government will, of course, provide every support to the team so that it may carry out its mission successfully. The facility of the Barzah Research and Development Centre, the building that was targeted by the tripartite aggression, was visited twice last year by experts from the OPCW. They inspected it, after which they gave us an official document stating that Syria had complied with its obligations under the OPCW and that no chemical activities had taken place in the inspected building. If the OPCW experts gave us an official document confirming that the Barzah Centre was not used for any type of chemical activity in contravention to our obligations with respect to the OPCW, how do Council members reconcile that with what we have heard this morning? How do they reconcile that with all the accusations and claims that the aggression targeted a chemical-weapons production centre? My American colleague said that the time for discussion is over — that it was over yesterday (see S/PV.8231). If that is so, then what are we doing today as diplomats an ambassadors at the Security Council? Our mission here is to speak, to explain what happened, to shed light on all the issues. We are not here in the Security Council simply to justify an aggression. How can we state that the discussion is over? No, the discussion is continuing in this Chamber, if the idea is to put an end to aggressions or to implement the provisions of the Charter and international law. That is why we are here. My British and French colleagues spoke of a plan of action and have invited the Secretary-General to implement it before the Council and the Syrian Government have agreed to it. Their plan of action is in fact a very strange one. But I would like to present on behalf of my Government a counter plan of action, which, I assume, should have been presented today. First, we should read the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and define and recall the responsibilities of the three States in maintaining international peace and security, rather than threatening it. I happen to have three versions of the Charter, two in English and one in French. Perhaps these three States should read what the Charter actually states. Secondly, these three States must immediately stop supporting the armed terrorist groups that are active in my country. Thirdly, they should put an end to the lies and fabrications being used to justify their aggression against my country. Fourthly, these three States should realize that, after seven years of a terrorist war that was imposed on my country, Syria, a war carried out by these three countries and their agents in the region, their missiles, airplanes and bombs will not weaken our determination to defeat and destroy their terrorists. This will not prevent the Syrian people from deciding their own political future without foreign intervention. I will repeat this for the thousandth time — the Syrian people will not allow any foreign intervention to define our future. I promised yesterday that we will not remain inactive in the face of any aggression, and we have kept our promise. I will explain how we have kept our promise. Allow me now to address those States that remain committed to international law. I would tell them that the Syrian Arab Republic and its many friends and allies are perfectly capable of dealing with the brutal aggression that my country has had to face. But what we are asking the diplomats and ambassadors today who are committed to international legitimacy and the Charter to call on the United States, Britain and France to read the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular those pertaining to respect for 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 21/26 the sovereignty of States and to the non-use of force in international relations. Perhaps the Governments of these three countries will realize, if only once, that their role in the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security rather than to undermine it. As I just said, I have three copies of the Charter, and I would ask the Council's secretariat to distribute them to the three delegations so that they might enlighten or awaken themselves from their ignorance and their tyranny. In flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States, Britain and France, at 3:55 a.m. on Saturday, 14 April, Damascus time, attacked the Syrian Arab Republic by launching some 110 missiles against Damascus and other Syrian cities and areas. In response to this terrible aggression, the Syrian Arab Republic has exercised its legitimate right in line with Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself, and we have defended ourselves against this evil attack. Syrian air defences were able to intercept a number of rockets launched by the tripartite aggression, while some of them reached the Barzah Centre in — not outside — the capital Damascus. The Centre in that location that includes laboratories and classrooms. Fortunately, the damage was only material. Some of those modern, charming and smart rockets were intercepted, while others targeted a military site near Homs, wounding three civilians. The Governments of these three States prepared for this evil attack by issuing aggressive statements through their senior officials, saying that their only excuse for preventing the advance of the Syrian Arab Army against armed groups was these allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Indeed, in a race against time, the armed terrorist groups did receive instructions from those aggressors to fabricate this charade of the use of chemical weapons in Douma. They found false witnesses and manipulated the alleged crime scene as they did before, which served as the pretext for this scandalous aggression. This can only be explained by the fact that the original aggressors — the United States of America, Britain and France — decided to interfere directly in order to avenge the defeat of their proxies in Ghouta. In fact, those who fabricated the charade of the chemical attack in Ghouta were arrested and admitted on television that it was a fabricated attack. We have a video of that if the presidency wishes to see it. I would like to draw the attention of those who align themselves with the Charter of the United Nations and international legitimacy to the fact that this evil aggression sends another message from those three aggressors to the terrorist groups that they can continue using chemical weapons in the future and committing their terrorist crimes, not against Syrian civilians only but in other countries. There is no doubt about that. In 146 letters we have drawn the Council's attention to the plans of the terrorist groups to use chemical weapons in Syria. There are 146 letters that have been sent to the Council and the Secretariat. Today, some Council members are suddenly reinventing the wheel. The Council knows that this aggression took place just as a fact-finding team from the OPCW was supposed to arrive in Syria at the request of the Syrian Government to examine the allegations of a chemical attack in Douma. Obviously, the main message that these aggressors are sending to the Council and to the world is that they are not actually interested in the Council's mandate and that they do not want a transparent and independent investigation. They are trying to undermine the work of the investigative mission and anticipating the results. They are trying to put pressure on that mission to conceal their lies and fabrications, just as happened six years ago, in 2013, when Mr. Sellström went to Khan Al-Assal from Damascus, as I have explained in a previous statement to the Council. This morning's attack was not just an attack on Syria, as my dear friend, the representative of Bolivia said; rather, it was an attack against the Charter, the Council, international law and 193 members of this Organization. The attempt by Washington, D.C., London and Paris to ensure the failure of the United Nations working groups and fact-finding missions is systematic. While those three States boast of their support for these bodies, behind the closed doors of the Organization they pressure and blackmail them not to carry out the mandates for which they were established. We recall what took place with the investigative missions in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia and Africa. No investigative mission can be successful if it is subjected to political blackmailing. It cannot succeed. Of the three aggressors, I say they are liars. They are compulsive liars. They are hypocrites. They are attempting to ensure the failure of any action of the Organization that does not serve their interests. Ever since the Organization was established, they have tried to undermine the efforts of international investigative bodies. They have tried to exploit them. I need only mention Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Africa. The aggressors exhausted the Council agendas for decades S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 22/26 18-10891 with their attempts to divert its attention from its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. They used the Council to pursue their aggressive policy of interference and colonialism. Yesterday, in the press of the United States and of the West, the main theme was lying in the context of a campaign that was claiming success, but they know it was a lie. While these three Governments were launching their evil aggression against my country, Syria, and while my country's air defence system was countering the attacks with a great deal of bravery — one hundred missiles were destroyed and did not reach their target — the American Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff were before the American and international press in an outrageous surrealist scenario. They were not actually able to answer objective questions. Millions of television viewers must have pitied those two men because they were like dunces, repeating phrases without any meaning, and were unable to respond to the legitimate questions of a journalist about their attempts to target chemical weapons facilities and the danger that posed to civilians if the alleged chemical weapons were to spread. They did not respond. They were also unable to respond to a journalist who asked the Secretary of Defense, "You said yesterday that you had no proof that the Syrian Government was responsible for the attack in Douma. What happened in the past few hours? What made you change your mind?" His answer was that he received confirmation from intelligence services. The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms this tripartite attack, which once again shows undeniably that those three countries pay no heed to international legitimacy, even though they repeatedly say they do. Those countries have revealed their belief in the law of the jungle and the law of the most powerful even as they are permanent members of the Security Council, an organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security and with stopping any aggression, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Syrian Arab Republic is disgusted by the scandalous position of the rulers in Sheikhdom of Qatar, who supported this Western colonial tripartite aggression by allowing planes to take off from the American Al Udeid air base in Qatar. It is not surprising that the little boys of the Sheikhdom of Qatar took that position. They have supported terrorist gangs, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others, in a variety of ways in order to destabilize Arab countries, including Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic is asking the international community, if it exists — we have heard a new definition of the international community today — and the Security Council to firmly condemn this aggression, which will exacerbate the tensions in the region and which is a threat to international peace and security throughout the world. I call upon those who are committed to international legitimacy to imagine with me the meeting in which the United States National Security Council decided to carry out this attack. I cannot help wondering what was said. "We have no legal basis for attacking Syria. We have no proof that a toxic chemical weapons attack took place in Douma, but let us set that aside. We did not need international legitimacy or any legal argument to conduct military interventions in the past." I am just imagining the discussion that might have taken place among them yesterday. "This military action is necessary for us and for our allies in order to distract public attention in our countries from the scandals involving our own political elite and ensure that the corrupt system in some Gulf States pays the price of such aggression. Most important is how to protect the terrorism that we have sponsored in Syria for years." The President (spoke in Spanish): Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/355, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation Against: Côte d'Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 23/26 Abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 3 votes in favour, 8 against and 4 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements after the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We voted against the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/355) because we believe that its language was unbalanced. It was not comprehensive and failed to address all of our concerns about the current situation. At the same time, we agree with the Secretary-General that actions must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in general. In our national statement delivered earlier today, we explained our view on the current situation in Syria and condemned the use of chemical weapons and the many other flagrant violations of international law in Syria. We also underscore the importance of a sustainable political solution. As members of the Security Council, we reiterate that we must unite and exercise our responsibility with regard to the situation in Syria. If there is any encouragement today, it is that it appears that everyone around the table insists on a sustainable political solution as the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian population. We therefore reiterate our full support for the United Nations political process, which must now be urgently reinvigorated, including through strong support for the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to explain why we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution proposed by Russia (S/2018/355). We abstained not because the text does not contain a great deal of truth — indeed it does — or because it does not adhere to principles to which we should all adhere; it does. We abstained on the grounds of pragmatism. We know that even if it had received nine votes, it would have been vetoed. Therefore it would have had only symbolic value. Nonetheless, that is not unimportant. However, for us, it is critical to defuse tensions and prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. We would like to play a constructive role in that regard. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan abstained in the voting today on draft resolution S/2018/355 because we believe that all disputes among States should be resolved through peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security. As I mentioned in my statement earlier today, we call for all parties to refrain from actions that could aggravate tensions and cause the situation to spiral out of control. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Our abstention reflects the frustration of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea with regard to the failure to adopt a resolution to establish an attribution and accountability mechanism to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. We reiterate our call for a consensus-based resolution that would establish that mechanism and prevent a repeat of the action we witnessed yesterday. In that regard, we recall that the Swedish initiative was endorsed by the 10 elected members of the Council. We could introduce the required changes into the draft resolution to enable its adoption by consensus, which would allow the mechanism to be established under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): The draft resolution submitted by Russia (S/2018/355) has just been categorically rejected. The result of the voting sends a clear message that the members of the Council understand the circumstances, reason for and objectives of the military action taken yesterday. The Council understands why such action, which has been acknowledged as proportional and targeted, was required. No one has refuted the fact that the use of chemical weapons cannot be tolerated and must be deterred. That is the key point. It is important that we now look towards the future. As I have just said, the air strikes were necessary and served to uphold international law and our political strategy to end the tragic situation in Syria. It is for that reason that, together with our American and British partners, France will work with all members of the Security Council to submit a draft resolution on the political, chemical and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict with a view to devising a lasting political solution to the conflict. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands voted against the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 24/26 18-10891 (S/2018/355) because the text does not provide for the urgent action that the Security Council must take in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It ignores the very essence of the action that must be taken by the Council. It should condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria, protect its people and hold accountable those responsible. Today's draft resolution does none of the above. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): Kuwait voted against draft resolution S/2018/355. At the time when the State of Kuwait reiterates its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use of force as a means to settle disputes and requires them to be settled by peaceful means, yesterday's use of force was the result of efforts to disrupt the will of the international community, specifically by hindering the Security Council in its determination to take measures at its disposal to end the ongoing use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons in Syria. That is a flagrant violation of resolution 2118 (2013), which unequivocally expresses the Security Council's intention to act under Chapter VII of the Charter when one party or several parties fail to comply with its provisions or in the case of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Council must once again show its unity and bear its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. It must agree on a new independent, impartial and professional mechanism for investigating any use of chemical weapons, bring those responsible for such crimes to account, and ensure that they do not enjoy impunity. We call for intensified efforts and a return to the political track, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim of reaching a peaceful settlement to the crisis based on the first Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has always opposed the use of force in the context of international relations. We advocate for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity, and the territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military action bypassing the Security Council runs counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violates the principles of international law and the basic norms governing international relations and, in the present case, will further complicate the Syrian issue. Based on that principled position, China voted in favour of draft resolution S/2018/355, proposed by the Russian Federation. I would like to emphasize here that a political settlement is the only viable pathway to solving the Syrian issue. China urges the parties involved to remain calm, exercise restraint, return to the framework of international law and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiations We support the role of the United Nations as the main channel for mediation, and we will spare no effort to reach a political settlement of the situation in Syria together with the international community. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today is the day when the Security Council and the world community should raise their voices in the defence of peace, security, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Every delegation in this Chamber is a sovereign country, and no one should attempt to pressure or dictate to any of us how to interpret international law and the Charter of the United Nations, or how to consult our own consciences. We have never hesitated to vote in accordance with the dictates of international law, the Charter, our conscience and truth. Today's meeting confirms that the United States, Britain and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, continue to plunge world politics and diplomacy into a realm of myths, myths that have been created in Washington, London and Paris. That is dangerous work, representing a kind of diplomacy that traffics in myths, hypocrisy, deceit and counterfeit ideas. Soon we will arrive at the diplomacy of the absurd. These three countries create these myths and try to force everyone to believe in them. We counter their myths with facts and a true picture of what is going on. But they do not want to see or hear. They simply ignore what they are told. They have come up with a legend about Russia as a constant wielder of the Security Council veto whom they purposely provoke into using the veto so as to then present themselves in a favourable light, especially right now. They are distorting international law and replacing its concepts with counterfeits. They are unabashedly hypocritical. They demand an investigation, and before the investigation has even started they name and punish the guilty parties. Why did they not wait for the result of the investigation that they themselves all called for? The Security Council is paralysed because of these countries' persistent deceptions both of us 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 25/26 and the international community. They are not only putting themselves above international law, they are trying to rewrite it. They violate international law and try to convince everyone that their actions are legal. The representative of the United Kingdom gave three reasons justifying the missile strikes based on the concept of humanitarian intervention. They are trying to substitute them for the Charter. That is why we and other countries did not support it then and do not support it now, because we do not want it to become the justification for their crimes. We demand once again that that they halt this aggression immediately and refrain from the illegal use of force in the future. Today we once again showed the whole world how we play our underhanded games. In Soviet times there was a pamphlet entitled Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From? that described Washington and the NATO countries' military preparations. Nothing has changed. The threat to peace comes from exactly the same place. Look at what they say and listen to the war drums that they are beating in Washington today in the guise of hypocritical concern for democracy, human rights and people in general. The five-minute rule in the latest presidential note's rules of procedure (S/2017/507) will not allow me to list them, because the list is too long. I could cite other examples, as for example how the President of France showed interest in a conversation with President Putin in an investigation in Douma and was ready to send French experts there when that idea suddenly disappeared. Because a different algorithm was put forward. That is obvious. Today is a sad day. It is a sad day for the world, the United Nations and its Charter, which has been blatantly violated, and the Security Council, which has shirked its responsibilities. I should like to believe that will not see another day as bad as today. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make another statement in my national capacity. Peru abstained in the voting because we believe that the draft resolution did not adequately reflect the need to guarantee due accountability for the use of chemical weapons throughout Syrian terrority and because its language is imbalanced and would not help to restore the Council's unity, which is critical to addressing the events in Syria in a comprehensive manner. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to make another statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I think it is obvious why we voted against the draft resolution. We support completely what the French representative laid out about next steps and we will work tirelessly to that objective, along with partners on the Council. The Russian Ambassador referred to myths. These are not our myths. The way forward in the Council has been blocked. The second of our own criteria for taking this action on an exceptional basis must be objectively clear. There is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. In the 113 meetings of the Council on Syria, I think that has been demonstrated absolutely crystally clear. The United Kingdom believes that it cannot be illegal to prevent the use of force to save lives in such numbers as we have seen in Syria. The reason we took this action — our legal basis — was that of humanitarian intervention. We believe that that is wholly within the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has ask for the floor to make a new statement. I now give him the floor. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I apologize for requesting the floor once again. The scene that we have just witnessed is quite sad. There are those in the Council who prefer to overlook an enormous elephant that we have spoken of before. The elephant is the direct American military occupation of one-third of my country's territory — a direct American military occupation of one-third of the Syrian Arab Republic territory. However, there are those who speak of minor details which they believe to be pivotal. No, the political scene is far more dangerous than that. We are a State whose sovereignty has been facing a direct military violation by a permanent member of the Council. That is the true scene, and not the allegations and the film prepared by the terrorist organization known as the White Helmets established by British intelligence. We need to focus on the main scene here. Some would claim that they are fighting Da'esh in Syria and Iraq. However they have given air cover to Da'esh. Whenever the Syrian Arab Army makes advances against Da'esh, United States, British and French war planes bombard our military sites. Why? To prevent our decisive victory against that entity. However, they failed S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 26/26 18-10891 and we were able to achieve victory against Da'esh with our brothers in Iraq in three years and not in thirty, as former President Obama predicted. We understand that the capitals of the three countries that launched the aggression against my country are frustrated. Some colleagues who voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/355) claim to support a political settlement. We tell them now, after their shameful vote against the draft resolution, that those who voted against it are no longer partners of the Syrian Government in any political process. The British Ambassador explained things about the Malvinas Islands. That testimony reveals the facts about the imperialistic policies of Britain. I am actually the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) and I work under the agenda of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. My task and that of my colleagues in the C-24 is to end colonialism throught the world. The Malvinas are on the list of territories that do not enjoy self-governance. We are working in accordance with the United Nations agenda to end the British occupation of the Malvinas. As for my colleague the Ambassador of Kuwait, I remind him — although he and his Government are well aware of it — that when my country participated in the liberation of Kuwait, we did not justify our principled position to the people of Kuwait. Our position was a principled one. We did not need draft resolutions, meetings or any tripartite aggression. We did not look into the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or undermine our national obligations to our brothers in Kuwait, nor did we join any bloc that was hostile to Kuwait. We fulfilled our national duty towards our brothers in Kuwait. The Ambassador of Kuwait will also recall that my country could have played a different role at the time and could have negatively impacted the peace, safety and security of Kuwait, but we chose not to do so. We acted pursuant to a national principled position that was not subject to negotiation or discussion. The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8228 Security Council Seventy-third year 8228th meeting Tuesday, 10 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh/Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10187 (E) *1810187* S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 2/21 18-10187 The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Canada, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/175, S/2018/321 and S/2018/322, which contain the texts of three draft resolutions, respectively. