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Developments in recent years in the technologies that underpin money transfers and financial investments have challenged banking in general and central banking in particular. On the one hand, with the onset and manifestation of the 2008 crisis, the banking system is being called into question as to whether it can be trusted, and on the other hand, also in the same historical context, blockchain technology is emerging and is seen as a threat by banks. Lately, there has been interest in Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) which are a digital replacement for banknotes and coins in physical form. In this paper we will highlight the features of CBDCs and the proposed Ethereum-based central bank money technology.

[1] Committee of Private Country Banks. Reasons against legislative interference. 1844.--[2] Drummond, Henry. Causes which lead to a bank restriction bill. 1839.--[3] Dun, John. The English bankers' grievance and its proper remedy. 1874.--[4] Greig, J.K. Bank note and banking reform. 1880.--[5] Holdsworth, A.H. A letter to a friend in Devonshire. 1818.--[6] Kinnear, George. Banks and exchange companies. 1847.--[7] A letter to the Right Hon. the Viscount Althorp on his proposed interference with the present system of country banking. 1833.--[8] LLoyds Bank Limited. Permanent staff training. 1919.--[9] [Maclean, A.W.] Additional considerations, addressed to all classes, on the necessity and equity of a national system of deposit-banking and paper currency. 1835.--[10] Nicholson, N.A. The controversy on free banking. 1868.--[11] Steele, F.E. On changes in the bank rate. [1891]--[12] Stirling, James. Practical considerations on banks and bank management. 1865.--[13] Thoughts upon the principles of banks, and the wisdom of legislative interference. 1837.--[14] Watt, Peter. The theory and practice of joint-stock banking. 1836. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Con la nascita e lo sviluppo della banconota comincia anche la storia delle banche centrali. Il periodo storico che va dalla metà del Seicento alla metà dell'Ottocento può essere considerato come un grande cantiere, nel quale sono state sperimentate le più svariate soluzioni per sostenere la fiducia nella banconota. Principalmente come ha riconosciuto Vera Smith il sistema dell'emissione di banconote tende ad essere organizzato in tre modi differenti: 1) attraverso l'accentramento in un organismo statale; 2) tramite l'attribuzione di un monopolio legale in materia a un ente privato assoggettato a controlli speciali; 3) con il decentramento a una molteplicità di enti privati in concorrenza. Risultato di questa sfida è un prolungato periodo di sperimentazioni durante il quale saranno testate tutte e tre le tipologie individuate da Vera Smith. All'interno di questo processo di sviluppo delle banche centrali si è affermato un modello intermedio. Tale modello, è il modello inglese, che prenderà forma nel 1844 attraverso l'adozione da parte del parlamento britannico del Bank Charter Act. L'analisi del sistema monetario inglese dell'epoca parte da una riflessione sul concetto di moneta come istituzione. Prendendo come punti di riferimento due studi che enfatizzano entrambi l'aspetto istituzionale della moneta. Mettendo a confronto il concetto di tecnologia di pagamento con il dilemma della liquidità è possibile così interpretare la storia delle banche centrali come un processo, innescato dalla banconota convertibile, attraverso il quale sono stati effettuati innumerevoli tentativi di rendere possibile un mercato del credito completamente liquido, ovvero privo di rischi. Al centro di questo processo c'è l'istituzione della Banca d'Inghilterra nel 1694, che permetterà in definitiva all'Inghilterra di fine Settecento di adottare un sistema monetario monometallico, basato sull'oro. Tale sistema di moneta convertibile in oro creerà non pochi problemi ai direttori della Banca d'Inghilterra, che saranno obbligati nel 1797 ad interrompere la convertibilità delle banconote in oro. L'importanza di questa dichiarazione d'inconvertibilità è stata sottolineata dagli innumerevoli dibattiti monetari che hanno caratterizzato tutta la prima metà dell'Ottocento, fino all'adozione del Bank Charter Act del 1844. All'interno del dibattito monetario inglese una figura di spicco come Sir Henry Thornton, aveva già individuato le linee guida dell'odierno central banking, sottolineando l'importanza del «credito di ultima istanza».

Over the past 15 years there has been remarkable progress in the specification and estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Central banks in developed and emerging market economies have become increasingly interested in their usefulness for policy analysis and forecasting. This paper reviews some issues and challenges surrounding the use of these models at central banks. It recognises that they offer coherent frameworks for structuring policy discussions. Nonetheless, they are not ready to accomplish all that is being asked of them. First, they still need to incorporate relevant transmission mechanisms or sectors of the economy; second, issues remain on how to empirically validate them; and finally, challenges remain on how to effectively communicate their features and implications to policy makers and to the public. Overall, at their current stage DSGE models have important limitations. How much of a problem this is will depend on their specific use at central banks.

Over the past 15 years there has been remarkable progress in the specification and estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Central banks in developed and emerging market economies have become increasingly interested in their usefulness for policy analysis and forecasting. This paper reviews some issues and challenges surrounding the use of these models at central banks. It recognises that they offer coherent frameworks for structuring policy discussions. Nonetheless, they are not ready to accomplish all that is being asked of them. First, they still need to incorporate relevant transmission mechanisms or sectors of the economy; Second, issues remain on how to empirically validate them; and finally, challenges remain on how to effectively communicate their features and implications to policy makers and to the public. Overall, at their current stage DSGE models have important limitations. How much of a problem this is will depend on their specific use at central banks.

Central banks are increasingly called upon to address climate change. Proposals for central bank action on climate change range from programs of "green" quantitative easing to increases in risk-based capital requirements meant to deter banks from lending to climate-unfriendly business. Politicians and academics alike have urged climate risk as both macroeconomic and financial stability risk. Relative to counterparts abroad, the U.S. central bank—-the Federal Reserve—-has been more measured in its response. This Article offers a legal explanation why. It urges that, despite the substantive importance of climate change, the U.S. Federal Reserve presently has relatively limited legal authority to address that problem head-on. Drawing on insights from corporate finance and macroeconomics, the Article constructs a legal framework-—stitching together a variety of Fed laws, regulations, and precedents of practice—to discern why many aspects of climate change sit outside the Fed's legal remit today. Ultimately, the Article tackles one of the most pressing rule-of-law questions facing the Fed today: What are the limits of the Fed's mandates to address climate change and how far can the Fed press beyond those mandates to make the economy greener? In doing so, the Article prompts reflection on the ideal role of the Fed vis-à-vis the fiscal authority of the Treasury, the political actors in Congress, and the Chief Executive.