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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- USSR and Europe -- The United States and The USSR -- Mutually Assured Destruction -- The Space Race -- The Korean War -- The Domino Theory -- The Berlin Wall -- The Cuban Missile Crisis -- Espionage -- War in Vietnam -- Defeat in Vietnam -- US Backyard -- Moon Landing -- Nixon and China -- Détente -- End of Détente -- The Second Cold War -- Perestroika and Glasnost -- End of the Cold War -- Timeline -- Glossary -- Further Information -- Index -- Back Cover

Electoral participation has been declining in post-Soviet Europe as in almost all of the established democracies. Patterns of electoral abstention in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine reflect those in other countries, but show particularly strong effects for older age. Not only do older electors vote more often, they also have distinctive views on matters of public policy, particularly on the economy but also on the Soviet system, strong leadership and hypothetical membership of the European Union. These differences are diminished but nonetheless generally remain statistically significant even when socio-economic controls are introduced. These differences may be seen as a 'representation bias' that advantages particular sections of the electorate and the views with which they are associated. The particular forms that are taken by this bias in post-communist societies may be transitory, but here as elsewhere lower levels of turnout will continue to impart a significant bias to the extent to which some views rather than others are articulated within the political process.

Electoral participation has been declining in post-Soviet Europe as in almost all of the established democracies. Patterns of electoral abstention in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine reflect those in other countries, but show particularly strong effects for older age. Not only do older electors vote more often, they also have distinctive views on matters of public policy, particularly on the economy but also on the Soviet system, strong leadership and hypothetical membership of the European Union. These differences are diminished but nonetheless generally remain statistically significant even when socio-economic controls are introduced. These differences may be seen as a 'representation bias' that advantages particular sections of the electorate and the views with which they are associated. The particular forms that are taken by this bias in post-communist societies may be transitory, but here as elsewhere lower levels of turnout will continue to impart a significant bias to the extent to which some views rather than others are articulated within the political process.

Five distinguished scholars offer separate commentaries on the article by Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. All of the commentators reject the broad interpretation and many of the specific arguments put forth by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe. They point out several crucial issues that are omitted from the article and raise questions about the authors' sources, use of evidence, and selective invocation of secondary literature. They regret that Cox and Kennedy Pipe seem to dwell on a large number of the same matters that preoccupied radical revisionist historians in the 1960s. They argue that although Cox and Kennedy-Pipe offer a more sophisticated version of revisionism, their article suffers from many of the same shortcomings. Most of the commentators believe that the Marshall Plan merely reflected a division of Europe that was already well under way rather than being the precipitating cause. In that sense, the debate on the origins of the Cold War needs to go well beyond the issues raised by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe.