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AbstractIn this study, we contend that distinguishing individuals who support bans onminorityreligious symbols from those who want to banallreligious symbols improves our understanding of the roots of opposition to minority religious symbols in the public sphere. We hypothesize that both groups are likely driven by markedly different motivations and that opposition to the presence of minority religious symbols in the public sphere may be the result of an alliance between "strange bedfellows," clusters of individuals whose political outlooks usually bring them to opposite sides of political debates. Drawing on a survey conducted in the province of Quebec (Canada), we find that while holding liberal values and low religiosity are key characteristics of those who would ban all religious symbols, feelings of cultural threat and generalized prejudice are central characteristics of those who would only restrict minority religious symbols. Negative attitudes specifically toward Muslims, however, also appear to motivate both groups.

While most interpretations of Terrence Malick's 2011The Tree of Life concentrate on the film's theological resonances, I focus here onThe Tree of Life's political vision. I locate this vision in the fraught relationship between two influential strands of American religio-political thought, Augustinianism and Emersonianism.The Tree of Life's theological concerns are undoubtedly Augustinian, yet it takes up a similar radical politics as what Emerson did in his best-known essays. The result, I argue, is a cinema of religio-political possibility with important implications for a potential rapproachment between religionists (namely evangelical Christians) and secularists, particularly on the topic of environmental conservation and sustainability.

Abstract. This article explores the competing relations between ethnic, religious and racial identities in contemporary Tanzania at a time of rapid socioeconomic change and in the face of the declining authority and legitimacy of the state. During nearly four decades of one‐party rule the state has pursued policies ‐ educational, linguistic, developmental, etc. ‐ aimed at constructing a secular national identity capable of uniting diverse social groups under the banner of African socialism. However, economic retrenchment in the 1980s and political liberalisation in the 1990s has contributed directly to a series of upheavals leading many Tanzanians to redefine the structures of common difference and to a fracturing of national identity. This article seeks to understand the reasons for the upsurge of conflict and cultural fragmentation in the 1990s.

This analysis challenges the consensus that, in post-war Italy the Catholic party [Democrazia Cristiana (Dc)], actively supported by the Catholic Church, fostered a process of vote nationalization. The paper, drawing upon a more fine-grained level of analysis, different statistical measures, and within and across regional models, provides a more nuanced interpretation. According to our analysis, although the Dc effectively acted as a homogenizing agent until the late 1970s, after that decade the processes of modernization and secularization fostered the decline of religious-based politics, and of the Dc itself. Such decline opened the way for the re-emergence of a territorial cleavage and a consequent dis-homogenization of Italian electoral politics. The paper demonstrated that the impact of modernization and secularization on the vote for the Catholic party is more significant considering the five Italy's geo-political areas rather than the country as a whole. Moreover, the divergent path in the five areas testifies the re-emergence of territory in the Italian electoral behaviour. Territorial heterogeneity, modernization, and secularization were central to the collapse of the Dc.

AbstractThis study asks how religious change at the social level (as expressed in increased religiosity) influences the religious behavior of public organizations. The study's empirical foundation is three Israeli case studies that focus on the impact of growing religiosity in Israeli Jewish society on three large public institutions: the military, healthcare, and schools. Based on comparative analysis of the three case studies, it is shown that variation in the extent of religionization in public organizations is influenced primarily by the religious composition of workers and consumers of a specific public organization. The influence of political pressure from above, however, is marginal. In addition, this study demonstrates how organizational religionization is differentially mediated by institutional mechanisms/structures: institutional layering or conversion.

AbstractDespite trends towards greater LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights in industrialized democracies, the rights of sexual minorities have become increasingly politicized and restricted throughout Africa. Recognizing religion's central role in shaping attitudes toward gays and lesbians, we hypothesize that local religious diversity could expose individuals to alternative religious perspectives, engender tolerance toward marginalized communities, and therefore dislodge dogmatic beliefs about social issues. Employing cross-national Afrobarometer survey data from 33 countries with an index of district-level religious concentration, we find that respondents living in religiously pluralistic communities are 4–5 points more likely to express tolerance of homosexual neighbors (50% increase) compared to those in homogeneous locales. This effect is not driven by outlier countries, the existence of specific religious affiliations within diverse communities, respondents' religiosity, or other observable and latent factors at the country, sub-national, district, and individual level. Further robustness checks address potential threats to validity. We conclude that religious diversity can foster inclusion of sexual minorities in Africa.

AbstractWhat impact do cues from religious elites have on followers, particularly when religious communities are internally divided? Could religious elites promote internal consensus, or would their cues stoke further internal polarization? This article utilizes the release of Pope Francis's encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si', to explore these questions. A unique survey experiment, conducted on a nationally representative sample of Catholic voters in the United States in late 2015, tests the impact of Francis' message relative to a similar message from unidentified environmental elites. In keeping with other studies of Laudato's impact in the United States, findings reveal real, but nuanced, effects from Francis' environmental cue. The Francis cue did impact conservatives and high religiosity Catholics, but these effects were not distinct from those on other Catholics in the sample, suggesting limitations in promoting consensus. Instead, responses to a Francis cue varied sharply depending on pre-existing views of Francis' leadership.

AbstractPositing a "clash of cultures," many European politicians oppose Muslim headscarves as well as Islamic instruction in public schools; the real source of "failed integration" lies not with the religiosity of young Muslims but rather with an arcane definition of "state neutrality" that sustains the dominance of some religions at the expense of others. Focusing on Germany, this study reviews educational statistics pertaining to youth of migrant origin, showing that conflicts over Islamic instruction mirror deeper patterns of minority discrimination. It outlines the legal hurdles new faith communities must overcome to secure recognition as "corporate entities under public law" (Körperschaftsstatus), entitling them to accredited teacher training, tax-funded salaries, construction subsidies, and other institutional privileges. It describes divergent curricular models utilized by the Länder, followed by a closer look at Islamic instruction in Berlin, where a court ruling compelled authorities to take a pro-active approach. It concludes with a review of dilemmas inherent in Germany's approach to "value education" against the backdrop of the new European Union anti-discrimination directives.Show me any mischief produced by the madness or wickedness of theologians, and I will show you a hundred resulting from the ambition and villany of conquerors and statesmen. Show me an absurdity in religion, and I will undertake to show you a hundred for one in political laws and institutionsEdmund Burke, 1756