Suchergebnisse

The Sufi Muslim orders to which the vast majority of Senegalese belong are the most significant institutions of social organization in the country. While studies of Islam and politics have tended to focus on the destabilizing force of religiously based groups, the author argues that in Senegal the orders have been a central component of a political system that has been among the most stable in Africa. Focusing on a regional administrative centre, he combines a detailed account of grassroots politics with an analysis of national and international forces to examine the ways in which the internal dynamics of the orders shape the exercise of power by the Senegalese. This is a major study that should be read by every student of Islam and politics as well as of Africa

"This book examines the role of hook-up apps in the lives of gay, bi, trans, and queer immigrants and refugees, and how the online culture of these platforms promotes belonging or exclusion. Within the context of the so-called European refugee crisis, this research focuses on the experiences of immigrants from especially Muslim-majority countries to the greater Copenhagen area, a region known for both its progressive ideologies and its anti-immigrant practices. Grindr and similar platforms connect newcomers with not only dates and sex, but also friends, roommates and other logistical contacts. But these socio-sexual platforms also become spaces of racialization and othering. Weaving together analyses of real Grindr profile texts, immigrant narratives, political rhetoric, and popular media, Immigrants on Grindr provides an in-depth look at the complex interplay between online and offline cultures, and between technology and society."--

The reception of the first generation of Finnish Tatars by representatives of the majority population in Finland, including state authorities, intellectuals, political movements and the press, shows that geopolitical circumstances and local interests outside the Tatars' own power determined to what extent they were perceived as enemies or brothers-in-arms. Events such as the independence of Finland and the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 influenced public perceptions of Muslims in Finland. Minority spokespersons felt pressured to address mutual fears, justify their presence in Finland, and put the majority representatives at ease. This did not always succeed without ruffling feathers within their own communities. Behind the "success story" of the Finnish Tatars we find one and half a century of struggles that were not always happily resolved. ; Peer reviewed

Preliminary Materials /E. Ben-Rafael -- Introduction Debating Transnationalism /Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg -- Chapter One. New Transnational Communities And Networks: Globalization Changes In Civilizational Frameworks /Shmuel N. Eisenstadt -- Chapter Two. Deconstructing And Reconstructing "Diaspora": A Study In Socio-Historical Semantics /Stéphane Dufoix -- Chapter Three. The Diaspora And The Homeland: Reciprocities, Transformations, And Role Reversals /William Safran -- Chapter Four. Contemporary Immigration In Comparative Perspective /Yitzhak Sternberg -- Chapter Five. Solid, Ductile And Liquid: Changing Notions Of Homeland And Home In Diaspora Studies /Robin Cohen -- Chapter Six. The Misfortunes Of Integration /Michel Wieviorka -- Chapter Seven. Value-Orientations In Catholic, Muslim And Protestant Societies /Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar and Yasmin Alkalay -- Chapter Eight. Rethinking History From Transnational Perspectives /David Thelen -- Chapter Nine. Across Space And Time: Identity And Transnational Diasporas /Tobie Nathan -- Chapter Ten. The Transglobal Network Nation: Diaspora, Homeland, And Hostland /Michel S. Laguerre -- Chapter Eleven. International Migration Of Jews /Sergio Dellapergola -- Chapter Twelve. Is The Jewish Transnational Diaspora Still Unique? /Yosef Gorny -- Chapter Thirteen. American Jewry's 'Social Zion': Changes Through Time /Allon Gal -- Chapter Fourteen. The New Russian-Jewish Diaspora In Israel And In The West: Between Integration And Transnationalism /Larissa I. Remennick -- Appendix The. Russian Language In Israel /Marina Niznik -- Chapter Fifteen. Russian-Speaking Jews And Germany's Local Jewry /Julius H. Schoeps -- Chapter Sixteen. Israeli And American Jews: Kinsmen Apart /Moshe Shokeid -- Chapter Seventeen. By The Israeli Jewish Diaspora In The United States: Socio-Cultural Mobility And Attachment To Homeland /Uzi Rebhun -- Chapter Eighteen. "Majority Societies" In Jewish Diasporas: Latin American Experiences /Haim Avni -- Chapter Nineteen. Latin American Jews: A Transnational Diaspora /Judit Bokser Liwerant -- Chapter Twenty. A Reexamination Of The Main Theoretical Approaches To The Study Of Diasporas And Their Applicability To The Jewish Diaspora /Gabriel Sheffer -- Chapter Twenty-One. The Linguistic Landscape Of Transnationalism: The Divided Heart Of Europe /Miriam Ben-Rafael and Eliezer Ben-Rafael -- Chapter Twenty-Two. Muslim Transnationalism And Diaspora In Europe: Migrant Experience And Theoretical Reflection /Nina Clara Tiesler -- Appendix Jews. And Muslims In Contemporary France /Roland Goetschel -- Chapter Twenty-Three. Roman Catholicism And The Challenge Of Globalization /Danièle Hervieu-Léger -- Chapter Twenty-Four. Accidental Diasporas And External "Homelands" In Central And Eastern Europe: Past And Present /Rogers Brubaker -- Chapter Twenty-Five. Marginality Reconstructed: Sub-National And Transnational Identities In The Wake Of International Migration And Tourism /Victor Azarya -- Chapter Twenty-Six. Civil Society In The United States: From Pluralism To Multiculturalism And Fragmentation Into Diasporas /Richard Münch.

