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The national malaise over Vietnam has had many spillovers. Among them can be counted a shelf of works on the militaryindustrial complex and the role of the military establishment in American policy-making. Much of this material should never have been written; it is uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical. Several recent contributions to the debate have attempted to raise the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matter of allocative theory and decision. Each of these books will be widely regarded as an authoritative pronouncement on the causes and cures of America's defense dilemmas. They have been written by distinguished scholars or former policy-makers whose reputations in their fields are excellent.

James N. Rosenau has elaborated the issue area typology developed by Theodore Lowi in an ambitious attempt to categorize motivations, role structures, and interaction sequences which distinguish "domestic" from "foreign" issues. Lowi classified domestic issues into three areas: distribution of resources, regulation of resources, and redistribution of resources, and he equated interaction sequences in these areas with the coalition (distributive), pluralist (regulatory), and elitist (redistributive) models of the political process. The theoretical underpinning of Lowi's typology was the assumption that stable expectations develop about appropriate patterns of political competition and conflict for issues in each of these three "arenas."The internal logic of Lowi's argument is as follows: (1) people's expectations concerning benefits to be derived from relating to others determine their choices of relationships; (2) governmental policies (outputs) determine expectations about questions of politics; (3) ergo, the type of policy at stake determines the patterning of any political relationship; a distinctive type of political relationship should characterize every major type of policy. In these arenas of power, "each arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations." Distributive policies are easily disaggregable into small units and can be apportioned among participants in relative isolation from one another. Regulatory policies, while specific in their impact, are not so infinitely disaggregable: "regulatory policies are distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived." Redistributive policies are similar to regulatory policies insofar as individual decisions are interrelated and apply to large categories of participants, but the impact of redistributive policies on these aggregates is much greater.

Although considerable attention has been paid to deterrence theory and crisis management, the equally important topic of ending wars has been virtually ignored. Conflict termination is the stepchild of U.S. strategy for a number of reasons. Thinking about how wars should end presupposes acceptance of the fact that war--especially nuclear war-- is possible. Further, analyzing options for ending conflicts implies less-than-total victory, a concept that not only runs counter to the U.S. approach to warfare but also raises the specter of limited war, an approach that fell into disfavor following Korea and Vietnam. Finally, defining conflict termination objectives assumes that we think more about ends than means, that we know what is important to us and why, and thus understand the risks we will accept to defend specific interests and objectives. The contributors examine a wide variety of topics, ranging from Soviet and U.S. views on conflict termination to past, present, and future U.S. military service contributions. Their aim is to demonstrate the importance of careful evaluation of conflict termination goals during peacetime because when war begins passions and emotions will cloud decisionmaking.

"One important area of interest within military and policy circles focuses on an effort to revitalize the nuclear triad amidst a number of competing strategic interests. The difficulties arising from U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading many scholars and policy makers to question whether a reinvigorated nuclear triad has any role in deterring modern adversaries. This volume takes an unashamed pro-nuclear modernization position and argues for designing and fielding new nuclear warheads and delivery systems (submarine, ICBM, and bomber) while also arguing against signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or agreeing to further reductions in the nuclear arsenal. It also argues that nuclear deterrence remains as relevant today, perhaps more, than it was during the Cold War. With so many authors advocating for 'Global Zero' and highlighting perceived dangers from a nuclear arsenal, this work stands in stark contrast to the chorus of anti-arsenal works. Because of the work's structure and effort to answer questions of current relevance, it should appeal to a broad audience including: service staffs, PME students, COCOM staffs, Pentagon personnel, Capitol Hill staffers, policy makers, academics, graduate students, and interested readers"--Provided by publisher.

"One important area of interest within military and policy circles focuses on an effort to revitalize the nuclear triad amidst a number of competing strategic interests. The difficulties arising from U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading many scholars and policy makers to question whether a reinvigorated nuclear triad has any role in deterring modern adversaries. This volume takes an unashamed pro-nuclear modernization position and argues for designing and fielding new nuclear warheads and delivery systems (submarine, ICBM, and bomber) while also arguing against signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or agreeing to further reductions in the nuclear arsenal. It also argues that nuclear deterrence remains as relevant today, perhaps more, than it was during the Cold War. With so many authors advocating for 'Global Zero' and highlighting perceived dangers from a nuclear arsenal, this work stands in stark contrast to the chorus of anti-arsenal works. Because of the work's structure and effort to answer questions of current relevance, it should appeal to a broad audience including: service staffs, PME students, COCOM staffs, Pentagon personnel, Capitol Hill staffers, policy makers, academics, graduate students, and interested readers"--Provided by publisher

Intro -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY MODELING: THE CRAZY MATHEMATICS OF THE COLD WAR -- 2 REDEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY -- 3 FRICTION AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- 4 TRIAD AND TRIBULATION: U.S. AND RUSSIAN START OPTIONS -- 5 PROLIFERATION IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD -- CONCLUSION -- FURTHER READING -- INDEX.

This text examines the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are technical and policy oriented, so the authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved.