Suchergebnisse

La coopération transfrontalière en Europe émerge dans les années 1960, dans le cadre de jumelages entre municipalités et sur la toile de fond marqué par la construction de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Elle se développera sous l'impulsion du Conseil de l'Europe – qui promouvra les relations de bon voisinage entre les autorités locales des États concernés, et de la CEE – qui mettra en place un système d'accords de coopération transfrontalière entre les pays communautaires, ainsi qu'avec les pays voisins. La convention-cadre européenne sur la coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités ou autorités territoriales (la « Convention de Madrid ») a été signée par les États membres du Conseil de l'Europe le 25 mai 1980. Son texte a été renforcé par deux protocoles additionnels dédiés à la coopération transfrontalière (en 1995) et interterritoriale (en 1998). [.]

В период господства Золотой Орды регионы и разнородное население Центральной Азии были впервые интегрированы в единую политическую целостность. Как и большинство империй, Золотая Орда охватывала разнородные культуры. Она стала пристанищем различных религиозных общин, которые не только сосуществовали, но и работали и торговали друг с другом, что привело к беспрецедентной интенсификации взаимных обменов, особенно в Поволжье в ее центральном районе. Золотая Орда оказала большое влияние на торговую экспансию середины XIII середины XIV веков, и ее экономическое и политическое правление в высшей степени способствовало глобализации Старого Света. ; During the Golden Horde's dominion, the regions and populations of central Eurasia were integrated for the first time and became politically unified. Like most empires, the Golden Horde was intrinsically cross-cultural. It accommodated diverse religious communities which not only co-habited but also worked and traded together, leading to an unprecedented intensification of the exchanges, especially in the Volga valley, its core area. The Golden Horde had a major impact on the expansion of trade in the 1250s-1350s and its economic and political regime highly contributed to the globalization of the Old World. Historians have revealed that after the Chinggisid conquests, a phenomenal trade boom transformed the human and cultural landscape in Eurasia. The so-called "Fur Road" interconnected with the "Silk Road" at the Lower Volga Basin. Here two major routes were passable: the eastern one through Central Asia towards north India and China, and the western one through the Crimean peninsula towards the Mediterranean world and the Middle East. The Golden Horde served as the stage for this dramatic change. Jöchid khans and begs played a leading role in the new inter-regional order. It was not due to hazard that during this flourishing time, cities and villages burgeoned in the Volga Valley, in the Crimea, as well as in the steppe land corridor from Siberia to Hungary. As nomadic elites converted to Islam, the khan's court became a major hub of the Islamic world. Wandering scholars and craftsmen from Anatolia, Central Asia, Egypt and Syria were welcomed in the ulus of Jöchi. The Golden Horde's regime had deep consequences on the political, economic and cultural map of modern Eurasia. Scholars have shown the unique way in which Islam unified and socially integrated peoples, by shaping community life and collective memory and by combining shamanist practices and local Sufism. The origin stories of the Tatars, and other Central Eurasian communities, extend back to the period when the khans Berke and Uzbek converted to Islam. Many Muslim peoples now living in the Russian Federation see it as a formative period in their history. Indeed, Islamization is one of the Golden Horde's most important legacies. The Golden Horde is part of the common heritage of mankind. It allowed a new sophisticated culture to grow in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, at the hinge of the nomadic and sedentary worlds. The western academic sphere has started only recently to recognize the significance of this phenomenon while, in Russian-speaking academia, scholars have long ago understood the uniqueness of its legacy. It has raised the interest not only of historians but also of archaeologists, art historians and numismatists from the Russian Federation, and especially from Tatarstan. Thanks to their works, to the important questions they raise, and to the results of their researches, the Golden Horde studies is now a field on its own rights. Western academia needs to get better acquainted with this rich scholarship. On the one hand, the historical period of the Golden Horde should integrate history course books in US, in UK, in France and in Europe in general. World history needs to be taught through a non-European lens to get a deeper perspective on our collective past without which we cannot decipher today's globalized world. On another hand, it is also crucial that the current scholarship on the Golden Horde takes into account new historiographical debates and concepts developed by global historians. A 'world' is a category of global history, recently identified by historians as a meaningful notion that goes beyond the narrower notion of empire. Indeed, empires and kingdoms did not exist in isolation, but were dependent of bigger worlds. The challenge of the new global history is to identify these worlds and to understand their mechanisms. The Golden Horde survived the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire; it grew and deeply influenced its surrounding world. This world included the successors states of the Mongol empire in China, Afghanistan, India, Persia and Anatolia as well as Byzantium, Russia, Europe and the Middle East. The density of the connections from the Mediterranean Sea to the Caspian Sea and as far as China illustrates how deeply the ulus of Jöchi was enmeshed with the wider world. Therefore, the history of the Golden Horde should not be disconnected from this world-shaping phenomenon. Nationalist historiographies are inclined to distort history, to create and disseminate self-serving clichés. The first task of historians is to avoid inaccurate terminology such as "the Tatar Yoke", in order to encourage inquiries into more important questions: how to deal with the notion of a collective history when it crosses the borders of modern nations? What then are the role and the legacy of the Golden Horde in world history? The Golden Horde in World History gives some answers to these important questions. It achieves a twofold aim: to bring to a larger academic audience a cutting-edge research that remains barely known outside the circle of specialists and to integrate this research into the broader perspective of world history. It combines diverse approaches and questions not only to offer an exhaustive picture of the state of the field, but also to herald the most profitable directions of research and the most fruitful advances made. This comprehensive new synthesis is the result of the collaboration of leading scholars coming from major academic institutions: Sh.Marjani Institute of History of Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, Institute of Russian History of Russian Academy of Sciences and Oxford University. I wish to address my deepest thanks to those who turned a bold editorial project into this impressively compelling collective book: Rafael Khakimov, Ilnur Mirgaleev, Roman Hautala, Vadim Trepavlov. Thanks to the fantastic energy of our colleagues from the Sh.Marjani Institute of History of Tatarstan Academy of Sciences and its M.A.Usmanov Centre for the Golden Horde studies, Kazan proved to be and remains a wonderful venue for historians, archaeologists and numismatists working on the Golden Horde and ready to confront their views. The understanding of the Golden Horde world, at the crossroad of Asia, Europe and the Middle East, requires such a dialogue between researchers who have different expertise. International collective publications are crucial to expanding and furthering complex fields of research, and writing history is a collective undertaking that can benefit immensely from institutional collaboration all the more so when it crosses borders. This international book will be the first to offer the readership the research outcome of the best experts in the field of the Golden Horde studies and to make the avant-garde concepts of the new global history accessible.