The published data and documents provide information to replicate the analyses of the paper "Interreligious contact and attitudes in Togo and Sierra Leone: The role of ingroup norms and individual preferences" by Julia Köbrich, Borja Martinović and Tobias Stark that will be published in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. Data were collected as part of the project 'Religion for Peace: Identifying Conditions and Mechanisms of Interfaith Peace' conducted at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies funded by the German Research Foundation.
The data include information for two independent samples on descriptive and injunctive norms, individual preferences for similar others, close contact, positive and negative casual contact, interreligious attitudes as well as demographic information. The R-syntax replicates analyses for Study 1 and Study 2 reported in the paper and its online supplement.

Data for Study 1 were collected via self-administered questionnaires by a non-probability sample between 13.09.2022 and 05.10.2022. Enumerators used their social (media) networks to spread participation links. Individuals who gave informed consent and indicated that they were residents of Togo or Sierra Leone were eligible to participate in the study. The published data include information on Muslim and Christian participants and removed potential duplicate respondents as well as those with missing values on all reported variables (N=678, 27 variables). Respondents had the choice to complete the questionnaire in English or Krio in Sierra Leone and in French or Ewe in Togo. All Sierra Leonean respondents completed the questionnaire in English and all Togolese respondents in French.

Data for Study 2 were collected as part of a household survey conducted in 50 neighborhoods in Lomé and Freetown (capitals of Togo and Sierra Leone) via computer assisted personal interviewing (Data collection in Lomé: 24.10.2022 to 08.11.2022; in Freetown: 26.11.2022 to 13.12.2022). Nine religiously mixed, eight predominantly Christian and eight predominantly Muslim neighborhoods per city were randomly drawn. Within neighborhoods, households were selected using a random-walk procedure. Participants were randomly chosen from a list of eligible household members. Adult residents of Lomé and Freetown who were able to communicate with the enumerators and gave informed consent were eligible for participation. The published data include information on Muslim and Christian participants (N=1831, 41 variables). Respondents had the choice to be interviewed in English or Krio in Sierra Leone and in French or Ewe in Togo. In Sierra Leone 6% chose English and 94% Krio and in Togo 46% chose French and 54% Ewe.

