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This paper discusses an increasingly important, yet challenging development, the international coordination of nationally rooted policies or funding schemes to support international collaboration in science and technology (S&T). It conceptualizes ways in which government ministries or agencies can realise synergies when it comes to supporting international activities of their researchers. Although the principles developed for international coordination can be generalized, it is set in the context of the European Research Area (ERA). Existing conceptual and empirical analysis has shown that coordination of policy to foster international S&T collaboration is by and large rather poor even domestically. The paper argues that international coordination of national policies for international S&T collaboration meets an additional set of challenges that need to be tackled systematically. The conceptual considerations presented in this chapter can lay the basis for an analysis of current coordination activities. They can, however, also be utilised to design systematic coordination schemes for policies geared towards international collaboration as they provide the major elements of strategic approach for such an international coordination approach.

In January 1974 the Council of Ministers of the European Community issued a resolution calling for the coordination of the science and technology policies of the member countries. This initiative came after several years of largely unrewarded efforts by the European institutions to bring a measure of Community-wide coherence in national R&D programs and objectives. Despite the development of alternative decision-making and implementation procedures, the Community's impact on national activities was on the whole limited in scope, confined to programs of marginal importance and more concerned with the joint execution of specific research tasks than with the political motives and intentions of the member governments. A review of the 1974 resolution's effects, principally through the work of the CREST committee, demonstrates that the multiple obstacles to policy coordination have yet to be overcome. These obstacles stem from a) varying conceptions of the policy coordination task, b) the discrepancies and inadequacies in national science policy formulation, c) deficiencies in the perspectives and procedures of Commission officials and national delegations, and d) a variety of constraints which restrict the domain of possible Community intervention.

AbstractThis paper sheds light on the policy coordination concept and explores its implications for science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies at the regional level. In particular it analyzes whether systemic and complex STI policies entail a larger and more complex need for coordination. We contribute to the literature by developing a conceptual framework that brings together insights from institutional and public policy theories with concepts from STI policy and regional innovation systems. This model is evidenced in the Basque Country (Spain). The paper introduces the concept of "coordination‐mix," which is defined as the combination of mechanisms that respond to the coordination failures that are derived from a complex policy setting where multiple instruments from different domains, levels, and actors coexist. It also complements the literature with a third policy dimension, the multi‐layer, which adds to the multi‐level and policy‐mix dimensions already established in the STI policy realm.

Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.

Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.

Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.

Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.

In this research note an empirical analysis is presented into factors explaining the progress and deterioration of foreign policy coordination among small European states. Nearly 40 percent of the variance in shifts of foreign policy coordination processes could be explained by the theory of structural stability. This is important because only the foreign policies of small states are investigated, and the differences between them do not result in conflicts but at most in indifference. This points at the strength of the theory of structural stability for explaining developments in post-war Europe.