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Our model suggests that national political, economic and cultural dimensions have to be taken into account when explaining support for European Union (EU) membership among the Swiss electorate. Using data from the first Eurobarometer survey in Switzerland (1999), we empirically test our model using structural equation modelling. We find that institutional attachment and `image' of neighbouring countries are strongly linked to the perception of threat to national interests, which in turn is a strong predictor of support for joining the EU. We also show that national identity, attachment to neutrality, as well as perceived economic gain or loss from EU membership are directly linked to attitudes towards EU membership.

This article posits that national identity is an important element in explaining attitudes towards the European Union. A model of support for European integration is developed that suggests that feelings of national identity are highly important in an individual's choice to support the EU. The impacts of three alternative conceptualizations of national identity are tested. These relate to national identity as an intensity of feelings towards one's country, the level of attachment to the nation and other territorial entities, and the fear of other identities and cultures encroaching on the dominant national culture. The results of ordered logit analyses confirm that stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower levels of support for the EU.

This article compares national parliamentary scrutiny over European Union matters in two countries with coalition governments, Germany and the Netherlands, based on interviews with members of parliament serving on their European Affairs Committee. While acknowledging that legal powers and institutional structures are important when evaluating parliamentary-government relations, the examination focuses on the goals and methods of party groups when overseeing government. In Germany, the goal of the governing coalition parties is to protect the government, whereas in the Netherlands they scrutinize the government's position in order to be sure the compromise in the cabinet sufficiently protects the party's interests. Although the Dutch governing parties normally support the government, a `floating coalition' occasionally emerges with ruling parties working with parts of the opposition to amend a proposal toward their own preferences. The study concludes that it is not only the legal powers and institutional structures that determine parliamentary scrutiny in a given member state, but also party interactions.

Current endeavours to employ the concept of consociational democracy in European Union research are misleading. This critique starts from a minimalist concept of democracy with alternation and inclusion of preferences in government formation as a parsimonious way to measure the extent to which political systems are majoritarian, consensual or even consociational in character. It then presents empirical results for the current EU member states and examines whether the European Union can be analysed in a similar way by using equivalent indicators. Despite a superficial resemblance to consociational systems, a crucial variable is missing in the EU: the formation of a stable grand coalition enclosing all institutions involved in decision-making. What has been wrongly termed consociationalism at the European level is best regarded as intergovernmentalism.

This article aims to make a three-fold contribution to the study of Euroscepticism in the wider Europe. First, it presents a two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on European integration in general, and of Euroscepticism in particular, distinguishing between diffuse and specific support for European integration (i.e. `support for the ideas of European integration' and `support for the EU'). Second, it analyses the location, type, and electoral strength of party-based Euroscepticism in the four candidate countries of East Central Europe - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Third, it contributes to the ideology vs. strategy debate, showing that ideology is the dominant explanation for both types of support, although strategy at times plays a role in explaining specific support.

A major challenge for EU enlargement is how to communicate the benefits of membership to electorates. Given the weak penetration of party systems in the Central and East European countries, subnational elites have an important role in shaping voter preferences. Attitudes among subnational elites to EU enlargement are examined in three leading candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. The results are based on large-scale elite interviews conducted in 1999-2000 in key regional cities. The research demonstrates that subnational elites are disengaged not only structurally from the European integration project, since the negotiations involve the Commission and national governments, but also in their opinions. The subnational elites tend to view EU membership as a national issue and irrelevant for their level, and are poorly informed about EU activities that benefit them. The article suggests that this disengagement of subnational elites constitutes a space for the mobilization of Euroscepticism from below.

This paper proposes a theory for regional integration based on structural conditions. By applying power transition theory, we are able to account for and anticipate not only the tendency for pairs of countries to participate in integration, but the likely intensity of such integration as well. We find that integration is most likely when there is an asymmetric distribution of power between countries and when they are jointly satisfied after a power transition has occurred. These results hold even after controlling for level of development and trade flows. We test this theory on all politically relevant dyads between 1950 and 1996 using a novel method to measure the level of regional integration. We illustrate the empirical findings through simulations that track the developments leading to Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union.

This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries.

This article examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are vastly overrepresented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, models of legislative vote-buying predict that overrepresented member states will be systematically favored in the distribution of EU fiscal transfers. Empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 1999 reveals a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita during each period. This is true for both agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of the connection between representation and redistribution as the European Union prepares to enlarge.

Many expect globalization and regional economic integration to force domestic institutions and policies to converge toward some efficiency-mandated minimalism. Applying basic trade theory to national institutional and policy systems clarifies, however, that the greater force is tax competition (broadly conceived), as abetted by ideology and transmitted and magnified by international financial mobility. Trade actually furthers institutional and policy diversity; and international finance per se tends to reinforce that. Tax competition for global capital, contrarily, does create fiscal pressures, but wholly independently of the efficiency of taxation or tax-financed public activity. However, the political integration that accompanies European economic integration provides a policy-making forum for surmounting the collective action problem of tax competition, sometimes turning economic globalization opponents into political Europeanization proponents. The analysis also highlights three broader conclusions. First, export or output growth or specialization in particular sectors suggests only comparative, not necessarily absolute advantage. Second, trade and, less surely, capital integration tend to reinforce domestic equilibria that sustain existing networks regardless of their efficiency. Third, economic integration partly offsets short-run costs of inferior networks, further dampening any efficiency-based pressures for convergence.