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): For years, as part of its responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has been mobilized on the issue of chemical weapons. After the chemical attacks in Ghouta in 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which provided for the complete dismantling of the chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime. Russia, as co-sponsor of that resolution, had guaranteed its implementation. Despite that guarantee, the Damascus regime has never complied with its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) and has never renounced — as we saw again on 7 April — the use of chemical weapons against its civilian population. Five years after the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), we note that the general subject of chemical weapons remains tragically topical. The upcoming voting marks our fourth meeting in less than a week on this issue. Yesterday we met in an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225) following a new chemical-weapons massacre in Douma, Syria, whose appalling images left us shocked. Last month we met to discuss the unacceptable attack in Salisbury (see S/PV.8203). Last year we met day after day after the terrible attack of Khan Shaykhun. That shows the deterioration of the situation and how serious the stakes are today for our security. The use of chemical weapons is so abominable that it has been banned for almost 100 years, and the international community began years ago to eliminate them. As such, the chemical non-proliferation regime, which we have patiently developed and strengthened, is one of the pillars of our collective security architecture, at the heart of our security system. Yet today it is under serious threat. We face the cynical, barbaric and all-out use of chemical weapons against civilian populations. The Douma attacks once again illustrated the abject brutality of the Syrian regime's resolute military strategy. Such acts constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. They increase the risk of dangerous normalization — tolerating the return of these agents of fear and death is nothing more than a blank cheque to all those who would like to use them. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without responding is to let the genie of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — which pose an existential threat to us all — out of the bottle. It would mark a serious and reprehensible setback to the international order that we have all patiently helped to develop. The consequences would be terrible, and we would all pay the price. That is why we cannot accept it. France will do all it can to prevent impunity for the use of chemical weapons. It is in that spirit that we launched an international partnership last January. The demise of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November, due to the Russian veto to protect Al-Assad's regime, sent a dangerous signal of impunity. It deprived us of an essential deterrent tool. It left a vacuum that the Syrian regime has rushed to exploit, and which yesterday's atrocities have tragically reminded us of. The American initiative to re-establish an independent mechanism, based on a balanced approach and taking into account the concerns expressed by every member of the Council, enables us to fill that glaring void. Such a mechanism would support the inquiry that has already been launched by the OPCW. It would also respect the essential criteria of independence, 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 3/21 without any interference, and impartiality to which each member of the Council has committed. Such a mechanism would have a mandate to attribute responsibility for the attacks. Only the combination of those two criteria — independence and a mandate to attribute responsibility — will make that mechanism effective, and therefore dissuasive. Let me be clear: in view of the gravity of the 7 April attack, France will not accept any third-rate or sham mechanism whose independence and impartiality would not be genuinely ensured. That is what the Security Council owes today to the Syrian victims of chemical attacks and to the entire international community, whose security is threatened by the chemicals in the hands of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Since the threat is of an existential nature for us all, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must, more than ever, be among the top priorities of the Security Council. If there is one area in which the Council has a moral and political responsibility to convene and act, it is this one. If there is one domain for which the credibility of the Council is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is this one. This is one of those moments when we have no choice but to act because what is at stake is essential. We cannot allow the chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it our entire security architecture — along with the principles and values that underpin our action — to crack and disintegrate before our very eyes. Today's vote is one of those key moments, one of those moments of truth. On behalf of France, I therefore call on each member of the Council to properly gauge and assume its responsibilities now and to vote in favour of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321). Mrs. Haley (United States of America): We have reached a decisive moment as the Security Council. On Saturday the first haunting images appeared from Douma, in Syria. We gathered around this table yesterday (see S/PV.8225) to express our collective outrage. We then collectively agreed that the Council needed to take steps to determine exactly what happened in Douma and to put an end to these barbaric attacks. The United States has put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that accomplishes those shared goals. For weeks we have been working with every single delegation on the Council to develop a new attribution mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We held open and transparent negotiations so that every delegation could provide its input. And we went the extra mile for one Council member. We adopted paragraph after paragraph of Russia's proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175). We tried to take every Russian proposal that did not compromise the impartiality, independence or professionalism of a new attribution mechanism. After the Douma attack, we updated our draft resolution with common sense changes. Our proposal condemns the attack. It demands unhindered humanitarian access for the people in Douma. It calls on the parties to give maximum cooperation to the investigation. And it creates the attribution mechanism that we worked so hard with each member to develop. The draft resolution is the bare minimum that the Council can do to respond to the attack. The United States did everything possible to work towards Council unity on this text. Again, we accepted every recommendation that did not compromise the impartiality and independence of the proposed attribution mechanism. I want to say a brief word about Russia's draft resolution, which is also before us for a vote. Our draft resolutions are similar, but there are important differences. The key point is that our draft resolution guarantees that any investigations will truly be independent. Russia's draft resolution gives Russia itself the chance to choose the investigators and then to assess the outcome. There is nothing independent about that. The United States is not asking to choose the investigators, and neither should Russia. The United States is not asking to review the findings of any investigation before they are final, and neither should Russia. All of us say that we want an independent investigation. Our draft resolution achieves that goal. Russia's does not. This is not an issue that more time or more consultations could have resolved. At a certain point, you are either for an independent and impartial investigation or you are not. And now that the Douma attack has happened, this is not a decision that we can delay any longer. The United States calls on all Security Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution and to abstain or vote against the Russian draft resolution. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today the delegation of the United States is once again trying to mislead the international S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 4/21 18-10187 community and is taking yet another step towards confrontation by putting to a vote a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that does not enjoy the unanimous support of the members of the Security Council. It is not true that it meets almost all our requirements. The text is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, unchanged, the former Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established to investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Russia has always emphasized that it will not support that approach. The JIM became a puppet in the hands of anti-Damascus forces, and it covered itself with shame when it issued a guilty verdict for a sovereign State without credible evidence. The American draft resolution represents an identical reproduction of all of the former Mechanism's flawed working methods. The new mechanism would conduct investigations as it sees fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has nothing to do with independence, which the draft resolution's sponsors and its closest allies only pretend to care about. We know the worth of such independence. It is true anarchy and manipulation. At every stage of our work on the American initiative we have insisted that the Secretary-General should select the staff for the investigative mechanism on the basis of the broadest possible geographic representation, with subsequent approval by the Security Council. Visits to the sites of the incidents and strict adherence to the principle of sequential actions while ensuring the preservation of the material evidence should be not optional but mandatory working principles. In a collective decision, the Security Council would determine who was responsible in any given case of the use of chemical weapons, based on reliable evidence that would leave no room for doubt about the correctness of the conclusions. There is nothing about this in the American draft resolution. The authors know that it goes against the Russian position and will not be adopted. But they are obstinately sticking to their line. It is clear that today's provocative step has nothing to do with a desire to investigate what happened in Douma, Syria, on 7 April. An attributive mechanism is not necessary in order to initially establish the facts. Even if we could conceive of the improbable scenario in which the draft resolution creating the mechanism was adopted today, it would take several months to put the mechanism together and fine-tune its operations. Establishing who is to blame is the final link in a very long chain of actions. Here, in front of everyone, I would once again like to ask the sponsors why they need the mechanism when they have already identified the guilty parties before the investigation. They do not need it. They do not want to hear anything. They do not want to hear that no traces of a chemical attack were found in Douma. They have simply been looking for an excuse the whole time, and the provocateurs among the White Helmets have very kindly provided it. This is all reminiscent of a kind of spring fever. Exactly a year ago, in April 2017, a similar scenario unrolled with the chemical provocation in Khan Shaykhun, followed by a missile strike. The fact is that the authors of the draft resolution are motivated by completely different priorities. They have pinned their hopes on the assumption that the draft resolution will not be adopted. That is what they want, and it is something that they can bank along with the rest of their reasons justifying the use of force against Syria. For several days now, the Administration in Washington, D.C., has been keeping the international community in suspense while discussing the so-called important decisions being prepared. Only yesterday we heard how anxiously Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura spoke about the current escalation extending beyond Syria's borders (see S/PV.8225), and we know that the Secretary-General is also very concerned about that. It is clear that Russia will once again be the target of the propaganda cannons. My American colleague will painstakingly enumerate the Russian vetoes on Syria. It is not impossible that she has taken upon herself a capitalist commitment to using the reckless policies of the United States to achieve some sort of personal record in that regard. We are using the veto to protect international law, peace and security and to ensure that the United States does not to drag the Security Council into its misadventures. The United States representative says that we are covering up for someone. Russia is in Syria at the invitation of its lawful Government in order to combat international terrorism, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, while the United States is covering up for militias and terrorists. If the United States has decided to carry out an illegal military venture — and we still hope that it will think better of it — it must answer for that itself. It wants to dump this draft resolution, which has been sitting on the shelf for a long time, onto the Security Council in order to find a pretext. The United States representative 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 5/21 herself has said repeatedly that if the Council does not make a decision, the United States will make a decision on its own. Why is the suta purposely undermining the Council's authority by promoting a draft resolution that we know will not go through? And a lot of people said that yesterday during consultations. We urge the Americans to give sober consideration to the potential this presents for confrontation, to think better of it and to withdraw its draft resolution from a vote. Russia cannot support it. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation Abstaining: China The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has not been adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): This is a sad day for the Security Council; it is a sad day for the cause of universal norms and standards; and it is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. But, above all, it is a very sad day for the people of Douma, who now are without the protection that the international system was set up to provide for them. This is the fourth time in six days that the Council has discussed chemical weapons. Yesterday 14 members of the Security Council called for an investigation. Several members called on the permanent five (P-5) to assume their responsibilities to uphold the universal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom was ready to do that and was joined by France and the United States. Conversely, by vetoing, Russia has crossed a line in the international order, and worse, if possible, history is repeating itself one year on from Khan Shaykun. Russia helped to create the original independent investigation that attributed Khan Shaykun to the Syrian regime and concluded that sarin, which can be developed only by a State actor, had been used. But last autumn, Russia vetoed renewal of that mechanism on not one but three occasions. The reason is clear: it is because Russia would rather cross the WMD line than risk sanction of its ally Syria. Instead, we are asked to believe that the Russian version of this latest attack should be the one that the Security Council believes. Russia is not authorized by the Security Council to carry out an investigation in Syria. Russia says that there were no traces of a chemical attack. No traces were found by whom? I repeat: Russia is not authorized to carry out an investigation on behalf of the Security Council. We need an independent investigative mechanism for that purpose, and only that sort of mechanism can have the confidence of the Security Council, the confidence of the membership of the United Nations and the confidence of the people of Syria. Sadly, reports of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria have continued since the original Russian veto, in November. It has become very clear that Russia will do what it takes to protect Syria, whatever the compelling evidence of the crimes committed, and to shut down further investigation and discussion of those crimes. This has come at the cost of Russia's own obligations and credibility as a permanent member of the Council, as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and as a declared and supposed supporter of peace in Syria. The Security Council has been unable to act solely because Russia has abused the power of veto to protect Syria from international scrutiny for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Even today open-source investigations have located a chlorine cylinder, the same kind that the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found that the Syrian regime used, atop a house in Douma full of people who had clearly died from respiratory problems. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 6/21 18-10187 I frankly doubt that in 48 hours Russia has verified all similar reports and can conclude that they are all fake. They are not fake; they need to be looked at and investigated by a proper independent mechanism such as the Council was prepared today to pass. Russia's credibility as a member of the Council is now in question. We will not stand idly by and watch Russia continue to undermine the global norms that have ensured the security of all of us, including Russia, for decades. As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom will stand up for international peace and security; it is our moral duty. It is a matter of shame that Russia has once again blocked a draft resolution. The Russian Ambassador mentioned that it was not a question of counting the number of Russian vetoes. I beg to differ. To quote Lenin, quantity has a quality all of its own. Russia's actions today are a step against the rules and authority of the Security Council and the wider United Nations. They are a step against international peace and security and non-proliferation, and they are a step against humanity. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned at reports that the use of chemical weapons has caused civilian deaths and casualties in Syria. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual, under any circumstances. This has been China's clear and consistent position. China supports the carrying out of a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria so as to achieve results that are based on substantial evidence and can pass the litmus test of history and truth, bringing the perpetrators and the parties responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice. There should be no prejudgment of the outcome or arbitrary conclusions. The Security Council has a consensus on condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and identifying the perpetrators of the chemical-weapon attack in Syria. All members of the Security Council should remain united and insist that the Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons be the main channel for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, in an effort to seek an appropriate solution through consultations. The draft resolution that was just put to the vote in the Security Council (S/2018/321) had elements of consensus, including condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and urging all parties to cooperate with the investigation. However, on some specific measures, it does not take full consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Security Council members on improving the mechanism's working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial investigation. Against that backdrop and in the light of our long-standing position on the question of chemical weapons in Syria, China abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. The issue of Syria is currently at a critical juncture. China remains firmly seized of the situation and is deeply concerned at the developments on the ground. China has always called for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and insists on seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. We oppose the use or threat of force in international relations and believe that any action taken should be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The international community and all parties concerned should stand firm on the imperative need to seek a political solution to the question of Syria, step up their support for the United Nations main channel of mediation, and push for all Syrian parties to seek a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution to the question of Syria, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). China is ready to work with all parties in an effort to push for a political solution to the issue of Syria. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution initiated by the United States (S/2018/321) for two main reasons. With regard to the first reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the draft resolution conforms to our firm belief that any and all use of chemical weapons in wartime as in peacetime must be condemned and requires investigation to determine those responsible for such acts to hold them accountable. In that regard, the draft resolution submitted by the United States clearly conveys the resolve of the international community to see perpetrators of chemical attacks identified and prosecuted so that they are accountable for their acts. Concerning the second reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the text of the draft resolution provides 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 7/21 guarantees with regard to the credibility of the outcome of investigations. The text insulates such investigations from any political influence and clears a path for the experts' professionalism and independence and the impartiality of the mechanism itself. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Ivorian delegation wanted to show its solidarity with Syrian victims who are suffering from the consequences of an endless war and to help meaningfully safeguard international peace and security. Sadly, my delegation notes that divisiveness within the Security Council prevented the adoption of the American draft resolution, which Côte d'Ivoire painfully regrets. It is time that efforts be made to unify the Council if we want truly to work to achieve international peace and security. Mr. Radomski (Poland): The use of chemical weapons is a serious atrocity, which may amount to a crime against humanity and a war crime. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law — and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. Draft resolution S/2018/321, presented by the United States, addressed the most pressing needs related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the role of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission, securing humanitarian access and, last but not least, creating a new, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. We thank the American delegation for its ongoing leadership in the negotiations. We appreciate its flexibility and fully understand and share the rationale behind putting this text to the vote today. Because of the use of the veto by the Russian Federation, the Security Council failed once again today to establish an accountability mechanism. By that act, Russia undermined the ability of the Council to fulfil its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations: to maintain international peace and security. We are disappointed that, for some States, political alliances and calculations proved to be more important than the need to end the horrors confronting the civilian population and the unacceptable loss of human life in Syria. Poland supports the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, and other instruments that might facilitate bringing the perpetrators of chemical attacks to justice. We will join all genuine efforts to achieve that goal. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates in the strongest terms its categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the weaponization of chemical agents as an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed, as such use constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. There is no justification for their use regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them. We therefore reaffirm the need to maintain the unity of the Security Council so as to ensure that those who have used chemical weapons are held accountable and brought to justice so that their actions do not go unpunished. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the work being carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission so that, in line with their mandates, they can carry out the work entrusted to them in the most methodical, technical and trustworthy manner possible with the support of an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation. We firmly reiterate that the work of an investigative mechanism is essential to ensuring accountability for such terrible acts. To that end, it must be independent, impartial and representative so that a transparent, impartial, complete, reliable and conclusive investigation can be carried out, and, for that to happen, we face the great challenge and the responsibility of not politicizing or instrumentalizing the Security Council. My delegation voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/321) presented by the United States of America, first of all, because we regret that once again a draft resolution was put to the vote with the knowledge that it would not be adopted by the Security Council, and, moreover, because there has already been a series of threats of the use of force accompanied by threats of unilateral action, which, of course, runs directly counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Bolivia once again makes clear its firm rejection of taking unilateral actions, because any unilateral military action that does not enjoy the approval of the Security Council is entirely illegal and contravenes the principles explicitly set forth in the Charter. In addition, any unilateral S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 8/21 18-10187 military action would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab Republic of Syria, and would affect the stability of the political process and the agreements on which progress has been made under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): In my statement yesterday (see S/PV.8225) I urged the Security Council not to stand idly by and watch as a spectator while chemical weapons were being used in Syria. In our opinion, the Council should act, condemn, protect, and hold to account those responsible. Those elements are all reflected in draft resolution (S/2018/321) put forward by the United States, and that is why the Kingdom of the Netherlands voted in favour of that draft resolution. We thank the United States delegation for drafting the text. We appreciate the earlier rounds of negotiations and the flexibility displayed at yesterday's late-night round. Together with others, we are extremely disappointed that an attempt to set up an effective mechanism of attribution on the use of chemical weapons has failed once again. Today we witnessed the twelfth overall Russian use of the veto concerning Syria, including six pertaining to chemical weapons. As I said yesterday, if the Russian representative claims that the chemical-weapons attack in Syria is a fabrication, he should not veto the draft resolution. By vetoing this draft resolution, the Russian Federation assumes a heavy responsibility for continued impunity and the horrible use of chemical weapons in Syria. Because of this permanent member, the Council is not even able to condemn the use of chemical-weapons attacks this past weekend in Douma, during which the White Helmets once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to their life-saving work in the most difficult circumstances. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175), the Netherlands will vote against it. That draft resolution falls short in every possible way. It seems that the Russian Federation is unable to support an independent and impartial investigative mechanism. It seems that it can accept a mechanism only in which itself can decide when, where, how and by whom the investigation would be conducted, while leaving the mandate attributed to the Council subject to its veto. This cannot be the end of the issue. The Security Council cannot remain passive in the face of the atrocities being committed in Syria. We must continue to work for an effective attribution mechanism, inside and outside the Security Council. Impunity must not prevail. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I speak about the draft resolution before us (S/2018/175), I would like to say that I am very happy that my British colleague is familiar with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, although that is hardly surprising, because Marx, Engels and Lenin were frequent visitors to London — indeed, Marx is buried there. But I would like to cite another quotation from Lenin, who wrote an article entitled "Better Fewer, but Better". After the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) on the use of chemical weapons in Syria ended, in November of last year, it was Russia that found itself in the forefront of the efforts to fill the resulting gap. We drafted a resolution on the issue that we submitted to our colleagues for their consideration on 23 January. The Western camp immediately gave the draft text a hostile reception, since it eliminated the loopholes that enabled investigations to be manipulated and handed over to the control of the opponents of Damascus, as occurred with the JIM and which was the reason for its premature demise. I want to emphasize that we have not invented anything new in our text, but have merely brought the principles for the work of the new mechanism in line with the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We now have a real opportunity to create a genuinely independent and impartial working mechanism that would help the Security Council to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the context of the conflict in Syria. All that it needs is for Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution, and we call on them to do that. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 9/21 In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Kuwait The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 6 votes in favour, 7 votes against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): As I have taken the floor once today already, I will be brief. With regard to Karl Marx, I think he must be turning in his grave to see what the country that was founded on many of his precepts is doing in the name of supporting Syria by condoning the use of chemical weapons on Syrian territory. We voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/175) for a number of reasons. The Russian text is a distraction. It has lain dormant around the Security Council for weeks. There was no attempt to meet other Council members' concerns in its drafting, unlike the United States text (S/2018/321), which had adapted its original preferences precisely to try to meet those of the Russian Federation and others. The Russian text does nothing to bring a political process any closer. Specifically, it moves the parameters on access and imparts a quasi-judicial standard — "beyond a reasonable doubt" — that is inappropriate for the type of investigation that the Council wishes to establish. If the Russians want a criminal investigation, they could always suggest that we refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, there is selective quoting of the Chemical Weapons Convention to undermine the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, and it takes a selective approach to the parameters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. But, above all, the text is unacceptable because it seeks to assert that sovereign States are above international law and international norms. That is breathtaking both in its arrogance and its ignorance, and for that reason alone, if not the others, we could not support it. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Yesterday I said that history will record this moment (see S/PV.8225) as one when we as the Security Council either lived up to our responsibilities or showed our complete failure to protect the Syrian people. Today we have our answer. The votes have been cast. The record will show that today some countries decided to stand up for truth, accountability and justice for the Syrian people. Most countries saw the horror that took place in Douma last weekend at the hands of the Al-Assad regime and realize that today was a time for action. Month after month, the Al-Assad regime, with the full support of Russia and Iran, has strung the Security Council along. They ignored our calls for a ceasefire, for political dialogue and for deliveries of humanitarian aid. They ignored our calls to stop using chemical weapons — weapons that are universally banned from war. And then, last weekend, the Al-Assad regime forced a moment of reckoning on all of us by gassing people in Douma. The United States and the countries that joined us today could not allow that attack to go unanswered. The record will not be kind to one permanent member of the Council. Unfortunately, Russia has again chosen the Al-Assad regime over the unity of the Security Council. We have said before that Russia will stop at nothing to shield the Al-Assad regime, and now we have our answer. Russia has trashed the credibility of the Council. It is not interested in unity or compromise. Whenever we propose anything meaningful to Russia, Russia vetoes it. It is a travesty. It has now officially vetoed draft resolutions that would hold Al-Assad accountable for these barbaric chemical attacks six times. Things did not have to turn out this way. For weeks, the United States has led transparent, good-faith negotiations with all Security Council members to establish an attribution mechanism for chemical weapons in Syria. We started from the simple premise that every Council member would want to know who was responsible for using those barbaric and illegal weapons. We did everything to accommodate Russia's views. Russia surprised us with a proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175), calling all of us into the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 10/21 18-10187 Security Council Chamber and handing out the draft text on the spot. After hearing widespread concerns about its draft resolution, Russia moved ahead anyway, accommodating no one's views. We could have done the same, but instead we tried to take as much as we could from Russia's draft text, while maintaining an impartial and independent process. We negotiated in good faith. Many aspects of our draft resolutions were similar. Russia said that the investigators should have safe access to the places where chemical weapons were used. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted an impartial, independent and professional investigation. We agreed. Russia said that the investigators should be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted reports on the activities of non-State actors involving chemical weapons. Although that sounded to us like an attempt to distract from the Al-Assad regime, we included Russia's request. We even gave our mechanism the name that Russia wanted — the United Nations independent mechanism of investigation. There were really only two key differences between our draft resolution and that of Russia, but those differences speak volumes. First, Russia wanted to give itself the opportunity to approve the investigators who were chosen for the task. Secondly, Russia wanted the Security Council to assess the findings of any investigation before any report was released. Does any of that sound independent or impartial? Russia's proposal was not about an independent and impartial investigation at all. It was all about protecting the Al-Assad regime. This is a sad day. The United States takes no pleasure in seeing Russia exercise its sixth veto on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria. Only last week, we had hoped that the one-year anniversary of the Khan Shaykun attack might be the start of a renewed partnership to combat chemical weapons. However, those deadly weapons have been used on Syrian families again. When the people of Douma, along with the rest of the international community, looked to the Council to act, one country stood in the way. History will record that. History will record that, on this day, Russia chose to protect a monster over the lives of the Syrian people. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has stated its principled position on the chemical weapons attack in Syria. The draft resolution on the establishment of a new investigative mechanism submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175) condemns the chemicals weapons attack in Syria and calls for the creation of a new investigative mechanism to establish the facts and the truth. We can all agree on those positive elements. In addition, it proposes improved working methods compared to previous investigative mechanism and set out concrete steps to carry out a robust on-site investigation on the ground and to ensure impartiality in the process of collecting evidence. As a result, the new investigative mechanism would be able to function with greater professionalism and to reach a truly credible conclusion. Those elements are in line with China's principled position. We support Russia's draft resolution. China regrets that the draft resolution was not adopted. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I am taking the floor following the voting on the two draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321) above all to express our frustration over the fact that the Security Council was not able to adopt either the first or the second draft, which sought to give the Council an independent and professional mechanism with a mandate to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, despite the fact that all Security Council members expressed their desire in that regard. That is precisely why we voted in favour of both draft resolutions in the hope of having a new monitoring mechanism to attribute responsibility so as to protect people from the terrible and harmful effects of such chemical weapons. Despite the negative outcome of the voting on both draft resolutions, the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose position on the use of chemical weapons we have clearly set out during the debates on the issue, wants the members of the Security Council to seek and to explore other alternative draft texts that could merit the joint agreement or the consensus of the Security Council so that we can establish that new mechanism as soon as possible. That is what the people who are suffering, or in the future may suffer, the terrible effects of chemical weapons hope and expect of the Security Council. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): It is indeed regrettable that the Council could not adopt a resolution to establish a new mechanism that would identify those responsible 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 11/21 for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Establishing such a tool would have sent a quick and unified message regarding the resolve of the Council not to tolerate impunity. That is how we view the defeat of both draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). However, we were not at all surprised. We voted in favour of both draft resolutions, consistent with our position in reaffirming the importance of setting up an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism with a view to ensuring accountability. No doubt, such a mechanism would clearly have addressed the existing institutional gap in that regard, which continues to be a source of major weakness in the fight against impunity. Both draft resolutions sought the establishment of such a mechanism. Clearly, there are differences, among others, concerning some aspects of the accountability mechanism. We believe that we have come some distance in bridging those differences. It would have been a major achievement, both functionally and from the point of view of enhancing trust, which is so greatly needed in order to address the challenge not only of ensuring non-proliferation but also of advancing the cause of international peace and security. That was why we were hoping that we could achieve consensus on the matter and unity within the Council. Frankly speaking, we do not like what we see. At the risk of sounding self-righteous — and the challenge that we face makes taking the risk appropriate — we must say that we are deeply disappointed about the situation that we are in. Since we have no alternative, it remains important that we all persevere in continuing our dialogue and supporting the efforts to ensure unity, without which the Council will not be in a position to discharge its principal responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, in particular repairing the damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Yesterday, we expressed our concern about the difficult situation we are currently facing (see S/PV.8225). We do not wish to repeat what we said, but allow me to state in closing that we look forward to handling the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, eastern Damascus, with a greater sense of responsibility. That is how we intend to look at the draft resolution from Russia before us, a draft which, in our view, is relatively similar to the draft resolution informally made available by Sweden yesterday, whenever the Council is ready to handle it. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I support the statement in explanation of vote on the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) made earlier in the meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that today is actually a sad day. It is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime, and a sad day for civilians — particularly women, children and the elderly — throughout Syria, and specifically Douma in eastern Ghouta. We ask their forgiveness because we have disappointed them once again. The Council has been unable to establish a mechanism that would hold accountable those who commit crimes by using chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to put an end to the serious and gross violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and many Security Council resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to hold to account the perpetrators of crimes related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Our position has always been clear. We have called for consensus in the Council on this sensitive issue, which touches on accountability and impunity. We voted in favour of the United States draft resolution because it contains the basic elements that we think are necessary to establish any new accountability mechanism in Syria in order to guarantee its independence, neutrality and professionalism. The mechanism would identify the perpetrators responsible for any chemical attack, and then the Security Council would shoulder its responsibility in terms of sanctions. We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution presented by the Russian Federation (S/2016/175) because it did not include the elements to which I have referred. It would undermine the credibility of the new mechanism by depriving it of its fundamental terms of reference, namely, to determine whoever is responsible in the event of attacks using chemical weapons. We are very concerned about the result of voting today because it will encourage parties to the conflict to continue using chemical weapons in the absence of accountability. Kuwait supported the code of conduct whereby the States members of the Security Council would commit to not opposing draft resolutions dealing with crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 12/21 18-10187 supported the French-Mexican initiative on abstention in the use of the veto in cases of human rights violations. As a result of the voting today, and based on our commitment to abiding by the four Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols, international humanitarian law and the final outcome of 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, we call again for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as humanitarian issues, to receive due attention. That would include allowing the safe and sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations, and preventing the siege of residential areas. These should be treated as procedural issues; they should not be subject to a veto so that such human tragedies and sufferings are never repeated. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Like everyone else, we deeply regret that today the Council was prevented once again from establishing a responsibility-attribution mechanism for the purpose of impartially identifying the perpetrators and organizers of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I am sure we all share a sense of very tragic déjà vu as we repeat the scenario the Council faced in November when the renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism was blocked. However — and I apologize to all of those who are tired of hearing me say this — we will not give up. Efforts to reach an agreement on a responsibility-attribution mechanism must continue, and we support all serious and genuine initiatives that aim to achieve this objective. We stand ready to help facilitatory efforts to find a way forward. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons is crucial. As we have stated before, the Syrian people suffering from more than seven years of conflict deserve no less from us. They want peace and justice, not further military escalation or impunity. A collective response to the most recent alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma therefore remains urgent and critical. The credibility of the Council is at stake. We must now come together to swiftly condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria and express alarm at the alleged attack in Douma. We must support an immediate and further investigation through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and we must demand full, free and safe access without any restrictions or impediments to the fact-finding mission in its immediate deployment to Syria. Establishing the facts of what has taken place in Douma remains an essential first step towards confirming the alleged use of chemical weapons and finding the truth, and we need independent, impartial attribution of guilt followed by full accountability. The Council must remain seized and live up to its responsibility. That is why we circulated yesterday a draft text aimed at finding common ground. We stand ready to work tirelessly to find agreement on a robust, swift and immediate response. We need to come back together again after the failure that we have just witnessed. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): Our position remains unchanged and consistent. Due to well-known historical reasons, Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stance of uncompromising condemnation of any use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We do so as that is an extremely heinous action and an unacceptable war crime. We have also been in support of attaching paramount importance to the creation of a new investigative mechanism. That has been strongly reiterated, and we have pressed for its urgency. Impunity for chemical crimes is not acceptable. It sends the wrong signal to those who continue to use or intend to use such an extremely heinous weapon. However, in order to punish anyone, we must be able to prove guilt completely and irrefutably. In that regard, the creation of a full-fledged, impartial and independent investigative tool is of the utmost necessity for all. We have worked in earnest with the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation. We must recognize that the use of chemical weapons in Syria continues, along with the persistent threat of chemical terrorism, to present a grave reality. In addition, many allegations of the use of chemical agents in Syria are still undisclosed. Based on the aforementioned circumstances and understanding the need to preserve this mechanism, we supported both draft resolutions intended to create new investigative mechanisms. We urge that we all work together for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): This meeting is an interesting one from a variety of perspectives. One is that Lenin and Marx, two anti-imperialists, have been invoked more than once. What we have seen today is related to that topic. It is a fact that all empires are under the illusion that they are morally superior to the rest of us, that they believe themselves to be exceptional and indispensable and that they are above the law. In this, as in other cases, they do not seek to advance democracy or 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 13/21 freedom, but rather ultimately to expand their power and domination worldwide. What we have seen today is a sad reflection of what is happening on the battlefield in Syria and of those interests. I would like to echo the words of the Swedish Ambassador in urging the Security Council not to rest until we are united and can reach consensus, if indeed we believe in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the Charter, and whether the members of the Council can fulfil it, that is ultimately at stake. One of our responsibilities under it is to refrain from taking unilateral action. We hope that principle will be honoured. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We too are sorry that our draft resolution (S/2018/175) was not adopted today, but at the moment neither it nor the United States draft resolution (S/2018/321) would have had any influence on the investigation of the alleged incident in Douma. Right now, that is not what they are about. There is no need to mislead anybody by saying that, or that there were intensive consultations on the American draft resolution but not on ours, or that most of our amendments were supposedly taken into account. Our colleagues will now tell the press that we vetoed their resolution, while modestly remaining silent about the fact that just as with the draft resolutions on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, they also vetoed ours. Yesterday, during the meeting on threats to international peace and security (see S/PV.8225), there was an emotional discussion of the event, or the alleged event, in Douma on 7 April. Based on the results of the inspection conducted by our specialists, we said that a chemical attack could not be confirmed. Nonetheless, we advocated for the speediest possible investigation of all of the circumstances by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and affirmed our willingness to facilitate its work on the ground. The Government of Syria has sent the OPCW an official request that such a mission be dispatched to Douma as soon as possible. Yesterday, the Swedish delegation put forward a fairly constructive text for a corresponding draft resolution. Unfortunately, their initiative was undeveloped and was trampled down thanks to the confrontational efforts of the United States and its closest allies, which had decided to shift the focus away from the issue of an investigation of what happened on 7 April. That is understandable, because they have already identified the guilty parties. As far as they are concerned, the so-called regime, along with Russia and Iran, is always to blame for everything. The investigation does not interest them. Well, sometimes it does, but only if it is based on so-called exclusive data from the opposition's social networks. For the hundredth time, I would like to ask the same question yet again. Can someone here explain clearly and plainly why Damascus needed this alleged chemical attack in Douma in principle, especially since practically all of the militias had evacuated Douma by then? And the militias who were still being evacuated on 8 April knew nothing about the alleged occurrence of this chemical attack. I will answer my own question. The provocation was desperately needed by the militias who received that very timely support from the United States and other Western countries. We decided to develop the Swedish initiative, and our draft resolution notes the Syrian Government's invitation to the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to visit the site of the alleged event without delay. It welcomes the decision of the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to send the Mission to Syria in order to conduct investigative work in line with Chemical Weapons Convention standards. It takes into account the guarantees of safe access provided by the Syrian authorities and Russian military forces. Fifteen days later, the Secretary-General would submit the first report to the Security Council. This is a strictly practical, non-confrontational and depoliticized initiative in support of the OPCW, which would help the specialists in this area determine what did, or rather did not, take place in Douma. And that is the priority now, not the draft resolution on a United Nations independent investigative mechanism, which was hastily submitted for a vote with the obvious aim of seeing both draft resolutions vetoed. We hope that Council members will give this initiative their unanimous support so that the process can begin as soon as possible. According to our information, two S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 14/21 18-10187 expert groups from the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should leave for Syria by the end of this week. Whatever the excuse that may be given, if the experts do not reach Douma because they have been prevented by those who continue to speculate about the chemical issue in order to smear Syria and Russia, that will be yet another piece of evidence showing that behind this thoroughly false story are dirty geopolitical games and, what is worse, aggressive military plans capable of reversing the positive trend in the resolution of Syria's conflict and inflicting a painful blow on a region already tormented by adventurist assaults. We are witnessing all of that literally in real time. We request that you put this draft resolution to a vote, Mr. President. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We want swift and resolute action today, and we want the Security Council to shoulder its collective responsibility. But I am not sure that we have exhausted all the avenues that could get us there, nor am I sure that voting on this new Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) will get us there either. We feel that we are at a very fragile stage of Council deliberations right now, and we need to reflect carefully on the way forward to ensure that we do not jump into further paralysis, with consequences that will be difficult to defend or repair. That is why I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to suspend the meeting right here and now so that we can all move into consultations and carefully and collectively reflect on the next step. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened carefully to what the Permanent Representative of Sweden has just said. To be candid, we are somewhat puzzled by his statement, because the draft resolution that we submitted (S/2018/322) is, in essence, based on the same idea as the draft submitted yesterday by the Swedish delegation. I do not know what we are going to consult on in consultations. I believe we already consulted on this subject yesterday. However, out of respect for the Swedish delegation and those delegations who would like to hold consultations, we are not against that. But let me say right away that we intend to put this draft resolution to a vote today, after our consultations. We hope that the consultations will be constructive and will not drag on for long, because that is certainly not necessary at this point. We need to adopt this draft resolution in support of the mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to establish the facts on the ground as quickly as possible. The President (spoke in Spanish): If there is no objection, I will suspend the meeting. We will continue after our consultations. The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden The President (spoke in Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 5 votes in favour, 4 against and 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I will be brief. In the Consultations Room just now, Mr. President, you and the representative of Sweden made valiant attempts at a compromise. We all appreciate what is at stake and thank you for your and Sweden's efforts. But, fundamentally, the United Kingdom could not vote for the Russian text (S/2018/322) because it does not establish an investigation into who was responsible for the attack. It only welcomes the Fact-finding Mission, which is already on its way. I repeat what I said in consultations: the Fact-finding Mission determines whether chemical weapons were used and, if they were, which chemical weapons were used. It does not, and cannot, establish who was responsible for 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 15/21 their use — and thus start on the first step on the path to attribution and accountability. For that reason, we are not able to support the text. It would be like watching a fire, identifying that there was a fire, and doing nothing to put it out. The Russians invited us to return to the issue of an investigative mechanism on a separate occasion. I am afraid that the answer to that is 17 November 2017, when Russia vetoed a joint investigative mechanism that it had itself decided to set up. For all those reasons, all it would have taken is a written decision for an investigation set up by the Security Council. Russia could not take that small step, and therefore we were not able to support the draft resolution. I very much regret that, but the answer was in Russia's hands. