Suchergebnisse

This article examines the ways in which international courts and tribunals should utilise their powers to prescribe provisional measures in the context of environmental disputes. The article makes the case that the system of dispute resolution has the capacity to adapt to the specific needs of environmental disputes. By analysing the key features of provisional measures and extracting new judicial trends, new light is shed on two core issues: first, this article develops a theoretical framework within which provisional measures should be understood in order to achieve their aim. Second, it shows how a certain level of judicial creativity in the design of provisional measures can have implications on whether such measures can be enforced through innovative cooperation with other institutional bodies. As a result, this article argues that provisional measures can fill the gap of enforcement in international environmental law and become a pivotal instrument in environmental protection.

Two prominent events that occurred midway through this century had a great impact on international criminal law. The first milestone in this area was the trials of the major war criminals held in Nuremberg and Tokyo in the wake of the Second World War. They highlighted the principle of individual criminal responsibility for certain serious violations of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict; the terms "crimes against the peace", "war crimes", and "crimes against humanity" found formal recognition. The second event, following closely on the first, was the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims. These instruments established a specific framework for the prevention and punishment of the most serious violations of the provisions they contain; the technical term "grave breach" was coined.

Do audience costs have to be extremely large in order to credibly signal resolve and affect international crises? Existing theoretical work on audience costs suggests an affirmative answer, and recent empirical work on audience costs focuses on whether a leader can generate such large audience costs as to create a commitment to fight where no such commitment previously existed. We analyze a richer crisis bargaining model with audience costs and find that (1) audience costs can have war-reducing effects on incomplete-information crisis bargaining through a noninformative, bargaining-leverage mechanism and (2) audience costs can have war-reducing effects even when such large audience costs are not being generated as to create a commitment to fight where no such commitment previously existed. Even more limited audience costs can have war-reducing effects in international crises. We discuss how the bargaining-leverage mechanism is consistent with a number of prominent historical cases.

International radio broadcasts are relatively common elements in the international flow of communication. They can be used for a number of different purposes. An important one is the distribution of propaganda. This article contains a presentation of the analyses of international propaganda broadcasts—analyses that for a number of years have been carried out at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. The studies have primarily been aimed at finding propaganda patterns for different broadcasters and at finding ways to measure variations in propaganda intensity.

Given the high degree of scholarly interest in the political use of military force and its prominence in international relations, I believe the time is ripe to develop a framework for analyzing the utility of such military operations. Using the political use of military force by the United States from 1953-1978 as my empirical referent, I develop a simple, but testable framework for explaining under what conditions a state is able to influence another to undertake some behavior. I find that when examining the short-term outcomes of incidents involving the political use of military force, the U.S. is more likely to achieve positive outcomes when its level of relative capabilities is greater and when it seeks to deter rather than compel its targets. In the long term, positive crisis outcomes for the United States are associated with U.S. credibility, target predisposition and deterrence objectives.

"Analyses current themes in Africa's international relations. Discusses the growing prominence of the African continent on the world stage, the evolution of Pan-Africanism and the emerging role of the African Union as an international actor"--Provided by publisher.