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Since 4 September 2012, the official beginning of the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), there has been much discussion about the possible application of the doctrine of command responsibility in the prosecution of international crimes by national courts. However, the scope of this doctrine, as developed in international criminal law, should be differentiated from the notion of criminal liability by omission under the Colombian Criminal Code (CCC).This paper explores the forms of criminal liability and the factual hypothesis that the doctrine of command responsibility covers. It also examines some decisions of the Colombian courts in which the notion of criminal liability by omission of armed force members is applied (especially with regard to the general provision contained in article 25 CCC), indicating some legal problems that have arisen in this regard. This paper seeks to demonstrate that the doctrine of command responsibility and the general provision of article 25 CCC, though closely related, are not the same. In doing so, it claims that Colombian courts should apply norms of the criminal code's special part to cover some factual hypothesis which are not covered by article 25 CCC, but still fall within the scope of the doctrine of command responsibility as defined, for example, in the Rome Statute. Finally, it maintains that the confusion of these two regimes of criminal liability could lead us to transfer into the Colombian legal system some of the problems faced in the application of international criminal law. ; Desde el 4 de septiembre de 2012, cuando oficialmente inició el proceso de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, se ha hecho referencia en varios contextos a la doctrina de responsabilidad del superior jerárquico. Sin embargo, es importante diferenciar, por un lado, el ámbito de aplicación de esta doctrina tal como ha sido desarrollada en el Derecho Penal Internacional y, por otro lado, el régimen de responsabilidad por omisión según el Código Penal colombiano (CPC). El presente trabajo explora las formas de responsabilidad penal y las hipótesis fácticas que la doctrina de responsabilidad del superior abarca. También analiza algunas decisiones judiciales colombianas sobre la responsabilidad penal por omisión de miembros de la Fuerza Pública (en especial con relación al artículo 25 CPC) y discute algunos problemas dogmáticos que se han presentado en estos casos. Al respecto, sostiene que la doctrina de responsabilidad del superior y el artículo 25 CPC solo coinciden parcialmente y que en el ordenamiento jurídico interno es necesario recurrir también a tipos penales de omisión propia para cubrir algunas hipótesis que sí podrían ser cubiertas por la doctrina de responsabilidad del superior como ha sido definida, por ejemplo, en el Estatuto de Roma. Finalmente, se llama la atención sobre la importancia de no confundir los dos ámbitos de responsabilidad para no reproducir en el sistema jurídico colombiano algunos de los problemas que se han presentado en el contexto del Derecho Internacional.

This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970-2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, our results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. We also provide evidence suggesting that c

This article tackles the fraught relationship between security discourse, on the theoretical level, and security experience and practice on the ground. It argues that the efforts of the Kyrgyzstani authorities to reform and thus create sustainable and needs-based community security and law enforcement structures have so far largely been performative or even "virtual", meaning that they have focused on governing, but not producing security. The argument is first developed out of literature on state building, the security sector and police reform from a global perspective and in the context of Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan, more specifically. In a second step, we draw on insights from fieldwork, professional experience and grey literature to examine Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs), which are communal-level public bodies where local administrations and residents potentially co-produce needs-based forms of security. However, we also show that the work of these bodies is still dependent on international support while lacking the conditions and facilitation that only executive actors can provide.

Volume 28 of the Advances in International Management focuses on the opportunities and challenges for multinational enterprises that consider emerging economies their destinations. It provides a forum for thought-provoking idea and empirical research, and is ideal for researchers and doctoral students whose work touches emerging markets

In den ersten zehn Jahren seit Inkrafttreten des Völkerstrafgesetzbuchs hat sich eine Norm zum Dreh- und Angelpunkt des "deutschen Völkerstrafrechts" herauskristallisiert: § 153f StPO. Danach liegt die Entscheidung über die Verfolgung von Völkerrechtsverbrechen im Ermessen des Generalbundesanwalts. Diese Untersuchung konturiert und strukturiert dieses Ermessen. Dazu werden die rechtlichen Erwägungen und Interessen identifiziert, die bei der Entscheidung über die Einleitung eines deutschen Völkerstrafverfahrens zu berücksichtigen und gegeneinander abzuwägen sind. Völkerrechtstheoretische Grundlage und wesentlicher Teil des rechtlichen Entscheidungsumfelds ist dabei das sich konsolidierende, auf dem ius puniendi der internationalen Gemeinschaft basierende Mehrebenensystem völkerrechtlicher Strafrechtspflege. Übergeordnetes Ziel der Arbeit ist es, eine vernünftige, verlässliche, für die betroffenen Staaten akzeptable und für Drittstaaten praktikable Handhabung der absolut universellen Jurisdiktion zu entwickeln

The Eastern European space proves itself full of instable spots and old disputes between States, regions, populations. The peaceful relations are constructed here by overcoming these legacies of the past, and through cooperation on multilateral levels. The relations between Romania and Ukraine are an example of this twofold trend. Inheriting a disputed border since the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and large minorities on their territories, the two States signed a Treaty of friendship and good neighborhood in 1997, when Romania was under pressure to fulfill the NATO accession criteria. After that, disputes re-emerged concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea, and the question was brought before the International Court of Justice in 2004. On the other hand, Romania and Ukraine were partners in the attempts to give a solution to the Transnistrean conflict or in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Observing the development of the relations between Romania and Ukraine since 1992, when the two countries established diplomatic relations, to 2004, we will argue that these relations follow a pattern of cooperation when conducted in a multilateral framework or when pressured by international organizations, while they are more prone to conflict when no other international actors are directly involved. These empirical findings support a liberal institutionalist approach to international relations in Eastern Europe. This view, together with a traditional foreign policy analysis approach, will be the main theoretical approaches adopted in this article.

Transatlantic differences over the future of the Iran nuclear deal - or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 - are damaging a nuclear accord that all parties, except the United States, see as delivering on its purpose. They also increase the risk of Washington and European capitals working at cross-purposes vis-à-vis Iran and broader regional policies. To avoid such a scenario, the E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom)/European Union (EU) and the United States need to set up new channels of communication to avoid a transatlantic rift, to attempt - if at all possible - to preserve the Iran deal, and to secure its benefits for regional and global security. (author's abstract)