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): Recent reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in Douma and the consequent civilian casualties have given rise to serious concern on the part of the international community. China has noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has already asked its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate the relevant reports. We support the OPCW in sending investigators to Syria so as to establish the truth. We call on all parties concerned to cooperate with the investigation. The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/322) expresses deep concern about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, strongly condemns the chemical-weapons attacks that took place in Syria and elsewhere, urges the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to carry out an on-site investigation, and provides that the Syrian Government and other parties will ensure the security of and safe access to investigators. The draft resolution is in keeping with China's principled position. China supports and voted in favour of the Russian draft resolution. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We deeply regret that we have ended up here following a long day of serious efforts to move forward by some of us — I believe. We abstained in the voting on the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) a few moments ago because the attribution and accountability track, which we believe is important, lacked clarity. We called for consultations earlier because we felt that, provided there was political will, an opportunity remained for us to come together and shoulder our responsibility today. We put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) to all members that we felt was credible and assertive, and was intended to support the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It was also very clear in its determination to establish an impartial, independent and professional investigative mechanism, and we had suggested that the Secretary-General help us recommend the best way forward in that area and give him 10 days to come back to the Council. I believe that would have been a much better way forward than where we are right now. I am therefore very disappointed that we have not been able to move forward on this. I thank all those members of the Security Council that were ready to engage, and I just hope that we do not consider this the end with regard to ensuring that the facts will be established and that there will be true accountability and no more impunity for the horrendous use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I once again express the frustration of our delegation over this afternoon's negative outcome. We abstained in the voting on the third draft resolution (S/2018/322), first of all because it was submitted only very late today and, secondly, because it is lacking compared to the two previous draft resolutions on which we voted in favour (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). We believe that we should ask the representative of Sweden, Mr. Olof Skoog, not to withdraw his proposal so that following this meeting — perhaps tomorrow afternoon — as was suggested during consultations, we can continue considering and analysing it to see whether we can agree to vote on the draft resolution once we have introduced amendments and reached a consensus on the text that he has presented. Mr. Radomski (Poland): Poland voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/322) presented by Russia. We believe that the draft resolution submitted originally by Sweden was an honest attempt to enable the Security Council to respond promptly to the horrific act of violence that occurred in eastern Ghouta on Saturday. To that end, the Security Council needs to re-establish a professional, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation is missing that important provision. That is why we had to vote against it. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 16/21 18-10187 Mrs. Haley (United States): I thank you, Sir, and members of the Security Council for what has been another frustrating day. My parents always said that you should always see the good in everyone and in everything. I have therefore been trying to figure out what the good is in Russia. I believe that it is very good at being consistent, and I believe that it is very good at playing games. We saw that when we took up the issue of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Russia loved the Joint Investigative Mechanism until we found one side guilty, and then it decided that it did not want it. We then adopted the ceasefire, and Russia loved the idea of the ceasefire until Al-Assad had a problem with it and subsequently violated it. Today Russia vetoed for the sixth time a draft resolution (S/2018/321) condemning Al-Assad for chemical-weapons attacks on his own people. No matter what we do, Russia will be consistent. Russia will continue to play games, and once again it is putting forward yet another surprise draft resolution (S/2018/322). The first time that any of us saw it was today at 11 a.m. The Russians held no negotiations. It took no input, and, when Sweden asked that the Council be allowed to discuss the draft resolution, Russia allowed that but did not want any changes to it. There is a reason for which Russia did not want to discuss its resolution, and that is because it does not accomplish anything. The draft resolution mainly asks for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its Fact-finding Mission to Douma, but the Fact-finding Mission is already travelling to Douma. It already has a mandate to investigate and collect samples. What makes it worse is that Russia includes several provisions in its draft resolution that are deeply problematic and once again seeks to compromise the credibility of the international investigation. The draft resolution puts Russia and the Al-Assad regime itself in the driver seat for making arrangements for the Fact-finding Mission investigators. We are just supposed to trust that the same Government that says that everything concerning the Douma attack was fake will work in good faith with the OPCW. This draft resolution also tries to micromanage how the Fact-finding Mission should carry out its investigation, while dictating where the investigators should go. As we have always said, for an investigation to be credible and independent, the investigators must choose where they believe they should go. Members of the Council — least of all Russia — should not be calling the shots. For those reasons, the United States voted against the draft resolution. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we saw value in its adoption as it offered, we thought, the possibility for the protection of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. Frankly, we tried to find weaknesses in the text. We could not. It is a matter-of-fact and uncomplicated draft resolution. We could not find any reason not to support it. Undoubtedly, it would not have made achieving attribution possible, but finding out whether chemical weapon were in fact used would have been a great achievement. Of course, so far the Russian position has been that there was no use of chemical weapons in Douma. Establishing the facts surrounding that assertion or position would have been a great achievement. We are not in a position to take advantage of the guarantee offered or the Council's strong support in that regard. We felt that the Fact-finding Mission needed the support. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Frankly speaking, I think all of us have seen everything for ourselves. Unfortunately, the failure to adopt draft resolution S/2018/322 really is a litmus test says a great deal and leaves us extremely apprehensive. We proposed a very innocuous draft resolution, which is moreover virtually a complete repeat of Sweden's draft text from yesterday. I find it difficult to understand which might be the parts where Mrs. Haley read between the lines to discover our scheming and our trickery. Perhaps the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom answered that when she said that they could not adopt the Russian draft resolution — let us say it out loud — because it was a Russian draft resolution. Then everything was clear. The United States representative said that we are very good at playing games. I am not sure about that. What I am sure of is that she is very good at making threats, and the threats that the United States is making with regard to Syria should make us all extremely alarmed, because we may be standing on the threshold of some very sad and terrible events. I would once again like to ask the United States to refrain from executing the plans that it may be incubating for Syria. Unfortunately, the refusal of the United States to adopt the draft resolution speaks to the fact that our 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 17/21 American partners and colleagues do not need any real investigation, which is something that we discussed earlier. We regret the fact that the draft resolution was not adopted, although it is true that the Fact-finding Mission will, I hope, reach Syria soon and be able to get to work on its principal mandate, which is establishing the facts about what really happened in Douma. To repeat what I have said once again, in all innocence, the Russian military and the Syrian Government will provide support to the mission in terms of ensuring its security. I hope that does not raise questions for anyone, because it is simply what must be done. We hope that the Mission will be able to make the trip effectively and without delay. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to start by thanking Sweden for its efforts and attempts to achieve rapprochement and to smooth over the differences among the members of the Security Council. We are disappointed by the Council's inability to reach consensus on this important matter and by the fact that the divisions among Council members unfortunately continue. We abstained in the voting, despite the fact that the gist of draft resolution S/2018/322 calls for an investigation into what took place in Douma, which is what we called for. The investigation should be undertaken by an international, independent and impartial body, which in this case is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission will go to Syria anyway, and the Council welcomed that fact yesterday. There is therefore no need for a draft resolution. What we are looking for is an international, independent, neutral and professional body or mechanism that would investigate the incident and identify the party that has used chemical weapons, if it indeed determines that chemical weapons have been used. That approach will enable the Council to hold the perpetrators accountable, in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013). Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I thank everybody for today's very difficult and unfortunately unproductive day. We voted for the Russian Federation's draft resolution (S/2018/322) on sending a fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as soon as possible because, as we said yesterday in raising this very simple question, we need to know what happened on the ground. Yesterday we were also very clear when we said that there were different and conflicting reports about the number of casualties and even about the very fact that the chemical attack had taken place. We requested and supported the important proposal that a fact-finding mission should go to Douma to establish the facts on the ground. We are not talking right now about who did it, but we are talking about the fact of the event itself. We needed to understand what was there and what had happened there. Sending a fact-finding mission was very important to us and to all the delegations that do not have a presence there to understand the objective reality of the place. Even if the only information obtained is about the kind of substance that was used, that would be very useful for us to understand who the perpetrators might be and at the very least establish the fact that a chemical attack took place. In this kind of understanding, we very much support sending OPCW experts to investigate on the ground in order to give us information on which we can base an objective opinion about the situation. We are not taking sides here, and we were very clear about that yesterday. We would like to receive full, objective, transparent and unbiased information about the facts that we are addressing here. We are therefore glad that the OPCW is sending a group to Douma, regardless of the results of today's voting on draft resolutions. We are hopeful that we can at least get this preliminary information about the situation in Douma. I would like to say once again that we in the Security Council should be objective and base our decisions on the simple facts that may be presented to us by the independent organizations that will determine whether there was a chemical attack or not. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): After having vetoed a draft resolution that sought to shed full light on acts of violence involving chemical weapons (S/2018/175), including those that took place last weekend, Russia persists in a dual strategy of obstruction and diversion on the matter. The only aim of the draft text on which we have just voted (S/2018/322) was clearly to confuse the issue. It is not a question of disputing the importance of an independent investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into what happened in Douma on 7 April. That is essential, and the investigation has already been launched. However, the Russian draft resolution, which we had to vote against, did not meet the challenges. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 18/21 18-10187 Let us be clear: what we lack today, and what Russia continues to reject, is a truly independent and impartial mechanism that can attribute responsibility in order to prevent impunity. That was the raison d'être for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. With the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, set up with the involvement of Russia, we put in place a tool for the essential deterrence of perpetrators of chemical attacks. That is clearly what we lack today. Let us be clear in saying that statements are not enough and that the Russian draft resolution is only a smokescreen that falls well short of the urgent response that the Council should provide. That is why France voted against the draft resolution and why the draft resolution was not adopted. Today I reiterate that France will spare no effort to ensure that the perpetrators of those chemical horrors are identified and held to account in an independent and impartial way. The stakes are extremely high, and we will not give up. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we had serious hesitations about the text, as it differed in some crucial aspects from the Swedish text put forward yesterday. First of all, the text makes it insufficiently clear that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic already has the mandate for on-site visits, as States have to comply with it. They do not need the Council's authorization. Secondly, the text is unduly restrictive. Paragraph 3 is not a correct reflection of the decision of the Director-General or of his existing mandate. The necessity of on-site investigations is up to the team to decide. My third point is that the fact-finding mission should be able to perform its mandate in complete independence. Fourthly, we do not want the precedent that Security Council authorization is needed for a fact-finding mission to do its work. We are convinced that those were issues that we could have solved if the draft resolution had been put forward for proper consultations. We received it this morning. We regret that those concerns could not be taken into account. My last point is that one colleague said that the litmus test of this evening, and of today, was the voting on this draft resolution. I disagree. The litmus test of today's meeting was the veto by one permanent member on the establishment of an effective attribution mechanism. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I shall be very brief. Bolivia voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) for several reasons. One of those is that, although the nature of the events that have been condemned is unknown, the highest authorities of the Organization have pointed out that the United Nations is not is a position to verify the reports of such events. It is therefore essential to establish the truth by means of an independent and impartial investigation. Many of those reports come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and we know who finances those NGOs. Therefore, we must allow doubts with regard to such sources. Analysing the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation word by word, from the point of view of intellectual integrity, commitment to the Syrian people or international law, we found no reason to vote against the draft resolution. Nevertheless, what concerns us is what is being planned outside the structure of this edifice. While it was said today that Lenin and Marx would probably be turning in their graves, I do not know about that. But what is certain is that Churchill and Roosevelt, for example, are turning in their graves because, as founding fathers of the structure of this world order, they endowed the Security Council with the authority to use force to deal with threats to international peace and security. I am not sure that they would be very happy that the outcome of such events, without a full and conclusive investigation, is that some of its members undertake the unilateral use of force. In any case, we remain hopeful that the Security Council will shoulder its responsibility and that, through unity, it can help to identify the perpetrators of any attack against international peace and security, if that is the case. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. We regret that we were not able to achieve consensus this afternoon on a draft resolution with regard to the delicate situation in Syria. We underscore that the investigation being carried out on the use of chemical weapons must be complemented by an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that attributes 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 19/21 responsibility. That is why we abstained in the voting on this occasion. We reiterate the need for the Security Council to regain its sense of unity on this very delicate subject so that it can fulfil its high responsibilities and thereby alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. That is why we will continue to explore options on this important matter. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I remind speakers of the content of presidential note S/2017/507 with regard to the length of statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will give colleagues who are about to leave the Chamber some of my valuable time. They are afraid that I will beat them in the battle of arguments. They become terrified when they hear any opposing views. Those who just left the Chamber said in their statements that today was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. I would like to refresh their memories and say that violation of the non-proliferation regime is the speciality of the following Western States. The United States of America used nuclear weapons in Japan. It used chemical and biological weapons in Viet Nam and enriched uranium in Iraq. France used Algerian human beings when it tested its first atomic bomb in the Algerian desert in 1960. In fact, it placed living Algerians in the desert tied to poles, and dropped on them the first French atomic bomb. Britain, of course, conducted all its nuclear tests in its colonies on islands in the oceans. The British Ambassador then says that day was a sad day for the people of Douma. English is not my mother tongue, but I know that there are no people of Douma. There are inhabitants in Douma. There are Syrian people. There are no people of Douma. However, beyond Marx, Engels and Lenin, I would like to quote from Shakespeare as saying: "Lies shame you. Speak the truth or remain silent". My British colleague said that Russia does not have the authority to go to Douma and establish whether or not chemicals were used there, stating that it is not within the jurisdiction of our Russian friends, who are on the ground, to go to Douma and investigate the scene. That is quite strange. Britain should have advised itself in the same manner when it sent intelligence officers to Khan Shaykhoun and conferred upon itself the authority to collect samples with the French. They took the samples to British and French laboratories, as they claimed, without coordinating with the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) or the Fact-finding Mission. That is quite the paradox: giving themselves the very right that they deprive others. Approximately two weeks ago, Britain signed an agreement with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia for an arms deal worth $100 billion — much bigger than the Al-Yamamah deal — to continue killing people in Yemen, start new wars in the region with Iran and Syria and entrench never-ending wars throughout the entire region. That is what Britain is capable of doing. Mahatma Gandhi knew the British well, and he was right when he said, "If two fish broke out into a fight in the sea, everyone knows it was Britain that started it". The American colleague said that there is only one monster facing the entire world in defiance today. That monster has financed terrorists in Syria for seven years and provided them with arms. I would say that the monster is the United States, Britain and France. They sponsored terrorism in my country for seven years, and before that they did the same in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. They sponsored terrorist organizations starting with Taliban and Da'esh, down to the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaida, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and the White Helmets, which British intelligence newly invented. The monster she spoke of unleashed lies in order to destroy, occupy and send troops thousands of miles throughout the world to destabilize international peace and security. The monster is the American who, thus far, refuses to destroy his chemical arsenal, as we know, yet lectures others on destroying chemical weapons. My French colleague said that he was horrified by the pictures he saw. But he was not horrified by the pictures of the hundreds of civilians who were killed in the 2016 French air strikes in Toukhar village in the rural area of Manbij. Two hundred civilians were killed, including entire families, by France's war planes. The French Ambassador must not have seen those pictures, and consequently they were not a source of horror for him. The concept of double standards is an understatement for those people. In response to the web of lies spread by some Western States against my country regarding the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 20/21 18-10187 alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic sent today, 10 April, an official invitation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Douma in order to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons there and to determine the facts about those allegations. I informed members of the Council of that invitation yesterday in this very Chamber (see S/PV.8225). The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes the visit of the fact-finding mission and stands ready to fully cooperate, provide all forms of assistance to the mission in the discharge of its duties and guarantee the safety of its personnel. It will also facilitate interviewing and sampling in accordance with the terms of reference. Syria looks forward to the fact-finding mission carrying out its work in a full, transparent and professional manner and while relying on credible and tangible evidence. If it does deploy, it will find Douma liberated and it will be granted full access to any location it wishes to visit. The situation is quite clear. The co-sponsors of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) do not seek the truth, because it will simply expose them and their terrorist proxies on the ground. Instead of waiting for the OPCW fact-finding mission to determine whether or not toxic chemicals were used in Douma, they present draft resolutions that do not enjoy consensus, nor do they seek truth, but rather establish non-objective mechanisms that pre-empt results in support of their political accusations and agendas. They are aware that a clone of the JIM would not be accepted by the States in the Council that are dedicated to the quest for truth regarding who is using toxic chemicals against Syrian civilians. In that regard, I underscore that the United States, Britain and France made the JIM fail by thwarting it through politicizing its work, putting pressure on members of its leadership and blackmailing them. Consequently, the JIM lacked credibility and professionalism, as it fabricated reports that accused the Syrian Government based on the so-called open sources, of course including the White Helmets, and false testimonies and fabricated evidence emanating mostly from terrorist groups, most important of which is the terrorist Al-Nusra Front and the White Helmets, which is the British misleading media arm of the Al-Nusra Front. The scenario that we witness today is exactly similar to what we witnessed a year ago when the United States of America launched a wanton aggression on the Al-Shayrat air base, which was founded on flimsy arguments and fabricated pretexts stating that the Syrian Arab Army used chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhoun. Those allegations were proven false when the United States and its allies prevented the experts of the JIM from visiting Khan Shaykhoun and collecting samples from the Al-Shayrat air base. Things are crystal clear. The aggression of the United States and its accomplices, throughout history, thrives on lies, deceit and hegemony, as well as on the rule of the powerful. It is a brutal approach that will never respect the rule of law and international legitimacy. For seven years, my country, Syria, has been a stark example of what the United States and Britain did when they unleashed lies, misleading information and fabricated stories in this very Chamber in order to destroy and occupy Iraq. Their actions were grounded on the pretext of a significant lie, that is, the existence of the so-called weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I am compelled each and every time to remind the Council of the position of former Secretary of State Colin Powell when, in this very Chamber (see S/PV.4701) — and I was sitting where the Deputy Permanent Representative of China is seated today — he presented tapes, documents, maps and pictures that were later discovered to have been produced, faked and fabricated by the American intelligence services for the purpose of invading Iraq. The operation was prepared in advance. The same scenario occurred with Libya. The truth must be revealed. For centuries the world has witnessed various instances of occupation and hegemony, whose sole purpose was to loot the wealth of nations, occupy land or impose a geopolitical agenda. However, political immorality has reached a depth today to the extent that Libya has been destroyed and many of its people killed to cover up cases of bribery and financial corruption involving the President of a permanent member of the Council that talks about democracy and freedom. It is so low today to the extent that a permanent State regrettably forces Arab oil-exporting countries to foot the bill for its ongoing aggression and military intervention in my country, Syria. It is a business deal forged between the corrupt with the financial means and a mercenary who has weapons and power. Some permanent members of the Council commit acts of aggression against sovereign 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 21/21 countries simply to detract attention from domestic crises and ongoing controversy surrounding their political elite. Following seven years of a dirty terrorist war that was imposed upon us, we in Syria believe that clear options exist — but they pose a major challenge to the majority of Council members. The Council must refute the lies and reverse the political deterioration that the United States, Britain and France are trying to push the Council towards engaging in. It is up to the Council today, and in the future, to make its decision. World public opinion and the people of the free world will judge whether or not the Council has assumed its responsibility to uphold international legitimacy, maintain international peace and security and protect the world against the horrible terrorism that is used and exploited by those three permanent member countries to undermine the stability and self-determination of States. I call upon the members of the Council to uphold a global, ethical and multilateral political system that believes in international law and in the right of peoples to self-determination, and rejects military, political and economic hegemony. In conclusion, my country reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of chemical weapons by any party, anywhere and under any circumstances. My country stands ready to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to reveal the allegations and lies being promoted by some Western parties so as to justify their aggression and serve their own political agenda. Their fleets are now in the eastern Mediterranean, waiting for the veto in order to start their aggression. I would like to inform those Western parties — and they must pay close attention to what I say — that their threats of aggression, manoeuvres, lies and terrorism will never prevent us — as one of the founding States of the Organization — from exercising our duties and rights under the Charter of the United Nations and our national Constitution to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to fend off aggression from any source. We will not allow anyone — big or small, permanent member or non-permanent member — to treat us the way Iraq and Libya were treated. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8225 Security Council Seventy-third year 8225th meeting Monday, 9 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-09955 (E) *1809955* S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 2/26 18-09955 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: This emergency meeting of the Security Council underscores the gravity of the events in recent days in Syria, of which there are severe consequences for civilians. It takes place at a time of increased international tensions, drawing national, regional and international actors into dangerous situations of potential or actual confrontation. It is an important meeting. There is an urgent need for the Council to address the situation with unity and purpose. How did we reach this point? The month of March saw devastating violence in part of eastern Ghouta, which resulted in at least 1,700 people killed or injured in opposition-controlled areas, dozens and dozens of people killed or injured in Government-controlled areas and, ultimately, the evacuation of 130,000 people, including fighters, family members and other civilians. However, in Douma there was a fragile ceasefire, which continued for most of March. The United Nations good offices played an important role in that regard. Since 31 March, the United Nations has no longer been able to be involved in talks, since, at that time, the Syrian Government did not agree to our presence, although we made efforts to propose concrete ways to address the issues that we understood were arising in the continuing contacts, including the proposal to activate the detainee working group agreed in Astana. However, that proposal was not taken up at the time. From 2 April, the evacuation of some 4,000 fighters, family members and other civilians from Douma to northern Syria took place. However, on 6 April there was a major escalation in violence. There were reports of sustained air strikes and shelling against Douma, the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks damaging health facilities. There were also reports of shelling on Damascus city, which reportedly again killed or injured civilians. Jaysh Al-Islam requested our involvement in emergency talks in extremis, but there was no positive response to that request when it conveyed the same message to the other side. At approximately 8 p.m. local time on 7 April, reports of an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma started to emerge. Pictures immediately circulated on social media showing what appeared to be lifeless men, women and children. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground claimed to have received hundreds of cases of civilians with symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. The same NGOs claimed that at least 49 people had been killed and hundreds injured. I wish to recall what the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, noted, namely, that the United Nations "is not in a position to verify these reports". However, he also made it very clear that he cannot ignore them and that he "is particularly alarmed by allegations that chemical weapons have been used against civilian populations in Douma" once again. He further emphasized "that any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation". I note that a number of States have strongly alluded to or expressed the suspicion that the Syrian Government was responsible for the alleged chemical attack. I also note that other States, as well as the Government of Syria itself, have strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations, depicting the attacks as a fabrication or/and a provocation. My comment is that this is one more reason for there to be a thorough independent investigation. 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 3/26 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said that it has made the preliminary analysis of the reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and is in the process of gathering further information from all available sources. My colleague Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who is with us in the Chamber today, will further address this matter. But I urge the Security Council, in accordance with its own mandate to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law, to, for God's sake, ensure that a mechanism is found to investigate these allegations and assign responsibility.Returning to the narrative of the events, at around midnight on 7 April, hours after the alleged chemical-weapons attack, Jaysh Al-Islam informed the United Nations that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Federation and the Syrian Government. The Russian Federation Ministry for Defence stated that the agreement encompasses a ceasefire and Jaysh Al-Islam fighters laying down their arms or evacuating Douma. The Russian Federation also reported that up to 8,000 Jaysh Al-Islam fighters and 40,000 of their family members were to evacuate.As I brief the Security Council now, we understand that additional evacuations from Douma are already under way. We have also received reports that some detainees — the ones we had heard about before — had begun to be released from Douma today. We note reports that the agreement provides for civilians who decide to stay to remain under Russian Federation guarantees, with the resumption of services in coordination with a local committee of civilians.I urge the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation to ensure the protection of those civilians so that as many civilians as possible can stay in their homes if they choose to, or leave to a place of their own choosing or return as per international law. I urge that there be, for there should be, an immediate refocusing for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). What we have see is basically an escalation before a de-escalation.Clearly, the dangers of further escalation arise from situations beyond Ghouta as well. We have received reports of missiles targeting the Syrian Government's Tiyas, or T-4, airbase early this morning. No State has claimed responsibility for that reported strike. The United States and France have explicitly denied any involvement. The Syrian Government, the Russian Federation and Iran have suggested that Israel could have carried out the attack, with Iranian State media reporting that over a dozen military personnel were killed or injured, including four Iranian military advisers. The Government of Israel has not commented. The United Nations is unable to independently verify or attribute responsibility for that attack, but we urge all parties to show their utmost restraint and avoid any further escalation or confrontation.We are also concerned about the dynamics in other areas of Syria. Syrians in Dar'a, northern rural Homs, eastern Qalamoun, Hamah and Idlib have all expressed to us their own fears that they may soon face escalations similar to what we have seen in eastern Ghouta. We therefore urge the Security Council and the Astana guarantors and those States involved in the Amman efforts to work towards reinstating de-escalation in those areas and elsewhere in Syria. The indications are the opposite at the moment.Meanwhile, following its operations in Afrin, the Turkish Government has indicated the potential for further operations in other areas of northern Syria if Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat and Kurdish People's Protection Units forces are not removed from those areas. Military operations in such areas have the potential of raising international tensions. We therefore urge all parties concerned to de-escalate, show restraint and find means to implement resolution 2401 (2018) through dialogue and fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Let me also highlight the fact that we have recently seen — and this is particularly tragic when we consider the efforts all of us, including all members of the Security Council, have made in the last year — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launch new operations within Syria, south of Damascus, in rural Damascus, in remote areas near the Iraqi border.I would like to conclude with some bottom lines, if I may.First, civilians are paying a very heavy price for the military escalation. We are not seeing de-escalation; we are seeing the contrary. Today our first priority must be to protect civilians from the war, from the conflict, from chemical weapons, from hunger. We call on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including humanitarian access across Syria to all people in need. We urge once S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 4/26 18-09955 more for concrete respect for resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, which is, after all, a resolution of the Security Council.Secondly, continued allegations of the use of chemical agents are of extremely grave concern. Those allegations must be independently and urgently investigated. Any use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited and constitutes a very serious violation of international law, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013). Preventing impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and upholding international law must be an utmost priority for all members of the Security Council.Thirdly, I have to say this very slowly because today is the first time, in over four years of briefing the Security Council in person, that I have reached a point in which I have to express a concern about international security, not just regional or national or Syrian security, but international security. Recent developments have more than ever before brought to the surface the dangers that the Secretary-General warned about recently at the Munich Security Conference, when he spoke of "different faultlines" in the Middle East that are interconnected and crossing each other, of conflicting interests of both global and regional Powers, and forms of escalation that can have absolutely devastating consequences that are difficult for us to even imagine. The Council cannot allow a situation of uncontrollable escalation to develop in Syria on any front. Instead, it must find unity and address the concrete threats to international peace and security in Syria today.I am sorry to have been this brief, but I wanted to focus on one specific concern, namely, the threat to international security related to what we are seeing now in Syria and the danger of the alleged chemical-weapons attacks being repeated. Next time I will brief the Council on humanitarian and other issues and on the political process, which I know we are all interested in focusing upon, but today is the day for talking about security — international security — and peace.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. De Mistura for his very informative briefing.I now give the floor to Mr. Markram.Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel.It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention.Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use of chemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations. Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 5/26 well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Markram for his informative briefing.I now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): If you imagine, Mr. President, that I derive pleasure from the subject of my statement today, or from speaking at great length, you are wrong. Unfortunately, however, the situation is such that I have a lot to say today. And you will have to listen to me.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.The Russian Federation asked that this meeting be convened under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security" because we are deeply alarmed about the fact that a number of capitals — Washington first and foremost, with London and Paris blindly following its lead — are purposely steering a course designed to supercharge international tensions. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France, with no grounds and no thought for the consequences, are taking a confrontational line on Russia and Syria and pushing others towards it too. They have a broad range of weapons in their arsenal — slander, insults, bellicose rhetoric, blackmail, sanctions and threats of the use of force against a sovereign State. Their threats against Russia are brazen, and the tone they take has gone beyond the limits of the permissible. Even during the Cold War their predecessors did not express themselves so crudely about my country. What next?I remember the rhetorical question that President Putin of Russia put to our Western partners, and especially the United States, from the rostrum of the General Assembly in 2015 (see A/70/PV.13), about their careless geopolitical experiments in the Middle East, when he asked them if they at least realized what they had done. At the time, the question went unanswered. But there is an answer, and it is that no, they do not realize what they have done. As they do not realize what they are doing now. It is not only we who are perplexed at their lack of any coherent strategy on any issue. It perplexes most of the people in this Chamber. They just do not want to ask them about it openly. Wherever they go, whatever they touch, they leave behind chaos in their wake in the murky water where they have gone fishing for some kind of fish. But the only fish they catch are mutants. I will ask them another rhetorical question. Do they understand the dangerous place they are dragging the world to?One of the areas where the hostility manifests itself most strongly is Syria. The terrorists and extremists supported by external sponsors are being defeated. Let me remind those responsible that these are the terrorists and extremists whom they equipped, financed and dumped into the country in order to overthrow the lawful Government. Now we can see why this is causing hysteria among those who have invested their political and material capital in such dark forces.In the past few weeks, thanks to Russia's efforts to implement the Security Council's resolutions, a massive operation has been carried out to unblock eastern Ghouta, whose residents have been forced to endure the humiliation of the rebel militias for several years. More than 150 thousand civilians were evacuated from this suburb of Damascus, completely voluntarily and under the necessary security conditions. Tens of thousands of them have already been able to return to liberated areas and many have been taken in by relatives. The changes in their demographic composition that the defenders of the Syrian opposition have been screaming about have not happened. That is a lie. Some extremely complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of the armed groups, as a result of which many left the neighbourhoods they were occupying, with full guarantees for their security. Incidentally, there were several attempted acts of terrorism during these transport operations when militias tried to bring suicide belts onto the buses and were prevented. Others preferred to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities. Thanks to the presidential amnesty, they will now be able to return to civilian life, and may even eventually be able to join Syria's security forces. That represents the implementation of the United Nations principle of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.However, not everyone is so keen on such positive dynamics. The outside sponsors — that is, the leading Western countries — were ready to grasp at any straw in order to hang on to any centre of terrorist resistance, however tiny, within striking distance of the Syrian capital, so that the militias could continue to terrorize ordinary residents, taking their food and begging humanitarian aid from the international community. Incidentally, they were not about to S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 6/26 18-09955 share medicines with those ordinary civilians, as an inspection of the strongholds left behind by the fighters revealed. As happened previously in eastern Aleppo, the improvised hospital facilities in basements were full of medicines that thanks to Western sanctions were not to be had for love or money in Damascus and other Government-controlled areas. Mass graves and bodies that showed evidence of torture were also discovered. The dimensions of the tunnels that the jihadists used were astonishing. Some of them could easily accommodate small trucks travelling in both directions. Those impressive underground facilities connected the positions of groups that some view as moderate to the strongholds of Jabhat Al-Nusra.On 6 April, at their sponsors' instructions, Jaysh Al-Islam's new ringleaders prevented the fourth group of militia fighters from evacuating Douma and resumed rocket and mortar fire on residential areas of Damascus, targeting Mezzeh, Mezzeh 86, Ish Al-Warwar, Abu Rummaneh and Umayyad Square. According to official data, eight civilians were killed and 37 were wounded. It is regrettable that we seen no statements from Western capitals condemning the shelling of a historic part of Damascus.The next day, 7 April, militias accused the Syrian authorities of dropping barrel bombs containing a toxic substance. However, they got their versions mixed up, referring to it sometimes as chlorine and sometimes as sarin or a mixture of poison gases. In a familiar pattern, the rumours were immediately seized on by non-governmental organizations financed by Western capitals and White Helmets operating in the guise of rescue workers. These so-called reports were also just as quickly disseminated through media outlets. I should once again point out that many of these dubious opposition entities have an accurate list of the email addresses of the representatives of Security Council members, which leads us to conclude that some of our colleagues, with a reckless attitude to their position, have been leaking sensitive information to those they sponsor. Incidentally, we all should remember the incident in which the White Helmets accidentally posted on the Internet a video showing the preparation stages for filming the next so-called victim of an attack allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian army. The chemical "series" that began in 2013 has continued to run, with each subsequent episode designed to top the impact of the previous one.In Washington, London and Paris, conclusions have immediately been reached as to the guilt of the Syrian authorities, or regime, as they call it. Has no one wondered why Damascus needs this? While the Syrian leadership has received its share of insults, the main burden of responsibility has been laid at the door of Russia and Iran, to no one's surprise, I believe. As is now customary, it has occurred at lightning speed and without any kind of investigation. On 8 April, Syrian troops searching the village of Al-Shifuniya, near Douma, discovered a small, makeshift Jaysh Al-Islam chemical-munitions factory, along with German-produced chlorine reagents and specialized equipment.The Istanbul-based opposition journalist Asaad Hanna posted a video on his Twitter feed that was allegedly from the area of the incident. In it, an unidentified individual in a gas mask, presumably from the White Helmets, is posing against a backdrop of a homemade chemical bomb that allegedly landed in a bedroom in a building in Douma. It is accompanied by commentary about what it calls another of the regime's attacks on civilians. There can be no doubt that this production was staged. The trajectory of the alleged bomb is entirely unnatural. It fell through the roof and landed gently on a wooden bed without damaging it in any way and was clearly placed there before the scene was shot.In an interesting coincidence, the chemical act of provocation in Douma on Saturday, 7 April, occurred immediately after the United States delegation in the Security Council was instructed to call for expert consultations for today, Monday, 9 April, on its draft resolution on a mechanism for investigating incidents involving chemical weapons. Today far-reaching changes were made to the initial text. In such murky circumstances, of course, we have to determine what happened. But we have to do it honestly, objectively and impartially, without sacrificing the principle of the presumption of innocence and certainly not by prejudging the process of an investigation.Despite this provocation, the Russian specialists have continued their efforts to resolve the situation in eastern Ghouta. On Sunday afternoon, 8 April, according to new agreements, the evacuation of Jaysh Al-Islam combatants was resumed. Following Douma's liberation from militants, Russian radiological, chemical and biological protection specialists were sent there to collect evidence. They took soil samples that showed no presence of nerve agents or substances 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 7/26 containing chlorine. Local residents and combatants who were no longer fighting were interviewed. Not one local confirmed the chemical attack. At the local hospital, no one with symptoms of sarin or chlorine poisoning had been admitted. There are no other active medical facilities in Douma. No bodies of people who had died from being poisoned were found, and the medical staff and residents had no information about where they might have been buried. Any use of sarin or chlorine in Douma is therefore unconfirmed. By the way, representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent refuted statements allegedly made on their behalf about providing assistance to victims of toxic gases. I call on those who plan to denounce the regime when they speak after me to assume that there was no chemical-weapon attack.Sweden has drafted a resolution calling for the incident to be investigated. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) does not need a resolution to investigate it, but we are willing to consider it. Today we propose to do what is envisaged in the draft resolution, which is to let the OPCW, which Mr. Üzümcü, Director-General of its Technical Secretariat, has announced is ready to deal with the situation, fly to Damascus immediately, if possible tomorrow. There the Syrian authorities and the Russian military will ensure the necessary conditions so that the OPCW experts can travel to the site of the alleged incident and familiarize themselves with the situation. That, by the way, is what President Trump and other Western leaders have been urging us to do.The Syrians have repeatedly warned that there might be chemical provocations. At the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic they are saying that the equipment needed to film the next purported chemical attack has already been brought in. We have also made statements to that effect in the Security Council. Everyone has heard those warnings, but has deliberately ignored them because they do not correspond to the doctrinal positions espoused by those who dream of seeing the legitimate Government of yet another Arab country destroyed.There has still been no attention given to the discovery in November and December 2017 of a significant quantity of chemical munitions on Syrian territory that had been liberated from militias. In terrorist warehouses in Az-Zahiriya and Al-Hafiya in Hama governorate, 20 one-ton containers and more than 50 pieces of ordnance containing toxic chemicals were discovered. In Tel Adel in Idlib governorate, 24 tons of toxic chemical, presumed to be chlorine, were discovered. At a storage site in Moadamiya, 30 kilometres to the north-east of Damascus, 240- and 160-millimetre-calibre munitions and plastic canisters of organo-phosphorous compounds were found. In the area around As-Suwayda in Idlib governorate, an manufacturing facility for synthesizing various toxic substances was found, along with 54 pieces of chemical ordnance and 44 containers of chemicals that could be used to manufacture toxic substances.Since the beginning of this year alone, four instances of militias using toxic chemicals against Government troop positions have been established in Suruj and Al-Mushairfeh districts, and more than 100 Syrian troops have been hospitalized. On 3 March, during the liberation of Khazram and Aftris in eastern Ghouta, soldiers from a sub-unit of Government troops discovered an auxiliary workshop for homemade chemical munitions. This far from exhaustive list is an indication of the misdeeds of the still unreconciled opposition. And yet we have seen no eagerness to send OPCW expert groups there to collect evidence of these events. We demand that the OPCW verify all of these areas. They are accessible. We are also seeing information that American instructors in the Al-Tanf camp have trained a number of groups of fighters to carry out provocations using chemical weapons in order to create a pretext for a rocket strikes and bombings.It has been clear to us that sooner or later there would be an attempt to bring the jihadists out of harm's way and at the same time to punish the regime that some Western capitals hate. The talking heads on television have thrown themselves into urging a repeat of last year's effort at a military attack on Syria. This morning there were missile strikes on the T-4 airfield in Homs governorate. We are deeply troubled by such actions.The provocations in Douma are reminiscent of last year's incident in Khan Shaykhun, with their shared element being the planned nature of the attacks. Analysis of the operations conducted by the United States in April 2017, on the eve of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and after it, shows that Washington prepared its operation in advance. From 4 to 7 April of last year — in other words, from the day that a toxic substance was used in Khan Shaykhun until the strike on the Al-Shayrat airbase — the USS Porter and Ross naval destroyers S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 8/26 18-09955 were already present in the Mediterranean Sea, where they were engaged in planned operations. They did not call into any ports where an exchange of munitions could have been effected as a way to increase their quantity of cruise missiles.Specifically, from 4 to 5 April, the USS Porter was located south-east of Sicily and the Ross was en route from the Rota naval base to an area south of Sardinia. Later, on 6 April, both ships were observed moving at accelerated speed towards the area of the firing positions to the south-west of Cyprus, from where they launched a massive strike on Al-Shayrat on 7 April. However, the 59 Tomahawk missiles that were launched would have exceeded the two destroyers' total munitions capacity if they had actually been engaged in the anti-missile defence operations that they were assigned to, which required only 48 units. That means, therefore, that even before the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun, these United States naval vessels undertook a military operation with a strike capability above the number of cruise missiles necessary for their anti-missile defence operations, which could be evidence of