In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 67-120
This paper argues that judicial assertion of entrenched Charter standards since 1982 has constituted the only real check against the lure of law-and-order politics by politicians of all stripes and the consequent unremittingly legislative trend to toughen the criminal law. The paper undertakes the daunting task of stating the basic minimum Charter standards under sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 for police powers to stop, detain and question, and the n considering whether the courts have arrived at the proper balance between affording police effective enforcement powers while protecting the civil rights of all Canadians. The paper concludes that the courts have done a reasonably good job in setting out Charter standards for the police which try to balance civil liberties and the need for effective police powers. They have in general achieved a reasonable balance comparatively free of the law-and-order politics that dominates Parliament. However, the paper acknowledges that the Charter as interpreted by our courts is certainly no panacea and that sometimes the standards have been set too low, and suggests that the Supreme Court reconsider its approaches in a number of areas such as the triggering devices of "reasonable expectation of privacy" for section 8 and "detention" for sections 9 and 10. The Court should revisit the issue of section 10(b) and right to silence protections, particularly in the context of custodial interrogation. Perhaps most importantly, the Court should announce a revised set of criteria for the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) to make it clear that the seriousness of the violation is determinative and not the reliability of the evidence or the seriousness of the offence. In these times of law and order and public security hype, it is hoped that the courts will maintain their independent role as guardians of the Charter so that our criminal justice system will remain one which balances and respects minority rights of all Canadians, including those of the accused.
In: Baranović, Branislava (2004) Attitudes of Croatian youth towards human rights as an integral part of a democrat political culture. In: Towards non-violence & dialogue culture in South East Europe. Ivan Hadjiyski Institute for Social Values and Structures, Sofia, pp. 29-46. ISBN 954-91428-1-7
The attitudes of young people in Croatia to human rights and duties form the subject of analysis in this text. Perception of human rights was analysed as a universal value for respondents, as a constitutional principle of the political and social system and as a goal (priority) of Croatian politics. The analysis is based on the results of empirical research conducted in 1999 with a representative sample of 1700 young people aged 15 to 29, from the whole of Croatia. The results indicate that human rights represent a very significant social value for the greater part of the young (88%). The results also show that, in the formation of young people's attitudes toward human rights and the evaluation of their realisation, the dominant influence belongs to their political orientation (measured through their party preference) and the social-cultural status of the young (the participant's level of education, place of residence, parental education, etc.). Unlike the supporters of right-wing political options, the sympathizers with social-democratic and liberal options accept human rights to a higher degree and are more critical toward the level of their realization in Croatia.
This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts. ; This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.
This article examines the response to the identification and support of unaccompanied children who have been trafficked into the UK. Locating the identification of victims of trafficking with the Home Office is problematic as their primary responsibility is not child protection. This approach is likely to prioritise immigration concerns that potentially exclude some children from the appropriate safeguarding support of local authority social work departments. In addition to the practice implications, the current responses are examined through a lens of neoliberalism, providing a unique critique of the present system. The article concludes by proposing an alternative model of identification and support that completely bypasses the Home Office. It proposes that identification of unaccompanied children who have been trafficked is located within a social work-led child protection framework. This would adhere to international obligations to child victims of human trafficking, and prioritise a human rights-based approach.