The thesis focuses on the industrialization of housing in France (1885-1970), from the lightweight and removable construction to the heavy construction and architecture. The purpose of this thesis is placed at the interface of four major topics: the existence of industrialization before the World War II, the technical policy of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism (MRU), projects after the Second World War that applied the methods of industrialization imposed by the State, and the principles of the Charter of Athens. The study period extends from 1885, the first witness of European industrialization of the building, to 1970ties of questioning of this type of construction. The industrialization of the building has very old roots; it grows primarily in the military, for the needs of the colonial conquest, campaigns, wars, which inflamed the Europe. The beach cabin or the shack resort, the canvas tent, canopy of market, are as much constructive figures which are proliferating at the end of the nineteenth century. Especially, the colonial expeditions conducted drums requiring speed, security, capacity: the shack is the industrial solution. Industrialization continues to be not light anymore but heavy. It is the main route for the State because it decreases the cost price of the construction, reduces the interventions and improves the comfort of the housing. From 1945, the French State newly invests in the most stricken, encourages innovation based on the employment of materials and techniques in establishing the technical approval of the "new materials and non-traditional methods of construction". In the first part of this research, i have tried to show that there is an industrialization of the building before the Second World War. Industrialization occupied "brutally" lightweight construction in the 1890s. The shack removable and transportable, military becomes the object of competitions, confrontations, of interest of warriors in Western Europe. Dozens of models are prefabricated and really mounted in the fields of battles or in anticipation of territorial conquest. In a second time i have chosen to continue the story in the heavy construction in the after war, specifically the construction of the housing. Therefore i chose to study two outstanding projects of the period just after the Second World War. First is the project of Noisy-le-Sec, through which the state tried to test the processes and new materials to use fewer the raw materials and energy, to simplify the implementation, to raise awareness of these innovations to advance technology and contribute to the improvement of the habitat (interior comfort and equipment). To do this, it imported new processes and imposed changes in pace and scale. Second is the project of Grandes Terres: The site of the project of Grandes Terres could be considered as the first masterpiece of heavy housing prefabrication. In addition the project of Grandes Terres affirms a new way of thinking about the city and its report to the habitat, it is one of the successful applications of the Charter of Athens, bible of the urbanism of Lods, and a reference for the urban development's decades 60 and 70. Finally, to develop this academic research I have taken the party "chronologically":1885-1940 "the lightweight construction and demountable", 1940-1970, "the heavy prefabrication and Unremovable", 1945-1953 "the city of experience of Noisy-le-sec", 1952-1956, "the completed model which is the most successful of major operations, the project of Grandes Terres". ; La thèse porte sur l'industrialisation du logement en France (1885-1970), de la construction légère et démontable à la construction lourde et architecturale. L'objet de cette thèse se place à l'interface de quatre grands sujets : l'existence de l'industrialisation avant la seconde guerre mondiale, la politique technique du ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (MRU), les projets réalisés après la seconde guerre mondiale dont on applique les méthodes d'industrialisation imposées par l'Etat, et les principes de la charte d'Athènes. La période d'étude s'étend de 1885, premier témoin européen de l'industrialisation du bâtiment, à 1970 année de remise en cause de ce type de construction. l'industrialisation du bâtiment a des racines très anciennes, elle croît d'abord parmi les militaires, pour les besoins de la conquête coloniale, des campagnes, des guerres qui enflamment l'Europe. La cabane de plage ou la baraque de villégiature, la tente de toile, l'auvent de marché, sont autant de figures constructives qui prolifèrent en fin du XIXe siècle. Surtout, les expéditions coloniales menées tambours battants exigent rapidité, sécurité, capacité : la baraque est la solution industrielle. L'industrialisation se poursuit, non plus légère mais lourde. Elle est pour l'Etat la principale voie car elle diminue le prix de revient de la construction, réduit les interventions et améliore le confort des logements. A partir de 1945, l'Etat français nouveau investit dans la partie la plus sinistrée, encourage les innovations basées sur l'emploi de matériaux et de techniques en instituant l'agrément technique des « matériaux nouveaux et des procédés non traditionnels de construction ». Dans la première partie de cette recherche, nous avons essayé de montrer qu'il y a bien une industrialisation du bâtiment avant la seconde guerre mondiale. L'industrialisation occupe « brutalement » la construction légère dans les années 1890. La baraque démontable et transportable, militaire, ambulante devient l'objet de compétitions, de confrontations, d'intérêts guerriers en Europe de l'ouest. Des dizaines de modèles sont préfabriqués et montés en arrière des champs de batailles ou en prévision des conquêtes territoriales. Dans un second temps nous avons choisi de continuer l'histoire de la construction lourde dans l'après guerre, spécifiquement la construction du logement. Par conséquent nous avons choisi d'étudier deux projets remarquables de la période juste après la seconde guerre mondiale. 1- Le projet de la cité expérimentale de Noisy-le-Sec : au travers de ce projet l'Etat a essayé de tester les procédés et matériaux nouveaux permettant d'utiliser moins de matières premières et d'énergie, de simplifier la mise en œuvre, de faire connaître ces nouveautés pour faire de la technique une technologie et contribuer à l'amélioration de l'habitat (confort intérieur, équipement). Pour ce faire, il importe des procédés et impose des changements de rythme et d'échelle. 2- le projet des Grands Terres : Le chantier des Grands Terres doit être considéré comme le premier chef d'œuvre de préfabrication lourde de logements. Ce projet affirme aussi une nouvelle façon de penser la ville et son rapport à l'habitat, il est une des applications réussies de la Charte d'Athènes, bible de l'urbanisme de Lods, et une référence pour les évolutions urbaines des décennies 60 et 70. Enfin, pour élaborer cette recherche académique j'ai pris le parti "chronologique" " : 1885-1940 "la construction légère et démontable", 1940-1970, "la préfabrication lourde et indémontable", 1945-1953 " la cité d'expérience de Noisy-le-Sec", 1952-1956, "le modèle achevé le plus réussi des grands opérations, le projet des Grandes Terres".

In many ways, Tomas Venclova's life mirrors the history of Lithuania during the last half century. Translator, poet and essayist, Venclova was born in 1937 in the Lithuanian seaport of Klaipeda. His father, Antanas Venclova, belonged to the radical Lithuanian literary circle, The Third Front, in the early 1930s. During the first Soviet occupation of the country, from 1940 to 1941, Antanas Venclova was appointed Minister of Education of the new Soviet Lithuanian government. After the war he remained a member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and a writer, says his son, 'of a strict Soviet persuasion' who 'belonged to the Soviet élite'. Tomas Venclova was also a member of this élite. In the first years after Stalin's death he attended the University of Vilnius, lived in Moscow and Leningrad, and formed much closer ties to Russian culture than most Lithuanians. At the University, he occasionally taught courses on Western literature, published a book on his own poetry, The Sign of Language (1972), two books of essays The Rockets, the Planets, and Us (1962) and Golem, or the Artificial Man (1965), and wrote articles for the literary press. His chief interest, however, was translation. Fluent in four languages — Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, and English — and with a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, Czech, and Ukrainian, Venclova introduced the Lithuanian reading public to many modern and classic works of world literature. He translated poems by W. H. Auden (In Memory of Yeats and September 1, 1939), T. S. Eliot (The Waste Land), short stories by Jorge Luis Borges, plays by Shakespeare, Harold Pinter, Eugene O'Neill, Garcia Lorca, excerpts from the works of James Joyce, Cavafy, and others. In this he harked back to the tradition of the radical Third Front his father had belonged to during Lithuania's years of independence. This group tried to introduce writers and poets such as Walt Whitman, Carl Sandburg, John Dos Passos, Alfred Doeblin, and Vladimir Mayakovsky to their fellow-countrymen. The younger Venclova also found something in common with other goals espoused by the Third Front. They wanted, he said, 'to air out literature, to bring Lithuanian letters out of provincialism, to bring it to maturity and to modernise it…'. Often this was done 'through humour — frequently angry and strident, but nevertheless humour — which in Lithuania is a rather rare thing; it was always much more fashionable with us to strike a suffering and tragic pose'. Yet the literary activity that had propelled Antanas Venclova into becoming part of the new Soviet establishment served to alienate Tomas Venclova from it. His own efforts to 'air out literature' during the post-war Soviet years led to increasing frustrations and obstacles. He recalls: 'Once I translated four of Borges' short stories, and brought them to the editorial offices of a magazine. The first thing the editor asked me was, "Is this Borges an enemy of the Soviet system?" I answered that I didn't think Borges was so much against the Soviet system as he was against the solar system. The editor got a little nervous and said, "I'll check to see if he might be on the blacklist." I asked him, "Maybe you could show me this blacklist, so that I would know once and for all, who can be translated and who cannot." The editor replied, "I don't have it, and myself am not quite sure where it is." And in some vague way he checked to see if Borges was on it. In the end they published two of the four stories.' Tomas Venclova's increasing confrontation with the censor spelled his eventual expulsion from the élite. He was pushed out of it, he says, 'in part through my own efforts, in part through the efforts of others. There is great competition to win a spot among the élite and people set up obstacles for one another'. Of the difficulties this caused with his father, Venclova says, 'We argued with one another, but our relationship stayed intact. It was simply that he belonged to one party and I to another. That often happens and people still find something in common to talk about. We tried to do the same.' Venclova's future in Lithuanian life did not remain intact. In the early 1970s he applied for membership in the Writers' Union as a translator and his application was turned down. He, it seems, did not meet the criteria of the first paragraph of the Union's by-laws, which stipulate that through his work, a writer must contribute to building Communist society. In addition, Venclova turned more and more to dissident and human rights activities, joining the Lithuanian Helsinki Agreements Monitoring Group in 1976. He began applying for permission to emigrate. Several writers in the West — including Arthur Miller, who wrote a letter on his behalf to the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party — gave him their support. Eventually, Czeslaw Milosz arranged a special lectureship at the University of Columbia, and Venclova was permitted to take the post in early 1977. Soon after he left the USSR, his citizenship was revoked by a unanimous vote of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In the West, Venclova has continued to publicise both the restrictions on literary expression and violations of human rights in the Soviet Union. He still writes, he says, mainly for readers in Lithuania. It is the thought that his translations, poems, and essays will reach them that underpins his work. While still in Lithuania, one of his principal aims as a translator was to 'broaden people's cultural horizons and bring them closer to world culture'. This purpose has not changed. His fourth book to be published in the West — which will appear later in 1984 — Texts on Texts, is an example. It is a collection of essays on literature and literary figures from various cultures, written by Venclova in several languages, which he himself translated into Lithuanian. (Venclova's books, whether published in the USSR or the West, have appeared only in Lithuanian.) The three other books he has published in the West consist of two collections of poetry — 98 Poems (1977) by himself, and Voices (1979) poems by others that he translated into Lithuanian — and a collection of essays, Lithuania in the World (1981). Covering a broad spectrum of cultural and political topics, this book sold out almost immediately, reflecting the central role Venclova plays in Lithuanian cultural life today. Historian Romas Misiúnas says of Venclova, 'He is one of a handful of Lithuanians who are discussed as much in Lithuania as in the émigré (post-World War Two) community, and who have left their footprints in both surroundings.' Venclova has made an impact outside this boundary as well. As Misiúnas writes on Lithuania in the World, ' (Venclova) concerns himself first with the common problems of humanity. But his analysis of them is from a Lithuanian and Eastern European intellectual standpoint…' The very broad forum where Venclova's work has appeared reflects this. His poems have been translated into English, Polish, and Russian. His essays have appeared in Polish and Russian literary journals, as well as English-language publications such as Encounter and the New York Review of Books. As a member of PEN Writers in Exile, he has travelled extensively in the past seven years. In all, Venclova has visited over thirty countries. He attributes this to a passion for globetrotting: 'When the Bolsheviks took history away from us, well, somehow we lived with that. But when they took away geography — that was too much!' Currently, Tomas Venclova teaches Russian literature at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. He has no regrets about having emigrated, but his focus never veers far from Lithuania and the Soviet Union. His experience reflects what many who have emigrated from that part of the world in the past fifteen years have gone through. As he explains: 'For about three years after I arrived in the West, I occasionally dreamt the following dream. I dreamt that I had returned to Vilnius, and sat together with my friends in the Neringa cafe, drinking coffee and cognac (this, in the Neringa cafe, is unavoidable). I talked to them, just as I talk here. Yet no one arrested me, no one hauled me into the secret police. I walked freely through my beloved city of Vilnius. I saw St Ann's Church, the cathedral, and everything was infinitely pleasant. Suddenly, through my dream, I remembered — my dear God, I don't have my American passport anymore, I can't leave! I bolted screaming from my sleep, turned on the light, and with relief, realised that I was in New Haven… This dream… hounded me a long time… We will all return, but the situation is such that most of us will return only through our works….'

Este artículo aborda los vínculos existentes entre la explotación de la mano de obra migrante y el desarrollo de la agricultura intensiva en la provincia de Huelva, España. El objetivo es describir cómo la apropiación explotación de la naturaleza humana y extrahumana (Moore, 2015) convergen en el cultivo de la fresa. Tomamos como punto de partida la teoría del capitalismo como ecología-mundo de Moore y la articulamos con las aportaciones del feminismo materialista y los análisis de la economía política sobre el continuum de control de la movilidad del trabajo en la historia del capitalismo. A partir de este posicionamiento teórico, analizamos el modo en que este cultivo extrae su rentabilidad de la asignación a circular de temporeras marroquíes empleadas a través del programa de migración temporal conocido como contratación en origen. Este programa permite al sector disponer de una mano de obra poco costosa y flexible que garantice la rentabilidad del cultivo, y que retorna a su país de origen al final de la temporada. Veremos que para ello se ha dirigido exclusivamente a mujeres con hijos pequeños a su cargo. La circulación entre país de origen y de trabajo de las jornaleras marroquíes y su adecuación a las exigencias del sector se fundan en las asimetrías de género, clase y etnia existentes. Concretamente, el programa implementa una doble dependencia de los hogares de trabajadoras hacia los ingresos de la temporada, por un lado, y hacia su participación en la economía doméstica, cuando regresan, por otro. Leemos esta subordinación de la reproducción por la producción como una apropiación de la naturaleza tal y como la define, de manera amplia, Moore. El artículo está basado en el material etnográfico recogido entre 2009 y 2012, y actualizado en 2019, en los lugares de vida y trabajo de las temporeras. Su estructura es la siguiente. En una primera parte se exponen las principales características de la producción de frutos rojos en Huelva. En un segundo momento, se describe cómo la contratación de temporeras marroquíes ha sido una estrategia del modelo productivo que había agotado los recursos presentes en el territorio. En la tercera parte, se abordan las consecuencias que el modelo de contratación en origen tiene sobre las condiciones de vida y trabajo de las temporeras y se describen los límites del programa que se está viendo cuestionado por la emergencia de movilizaciones y resistencias. ; The province of Huelva, in Andalusia (Spain), is the first strawberry exporting area in Europe. Based on an intensive use of inputs applied on sterilized land, this sector is an archetype of agricultural industrialization, marking the decisive influence of capitalist activity on the biosphere right down to the landscape. Considered red gold for decades, this monoculture entered into crisis in the mid-1990s. Despite the continuous increase in input costs, the price per kilogram of strawberries remains stable, with supermarkets and input suppliers controlling the agrifood chain. To maintain profitability, farmers have followed three strategies: increasing production per hectare through technical intensification of production, introducing new berries cultures, and making wages an adjustment variable. This last one, has been possible through the employment of a diversified migrant workforce. Since the 90's, various labor substitutions processes have resulted in a segmented labor market by origin, gender, migration status and work relationship. From the year 2000, an important part of the labor force have been women employed through a temporary migration program named contratacion en origen. Morocco has been the main country of recruitment since 2008. Besides Moroccan workers, the sector employs North and West African workers, with or without work permits, an important number of Eastern European workers coming seasonally through work agencies, and Spanish women workers, mainly in the packing stations. The rise of unemployment caused by the economic crisis limited the contratacion en origen between 2012 and 2017. However, this program is very appreciated by employers who have been demanding its reinstatement, as it guarantees a flexible and non-demanding labor force, available throughout the campaign, even if at certain times the work is scarce. In 2017, it was reactivated with more workers than ever. Based on qualitative material gathered between 2009 and 2012, and updated in 2019, we will address several dimensions of an agro-migration regime constitutive of this land designed by capitalist world-ecology. The paper will focus on the contratacion en origen held with Morocco since 2006. Financed by European Union money, this program aims to facilitate the movement of women workers who must return to Morocco after the season ends. To this end, a series of criteria are established based on racist and sexist stereotypes that define rural Moroccan women mainly as mothers and wives to justify their return to the country when strawberry season is over. To participate in the program, it is necessary to be a woman of rural and poor origin and to have dependent children under 14 years old. It means that capital accumulation in this agriculture is based on control over female farmworkers reproduction. Taking up the contributions of materialist feminism and cross-referencing them with political economy and world-ecology theory, we analyze this subordination of reproduction by production as an appropriation of nature as defined by Moore. Capitalist accumulation expands through commodity fronts (2015). Competition leads to a perpetual search for new territories - spatial or social - that have not yet been commodified and whose conquest opens new cycles of profitability. Capitalism appropriates these borderlands, reclaiming the free labor of women, nature and colonies (Mies, 1986) and justifying it by the fact that these cheap natures are objects that can be appropriated. Naturalization is the ideology that allows the material exploitation and appropriation of the "free gifts of nature". In this paper, we argue that, in intensive agriculture, accumulation is based on the exploitation of the web of life, embedded in control over the reproduction of female foreign farmworkers. We show how the imbrication between racism and sexism transforms Moroccan women into inputs for intensive agriculture and address the two dimensions of these power relations: their material appropriation and the ideology that identifies women and racialized people as nature that sustains the former. We analyze how borders implemented by the contratacion en origen mobilize gender and race to allow workforce exploitation. This temporary migration program is based on an economic articulation and a physical separation of the time-spaces of production and reproduction of labor power. Moroccan farmworkers are recruited as appropriated women (Guillaumin, 1992). It is because they carry out the bulk of domestic work, because they are materially involved in the rearing of children, and because this activity is considered their legitimate and main activity, that they are seen as ideal seasonal workers. That is to say, the women will work hard for their children that remain on the other side of the border and they will return home at the end of the season. The constraints implied by the process of recruitment are reinforced by a legal captivity induced by the fact that residence permits are linked to a specific employer. In addition to this juridical captivity, the confinement in the dwellings weakens these workers' capacity to negotiate their working conditions. The farms are often far from the villages. Isolation is increased by the fact that farmworkers generally do not speak Spanish and do not have any other means of transportation than the one normally provided once a week by the employer for shopping. The mechanisms of control over women's bodies and sexuality are furthermore mobilized to impose discipline and control over workers, as well as to avoid them leaving the Program. The stigma of the woman of bad life and the prostitute, attributed to those who go out at night or to those who leave the Program to stay irregularly in Spain, patrols the borders of temporary work. This system constructs a vulnerable labor force ready to accept the poor working and living conditions offered. However, as Burawoy (1975) pointed out, the interdependence between home and host countries and the separation of production and reproduction tend to erode over time, usually leading to resistance and eventual labor replacement. In 2018 the pact of silence regarding the living and working conditions of foreign seasonal workers was finally broken. The collective mobilizations of Moroccan seasonal workers were organized to denounce poor living and working conditions and the existence of sexual abuse. This questioned the core of a recruitment program that had been designed as an example of ethical and orderly migration for 20 years. At the end of the season, various actors also reported that a significant number of female workers had not returned to Morocco at the end of their contracts. We read these forms of collective and individual resistance as signs of the erosion of this program. We will have to wait to see the impact of these emerging acts of resistance.

The province of Huelva, in Andalusia (Spain), is the first strawberry exporting area in Europe. Based on an intensive use of inputs applied on sterilized land, this sector is an archetype of agricultural industrialization, marking the decisive influence of capitalist activity on the biosphere right down to the landscape.Considered red gold for decades, this monoculture entered into crisis in the mid-1990s. Despite the continuous increase in input costs, the price per kilogram of strawberries remains stable, with supermarkets and input suppliers controlling the agrifood chain. To maintain profitability, farmers have followed three strategies: increasing production per hectare through technical intensification of production, introducing new berries cultures, and making wages an adjustment variable. This last one, has been possible through the employment of a diversified migrant workforce. Since the 90's, various labor substitutions processes have resulted in a segmented labor market by origin, gender, migration status and work relationship. From the year 2000, an important part of the labor force have been women employed through a temporary migration program named contratación en origen. Morocco has been the main country of recruitment since 2008. Besides Moroccan workers, the sector employs North and West African workers, with or without work permits, an important number of Eastern European workers coming seasonally through work agencies, and Spanish women workers, mainly in the packing stations. The rise of unemployment caused by the economic crisis limited the contratación en origen between 2012 and 2017. However, this program is very appreciated by employers who have been demanding its reinstatement, as it guarantees a flexible and non-demanding labor force, available throughout the campaign, even if at certain times the work is scarce. In 2017, it was reactivated with more workers than ever.Based on qualitative material gathered between 2009 and 2012, and updated in 2019, we will address several dimensions of an agro-migration regime constitutive of this land designed by capitalist world-ecology. The paper will focus on the contratación en origen held with Morocco since 2006. Financed by European Union money, this program aims to facilitate the movement of women workers who must return to Morocco after the season ends. To this end, a series of criteria are established based on racist and sexist stereotypes that define rural Moroccan women mainly as mothers and wives to justify their return to the country when strawberry season is over. To participate in the program, it is necessary to be a woman of rural and poor origin and to have dependent children under 14 years old. It means that capital accumulation in this agriculture is based on control over female farmworkers reproduction. Taking up the contributions of materialist feminism and cross-referencing them with political economy and world-ecology theory, we analyze this subordination of reproduction by production as an appropriation of nature as defined by Moore. Capitalist accumulation expands through commodity fronts (2015). Competition leads to a perpetual search for new territories – spatial or social – that have not yet been commodified and whose conquest opens new cycles of profitability. Capitalism appropriates these borderlands, reclaiming the free labor of women, nature and colonies (Mies, 1986) and justifying it by the fact that these cheap natures are objects that can be appropriated. Naturalization is the ideology that allows the material exploitation and appropriation of the "free gifts of nature".In this paper, we argue that, in intensive agriculture, accumulation is based on the exploitation of the web of life, embedded in control over the reproduction of female foreign farmworkers. We show how the imbrication between racism and sexism transforms Moroccan women into inputs for intensive agriculture and address the two dimensions of these power relations: their material appropriation and the ideology that identifies women and racialized people as nature that sustains the former.We analyze how borders implemented by the contratación en origen mobilize gender and race to allow workforce exploitation. This temporary migration program is based on an economic articulation and a physical separation of the time-spaces of production and reproduction of labor power. Moroccan farmworkers are recruited as appropriated women (Guillaumin, 1992). It is because they carry out the bulk of domestic work, because they are materially involved in the rearing of children, and because this activity is considered their legitimate and main activity, that they are seen as ideal seasonal workers. That is to say, the women will work hard for their children that remain on the other side of the border and they will return home at the end of the season.The constraints implied by the process of recruitment are reinforced by a legal captivity induced by the fact that residence permits are linked to a specific employer. In addition to this juridical captivity, the confinement in the dwellings weakens these workers' capacity to negotiate their working conditions. The farms are often far from the villages. Isolation is increased by the fact that farmworkers generally do not speak Spanish and do not have any other means of transportation than the one normally provided once a week by the employer for shopping. The mechanisms of control over women's bodies and sexuality are furthermore mobilized to impose discipline and control over workers, as well as to avoid them leaving the Program. The stigma of the woman of bad life and the prostitute, attributed to those who go out at night or to those who leave the Program to stay irregularly in Spain, patrols the borders of temporary work. This system constructs a vulnerable labor force ready to accept the poor working and living conditions offered. However, as Burawoy (1975) pointed out, the interdependence between home and host countries and the separation of production and reproduction tend to erode over time, usually leading to resistance and eventual labor replacement. In 2018 the pact of silence regarding the living and working conditions of foreign seasonal workers was finally broken. The collective mobilizations of Moroccan seasonal workers were organized to denounce poor living and working conditions and the existence of sexual abuse. This questioned the core of a recruitment program that had been designed as an example of ethical and orderly migration for 20 years. At the end of the season, various actors also reported that a significant number of female workers had not returned to Morocco at the end of their contracts. We read these forms of collective and individual resistance as signs of the erosion of this program. We will have to wait to see the impact of these emerging acts of resistance. ; Este artículo aborda los vínculos existentes entre la explotación de la mano de obra migrante y el desarrollo de la agricultura intensiva en la provincia de Huelva, España. El objetivo es describir cómo la apropiación-explotación de la naturaleza humana y extrahumana (Moore, 2015) convergen en el cultivo de la fresa. Tomamos como punto de partida la teoría del capitalismo como ecología-mundo de Moore y la articulamos con las aportaciones del feminismo materialista y los análisis de la economía política sobre el continuum de control de la movilidad del trabajo en la historia del capitalismo. A partir de este posicionamiento teórico, analizamos el modo en que este cultivo extrae su rentabilidad de la asignación a circular de temporeras marroquíes empleadas a través del programa de migración temporal conocido como contratación en origen. Este programa permite al sector disponer de una mano de obra poco costosa y flexible que garantice la rentabilidad del cultivo, y que retorna a su país de origen al final de la temporada. Veremos que para ello se ha dirigido exclusivamente a mujeres con hijos pequeños a su cargo. La circulación entre país de origen y de trabajo de las jornaleras marroquíes y su adecuación a las exigencias del sector se fundan en las asimetrías de género, clase y etnia existentes. Concretamente, el programa implementa una doble dependencia de los hogares de trabajadoras hacia los ingresos de la temporada, por un lado, y hacia su participación en la economía doméstica, cuando regresan, por otro. Leemos esta subordinación de la reproducción por la producción como una apropiación de la naturaleza tal y como la define, de manera amplia, Moore. El artículo está basado en el material etnográfico recogido entre 2009 y 2012, y actualizado en 2019, en los lugares de vida y trabajo de las temporeras. Su estructura es la siguiente. En una primera parte se exponen las principales características de la producción de frutos rojos en Huelva. En un segundo momento, se describe cómo la contratación de temporeras marroquíes ha sido una estrategia del modelo productivo que había agotado los recursos presentes en el territorio. En la tercera parte, se abordan las consecuencias que el modelo de contratación en origen tiene sobre las condiciones de vida y trabajo de las temporeras y se describen los límites del programa que se está viendo cuestionado por la emergencia de movilizaciones y resistencias.

In January 2020, the Philippines joined the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce which seeks to develop a multilateral agreement on trade-related aspects of e-commerce. This paper explores the costs and benefits of possible trade disciplines, particularly the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. Based on estimates of digitizable products, the foregone revenue of a moratorium represents about 0.10 percent and 0.65 percent of national government revenues using the average MFN rate and the bound tariff rate, respectively. Estimates based on broader definitions of electronic transmission range from 0.59 to 1.38 percent and from 3.68 to 8.59 percent of national government revenues using the average MFN rate and bound rate, respectively. However, there are practical difficulties and policy constraints which could limit the actual intake from tariffs. Various barriers to cross-border data flows could also adversely affect not only data-intensive industries but the economy more broadly. Thus, the country should support trade rules that facilitate cross-border data flows. At the same time, the government must invest in digital infrastructure necessary for an efficient and effective tax system fit for the digital economy.

Die rechtspopulistische Partei Perussuomalaiset (PS) (dt.: Finnen-Partei), auch bekannt als die Finnen (die kursive Schreibweise weist auf die Partei hin, in Abgrenzung zu finnischen Bürger:innen), weist einige Besonderheiten im Gegensatz zu anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien auf, die sich teils aus Besonderheiten von Finnland ergeben.Zum Beispiel spielt das Thema Migration – obwohl die Finnen dieses Thema durchaus bedienen – in Finnland eine eher untergeordnete Rolle (vgl. Wilde-Krell & Adorf 2022, S. 288 f.). Auch zeigt sich in der Regierungsbeteiligung die Besonderheit, dass die Finnen nicht erst die nötige Reputation dafür aufbauen mussten, im Gegensatz zu einigen anderen rechtspopulistischen Parteien.Dieser Umstand ist in der Tatsache begründet, dass die Finnen eine Nachfolgerpartei der Suomen maaseudun puolue (SMP) darstellt, welche als populistische Partei bereits Regierungserfahrung sammeln konnte (vgl. Wilde-Krell & Adorf 2022, S. 279). Die Finnen besitzen also eine lange Parteiengeschichte, welche auch dazu führt, dass die Partei nach Cas Muddes Kategorisierung in "extreme right" und "radical right" von Lahti und Palonen als "radical right" Partei gesehen wird, wobei "extreme right" Parteien als demokratiefeindlich gelten, während die "radical right" Parteien im Rahmen der Demokratie operieren (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 128).Eine weitere Besonderheit der Finnen wird nachfolgend in den Fokus genommen: ihre Russland-kritische Haltung. Viele rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa fallen immer wieder durch ihre Nähe zu Russland bzw. Putin auf. Eine Nähe, die selbst nach dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine und dem daraus resultierenden Krieg häufig bestehen bleibt.So beispielsweise die deutsche AfD, die diese Nähe aufrechterhält (vgl. Ntv 2023). Zwar ist die AfD auch in dieser Hinsicht gespalten und parteiintern gibt es genauso Stimmen gegen diese Russlandnähe, es ist jedoch auffällig, dass wichtige Parteimitglieder wie der Vorsitzende Tino Chrupalla immer wieder mit einer Pro-Russland Haltung auffallen.Zudem zeichnet sich ein ähnliches Bild ab wie bei anderen Streitfragen der AfD: die Gemäßigteren, die die radikalen Meinungen anderer Parteimitglieder ablehnen, sind diejenigen, die die Partei verlassen (vgl. Schmidt 2022). Die AfD stellt hierbei nur ein Beispiel dar für eine europäische rechtspopulistische Partei, die – vereinfacht auf die beiden Konfliktparteien aus dem Kalten Krieg bezogen – einen USA-kritischen und Russland-freundlichen Ton anschlägt.Die USA, sinnbildlich für den liberalen Westen mit seinen vermeintlich linken Ideologien, welche durch die Rechtspopulisten abgelehnt werden (LGBTQI+ Bewegung, Klimaproteste, etc.), Russland bzw. Putin sinnbildlich für Autorität, Stärke, Nationalismus. Entgegen diesem Bild stehen die finnischen Rechtspopulisten der PS.Hierbei ist erwähnenswert, dass Finnland nicht frei von Populisten mit Nähe zu Russland ist. Die finnische Partei Liike Nyt ist stark geprägt von wirtschaftlichen Eliten mit Nähe zu russischen Oligarchen, welche jedoch seit Beginn des Krieges abgestritten wird (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 129).Die Finnen hingegen waren nie pro-russisch eingestellt, wofür es vielseitige Erklärungsansätze gibt. Einerseits kann hierbei das historische Erbe erwähnt werden. Lahti und Palonen sehen die Möglichkeit einer starken Solidarisierung mit der Ukraine auf Basis der finnischen Geschichte. Finnland wehrte im Winterkrieg 1939-1940 mit vergleichsweise geringer militärischer Stärke das militärisch starke Russland ab.Russland ist somit in der finnischen Geschichte ein Kriegsgegner gewesen, zudem stellt sich möglicherweise für manche finnische Bürger:innen die Situation in der Ukraine ähnlich dar: die militärisch unterlegene Ukraine, welche von Russland angegriffen wird und bisher erfolgreich Widerstand leistet.Ein weiterer wichtiger Faktor stellt der bis 2021 Vorsitzende der Partei, Jussi Halla-aho, dar. Halla-aho kann keineswegs als gemäßigter Konservativer bezeichnet werden, viel Kritik begleitet seine politische Biografie sowie seine ideologischen Positionen, immerhin wurde Halla-aho bereits wegen Volksverhetzung verurteilt und fällt immer wieder mit extremistischen Aussagen gegen Bevölkerungsgruppen, beispielsweise muslimische Bürger:innen, auf. Auch gilt er nicht als EU-freundlich, immerhin forderte er den "Fixit", also den Austritt Finnlands aus der EU (vgl. Wolff 2017).Ein Punkt in Halla-ahos Biografie beleuchtet allerdings, weshalb er dennoch pro-ukrainisch eingestellt ist: Halla-aho studierte Slawistik und setzte sich im Rahmen des Studiums schon früh mit der Geschichte slawischer Länder auseinander, so auch mit der Geschichte der Ukraine nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion. Es scheint logisch, dass Halla-aho eine große Gefahr in der Ausbreitung der russischen Grenzen für das eigene, an Russland grenzende Land sieht. Als überzeugter Nationalist ist es daher kaum verwunderlich, dass er für finnische Interessen einen Eingriff zugunsten der Ukraine als nötig betrachtet, wofür er sich auch mehrfach stark gemacht hat (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 131 f.). Dass die pro-ukrainische Haltung der Finnen nicht nur ein politisches Manöver darstellt, um Stimmen zu generieren, sondern auf Überzeugung basiert, zeigt auch der Wechsel der Fraktion im EU-Parlament. Während die Finnen – Vertreten durch zwei Abgeordnete – vor dem Krieg in der Ukraine der rechtspopulistisch bis -extremistischen Fraktion Identität und Demokratie (ID) angehörten, welche viele weitere rechtspopulistische bis -extremistische Parteien unter sich vereint wie z.B. Rassemblement National, Lega, Alternative für Deutschland, Vlaams Belang uvm., schloss sie sich als Reaktion auf den Krieg der Fraktion Europäische Konservative und Reformer (EKR) an (vgl. Camut 2023).Die EKR vereint ebenfalls einige rechtspopulistische Akteure unter sich, wie z.B. Vox oder die Alternative für Deutschland, bevor sie in die ID-Fraktion eintrat. Die Finnen kommentierten, sie hätten sich einer Gruppe angeschlossen, "whose member parties are united by the uncompromising defense of Western civilization and the European security policy architecture" (Camut 2023). Ihre anti-russische Haltung zum Schutze Europas bzw. Finnlands sahen sie folglich in der vorigen Fraktion nicht mehr für möglich.Eine weitere schwerwiegende Entscheidung und Veränderung in der Haltung der Finnen war der Eintritt Finnlands in die NATO. Während die finnische Bevölkerung, die ein Selbstverständnis von Neutralität in Bezug auf den Kalten Krieg hatte und bis heute hat, nach der Annexion der Krim durch Russland nach wie vor gegen einen NATO-Beitritt war, änderte der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine 2022 diese Haltung. 2014 nach der Annexion der Krim stimmten nur 26% für einen Beitritt Finnlands zur NATO. Im März 2022 waren es 48%, die dafür stimmten, im Juni 2022 waren es 79% (vgl. Lathi & Palonen 2023, S. 129). Infolge dieser Veränderung kam es 2023 zum Beitritt in das NATO-Bündnis (vgl. ZDFheute 2023), wobei auch die Finnen hinter diesem Beitritt stehen. Die Haltung der Finnen unterscheidet sich also in Bezug auf Russland von anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien. In Umfragen ist kein maßgeblicher Unterschied merkbar, seit die Finnen sich auf die Seite der Ukraine gestellt haben, was vermuten lässt, dass dieser Faktor keinen allzu großen Stellenwert in der Wählerschaft hat oder die bisherige Wählerschaft diesen Standpunkt teilt.Dennoch ist diese Besonderheit einer europäischen rechtspopulistischen Partei nicht unbedeutend, insbesondere mit Blick auf mögliche Entwicklungen. Die Entscheidung zum NATO-Beitritt könnte Spannungen einerseits zwischen den Finnen und anderen rechten Randparteien, andererseits aber auch zwischen verschiedenen Lagern innerhalb der Partei auslösen. Mit der Frage beispielsweise nach der Neutralität Finnlands, die mit dem NATO-Beitritt nicht mehr vorhanden ist, könnte vor allem von NATO-kritischen Parteien der Versuch unternommen werden, Wähler:innen zu mobilisieren oder von den Finnen abzuwerben.Auch die Tatsache, dass die Finnen nicht mehr aktiv die "Fixit"-Kampagne verfolgen – wobei unklar ist, ob die Kampagne wieder aktiviert wird – könnte einerseits das Feld für andere rechtspopulistische Parteien öffnen, andererseits aber auch die Finnen für eine breitere Wählerschaft öffnen (vgl. Lathi & Palonen 2023, S. 134 f.). Ob und - wenn ja - wie sich die Partei und die Zustimmung im Volk verändern wird aufgrund dieser Entwicklungen, bleibt abzuwarten. Mit der Unterstützung der Ukraine, der Ablehnung von Russland und der Zustimmung zum NATO-Beitritt haben die Finnen in den letzten zwei Jahren jedoch auf jeden Fall besondere Positionen eingenommen, verglichen mit anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien. Quellen:Camut, Nicolas (2023): Far-right Finns Party moves to ECR group in EU Parliament. In: POLITICO, 05. 04.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-finns-party-ecr-european-conservatives-and-reformists-group-parliament/ ,zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Lahti, Yannick/Palonen, Emilia (2023): The impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on right-wing populism in Finland; in: Ivaldi, Gilles/Zankina, Emilia (Hrsg.) (2023): The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Brussels.Ntv (2023): Bensmann zur AfD und Russland: "Die machen das aus Überzeugung". In: n-tv NACHRICHTEN, 10.01.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Die-machen-das-aus-Uberzeugung-article24434349.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Schmidt, Martin (2022): Ukraine-Krieg: Wie hält es die AfD mit Russland? In: tagesschau.de, 30.03.2022. Online verfügbar unter https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-russland-115.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Wilde-Krell, Anna-Lena/Adorf, Philipp (2022): Die Finnen - Auf dem Weg zum konventionellen Rechtspopulismus?; in: Decker, Frank (Hrsg.) (2022): Aufstand der Außenseiter. Die Herausforderung der europäischen Politik durch den neuen Populismus, Nomos.Wolff, Reinhard (2017): Ein neuer Chef bei den Wahren Finnen: "Der größte Rassist des Landes". Online verfügbar unter https://taz.de/Ein-neuer-Chef-bei-den-Wahren-Finnen/!5416271/ ,zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.ZDFheute (2023): Finnland ist Nato-Mitglied - was das bedeutet. In: ZDFheute, 04.04.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/nato-beitritt-finnland-bedeutung-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.