Krajem listopada 1993. pripadnici Armije Bosne i Hercegovine i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine realizirali su akciju "Trebević-2", koja je bila predstavljena kao konačni obračun s kriminalnim skupinama u muslimanskoj vojsci na području Sarajeva. Za razliku od proklamiranoga cilja, tu je akciju muslimanski politički i vojni vrh iskoristio za rješavanje zaoštrenih odnosa u vrhu Armije Bosne i Hercegovine. Ti narušeni odnosi eruptirali su u razdoblju nakon uspostave dužnosti zapovjednika Armije Bosne i Hercegovine kojom je degradiran načelnik Glavnoga štaba general Sefer Halilović. Usto je akcija "Trebević" poslužila i za skretanje odgovornosti muslimanskoga političkog i vojnog rukovodstva od ratnih zločina počinjenih u operaciji "Neretva 93", gdje su sudjelovale upravo jedinice Armije Bosne i Hercegovine iz Sarajeva protiv kojih je isplanirana i provedena navedena akcija. ; In October 1993, the Muslim political and military leadership, with the full support of the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, planned and implemented a military-police operation that was, officially, supposed to introduce order among the 'renegade' commanders of the 9th Motorised and 10th Mountain Brigades of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AB&H). However, a reconstruction of the events that led up to the initiation of the mentioned operation casts doubt on the official version of the events. Namely, the Muslim political and military leadership had been aware of certain inappropriate activities of some units under its command as early as the first half of 1993, but failed to take any concrete actions to sanction them. On the contrary, despite being clearly aware of these problematic activities, the leadership of the AB&H continued to use such units in combat. In September 1993, parts of these units were actively involved in the operation 'Neretva 93', during which war crimes were committed against Croatian civilians in the village of Grabovica on 8 and 9 September. After a meeting held on 4 October 1993, the Muslim leadership headed by Izetbegović reached a decision to deal with the problematic military commanders of the AB&H and a part of the units under their control. However, this process of facing the criminal activities performed by members of the AB&H concealed the real conflict, which was the conflict about who had supreme influence over the army and in politics, and was actually between Izetbegović and the leader of the AB&H Chief of the General Staff, Sefer Halilović. The successful results of operation 'Trebević 2' left Izetbegović without any serious challengers to his authority.

Abstract. This study discusses the decline in the vote acquisition of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in the midst of the Islamic populism movement in the 2019 Election. As an Islamic party, this momentum should be a turning point for PPP to become a party that listens to the aspirations or interests of Muslims, as one of the task of political parties in a democratic country is as an aggregation of interests. This study uses qualitative research methods with primary data from interviews and secondary data from library studies. Based on the reading of these data, it can be seen that the failure of PPP to gain vote incentives from the Islamic populism movement in the 2019 elections is; first, the failure to create a good institutional system. This poor institutionalization is reflected in the PPP's internal conflicts. Second, there is a split in the political orientation of Indonesian Muslims in conservatism and moderatism which is clearly depicted in the 2019 election. Third, there is a change in the political orientation of the Indonesian Islamic community which places religion not as the only foothold in their political choices. People choose political parties not based on who is the most Islamic, pious, or representing the aspirations of Muslims, but based on the performance and work programs offered by the party. Keywords: PPP, Islamic Populism, 2019 Election, Party Institutionalization. Abstrak. Penelitian ini membahas perihal panurunan perolehan suara Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) di tengah gerakan populisme Islam pada Pemilu 2019. Harusnya sebagai partai Islam momentum ini adalah titik balik bagi PPP untuk bisa menjadi partai yang mendengar aspirasi atau kepentingan umat Islam, sebagaimana salah satu tugas partai politik dalam negara demokrasi yakni sebagai agregasi kepentingan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan data primer dari hasil wawancara dan data sekunder dari hasil kajian Pustaka. Berdasarkan pembacaan terhadap data-data tersebut terlihat bahwa kegagalan PPP meraih insentif suara dari gerakan populisme Islam pada Pemilu 2019 adalah; pertama, kegagalan menciptakan sistem kelembagaan yang baik. Kelembagaan yang tidak baik ini tergambar dari konflik internal PPP. Kedua, adanya keterbelahan orientasi politik umat Islam Indonesia dalam konservatisme dan moderatisme yang tergambar kuat dalam Pemilu 2019. Ketiga, adanya perubahan orientasi politik masyarakat Islam Indonesia yang menempatkan agama bukan sebagai pijakan satu-satunya dalam pilihan politiknya. Masyarakat memilih partai politik bukan berdasarkan siapa yang paling Islam, salih, atau mewakili aspirasi umat Islam, namun berdasarkan kinerja dan program kerja yang ditawarkan partai.Kata Kunci: PPP, Populisme Islam, Pemilu 2019, Pelembagaan Partai Politik.

