Reasoning Unbound: Changing the Way We Think about Thinking
Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Is Reasoning Useful? -- 2.1 Outreach Publications -- 2.1.1 Trends in Cognitive Sciences -- 2.1.2 Psychological Science in the Public Interest -- 2.2 Policymaking -- 2.2.1 The Credibility Problem -- 2.2.2 Behaviorally Informed Policies -- 2.3 Making Reasoning Relevant -- 2.3.1 A New Language -- 2.3.2 A New Toolbox -- References -- 3 What Is Special About Human Reasoning? -- 3.1 Protoreasoning Among Nonhuman Primates -- 3.1.1 Causality -- 3.1.2 Logic -- 3.1.3 Comparative Ontogeny -- 3.2 Our Uniquely Cooperative Mind -- 3.2.1 Coordination -- 3.2.2 Division of Labor -- 3.2.3 Cumulative Culture -- 3.3 Our Special Powers of Reasoning -- 3.3.1 More Than Social Context -- 3.3.2 More Than (One) Social Function -- References -- 4 Decisions -- 4.1 The Rationality Assumption -- 4.2 Rational Doers -- 4.2.1 The Naïve Utility Calculus Model -- 4.2.2 Reasoning About What People Do -- 4.3 Rational Talkers -- 4.3.1 The Rational Speech Act Model -- 4.3.2 Reasoning About What People Say -- 4.4 Do We Intuit Utility Maximization? -- 4.4.1 Intuitions About Doers -- 4.4.2 Intuitions About Talkers -- References -- 5 Morality -- 5.1 Moral Character and Its Components -- 5.2 Other-Regarding Preferences -- 5.2.1 Inferences from Behavior -- 5.2.2 Inferences from Processing -- 5.3 Doing Culture Right -- 5.3.1 The Impure and the Bizarre -- 5.3.2 From Conformity to Morality -- References -- 6 Delusions -- 6.1 Motivated Beliefs -- 6.1.1 Feeling and Doing Better -- 6.1.2 Cooperation-Motivated Beliefs -- 6.2 Self-Deluded Reasoning -- 6.2.1 Biased Evaluations -- 6.2.2 Conjuring Premises -- 6.3 Reasoning About Delusions -- 6.3.1 How Hard Should It Be to Detect Self-Deceivers? -- 6.3.2 What Counts as Detecting Self-Deceivers? -- References -- 7 Democracy -- 7.1 Reasoning About Issues