advance planning by Washington of an action against Damascus.Among other things, Saturday's fake news from Douma was aimed at diverting the public's attention from the circus that is the Skripal case, in which London has become terminally mired, hurling completely unproven accusations at Russia and accomplishing its basic purpose of extracting solidarity from its allies in order to construct an anti-Russian front. Now the British are shifting away from a transparent investigation and concrete responses to the questions they have been asked while simultaneously covering their tracks.At the Security Council meeting on 5 April on the Skripal case (see S/PV.8224), we warned the Council that the attempt to accuse us, without proof, of involvement in the Salisbury incident was linked to the Syrian chemical issue. There was an interesting new development regarding the issue yesterday. As Britain's Foreign Minister Boris Johnson was continuing his display of rapier wit "exposing" Russia, another gem emerged. The Times informed us that Royal Air Force experts in southern Cyprus had intercepted a message sent from outside Damascus to Moscow on the day of the Skripals' poisoning that contained the phrase "the package has been delivered" and said that two people had "successfully departed". Apparently this formed part of the intelligence that London provided to its allies before expelling our Russian diplomats. Is not it obvious to everyone that there is an irrefutable Syria-Russia-Salisbury connection? I will give the British intelligence services one more huge hint, for free. Why do they not assume that the Novichok they are so thrilled about reached Salisbury directly from Syria? In a package. To cover its tracks. How pathetic.Ambassador Haley recently stated that Russia will never be a friend of the United States. To that, I say that friendship is both reciprocal and voluntary. One cannot force a friendship and we are not begging the United States to be friends. What we want from it is very little — normal, civilized relations, which it arrogantly refuses, disregarding basic courtesy. However, the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it has friends. Its so-called friends are only those who cannot say no to it. And that is the only criterion for friendship that it understands.Russia has friends. And unlike the United States, we do not have adversaries. That is not the prism through which we view the world. It is international terrorism that is our enemy. However, we continue to propose cooperating with the United States. That cooperation should be respectful and mutual, and aimed at resolving genuine problems, not imaginary ones, and it should be just as much in the interests of the United States. Ultimately, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.Through the relevant channels, we already conveyed to the United States that military action conducted on false pretences against Syria, where Russian troops are deployed at the request of its legitimate Government, could have extremely serious repercussions. We urge Western politicians to temper their hawkish rhetoric, seriously consider the possible repercussions and cease their feeble, foolhardy efforts, which merely produce challenges to global security. We can see very good examples of what becomes of the military misadventures of the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. No one has invested Western leaders with the power to take on the roles of the world's policeman and its investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners as well. We urge them to return to the world of legality, comply with the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to address the problems that arise rather than attempting to realize its own selfish geopolitical dreams at every step. All our energy should be focused on supporting the political process in Syria, and for that, all stakeholders with influence must unite in a 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 9/26 constructive effort. Russia is always ready for that kind of cooperation.In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to request a briefing of the Security Council on the results of the United Nations assessment mission in Raqqa and on the situation in the Rukban camp. We can see how the coalition members are trying to complicate a resolution of the problems resulting from their actions in Syria, particularly the carpet-bombing operation designed to wipe out Raqqa. No chemical provocations will distract our attention from that issue.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Thomas Markram for their briefings.Only five days ago, here in this Chamber (see S/PV.8221), we mourned as we remembered the sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun that occurred a year ago. This weekend another devastating gas attack was carried out in the city of Douma, killing more than 45 civilians and injuring more than 500. It was another in a series of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. That is unacceptable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of nine Security Council members that requested today's emergency meeting because we all believed that it was critically important to address this horrific attack. We must reinstate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We must underscore the basic norms of the international legal order and stop the ongoing tragedy in eastern Ghouta and Douma.We almost met twice today because one permanent member of the Council seemed not to want a focused discussion on the issue at hand, the chemical attack in Douma. That begs the question of whether that particular member State would prefer the international community to stand by and watch like a spectator while it covers for the crimes of its ally, the Syrian regime, some of which amount to serious war crimes. The Council must not stand idly by. It is high time for us to act in three ways, condemning, protecting and holding to account. First, today we should condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons. International law has been trampled on. Silence and impunity are not an option. However, condemnation alone is not enough.Secondly, we must deliver on our responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians must remain an absolute priority. We call on the Astana guarantors to use their influence to prevent any further attacks. They must ensure a cessation of hostilities and a de-escalation of the violence, as per resolution 2401 (2018). An immediate ceasefire is needed in Douma so that humanitarian and medical aid can reach the victims of the attack and so that humanitarian personnel can continue their life-saving work. We owe it to the men, women and children of Douma and of Syria. We owe it to our own citizens.Furthermore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to point out that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations count on the permanent members of the Council not to use their veto in cases of mass atrocities. The international community should be able to count on the Council to uphold international humanitarian law and the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and to act when international law is trampled. Let me be clear. We support the humanitarian work of the White Helmets. They do extremely important humanitarian work for civilians in Syria in dire circumstances.Thirdly, all members of the Council regularly stress the importance of accountability for perpetrators who use chemical weapons. Yet the Council has not been able to move forward on that issue for months owing to one permanent member's use of the veto. We have been unable to tackle this crisis because one permanent member is a direct party to the conflict and has proved that it will defend the Syrian regime at all costs. We must intensify our efforts to establish a mechanism that can continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and investigate and identify perpetrators independently of the politics in the Council. The JIM has identified both the Syrian regime and a non-State actor as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As I said last week (see S/PV.8221), the discontinuation of the JIM mandate cannot be the end of the story — all the more so because since the JIM ceased to operate, we have received reports that the regime has carried out at least six more chemical-weapon attacks and perhaps even more. For those who claim that chemical-weapon attacks have not taken place or that such accounts have been fabricated, I have a clear message. The establishment of an effective, impartial and independent attribution and accountability mechanism must not be vetoed.Let us not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the helm of Organization and a powerful General S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 10/26 18-09955 Assembly. Both must consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The work should build on the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission and the JIM. We welcome the Fact-finding Mission's immediate investigation of the terrible incident in Douma this weekend. It should be given full access and cooperation by all parties. We reiterate our strong support for, first, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; secondly, the Commission of Inquiry; thirdly, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France; and fourthly, a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice.In conclusion, the Council must act. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission must complete an investigation as soon as possible, and there can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To do otherwise is tantamount to condoning such appalling attacks, failing in our responsibilities and undermining the international architecture that we have collectively designed to stop such attacks. It is time for the Council and the international community as a whole to act.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.Almost exactly one year ago, I stood on the floor of the Security Council and held up pictures of dead Syrian children (see S/PV.7915). After that day, I prayed that I would never have to do that again. I could; there are many truly gruesome pictures. Many of us have worked hard to ensure that one day we would not have to see images of babies gassed to death in Syria. However, the day we prayed would never come, has come again. Chemical weapons have once again been used on Syrian men, women and children. And once again, the Security Council is meeting in response.This time I am not going to hold up pictures of victims. I could; there are many, and they are gruesome. Worse are the videos imprinted in our minds that no one should ever have to see. I could hold up pictures of babies lying dead next to their mothers, brothers and sisters — even toddlers and infants still in diapers, all lying together dead. Their skin is the ashen blue that is now tragically familiar from chemical-weapon scenes. Their eyes are open and lifeless, with white foam bubbles at their mouths and noses. They are pictures of dead Syrians who are unarmed, not soldiers and fit the very definition of innocent and non-threatening. Rather, they are women and children who were hiding in basements from a renewed assault by Bashar Al-Assad. They are of families who were hiding underground to escape Al-Assad's conventional bombs and artillery, but the basements that Syrian families thought would shelter them from conventional bombs were the worst place to be when chemical weapons fell from the sky. Saturday evening, the basements of Douma became their tombs.It is impossible to know for certain how many have died, because access to Douma is cut off by Al-Assad's forces. Dozens are dead that we know of, and hundreds are wounded. I could hold up pictures of survivors — children with burning eyes and choking for breath. I could hold up pictures of first responders washing the chemicals off of the victims and putting respirators on children, or of first responders walking through room after room of families lying motionless with babies still in the arms of their mothers and fathers. I could show pictures of a hospital attacked with chemical weapons. I could show pictures of hospitals struck by barrel bombs following the chemical attack. Ambulances and rescue vehicles have been repeatedly attacked, maximizing the number of dead civilians. Civil defence centres have been attacked in order to paralyse the medical response so as to increase the suffering of the survivors. Who does that? Only a monster does that. Only a monster targets civilians, and then ensures that there are no ambulances to transfer the wounded, no hospitals to save their lives and no doctors or medicine to ease their pain.I could hold up pictures of all of that killing and suffering for the Council to see, but what would be the point? The monster who was responsible for those attacks has no conscience, not even to be shocked by pictures of dead children. The Russian regime, whose hands are all covered in the blood of Syrian children, cannot be ashamed by pictures of its victims. We have tried that before. We must not overlook Russia and Iran's roles in enabling the Al-Assad regime's murderous destruction. Russia and Iran have military advisers at Al-Assad's airfields and operation centres. Russian officials are on the ground helping direct the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 11/26 regime's starve-and-surrender campaign, and Iranian allied forces do much of the dirty work.When the Syrian military pummels civilians, they rely on the military hardware given by Russia. Russia could stop that senseless slaughter if it wanted, but it stands with the Al-Assad regime and supports without any hesitation. What is the point of trying to shame such people? After all, no civilized Government would have anything to do with Al-Assad's murderous regime. Pictures of dead children mean little to Governments like Russia, who expend their own resources to prop up Al-Assad.The Council, which saw the pictures last year, has failed to act because Russia has stood in its way every single time. For a year we have allowed Russia to hold the lives of innocent Syrians hostage to its alliance with the Al-Assad regime. That also allowed Russian to weaken the credibility of the United Nations. We are quick to condemn chemical weapons in the Security Council, but then Russia prevents any action. It vetoed five draft resolutions on this issue alone and used 11 vetoes all together to save Al-Assad. Our lives go on as usual.The Council created the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It found the Syrian regime responsible for the attack at Khan Shaykhun a year ago. Because Russia supported Al-Assad and his actions, Russia killed the Mechanism. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. We pushed for a ceasefire. The Council unanimously agreed, but it was immediately ignored by Russia and Al-Assad. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. Now here we are, confronted with the consequences of giving Russia a pass in the name of unity — a unity that Russia has shown many times before it does not want. Here we are, in a world where chemical-weapons use is becoming normalized — from an Indonesian airport to an English village to the homes and hospitals of Syria. Since the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun one year ago, chemical weapons have been reportedly used dozens of times, and the Council does nothing.What we are dealing with today is not about a spat between the United States and Russia. It is about the inhumane use of chemical agents on innocent civilians. Each and every one of the nations in the Council is on record opposing the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more rationalizations for our failure to act. We have already introduced and circulated to the Council a draft resolution demanding unrestricted humanitarian access to the people of Douma. Al-Assad is doing all he can to assure maximum suffering in Douma. Our priority must be to help the starving, the sick and the injured who have been left behind. We also call on the Council to immediately re-establish a truly professional and impartial mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, including the attack this weekend. We hope that our colleagues on the Council will join us, as they have before.That is a very minimum we can do in response to the attack we just witnessed. Russia's obstructionism will not continue to hold us hostage when we are confronted with an attack like that one. The United States is determined to see the monster who dropped chemical weapons on the Syrian people held to account. Those present have heard what the President of the United States has said about that. Meetings are ongoing. Important decisions are being weighed, even as we speak. We are on the edge of a dangerous precipice. The great evil of chemical-weapons use, which once unified the world in opposition, is on the verge of becoming the new normal. The international community must not let that happen. We are beyond showing pictures of dead babies. We are beyond appeals to conscience. We have reached the moment when the world must see justice done. History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Peruvian presidency for having convened this emergency Security Council meeting, at the request of France, together with eight other Council members. I also wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram, for their insightful briefings.There are times in the lives of nations where what is essential is at stake: life or death; peace or war; civilization or barbarism; the international order or chaos. That is the case today following the dreadful chemical carnage that once again pushed the boundaries of horror on Saturday in Douma. We are aware that two new and particularly serious chemical-weapons attacks took place in Douma on 7 April. The provisional toll of human life is appalling. There are nearly 50 dead, including a number of children, and 1,000 wounded. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 12/26 18-09955 That toll is likely to be even higher, as assistance cannot reach some areas. Once again, toxic substances have been dropped to asphyxiate, to kill and to terrorize civilians, reaching them even in the basements where they sought refuge. Chlorine gas has the particular characteristic of being a heavy gas, capable of entering basements. For that reason, it is used. That is the level of deadly cynicism that has been reached in Syria.There are no words to describe the horror of the images that surfaced on 7 April, nearly one year after the Khan Shaykhun attack, which killed nearly 80 people. What we see in the thousands of photos and videos that surfaced in the course of several hours after the 7 April attacks reminds us of the images we have seen far too often: children and adults suffocating due to exposure to concentrated chlorine gas. What we also see are people suffering from violent convulsions, excessive salivation and burning eyes, all of which are symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect. As I mentioned, in total more than 1,000 people were exposed to that deadly chemical compound.The experience and the successive reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism leave no room for doubt as to the perpetrators of this most recent attack. Only the Syrian armed forces and their agencies have the requisite knowledge to develop such sophisticated toxic substances with such a high degree of lethality. And only the Syrian armed forces and its agencies have a military interest in their use. This attack took place in Douma, an area that has been subjected to relentless shelling by the Syrian armed and air forces for several weeks. Unfortunately, the use of such weapons enables much swifter tactical progress than conventional weapons.We are all aware that the Syrian regime has already been identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as the party responsible for the use, on at least four occasions, of chlorine and sarin gas as a chemical weapon. There are no illusions as to the sincerity of the declaration delivered by Syria on the state of its chemical stockpiles in 2013. Unfortunately, we once again we have proof in the form of empirical evidence. This dovetails with the regime's strategy of terror against civilians. We have already experienced this. At the worst, this is bad faith or, even worse, complicity. The Damascus regime clearly seeks, by sowing terror, to accelerate the capture of other urban areas that it wishes to control. What could be more effective to prompt those who resist the regime to flee than sieges, a tactic worthy of the Middle Ages, in addition to chemical terror. Let us make no mistake: the children frozen in an agonizing death are not so-called collateral victims. They are deliberate targets of these chemical attacks, designed and planned for the purpose of waging terror. The Damascus regime is conducting State terrorism, with its litany of war crimes and even crimes against humanity.The offensive and the shelling conducted by the regime, as well as by its Russian and Iranian allies, over the past 48 hours prove the degree to which they have engaged in a military race without any consideration of the human cost. This latest escalation of violence, punctuated by a new instance of the use of chemical weapons, brings us face to face with the destructive madness of a diehard regime that seeks to destroy its people completely. And that regime's Russian and Iranian allies are either unable or unwilling to stop it. We are aware of the fact, and the Russian authorities have confirmed this on several occasions, that Russian military forces have a presence on the ground and in the air in eastern Ghouta. On 7 April, as the second chemical attack took place in Douma, Russian aircraft were also taking part in air operations in the Damascus region. Russian and Iranian military support is present on the ground and at all levels of the Syrian war machinery. No Syrian aircraft takes off without the Russian ally being informed. These attacks took place either with the tacit or explicit consent of Russia or despite its reluctance and military presence. I do not know which is more alarming when it comes to our collective security.The stakes revolving around this recent attack are extremely grave. This is the latest proof of the normalization of chemical weapons use, which we should attribute not only to a regime that has become uncontrollable and continues to gas civilians with complete impunity, but also to its supporters, including a permanent member of the Security Council. That member failed in its commitment to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which it, itself, co-sponsored. That member's responsibility in the endless tragedy that is the war in Syria is overwhelming.France therefore of course turns towards Russia today in order to put forward two demands. The first demand is a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire in Syria, in line with resolution 2401 (2018), adopted on 24 February, 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 13/26 which to date has never been upheld by the Damascus regime. France deeply deplores the fact that, although it was unanimously adopted, it was not possible to implement that resolution, which provides for a truce and emergency humanitarian access. The second demand is the establishment of a new international investigative mechanism that will be able to document all of the factors of the attack in Douma and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The end of the Joint Investigative Mechanism last November due to two successive Russian vetoes has stripped us of an essential tool of deterrence. For that reason, we support any initiative to bridge that gap. And in that spirit France has committed to a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons. In that same spirit, we endorse the draft resolution that has been put forward today by the United States.With this attack the Al-Assad regime is testing yet again the determination of the international community to ensure compliance with the prohibition against chemica-weapons use. Our response must be united, robust and implacable. That response must make it clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians will no longer be tolerated, and that those who flout that fundamental rule of our collective security will be held accountable and must face the consequences. The Al-Assad regime needs to hear an international response, and France stands ready to fully shoulder its role alongside its partners.Ultimately, we know that only an inclusive political solution will bring an end to the seven-year conflict, which has claimed the lives of 500,000 people and pushed millions to take the route of exile. That is why France will remain fully committed alongside the United Nations Special Envoy and in line with the Geneva process. However, in the light of this most recent carnage, we can no longer merely repeat words. Without being followed up by deeds, such words would be meaningless. I wish to reiterate here what President Macron has stressed on several occasions: France will assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. France's position is clear. It will uphold its commitments and keep its word.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and Mr. Markram for their briefings. I also thank all the United Nations teams on the ground for the important and incredibly difficult work they do.As Staffan de Mistura said, this is an important Security Council meeting. My Government shares the outrage that other colleagues have eloquently described today. It is truly horrific to think of victims and families sheltered underground when the chlorine found them.This is the third time in five days that the Council has convened to discuss chemical weapons. This is dreadful in the true sense of that word. The Council should dread what we risk happening — for chemical weapons to become a routine part of fighting. As one of the five permanent members of the Council (P-5), the United Kingdom believes that we have a particular responsibility to uphold the worldwide prohibition on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We agree with the Netherlands Ambassador that the P-5 has specific responsibilities. I believe that four members of the P-5 do believe that, but there is one that does not. The Russian Ambassador referred to a resurgence of the Cold War. This is not the Cold War. In the Cold War there was not this flagrant disregard for the prohibitions that are universal on the use of WMDs.The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also referred to the risks of escalation, and to international peace and security more broadly. We share his fears, but it is the Syrian Government and its backers, Iran and Russia, who are prolonging the fighting and risking regional and wider instability. There are real questions about what is happening in the T-4 airbase, with its foreign fighters and its mercenaries.We have been challenged today by our Russian colleague to say why we believe the attack was carried out by Syria and why we believe, further, that chemical weapons were used. The reasons are as follows. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism found six uses of chemical weapons between 2014 and 2017. Two it ascribed to Da'esh for the use of mustard gas, three it ascribed to the regime for the use of chlorine and one further use it ascribed to the Syrian regime for the use of sarin. That is the attacks that we talked about in the Council just last week at Khan Sheykhoun, which led to the United States strike — which we support — on Al-Shayrat. In addition, as the French Ambassador has said, we had reports of Russian and Syrian warnings before the chemical-weapon attack took place and of a pattern of Mi-8 Hip helicopters flying overhead. Those reports have come from the ground.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 14/26 18-09955 I listened carefully to the Russian Ambassador's argument. As I have just set out, we, as the United Kingdom believe that the Syrian regime is responsible for these latest attacks. But there is one way to settle this — to have an independent fact-finding mission followed by an independent investigation — as we all know that fact-finding missions are there to determine whether chemical weapons have been used and, if they have been used, what sort of chemical weapons. But only an investigation can determine who is responsible for their use, and therefore start the path to accountability.I was very interested to hear the Russian offer that an OPCW fact-finding mission could visit and would have the protection of Russian forces. I believe that this is an offer worth pursuing, but it would, of course, be necessary for the OPCW mission to have complete freedom of action and freedom of access. That still leaves us with the question of who committed these atrocities. That is why we support the United States text for a draft resolution and we believe that there is no legitimate reason not to support the call for the Council to set up an independent investigative mechanism. As I said before, we have nothing to hide, but it appears that Russia, Syria and their supporters, Iran, do have something to fear.The Russian Ambassador singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France for criticism. I would like, if I may, to turn to that. The responsibility for the cruelty in Syria belongs to Syria and its backers — Russia and Iran. The use of chemical weapons is an escalatory and diabolical act. It strikes me that what Russia is trying to do is to turn the debate in the Council away from the discussion of the use of chemical weapons into a dispute between East and West, presenting itself as the victim. It is far too important to play games with the politics between East and West in respect of chemical weapons. Russia's crocodile tears for the people of eastern Ghouta has an easy answer. It is to join us in the non-political attempt to get in humanitarian and protection workers from the United Nations to do their job of looking after and mitigating the risk to civilians. Russia's concern about attribution for the use of chemical weapons also has an easy answer. It is to join us in allowing the United Nations to set up an international investigative mechanism to pursue the responsible parties. I repeat here the two demands of my French colleague, and I hope we will be able to make progress.I had not intended to address the Skripal case in Salisbury, but since my Russian colleague has done so, I will address it today. He asked what the similarities were between Salisbury and Syria. I think it is important that I point out that the cases are different in the following respects. First, there is a thorough investigation under way in Salisbury. As we have heard, there is no investigation under way in Syria. The British Government in Salisbury is seeking to protect its people, as is its duty. The Syrian Government, on the contrary, as we have heard today, attacks and gasses its people. I am sorry to say that what the two do have in common though, is Russia's refusal to assume P-5 responsibilities to prevent the use of WMDs and its reckless support for the use of WMDs by its agents and by its allies.It is not we who want to alienate Russia. It alienates herself by not joining in the vast majority of the Council who wish to find a non-polemical way through and to address the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The Russian Ambassador mentioned friends of the United States. My Government and its people are proud to be a friend of the United States. We stand with everyone on the Council who wants to find a way through the chemical weapons problem, to have a proper fact-finding mission and to have a proper investigation as the first step to bringing this dreadful conflict to a close.Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Envoy de Mistura and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Markram, for their briefings. China takes note of the reports alleging that chemical weapons were once again used in Syria and caused civilian casualties. That is of great concern to China.China's position on chemical-weapons has been consistent and clear. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstances. Any use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever, must not be tolerated. China supports a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation of the incident concerned so that it can reach a conclusion based on substantiated evidence that can stand the test of history and facts so that the perpetrators and responsible parties can be brought to justice.The Syrian chemical-weapons issue is closely linked to to a political settlement of the Syrian situation. China 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 15/26 supports the ongoing important role of the Security Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the main channels for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapons issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take a constructive approach so as to seek a solution through consultations, establish the facts, prevent any further use of chemical weapons, preserve the unity of the Security Council and cooperate with the efforts by the parties concerned to advance the political process in Syria.The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and is inflicting tremendous suffering on the Syrian people. A political settlement is the only solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must remain committed to a political settlement of the question of Syria, while fully respecting its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.China has always opposed the use or threat of force in international affairs. We always advocate adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. All parties should increase their support for the United Nations mediation efforts and compel the parties in Syria to seek a political settlement under the principle of Syrian leadership and ownership in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).The fight against terrorism is an important and urgent issue in the political settlement of the Syrian question. The international community must strengthen its coordination, uphold uniform standards and combat all terrorist groups identified as such by the Security Council.At a recent Security Council meeting, China set out its principled position with regard to the Skripal incident (see S/PV.8224). China believes that the parties concerned should strictly comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention, carry out a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation and deal with the issues concerned within the framework of the OPCW. China hopes that the parties concerned will work in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and equality, engage in consultations, cooperate, avoid politicization and measures that might further exacerbate tensions and resolve their differences properly through dialogue.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings this afternoon. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for acceding to our request for an emergency meeting.We are dismayed by the general escalation of violence in Syria, as described today by Staffan de Mistura, in clear violation of the various resolutions, including resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I want to plea with the Syrian authorities represented in the Chamber and with the Astana guarantors to live up to the Security Council's resolutions.We asked for this meeting today because over the weekend we were yet again faced with horrifying allegations of chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, this time in Douma, just outside Damascus. There are worrying reports of a large number of civilian casualties, including women and children. The graphic material that has been shared is beyond repugnant. We are alarmed by those extremely serious allegations. There must now be an immediate, independent and thorough investigation.Let me reiterate that Sweden supports all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in armed conflict is always prohibited and amounts to a war crime. Those responsible must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria has become a central test of the credibility of the Council. How we respond to the most recent reports from Douma is therefore decisive. Despite the odds, we must put aside our differences and come together. Now is the time to show unity. In our view, the following needs to happen.First, we must condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria.Secondly, our immediate priority must be to investigate the worrying reports from Douma. In that context, we welcome the announcement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Fact-finding Mission for Syria — to which we reiterate our full support — is in the process of gathering information from all available sources. We express our hope that the Fact-finding Mission can be urgently deployed to Syria.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 16/26 18-09955 Thirdly, all States, as well as the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, must fully cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission. What is particularly needed is safe and unhindered access to the site in Douma, as well as any information and evidence deemed relevant by the Fact-finding Mission to conduct its independent investigation.Fourthly, we need to urgently redouble our efforts in the Council to agree on a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism to identify those responsible for chemical-weapons use.Finally, if the allegations of chemical-weapons use are indeed confirmed and those responsible are eventually identified, the perpetrators must be held to account.We are ready to work actively and constructively with other members for urgent Council action. To that end, we have circulated elements as input to our discussions. We must immediately engage in consultations in order to break the current deadlock and to shoulder our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. We owe that to the many victims of the crimes committed in this conflict.Mr. Radomski (Poland): Allow me to thank Special Envoy Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Mr. Thomas Markham for their important briefings.We are horrified by the news of another deadly attack in eastern Ghouta, which took place on Saturday evening. Dozens of people perished as a result of a vicious act of violence against civilians in Douma. The available information about the symptoms of the victims affirm that they are consistent with those caused by a chemical agent.Poland condemns that barbaric attack, and expects that it will be possible to hold the perpetrators accountable. No military or political goal can justify the extermination of innocent vulnerable people, especially those seeking help in medical facilities. That atrocious crime seems to be a cynical response to the debates in the Council last week, when we commemorated the first anniversary of the attack in Khan Shaykun (see S/PV.8221).We call on the actors affecting the situation in Syria, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take all the necessary actions to prevent any further use of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve the full cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Syria. We insist that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.As has been stated many times by members of the Council, as well as United Nations officials and European Union representatives, it is highly regrettable that the renewal of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was vetoed, thereby allowing those responsible for the subsequent chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Today we face the results of that impunity, witnessing further attacks against civilians with the use of chemicals as weapons.We urge all our partners in the Council to engage in a serious discussion in good faith in order to re-establish an accountability mechanism for chemical attacks in Syria. That is the minimum that we owe the victims of Ghouta, Khan Shaykun, Al-Lataminah and the numerous other places where chemical weapons have been used.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to thank Special Envoy De Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings.Reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on Saturday and the videos and pictures that we saw through media outlets are indeed very worrisome. It is also deeply disturbing that such reports of the use of chemical weapons have continued in the ongoing military activities in Syria. As we have repeatedly stated, we strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons by any actor under any circumstances. There is no justification whatsoever for the use of chemical weapons. Those responsible for these inhuman acts must be identified and held accountable. This is absolutely vital, not only for the sake of the victims of chemical weapons in Syria but also for maintaining international peace and security and for preserving the non-proliferation architecture.As the Secretary-General said in his 8 April statement, cited by the Special Envoy earlier, any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation. That includes the need to establish accountability — something on which the Council has yet to achieve consensus. In the meantime, we believe the reported use of chemical weapons in Douma, and in other parts of Syria, should be investigated by the Fact-finding Mission, and all parties should extend full cooperation in that 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 17/26 regard, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.While we all agree that accountability is indispensable for deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and beyond, there is currently, as has already be said, no independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify those individuals, entities, State or non-State actors that use chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Council should recover its unity and engage in a positive and constructive discussion that could address the existing institutional lacunae.We all know that the threats to international peace and security we face today are becoming increasingly more complex by the day. We are seeing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is posing a real danger and that the international norms on the use of chemical weapons are also being undermined. Since the end of the Cold War, the trust among major Powers has never been so low as it is currently, which has enormous implications not only for global peace and security but also for the transformative agenda that we have set for ourselves in the development sphere. We cannot think of making any meaningful headway towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals without creating the necessary global security environment. At the moment, we really cannot say that this is an environment conducive to making any progress on that account.The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, it has not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security that we are facing today. It has been all the more apparent that the lack of unity and cohesion among members is undermining the credibility of the Council. Perhaps we, the elected members, have to look for ways and means to have a greater impact, with a view to contributing to increasing the Council's effectiveness. Without dialogue among the major Powers to build the necessary trust and understanding, it will be extremely difficult to address some of the most difficult and complex security challenges we have ever seen, including the situation in Syria.Things are in fact bound to get even worse unless something is done. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand. The dangers are very palpable. That is why every opportunity should be seized. That is also why we consider the news about the upcoming summit-level meetings being planned to be encouraging. We can only hope that those meetings will help to defuse tensions and allow for serious discussions to take place with a view to finding a common approach to tackling current threats and challenges. The sooner those discussions happen, the better for preserving global peace and stability, which, as we speak, is becoming a source of extremely great concern. In fact, I am understating the magnitude of the potential danger we are facing.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The Ivorian delegation thanks Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their respective briefings on the latest developments in Syria, after the resumption of fighting in Douma and eastern Ghouta and the bombing of the city of Damascus, following the relative calm of recent weeks. My delegation would like to focus its statement on three main points.First, we remain deeply concerned about recent reports of chemical-weapons attacks against innocent civilian populations, which have reportedly resulted in numerous casualties who have shown symptoms of exposure to a chemical agent. While reaffirming its categorical rejection of any use or resort to chemical weapons, be it in times of peace or in times of war, Côte d'Ivoire strongly condemns such acts and calls for these events to be placed under an intense spotlight, with the contribution of all stakeholders.In the face of allegations of recurrent use of chemical weapons by the warring parties in the Syrian conflict, the Ivorian delegation stresses that it is more important than ever that the international community send a strong signal to show, beyond the usual principled condemnations, its determination to put a definitive end to this infernal cycle.The use of chemical weapons violates the most fundamental norms of international law and poses threats to our collective security. That is why we must engage in a unflagging fight against impunity in the use of chemical weapons and preserving the international chemical non-proliferation regime, which is one of the fundamental pillars of our common security.My second point concerns the need for the international community to put in place a mechanism for accountability and for the fight against impunity for those who use chemical weapons, in order to put an end to the repeated use of these weapons. In that regard, the Ivorian delegation expresses its readiness to work S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 18/26 18-09955 towards the establishment of such a mechanism and calls on the Council to return to the unity it had when it established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, whose mandate unfortunately could not be renewed despite our common efforts.Thirdly, Côte d'Ivoire notes with regret that resolution 2401 (2018), which remains the framework for our joint action, has not been implemented and that the humanitarian situation in Syria has further deteriorated. In the light of the distress of the civilian populations trapped in the fighting, the urgency for a cessation of hostilities remains more relevant than ever. In the face of the deteriorating situation, my country would like once again to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and to respect international humanitarian law, including unhindered humanitarian access to persons in distress, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018).In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that the solution to the crisis in Syria cannot be military. Only an inclusive political process can put a definitive end to this conflict. Such a political solution must be in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and imbued with the results of the Geneva negotiations. My country believes that the Geneva talks remain the right framework for achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram and their respective teams for their exhaustive briefings.The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its gratitude to the French Republic and to the other members of the Council that called for the convening of this afternoon's meeting. We also thank the President of the Security Council for having decided to hold this afternoon's meeting under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security: The situation in the Middle East". This is an appropriate topic, since recent events in the Middle East represent a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but at the international level as well. From the protests in the Gaza Strip, with their loss of human lives, to the missile attacks on Syria, as well as the horrendous chemical weapons attack in the Syrian town of Douma, those are all situations of deep concern for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.This past weekend we awoke to news that added a new low to the saddest and bloodiest episodes of the Syrian conflict. According to reports published in the international media, on 7 April, in the Syrian town of Douma in eastern Ghouta, more than 40 people, mostly women and girls, died from asphyxiation caused by inhaling a poison gas.As we heard in this Chamber on 4 April from the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram (see S/PV.8221), the conclusions and recommendations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are not binding and do not attribute responsibilities in the case of evidence of the use of chemical substances prohibited under the relevant international treaties. In the light of that fact, we take this opportunity to recall the obligation of all parties to take essential steps towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), and we underscore the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism of the United Nations whose task should be focused on preventing impunity, identifying those responsible and preventing future attacks to the best of its abilities.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, no use of chemical weapons should go uninvestigated or unpunished. As a result, the alarming information coming out of Syria, especially that pertaining to the use of chemical weapons targeting civilians, both the case of Douma, which we are discussing today, as well as similar events in the past, must be investigated exhaustively, fairly, objectively and independently by international bodies in accordance with OPCW standards. The results of such investigations must be made public and those responsible must answer for their crimes before the implacable face of justice.The fact that chemical substances continue to be used, especially against civilians, is cause for serious concern to the Government of Equatorial Guinea. During the general debate of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, condemned in the strongest terms the use, manufacture, possession and distribution of chemical weapons in armed conflicts (see A/72/PV.13). It is worth recalling that no member of the Council should be considered exempt from that obligation, which also reflects Chapter I of the Charter of the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 19/26 United Nations, which enshrines the determination of Member States to build a world of peace and ensure the well-being of humankind.The Security Council now finds itself at a crossroads with respect to its options. It can either strengthen the presence of international forces with a view to future military intervention, as some military Powers have been suggesting, or we can pursue international negotiations, be they in Geneva, Astana, Sochi or Ankara. However, history continues to teach us that military interventionism has never resolved conflicts; rather, it exacerbates and entrenches them, sowing desolation and ruin in its wake.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, the only solution to the Syrian conflict is to be found in the words spoken yesterday by Pope Francis in the traditional Sunday mass in Saint Peter's Square in the Vatican:"There is no such thing as a good war and a bad war. Nothing, but nothing, can justify the use of such instruments of extermination on defenseless people and populations . military and political leaders choose another path, that of negotiations, which is the only one that can bring about peace and not death and destruction."In conclusion, we reiterate the appeal made by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the countries and actors with influence in Syria, as well as in Israel and Palestine, to wield that influence in order to force all parties involved in those conflicts to mitigate the suffering of their people and to sit down to negotiate to put an end to that chronic threat to international peace and security which persists in the Middle East.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Thomas Markram, for their briefings. We express our gratitude to Council members for initiating this emergency meeting, which we hope will lead to the launching of a timely and objective investigation of the incident in Douma.We firmly believe that the Security Council remains the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the situation within the Council is becoming increasingly strained. In order to achieve an appropriate solution to these critical issues, it is of utmost importance that the Council act unanimously, in a balanced and pragmatic manner. To that end, we must demonstrate greater flexibility and negotiability, rising above our national interests in order to achieve peace and stability. Any controversy that involves prejudices and mutual accusations and lacks conclusive results and irrefutable evidence will have only a destructive effect and will not lead to the results that the world community expects from us.With regard to the chemical attacks in Syria, we mourn together with the families of those killed and express our solidarity with them in the face of such atrocities, by which innocent civilians become victims of the relentless confrontation of the opposing parties. Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stand, uncompromisingly condemning any use of chemical weapons as the most heinous action and an unacceptable war crime.With regard to the situation in Douma, we call for an investigation into this alleged incident to be carried out and for all the circumstances to be clarified as soon as possible. The Council has the great responsibility to act on verifiable facts, not only before the world community, but before ourselves. Furthermore, history itself will ultimately be the judge of our decisions. Therefore, we need to verify all the details of the incident. In that regard, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.First, are there any other reliable sources, in addition to White Helmets' claims, and who can verify the veracity of the assessments and testimonies of those sources? Some claim that the number of victims is 70, while others report that there were more than 150 victims and still others believe there were only 25 victims. Even one victim is too many. However, today, the Russian Federation denied the attack altogether. There are many allegations and assumptions regarding the very facts concerning the use of a toxic chemical substance.Secondly, we consider it important to take into account the fact that the Government of Syria has repeatedly notified us and requested that we check its reports that a number of terrorist groups on the side of the opposition were making attempts to transfer chemical weapons and prepare chemical attacks on the territory of eastern Ghouta. Actually, these allegations have not been given due attention and we have had no opportunity to verify all the facts. We are not advocating for any side in this conflict, but rather demanding a full S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 20/26 18-09955 and objective investigation on the basis of which we can make a thoughtful decision.Thirdly, we believe that it is imperative to conduct an independent investigation. We again recall the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, the establishment of which depends on the permanent members of the Council. They must make every possible effort to find common ground on the issue. We urgently need objective and verifiable information, as well as an immediate, independent, transparent and unbiased investigation before any decision or action, unilateral or otherwise, is taken.We fully support the proposal that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission be sent at the earliest. We are certain that the Syrian people are very interested in an objective investigation. Therefore, Damascus and opposing parties should provide all assistance and secure access for the speedy visit of the OPCW inspectors to the incident sites to collect facts on the ground.Finally, we again call for the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the Council to reach a consensus-based decision to preserve peace and stability in the world.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank you, Mr. President, for the prompt convening of today's meeting. We were one of the countries that requested it.We also thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.Since the beginning of this year, the State of Kuwait has occupied the Arab seat in the Security Council. One of our most important priorities, which we made clear before we joined it, is to defend and uphold Arab issues, voice the concerns about them and work to find peaceful solutions. We deeply deplore the lack of any real and genuine progress on any of these issues, in particular that of the Syrian crisis, which regrettably continues to deteriorate. Security Council resolutions on such issues are not implemented. The Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is unable to shoulder that responsibility. It is divided as it faces those dangers and threats. Therefore the crises continue, along with the suffering of the people in the region.The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest terms the heinous rocket and barrel bomb attacks against residential areas under siege in eastern Ghouta, including the latest attack on Douma, on 7 April. Five days ago we marked the first anniversary of the Khan Shaykhun incident (see S/PV.8221), in which chemical weapons were used, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also identified who used them.Two days ago, scores of civilians, including children and women, were killed or injured in attacks and air strikes against Douma. Many cases of asphyxiation were recorded. Several international reports confirmed that the crimes committed in both incidents were tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, which reminds us once again of the request we all made in the Chamber for the establishment of a new mechanism to determine whether or not and by whom chemical weapons had been used, and to hold the perpetrators in Syria accountable. The mechanism must guarantee impartial, transparent and professional investigations in all chemical attacks in Syria in order to end impunity. For the past five years — specifically, since August 2013 — the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria have enjoyed impunity. They have not been punished, even when we witnessed the very first crime of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta.We do not want to mark the first anniversary of the attack in Douma without a conviction. We call for the Council to establish an accountability mechanism that would determine the perpetrators of the chemical-weapons crimes anywhere in Syria — be they a Government, entity, group or individual — so that they can be held accountable in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013). The Council must shoulder its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in Syria is a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime. The continued attacks against civilians in medical facilities and residential areas, through air strikes or artillery, are all flagrant violations of the international community's will and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, at the very least, without delay.09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 21/26 The provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) are clear and definite. They call for accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, current events are a clear violation of the provisions of the resolution. As members of the Council, we cannot accept the status quo, which is the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is another disappointment for the Syrian people, whose suffering caused by the use of such weapons in different parts of Syria we have been unable to end.The Council has a collective responsibility. The suffering Syrian people are sick and tired of tuning into meetings of the Council without seeing tangible results on the ground. At several junctures throughout this bloody conflict the Council has been able to find common ground to end the crisis. However, we must overcome our political differences and establish a new accountability mechanism in Syria that is professional, credible and impartial. Such elements are available in the draft resolution under discussion, which has been put forward by the United States. It includes updates on the incident in Douma. We call on all members of the Council to build on that draft as a good basis for negotiations on a future mechanism.We continue to seek a political solution as the only means to end the crisis in all its dimensions. The political road map is clear and agreed, based on the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and on resolution 2254 (2015). It seeks to maintain the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria and meet the legitimate aspirations and ambitions of the Syrian people towards living a dignified life.Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma. Bolivia reiterates its condemnation of the use of chemical agents as weapons and considers it to be an unjustifiable criminal act. There can be no justification for their use, regardless of the circumstances or by whom they are used, as it constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to international peace and security.We believe that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, in line with its mandate, should verify in the most objective, methodological and technical manner the reported use of chemical weapons. Should their use be verified, it must be investigated in an effective and transparent manner in order to ensure that the perpetrators can be identified and tried by the appropriate bodies so as to prevent impunity. We therefore need an independent, impartial and representative entity that will conduct a comprehensive, credible and conclusive investigation. Our major challenge is to ensure that we do not politicize or exploit the Security Council for our own purposes. We regret that so far there have been obstacles to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on all the parties involved to make every effort to effectively implement it throughout Syrian territory. We emphatically reject the ongoing bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, especially those on civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, and we deplore all military activity in residential areas. Such actions only cause more displacements, injuries and deaths. We call on all the parties to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, including authorizing humanitarian access throughout Syria and to all persons in need, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that the only option is an inclusive, negotiated and coordinated political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, aimed at enabling sustainable peace to be achieved in the area without any foreign pressure, as provided for in resolution 2254 (2015). We also reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria.Bolivia wants to once again make clear its firm rejection of the use of force or the threat of use of force. We also reject unilateral actions, which are illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and undermine any effort to achieve a political solution.Lastly, with regard to the events in the city of Salisbury, we reiterate the importance of conducting an independent, transparent and depoliticized investigation in accordance with current rules and regulations of international law, especially as set forth by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 22/26 18-09955 We believe that cooperation among the relevant parties will be essential to making progress through the appropriate diplomatic channels in solving the crime and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings. Peru is deeply concerned about the new reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, including minors, in the town of Douma. In that regard, we note the urgent need for a thorough investigation. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons wherever it may take place. We want to point out that it is a heinous crime, a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and a violation both of the non-proliferation regime and international humanitarian law.In the short term, we believe that the Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict, including countries with influence on the ground, should abide by and implement the humanitarian ceasefire that the Council provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and to cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. To that end, we once again reiterate the importance of establishing an independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The investigations should result in the prosecution and punishment of those responsible. The members of the Council cannot permit impunity.We must also remember that any response to the conflict in Syria and the atrocities committed there must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Peru opposes any use or threat of use of force contrary to international law. We reiterate our deep concern about the serious consequences that the ongoing atrocities in the Syrian conflict may have for the stability of the Middle East and for an international order based on minimum standards of humanity and coexistence. In that regard, I would like to conclude by calling on the members of the Council to restore a sense of unity and the common good to our discharge of our high responsibilities. In the case of Syria, that means implementing the ceasefire and ensuring the effective protection of civilians, investigating and punishing atrocity crimes and resuming a serious process of political dialogue, based on resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), with a view to promoting the sustainable peace that the Syrian people so badly need.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like my Dutch colleague and friend, I too have three points to make.I would first like to respectfully request of my colleague Mrs. Nikki Haley, Permanent Representative of the United States, that from now on she refrain from labelling any legitimate Governments as "regimes". Right now I am referring specifically to Russia. I have made that request once before, but Ambassador Haley was not present, and I asked for it to be conveyed to her by her colleagues. Now I am requesting it personally. If it happens again, I will interrupt the meeting on a point of order.Secondly, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said that Syria is different from Salisbury in that there no investigation is being conducted in Syria, while one is under way in Salisbury. We would very much like to know more about the details of that investigation and would be grateful if she could communicate them to us. However, for the time being we know nothing other than that all of a sudden the alleged victims of a chemical warfare agent, thankfully, turn out to be alive and, apparently, almost completely well. However, nobody has seen them yet, and we fear for the condition of those important witnesses. At the moment, we have learned from newspaper reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has offered to shelter the Skripals in the United States under new identities. The CIA's participation in this is itself revealing. But it also means that we may never see these people, who are key witnesses to what happened, again.What else do we know? We know about the speedy euthanization of the Skripals' pets and the cremation of the cat and dead guinea pigs. We are also aware of the intention to demolish their house and the restaurant and pub they visited. We also know that Yulia Skripal's sister, Viktoria, who wanted to see her, was denied a British visa. Why? That is all we know. I repeat that we would very much like to learn more details about what is going on, and we would be grateful to our British 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 23/26 colleagues if they could keep us regularly informed during the investigation.Thirdly, and lastly, we did not meet here today to address the situation in Douma. The agenda item is entitled "Threats to international peace and security", although, needless to say, it was the situation regarding Douma and the so-called chemical attack that prompted the meeting. In today's meeting, as Mr. De Mistura mentioned and the Secretary-General has previously discussed, we are moving towards a dangerous area. Unfortunately, the people who are playing these dangerous games and spewing irresponsible threats do not understand that. Today we heard once again what we have already heard many times. None of our Western colleagues want to hear or listen to objective information. None of them has expressed any doubts about the one and only version that has been given of what transpired. So what is the point of an investigation? Why bother? They have accused Damascus of a chemical-weapon attack not just before any investigation has been carried out but before the incident was even known about.They are not convinced by the information that we have provided today. They simply do not want to listen. We have already said that there are no witnesses to the use of chemical weapons at all. There are no traces of chemicals, no bodies, no injuries, no poisoning victims. Nobody went to the hospital. The footage was all clearly staged by the White Helmets. We demand that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission immediately visit Douma and the area of the alleged chemical weapons attack, interview the residents and medical staff and and collect soil samples. My British colleague said that only an investigation can establish who is to blame. We agree, except that did not stop her from blaming the so-called Syrian regime. Those two things do not really jibe. We insist that the OPCW mission visit Douma immediately. The Syrian authorities and Russian troops are ready to provide the necessary conditions for this to take place.Lastly, we too wish there were an independent investigative mechanism. I would like to remind the Council that our draft resolution, which includes a proposal for establishing such a mechanism, is in blue, and we are ready to adopt it today, if necessary.The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I apologize for taking the floor again, but I want to clarify something. The Russian Ambassador's English is far too good for him not to have understood me when I spoke on 5 April (see S/PV.8224). The investigation of the Salisbury incident that is under way is an independent police investigation, and the United Kingdom will be very pleased to update the Council as and when we have something to say.If I may, I would like to add one more thing. The other difference between Salisbury and Syria is that the United Kingdom is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in good standing, and the Syrian Government has not complied with its obligations as certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The American representative said that Russia spends its resources to support what she calls the regime in Syria. My question to her is: What does the United States spend its resources on in Syria? Does it spend its resources providing milk and medicine to Syrian children, or on providing weapons and munitions to its terrorist groups, which have committed the most heinous crimes against the Syrian people? Or is it spending resources on the its alliance's aircraft, which have wreaked destruction in many places in Syria, particularly in the city of Raqqa? What about the continuous threats that are made against my country at nearly every meeting of the Security Council on this issue? Does she acknowledge that her Administration has no respect for the Security Council, this international Organization or the principles of international law?Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the United States Ambassador said. I ask members to note that I do not refer to the American Administration as the "American regime" because that would be legally shameful in this Chamber. Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the American Ambassador said when she asked the Security Council to act in order to achieve justice in Syria. Well, my test is to request that her Administration and her country allow the disclosure of the results of the United Nations Special Commission that investigated the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq for 18 years. The Commission was headed for some time by a Swede, Mr. Hans Blix.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 24/26 18-09955 As Council members know, after 18 years of investigation the Commission found no chemical weapons in Iraq. Nor did they find Coca-Cola or Pepsi Cola. Nevertheless, in a semi-confidential meeting towards the end of 2008, the Security Council decided to end the Commission's work and bury its archives in iron boxes. I repeat — it decided to bury its archives in iron boxes. Only the Secretary-General knows the code that opens those boxes. There was one condition, which was that the boxes could not be opened for 60 years. What is so shameful in those archives? Why did they have to be buried in boxes that cannot be opened for 60 years? That question is directed to the American Ambassador.The Government of my country condemns in the strongest terms the ruthless Israeli aggression that took place this morning on the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate, in which a number of civilians were killed and injured. It was a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and of various Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, and would not have occurred were it not for the American Administration's unlimited and consistent support for Israel. The American Administration guarantees Israel immunity so that it will not be held accountable in the Council. That allows Israel to continue to practice State terrorism and to threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. Of course, Western countries did not even mention the Israeli aggression in their statements today, which shows that the Governments of their countries are complicit in it and are covering for it. Unfortunately, my dear friend Mr. De Mistura did not hear Netanyahu say this morning that it was Israel that launched the attack. That is why I was surprised when he said that the United Nations has not been able to verify the identity of its perpetrators. If Netanyahu himself says that he launched this aggression, why does Mr. De Mistura not refer to Israel as the aggressor?This Israeli aggression is an indirect response to the successes of the Syrian Arab Army in expelling armed terrorist groups from the suburbs of Damascus, its rural area and other Syrian territory. Those groups have been killing the Syrian people, kidnapping civilians, detaining them and using them as human shields. They targeted Damascus alone with 3,000 missiles over the course of three months, killing 155 martyrs and injuring 865 civilians, most of them women and children. The Syrian Government underscores that the repeated Israeli aggression did not and will not protect Israeli agents operating within terrorist groups, nor will it divert the attention of the Syrian Army from its decisive military achievements in combating terrorism.The American anti-racism activist Martin Luther King Jr. said that "a lie is like a snowball: the further you roll it the bigger it becomes". It would seem that this wise saying holds true at any time and at any place. The Governments of some countries lie incessantly. Fortunately, though, they have not quite perfected the details of their web of lies, much like the famous Baron Munchausen of German literature. How many roosters truly believe that sunrise is the result of crowing?Some permanent members have become professional liars, and that in itself is a weapon of mass destruction. Through their lies, Palestine was stolen. The lies of these countries fuelled the war in the Korean peninsula. Through their lies, they invaded Viet Nam. Through their lies, they invaded Grenada. Through their lies, they destroyed Yugoslavia. Through their lies, they occupied Iraq. Through their lies, they destroyed Libya. Through their lies, they created takfiri terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam — and the list goes on and on. Through their lies, the same countries are trying to defeat Syria and prepare the ground for an assault today.It is worth noting that the today's negative statement of the United States representative is in absolute contradiction with a statement made by United States Secretary of Defence General Mattis in an interview with Newsweek two days ago with journalist Ian Wilkie. Mr. Wilkie used the following title for the interview: "Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People." That was said by the American Defence Secretary, not the Syrian Defence Minister. What a harmonious Administration!On 10 December 2012, some six years ago, we submitted a formal letter to the Council (S/2012/917), before the operators of terrorist groups claimed, for the first time, that sarin gas was used in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013. We informed the Council that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had launched a campaign of allegations claiming that the Syrian Government may have used chemical weapons. Back then, we warned that such allegations would encourage Governments that sponsor terrorists to provide chemical weapons to armed terrorist groups and then claim that the Syrian Government had used such weapons. What happened in the past few years 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 25/26 in Khan Al-Assal, Ghouta, Kafr Zita, Lataminah, Tal Minis, Khan Shaykhun and many other villages and towns in Syria confirms unequivocally what we had warned of five to six years ago, and during all these six years.The United States, the United Kingdom and France have been extremely eager to hold one meeting after another based on fabricated information. That is part of the deep crisis that we are witnessing. They want to involve other Council members in that crisis. Since 2013, those three countries have created a big elephant of lies and deceit in the Security Council. That elephant is living in the Chamber today and is stomping on the credibility of the Council with its huge feet. It seems that these countries called for the holding of today's meeting to support terrorists and to obstruct the agreement reached about Douma.However, those countries were a bit late because the terrorists had hoped this meeting would be held before they were forced to reach an agreement with the Syrian State to leave their strongholds and hand over their weapons. These countries were late in fulfilling their promises to the terrorists. It would have been better not to repeat their nasty story and not to rely on false reports from mercenaries — so-called White Helmets, founded by British intelligence officer James Le Mesurier. He is British, but his name is French. What proves that these countries were lying is that the residents of Douma left the city safely — 170,000 civilians left the city safely. Those terrorists chose to reach an agreement with the Syrian State as a last resort for them and their families. Many buses are transferring them and their families to the city of Jarabulus, after they refused to settle their affairs and chose to go there. However, the vast majority of residents chose to stay in their houses and resort to the Syrian State.It has been proven that the allegations of certain States, including some States members of the Council, on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta were lies, just as we saw in Aleppo and other places. As it turned out, terrorist group warehouses were full of medication and food, monopolized by their elements who sold some of those items to civilians at exorbitant prices. At this point, I must ask: Did the three countries call for this meeting in order to legitimize the Israeli aggression that occurred this morning or to impede the implementation of the agreement reached with their terrorist tools?In this context, I must thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for recognizing the true nature of what these countries were preparing for, and aptly called for the meeting to be held under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security". That is the correct agenda item.We have conveyed to the Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and what used to be called the Joint Investigative Mechanism 145 letters, the latest on 1 April 2018. I thank the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan for pointing out that the Council members do not read and that the Council does not respond to those letters. The letters contain accurate information. They indicate that armed terrorist groups possess toxic chemical substances, notably chlorine and sarin. We have warned time and again that those groups were preparing to commit crimes involving chemical weapons against innocent Syrians, and were working with the White Helmets to fabricate evidence, photograph locations and film Hollywood-like scenes with everything staged in order to blame the Syrian Government and influence public opinion against Syria and its allies. Those countries call for the holding of meetings such as this in order to create a pretext that would justify any military aggression against Syria.It seems that the directors of that terrorist scene failed to perfect their web of lies. We note that in each of those theatrical scenes on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government, the substances never seem to affect the armed elements, but only women and children. These chemical weapons seem to discriminate against women and children and do not affect armed men. It suffices to wash away these chemicals with water in front of the camera. Water appears to heal everything. Rescue workers never need to wear protective masks. The Syrian Arab Army does not use these substances because it does not possess them to begin with. The Americans destroyed them on the vessel MV Cape Ray in the Mediterranean. So, the Syrian Arab Army uses these substances, which it does not possess, only when it is making military progress. How strange that is!This vehement campaign lacks the minimum standards of credibility. It relies on fabricated information on social media by elements of armed terrorist groups and their operators. I announce from this table that the Syrian Government is fully prepared to facilitate an OPCW fact-finding mission to Douma, S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 26/26 18-09955 where the incident is alleged to have occurred, as soon as possible to investigate and verify these allegations. We endorse the Russian proposal to hear a briefing on the fact-finding mission's report after its visit to Al-Raqqa. We welcome this visit as soon as possible.I hope that this offer does not suffer the same fate as the first offer we made to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the Khan Al-Assal incident of chemical substance use in March 2013. At that time, we asked the Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Syrian Government in immediately investigating what happened in the town of Khan Al-Assal. It took the United Nations four months and 11 days to send Mr. Sellström, as Council members recall. Yes, it took the United Nations four months and 11 days. That is how the United Nations interpreted the term "immediately" — four months and 11 days. When Mr. Sellström arrived in Damascus to investigate what had happened in Khan Al-Assal, terrorists in Ghouta were instructed to use chemical substances again. Mr. Sellström therefore left Khan Al-Assal and moved to Ghouta. Council members should be aware that since March 2013, investigations into what happened in Khan Al-Assal have not taken place.Today, we directly accuse Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha and Ankara of providing Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and scores of other affiliated terrorist groups with toxic chemical substances to be used against Syrian civilians. We accuse them of inciting those massacres and of fabricating evidence to falsely blame the Syrian Government for the use of toxic chemical substances in order to prepare the ground for an aggression against my country, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did in Iraq in 2003.Yes, we say to the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in Syria and Iraq, we eliminated the vast majority of Da'esh elements within three years — not within 30 years, as President Obama has said. Those States have plans to justify undermining the stability of the region. Yes, we say to Saudi Arabia today that we cut off its terrorist tentacles — the gangs of Jaysh Al-Islam — in eastern Ghouta. Yes, we say to Qatar and Turkey that we cut off their terrorist tentacles — the gangs of the Al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman — in eastern Ghouta. I say to all those who sent moderate, armed, genetically modified opposition fighters to our land that we eliminated these toxic exports. We call on those exporters to bear the consequences of their actions, as some surviving elements will return to their original countries.The issue is very simple. Let me just say that on our borders with Turkey and in the separation zone in the Golan with Israel, there are tens of thousands of good, moderate terrorists with their light weapons, long beards, black banners and white helmets. Whoever wants to adopt them should submit an application to their operators. They are ready to go to Europe and the West as refugees.In conclusion, the Syrian Arab Republic stresses once again that it does not possess chemical weapons of any type, including chlorine. We condemn anew the use of chemical weapons at anytime, anywhere and in any circumstances. My country, Syria, reaffirms its readiness to cooperate fully with the OPCW in fulfilling its commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.The Russian Centre for Reconciliation in Syria announced today that Russian military experts have carried out investigations in Douma and confirmed that they have found no sign of the use of chemical weapons there. While treating the sick in the hospitals of Douma, Russian doctors have proven that these patients have not been subjected to any chemical substance. What we were seeing there was nothing but Hollywood-style scenes.The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.