Turkish history has been presented with a seamless continuity to the Republic of Turkey, starting from the Huns and state-centered narrative. This approach not only offers some cyclical advantages in writing and teaching, but it also carries some structural problems. It can be argued that the way to solve these is a Turkish historical model based on a "mentality-based approach." Although "mentality" is an important phenomenon that has guided the course of Turkish history, it has been ignored both in writing and teaching. The major cause for this neglect is represented by Turkish military schools, which have presented it as a lesson in the military context for the first time in modern history. Further, it was influenced by the state-centered historical narrative determined by the "project to create a modern Turkish nation" that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Another reason for focusing on the impact of Turkey's Cold War military victory in is the existence of a historical narrative. It can be said that these cyclical developments have prevented a realistic and rich approach to the 2, 200-year-old Turkish history in various ways. This study aims to discuss a new historiographical approach that takes into account the great changes in the history of Turkey. To this end, it has been proposed to develop a mentality-based model according to which Turkish history may be written in a realistic way. Turkish history is thus discussed in three main periods: (1) that of the "Old Turks, " (2) that of the "Muslim Turks, " and (3) that of the "Modern Turks." In this new model, the spread of Turkish peoples and communities to Eurasia by migrating from Central Asia is examined through the steppe culture. It then points out the various Muslim cultures created by Turks who converted to Islam differently in different areas as well as the historical developments determined by the mentalities of their established states. Thus, it focuses on the culture(s) built by Muslim Turks and their new political-economic-social-religious structure(s). Finally, it mentions, in the process of modernization emerging as a necessity, the historical events and institutions that had a differentiating mentality in the Turkish state and society. Thus, it is thought that the model will make a contribution to the holistic understanding of Turkish history. © 2021 The Author(s). ; Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed. Conflict of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare. Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

Casi treinta años después de la inauguración de la primera gran mezquita del Madrid contemporáneo, la de Abu Bakr en el barrio de Estrecho, la apertura de lugares de culto como primer espacio comunitario no es ya siempre la principal y exclusiva demanda de las comunidades musulmanas en el espacio urbano, entre las cuales se encuentran ahora su visibilización en el espacio público, resultado en gran medida de la consolidación e institucionalización del tejido asociativo islámico y de un progresivo, aunque lento, reconocimiento institucional. Este texto repasa el pasado-presente de este proceso, para a continuación contextualizarlo en el actual marco político y normativo donde se insertan dos estudios de caso de utilización de los espacios públicos por comunidades musulmanas coincidiendo con alguna festividad religiosa: la celebración por la comunidad bangladesí del Eid al-Fitr en las canchas deportivas municipales del barrio multicultural de Lavapiés; y la conmemoración por la Fundación Alulbeyt España, una organización chií duodecimana, del martirio del Imam Husain en la céntrica Puerta de Sol. ; Thirty years after the inauguration of the first great mosque in modern-day Madrid, namely the Abu Bakr mosque in the district of Estrecho, opening more places of worship is no longer the main or only demand that Muslim communities are making in urban spaces. Visibility in public spaces is now their main concern. This is mostly due to the process of consolidation and institutionalization of Islamic associations and increasing, albeit slo w, official recognition by governmental authorities. This article reviews the past and present of this process, contextualizing it in the current political and normative framework, consider-ing the case studies of two Muslim communities which use public space for religious festivities. The first is the celebration of the Eid al-Fitr by Bangladeshi Muslims at the local sports centre in the multicultural district of Lavapiés; the second is the com-memoration of the martyrdom of the Imam Husain in Puerta de Sol by Fundación Alulbeyt España, a Twelver Shiite cultural centre. ; Proyecto CSO2015-66198-P «Expresiones Religiosas en el Espacio Urbano en Madrid y Barcelona (EREU – MyB)», Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica y Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, I+D+i Excelencia, convocatoria 2015. ; No data JCR 2020 ; No data SJR 2020 ; 0.375 IDR (2020) C1, 4/27 Antropología ; UEM

Ethnocultural conflicts in the world to-day are rooted in the increasingly in-cendiary globalization in the course of which certain regions cannot cope with migrant flows (EU member countries are a pertinent example) while others (the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China, Tatarstan, Chechnia, Bashkortostan, the Stavropol Territory, Tyumen Region, Adygea, and Ingushetia in the Russian Federation) are living in the complicated context of ethnic patchwork. Societies are moving towards blending different ethnocultural elements, causing havoc in human minds, unexpected ethnocultural situations and social and ethnic deviations which, as could be expected, consolidates the positions of the Islamic State.1 It is difficult to study different aspects of the problem in depth in the age of the contemporary digital information society and various brainwashing strategies used by ISIS agents: they present ISIS as the best place for the development of genuine human qualities, which has already brought together members of several ethnic communities. The transnational extremist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami among them, have spread their influence to Central Asia and are gradually moving into Russian territory. Strongholds of extremism are not limited to the Northern Caucasus; they are present in the historically peaceful Volga area where Islamists have their own mosques and training courses and work hard to lure as many young people as possible to their side. Post-Soviet Islamism is a mixture of classic universalist Islamism and xenophobic fundamentalism. In Soviet times local Muslims treated the so-called Muslim world as something abstract, while Afghan mujahideen caused a lot of irritation in the Soviet Central Asian countries: Uzbeks or Tajiks, for instance, found it hard to associate the mujahideen persistent opposition with the defense of Islam. Today, the situation in the Muslim world is different. Former Soviet republics accept the universalist model of Islam as an endogenous phenomenon rooted in economic, political and ideological prerequisites. Fundamentalism/Wahhabism is seen as an exogenous phenomenon that forced some adherents of classic Islam out and drew the rest into its ranks. Political religions are never neutral. The difference between "us" and "others" is ontological. "Others" are a product of evil (ideologists of political religions do not hesitate to state that their enemies are "soulless"), therefore destruction is the only method to be employed against them. This paradoxical combination of cruelty and flexibility is typical of the post-modernist phenomena. © 2018, CA and CC Press AB. All rights reserved.

Ethnocultural conflicts in the world today are rooted in the increasingly incendiary globalization in the course of which certain regions cannot cope with migrant flows (EU member countries are a pertinent example) while others (the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China, Tatarstan, Chechnia, Bashkortostan, the Stavropol Territory, Tyumen Region, Adygea, and Ingushetia in the Russian Federation) are living in the complicated context of ethnic patchwork. Societies are moving towards blending different ethnocultural elements, causing havoc in human minds, unexpected ethnocultural situations and social and ethnic deviations which, as could be expected, consolidates the positions of the Islamic State. [1] It is difficult to study different aspects of the problem in depth in the age of the contemporary digital information society and various brainwashing strategies used by ISIS agents: they present ISIS as the best place for the development of genuine human qualities, which has already brought together members of several ethnic communities. The transnational extremist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami among them, have spread their influence to Central Asia and are gradually moving into Russian territory. Strongholds of extremism are not limited to the Northern Caucasus; they are present in the historically peaceful Volga area where Islamists have their own mosques and training courses and work hard to lure as many young people as possible to their side. Post-Soviet Islamism is a mixture of classic universalist Islamism and xenophobic fundamentalism. In Soviet times local Muslims treated the so-called Muslim world as something abstract, while Afghan mujahideen caused a lot of irritation in the Soviet Central Asian countries: Uzbeks or Tajiks, for instance, found it hard to associate the mujahideen persistent opposition with the defense of Islam. Today, the situation in the Muslim world is different. Former Soviet republics accept the universalist model of Islam as an endogenous phenomenon rooted in economic, political and ideological prerequisites. Fundamentalism/Wahhabism is seen as an exogenous phenomenon that forced some adherents of classic Islam out and drew the rest into its ranks. Political religions are never neutral. The difference between "us" and "others" is ontological. "Others" are a product of evil (ideologists of political religions do not hesitate to state that their enemies are "soulless"), therefore destruction is the only method to be employed against them. This paradoxical combination of cruelty and flexibility is typical of the post-modernist phenomena.

Mediado el siglo XIII se produjo lo que la historiografía define como "la conquista del sureste peninsular por Jaume I d'Aragó y Alfonso X de Castilla", sobre todo, los castillos/els castells/husun. Con ello, se vería la compleja pugna de poderes por el dominio de las nuevas tierras de frontera -así visto en el señorío de don Manuel y don Juan Manuel- tanto por la corona, los señores feudales (laicos, eclesiásticos y órdenes militares) y, ahora, se añadiría la pugna religiosa de dos obispados Cartagena (1250) y Valencia (1238). Ambos tenían que articular una red de parroquias cristianas en un amplio territorial musulmán donde las mezquitas -organizadas en distritos (amal)- pasaron de ser un patrimonio de la monarquía para ser cedidas a los obispados. Esta arquitectura religiosa musulmana, ya en poder de la Iglesia, tuvo dos usos principales: uno, la conversión en iglesias y, otra, el arrendamiento como bienes inmuebles a particulares mediante contratos privados a censo. No se ha podido determinar cuántas mezquitas desaparecieron, se convirtieron o tuvieron otros usos. Lo que hoy es indudable es que algunas iglesias de frontera –a la Virgen María- están situadas sobre mezquitas y el rezo se hace donde antes se llamaba a la oración/çala musulmana. ; Halfway through the thirteenth century what historiography defines as "the conquest of the peninsular southeast by Jaume I d'Aragó and Alfonso X of Castile", above all, the castles / els castells / husun. With this, one would see the complex struggle of powers for the dominion of the new frontier lands, as seen in the lordship of Don Manuel and Don Juan Manuel, both for the crown, the feudal lords (laymen, ecclesiastics and military orders) and , now, would be added the religious struggle of two bishoprics Cartagena (1250) and Valencia (1238). Both had to articulate a network of Christian parishes in a broad Muslim territory where the mosques - organized in districts (amal) - went from being a patrimony of the monarchy to be ceded to the bishoprics. This Muslim religious architecture, already in the power of the Church, had two main uses: one, the conversion into churches and, another, the lease as real estate to individuals through private contracts to census. It has not been possible to determine how many mosques disappeared, were converted or had other uses. What is undoubted today is that some frontier churches - the Virgin Mary - are located on mosques and the prayer is done where once it was called Muslim prayer / çala.

AbstractThis paper is taking two cases of leadership. The first case deals with a given leadership trait of Nyai Yoyoh Johara, Cintawana Pesantren, Singaparna, Tasikmalaya district, and the other of Nyai Etti Tismayanti, al-Ikhwan Pesantren, Condong, Setia Negara, Tasikmalaya city. Applying a grounded research method and using Anthony Giddens's perspective of social practice, the study identifies woman's leadership in Islamic educational institutions, from the competition of social force of kodrat and of democracy and feminism. The object of the study is the Muslim woman's leadership at pesantren in the local context. The data used in this study is based on the fieldwork which was done April to November 2010 in both Tasikmalaya district and city. The study found that women apply some strategies and manipulate the hindrances they face dynamically to have a career in the educational realm, in the male world using the limitation imposed by the norm such as kodrat, with several strategies. Modern values as social forces do influence female leadership agency but are implemented through certain rationalization which still maintains the traditional roles of women.AbstrakArtikel ini mendiskusikan bagaimana perempuan memimpin di pesantren, baik dalam bentuk kepemimpinan terberi (inherited) atau kepemimpinan yang diraih dengan usaha (achieved leadership) di konteks lokal, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya dan Kota Tasikmalaaya, dengan mengambil dua kasus kepemimpinan. Kasus pertama mendiskusikan jalan (trait) kepemimpinan Nyai Yoyoh Johara, Cintawana Pesantren, Singaparna, Tasikmalaya Kabupaten, dan kedua Nyai Etti Tismayanti, dari Pesantren al-Ikhwan, Condong, Setia Negara, Kota Tasikmalaya. Dengan menggunakan metode grounded research dan perspektif praktek sosial Anthony Giddens, kajian ini mengidentifiksi kepemimpinan perempuan di Lembaga pendidikan Islam, dari kompetisi kekuatan sosial kodrat perempuan dan kekuatan demokrasi dan feminism. Obyek kajian ini adalah kepemimpinan perempuan Muslim di pesantren dalam konteks lokal. ata yang digunakan dalam peneliti ini adalah berdasar pada hasil penelitin lapngan yang dikerjakan dari bulan April sampai November 2010 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya dan Kota Tasikmalaya.Kajian ini menemukan bahwa perempuan mengaplikasikan beberapa strategi dan mensiasti halangan yang mereka temui dan mereka secara dinamis bergerak meraih karir dalam dunia pendidikan, dengan menggunakan keterbatasan yang mereka punyai disebabkan pengaruh norma kodrat. Nilai-nilai modern yang berfungsi sebagai kekuatan sosial mempengaruhi agensi kepemimpinan perempuan, tapi pengaruh tersebut dirasionalisasi melalui kekuatan sosial yang masih memelihara peranan tradisional perempuan. How to Cite Kusmana (2019). Pesantren and Local Female Leadership in Modern Indonesia. TARBIYA: Journal of Education in Muslim Society, 6(1), 23-35. doi:10.15408/tjems.v6i1.8919.

ResumenEste artículo tiene el objetivo de presentar concisamente los principales ejes de mi cuestionamiento de los términos, los conceptos y la epistemología que subyace al trato habitual que se le ha dado, tanto por parte de no musulmanes como de personas que se reconocen como tal, a los debates sobre feminismo e islam. Esto lo abordaré desde la redefinición y la reflexión sobre los conceptos de islamofobia y patriarcado.En este sentido, todos los debates que abordan la cuestión en la actualidad gravitan muy heterogéneamente entorno a los términos del oxímoron, es decir un concepto cuyos términos son contradictorios. De modo que quedan encerrados en el debate binario de la compatibilidad o incompatibilidad de feminismo e islam. Sostengo que dicho esquema responde a unas estructuras de poder colonial sistémico que producen complejamente la subalternización e inferiorización del islam como civilización y sistema de valores y la subhumanización de las y los musulmanes. Por lo tanto, nos encontramos ante la urgente necesidad de trascender estos términos y las maneras muy concretas de hablar y de representar al islam y a las y los musulmanes y para ello debemos cuestionarnos: ¿Quién está planteando estas cuestiones? ¿Desde qué lugar de enunciación? ¿Por qué? ¿Para qué? Y ¿En qué términos?Palabras clave: Feminismo, Islam, patriarcado, islamofobia, decolonialidad.AbstractThis article aims to present concisely the main axes of my questioning of terms, concepts and epistemology that underlies the usual treatment that has been given, both by non-Muslims and people who recognize themselves as such, to the debates on feminism and Islam. This I will approach from the redefinition and reflection on the concepts of Islamophobia and patriarchy.In this sense, all the debates that address the issue at present gravitate very heterogeneously around the terms of the oxymoron, that is, a concept whose terms are contradictory. So they are locked in the binary debate on the compatibility or incompatibility of feminism and Islam. I argue that this scheme responds to structures of systemic colonial power that complexly produce the subalternization and inferiorization of Islam as a civilization and value system and the subhumanization of Muslims. Therefore, we are faced with the urgent need to transcend these terms and the very specific ways of speaking and epresenting Islam and the Muslims and for this we must question ourselves Who is raising these issues? From what place of enunciation? Why? For what? And on what terms?Keywords: Feminism, Islam, patriarchy, islamophobia, decoloniality.

abstract An important part of the controversy which animates the political debate today in the countries affected by the Arab Spring has its origin in the uncertainties which surround the process of secularization and democratization of political regimes. Indeed, the arrival of the Islamists in power updated the debate on the political / religion relationship and at the same time gave rise to questions about the nature of the relationship that the Islamist parties have with regard to the so-called values of "modernity". It is important to remember that the interaction between religion and politics constitutes an important regularity from which Arab-Muslim societies would escape. In Islam, all political institutions are said to be based on and cemented by religious dogmas. This interpretation of Islam has imposed practical arrangements between the state and society in the land of Islam to avoid the breakup of society or its dissolution into widespread anarchy. From the perspective of legitimization, the duty to obey, which transformed after the arrival of the Umayyad dynasty to power (661-749) into a constitutive norm of Muslim public law, has as a corollary the desire not to fall back into jahiliya (disorder) and to go beyond fitna .discord. key words: interpretation, religion, dynasty, Muslim, legitimation ; abstract Une partie importante de la controverse qui anime aujourd'hui le débat politique dans les pays touchés par le printemps arabe a pour origine les incertitudes qui entourent le processus de sécularisation et de démocratisation des régimes politiques. En effet, l'arrivée des islamistes au pouvoir a actualisé le débat sur le rapport politique /religion et a en même temps donné lieu à des interrogations sur la nature de la relation que les partis islamistes entretiennent vis-à-vis des valeurs dites de «modernité». Il importe de rappeler que l'interaction entre religion et politique constitue une régularité importante à laquelle n'échapperaient les sociétés arabo-musulmanes. En islam, toutes les institutions politiques sont censées être fondées sur les dogmes religieux et cimentées par ceux-ci. Cette interprétation de l'Islam a imposé des arrangements pratiques entre l'Etat et la société en terre d'Islam pour éviter l'éclatement de la société ou sa dissolution dans une anarchie généralisée. Dans la perspective de légitimation, le devoir d'obéir, qui s'est transformé après l'arrivée de la dynastie Omeyyades au pouvoir (661-749) en norme constitutive du droit public musulman, a pour corollaire le désir de ne pas retomber dans la jahiliya (désordre) et de dépasser la fitna (discorde). mots clé:interprétation,religion,dynastie,musulman,légitimation